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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5543

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

November 6, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: CHARLES A. COOPER *col*
SUBJECT: Israel Housing Guarantees

State (Pickering) has sent you a memo (Tab B) asking for clearance on a cable authorizing a \$25 million housing guarantee for Israel. This issue comes to the NSC only because of strong Treasury objections to the guarantee.

The State memo was not shown to Treasury, but Treasury has given us its objections (Tab C). OMB has concurred with the State request (Tab D).

The issue is that AID has justified its housing guarantee program as a means of developing housing institutions in poor countries for poor people. Israel has strong housing institutions and the housing financed under the AID program does not go to the poorest third of its people.

However, because the money is provided from the U.S. private sector on commercial terms (interest of 10 percent and up), AID has not been able to find uses for all its guarantee authority in other countries. Moreover, this assistance program is, in effect, the least costly of all our programs for Israel. Deviation from the program rhetoric will give us fewer Congressional problems in Israel than anywhere else.

Treasury has stated that it will not object to the initial \$25 million if the NSC staff indicates there is a political commitment involved. It is not necessary to make any decision in amounts beyond this initial tranche at this time, although there is no reason to shut the door on future amounts following Congressional action on the AID bill.

Events in the Middle East since the memos were sent may delay implementation, but there is no reason to delay clearing up the bureaucratic hassle at this end.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the memo at Tab A to State (Info Treasury) authorizing the cable as requested by State and providing the NSC political endorsement as suggested by Treasury. Bill Quandt concurs. *2.*

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

Palash

UNCLASSIFIED 661

PAGE 01 STATE 230709

13
ORIGIN AID-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-05 EB-05 IGA-02 L-03 SR-02 ORM-01 /044 R

66664

DRAFTED BY: PETER KIMM, SER/H:GC/H
WILLIAM CLARK, GC/H:SER/H
EDWARD PALASH:SER/H

APPROVED BY: PETER KIMM, SER/H

→ AA/SER, JAMES F. CAMPBELL

→ ASIA/NE, PLANGMAIDIPHONE

GC, JHOSKINS(DRAFT)

SR/ORM, OTRUFORTHY(INFO)

2E ACTION HQ INFO SER ASIA GC GCFLD GCASIA HUD FHLB 25P

070219

R 227144Z DEC 72

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

UNCLAS STATE 230709

AIDAC

SUBJECT: STATUS OF LEGISLATION FOR ISRAEL HOUSING

REF: TEL AVIV 7548; STATE 217792

1. CONGRESS ADJOURNED WITHOUT ENACTING A FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT. CONGRESS PASSED A CONTINUING RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE OPERATING FUNDS FOR A.I.D. CONTINUING RESOLUTION RELATES ONLY TO APPROPRIATIONS. HOUSING GUARANTY PROGRAM OPERATES WITH GUARANTY AUTHORIZATION WHICH CAN ONLY BE INCREASED BY LEGISLATION.

2. AID PLANS TO INCLUDE WITH LEGISLATION TO BE PRESENTED EARLY NEXT YEAR AN INCREASE IN WORLDWIDE HOUSING GUARANTY AUTHORITY WHICH WILL PERMIT DOLS 100 MILLION IN NEW HG AUTHORIZATIONS FOR ISRAEL.

3. AT PRESENT TIME DUE TO EARMARKING IN STATUTE FOR WORLDWIDE PROGRAM ONLY DOLS 25 MILLION REMAINS AVAILABLE FOR ISRAEL HOUSING. ALL REST OF WORLDWIDE HOUSING AUTHORITY COMMITTED.

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except Treasury, which believed that the proposal was not acceptable on purely economic grounds. Treasury has since indicated in interagency discussions it would agree to the \$25 million guaranty but only if it is understood with Israel and within the USG that no additional guaranty authorization for Israel will be extended in the present fiscal year, even if Congressional action should make this possible. Moreover, Treasury wants the record to show that the guaranty was approved in response to a political commitment.

State believes that additional funds, if available, could be used effectively as part of our continuing program of support for Israel's economic viability and security. The Housing Guaranty Program assists Israel in providing adequate housing for Soviet immigrants and finances activity in the construction sector, which is the leading element in the Israeli economy and is crucial to the economic well-being of the State. The Housing Guaranty Program, which provides for loan repayments in dollars at commercial rates, is the least costly to the U.S. of the various forms of assistance which the U.S. Government extends to Israel. Moreover, there is always the possibility that if the U.S. restricts the guaranty authorization to \$25 million, even though other funds may become available, Congress, for whom the Program has considerable appeal, might earmark future Guaranty Authority for Israel, thus reducing Administration flexibility.

Recommendation:

That the \$25 million Housing Guaranty Program Authorization for Israel be approved leaving open the total amount of the Program in FY 1974. Embassy Tel Aviv would be informed by the telegram at Attachment 5, which is enclosed for clearance. At Attachment 6 is a telegram reflecting the Treasury position.

Thomas A. Pickering
Executive Secretary

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

make new decisions on aircraft for Israel at least until late 1975 or 1976. This longer-term agreement would provide the Israelis with continuity of supply, though in somewhat smaller numbers than they might like.

The Departments of State and Defense prefer this four-year approach and recommend that you approve the delivery of 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s during the 1974-77 period. As a modification of this option, they suggest that the number of F-4s could be increased to 48, or even higher, over four years, if you feel we should be more forthcoming.

I see considerable merit in deciding now on a delivery schedule on aircraft that would cover a four-year period. The basic Israeli request would be met, although with fewer aircraft than they would request over that period. Our relations with Arab friends would not be periodically strained by announcements of new agreements on aircraft for Israel. And our air force would be able to rebuild its inventory of F-4s instead of diverting planes from its own inventory for Israel.

I would recommend offering Israel a four-year agreement for 48 F-4 Phantoms rather than the 36 that State and Defense suggest and offering 42 A-4 Skyhawks.

There is a question of timing. It would not be helpful to have publicity on these decisions until reaction to Israel's raid on Beirut dies down. I shall work that out when a decision has been made.

Apart from this decision, Defense is going ahead as you instructed with aid to permit Israel to produce at least 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a four-year delivery schedule for aircraft to Israel, consisting of 48 F-4 Phantoms delivered at the rate of 12 a year and 42 A-4 Skyhawks distributed more or less evenly over the four years. If you approve, I shall sign the attached decision memorandum.

Approve _____

Prefer two-year package meeting present Israeli requests for
36 F-4s and 30 A-4s _____

Prefer four-year approach with State-Defense recommendation option
of 36 Phantoms and 42 Skyhawks _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 4, 1973

7310201

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Israeli Public Reaction to Sale of
F-4s to Saudi Arabia

The Israelis have made known publicly their unhappiness with any sale by us to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait of Phantoms. But they are now showing forbearance in their public reaction and, contrary to initial indications, seem disinclined at this time to make this a major issue between us.

Today's Washington Post reports from Jerusalem that "Israel plans a low-key public reaction to the large-scale U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia..." This seems to describe well the GOI's current stance. While preserving an element of watchful waiting, Israeli public figures speaking for the record to date have expressed their understanding of the need for a strong U.S. role in the context of Persian Gulf security and stability and their confidence that, at least for the time being, the Middle East arms balance will remain weighted in favor of Israel.

Our reports indicate Mrs. Meir has been silent on the issue up until now. Foreign Minister Eban's statements have been restrained. A report he had "denounced" the U.S. for selling Phantoms to Saudi Arabia was incorrect.

In a May 30 address, Defense Minister Dayan noted the Israeli edge in terms of skilled manpower and forecast that Israel can maintain military

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superiority as a deterrent to Arab belligerence for at least the next ten years. Israeli editorialists are falling into line behind the relatively restrained view from the top. In this country, supporters of Israel have shown as yet no indications of gearing up a public campaign against such sales. The amount of public discussion of this issue already, however, virtually assures there will be at least some critical spontaneous reaction from that quarter.

Robert Blackwill for

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACT
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
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SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS + LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER X RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT + S _____ CODEWORD _____

T5 _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Israeli public reaction to US sale of F-4s to Saudi Arabia

REFERENCE: S/S 7310201 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<u>X</u>			MEMO FOR HAK _____
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. _____
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <u>X</u>
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <u>6/10</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/5/73	Laure	NSC/S		This was covered in 3080 and the add-on - both given to HAK 6/2. No further action. HHS	
6/05				C See 7303080NS for action	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ 7303080NS JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D AC BY _____

CYS FOR: SA _____

ORIG: WH _____

TO: PA X

SF _____

NS _____

EP _____

DESTROY: BY _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Aircraft Deliveries for Israel

The President has reviewed the options for F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel presented in the State Department's memo of April 2, 1973. The President has directed the following:

- That the US offer to deliver 48 F-4 aircraft to Israel over a four-year period with deliveries evenly spaced at the rate of 12 aircraft in each twelve-month period following the expiration of present deliveries.
- That the US deliver 42 A-4 aircraft evenly spaced over the period between June 1974 and December 1977.

The President has emphasized that this decision should remain confidential between the governments of the US and Israel.

Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS) 3

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

1827 (revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel

You will recall that in your meeting with Prime Minister Meir ~~on~~ ~~March 11~~ you indicated that we would view Israeli requests for additional aircraft with sympathy but made no specific commitment on numbers. The Departments of State and Defense have now developed several options for responding.

The Israelis have formally requested 36 F-4 Phantoms and 30 A-4 Skyhawks during the period 1974-1975.

One possible response is to meet their request in full for the next two years, although ^{Defense would prefer to bunch} the delivery of F-4s ~~would take place~~ primarily in 1975 in order to allow ^{the USAF} ~~our air force~~ to rebuild its own inventory.

A theoretically possible alternative would be to provide a much lower number than requested as a signal that we intend to cut back significantly on the level of our military assistance to Israel. This might gain us some credit among the Arab states at a time when we are being sharply criticized for making it possible for Israel ~~to~~ "remain intransigent" on issues of a settlement. However, it would cause a crisis of confidence with Israel without getting anything in return, and I assume that you do not want to pursue this approach.

A more attractive alternative to giving Israel what it has asked for over the next two years would be to aim for a longer term agreement over a period of four years--1974 to 1977--involving at least as many, and perhaps more, aircraft than the Israelis have now requested, but somewhat less than we anticipate they will want during the whole four-year period ahead. The advantage to us would be that we might not have to make new decisions on aircraft for Israel at least until late 1975 or 1976. This longer-term agreement would provide the Israelis with continuity of supply, though in somewhat smaller numbers than they might like.

XGDS - 3

DECLAS Date Impossible to Determine

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

The Departments of State and Defense prefer this four-year approach and recommend that you approve the delivery of 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s during the 1974-77 period. As a modification of this option, ^{they suggest that} the number of F-4s could be increased to 48, or even ^{higher} 60, over four years, if you feel we should be more forthcoming.

I see considerable merit in deciding now on a delivery schedule on aircraft that would cover a four-year period. The basic Israeli request would be met, although ^{with fewer aircraft than they would request over that period,} not quite as they would prefer. Our relations with Arab friends would not be periodically strained by announcements of new agreements on aircraft for Israel. And our air force would be able to rebuild its inventory of F-4s instead of diverting planes from its own inventory for Israel. ^{Phantom} I would recommend ~~(1)~~ offering Israel a four-year agreement for 48 F-4s, rather than the 36 that State and Defense suggest and ~~(2)~~ being prepared to go to 60 if Israel feels 48 is too low. ^{A-4 Skyhawk} On Skyhawks, I would propose offering 42 ^{with willingness to go as high as 60 if they wish.}

There is a question of timing. It would not be helpful to have publicity on these decisions until reaction to Israel's raid on Beirut dies down. I shall work that out when a decision has been made.

Apart from this decision, ^{Defense is} ~~we are~~ going ahead ^{as you instructed} with aid to permit Israel to produce at least 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a four-year delivery schedule for aircraft to Israel, consisting of 48 F-4 Phantoms and 42 A-4 Skyhawks ^{delivered at the rate of 12 a year} ~~with readiness to go to 60 of each if the Israelis wish.~~ ^{distributed more or less evenly over the four years. If you approve,}

Approve _____

Prefer two-year package meeting present Israeli requests for 36 F-4s and 30 A-4s _____

^{Prefer} ~~Within~~ four-year approach, ^{with} ~~adopt~~ State-Defense ^{recommendation} ~~highest~~ option of ³⁶ 48 Phantoms and 42 Skyhawks _____

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

I shall ~~and~~ sign the attached

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 1827
(revised)SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

April 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel--Revised Package

As you requested, I have revised the memorandum for the President at Tab A to reflect the judgment expressed in your note on my earlier memo (next page).

Two changes have been made in the memorandum for the President:

1. The recommendation is revised to reflect the numbers you propose.
2. A decision memorandum is now attached to the memo for the President for your signature if he approves.

There is one issue I would like you to think about before sending this memorandum forward: What will be our answer if the Israelis either insist on a higher number now or reserve their right to increase the number in a year or two? I particularly raise this in connection with the Skyhawks. We could provide a larger number now relatively easily if they wished and the Skyhawk has less symbolic importance.

This leads to even a more fundamental issue: What rationale should be used in explaining to the Israelis why we are providing fewer aircraft than they would be likely to request over the four-year period ahead? Over that long a period, it is difficult to cite our own aircraft requirements because the production line over that period could be geared to larger output. The only approach I can see is to say that our decision is a combination of other needs and the US desire to see some restraint introduced into the Mid-East arms race. Do you agree?

Yes ☒

Other rationale _____

Recommendation: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President and, if he approves, that you sign the decision memorandum attached to it.

XGDS- 3

DECLAS - Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7305748

NSC #1827

April 2, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Options on A-4 and F-4 Deliveries
to Israel

In response to your request of March 2, we have prepared a number of options for both F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel.

As you know, Israel requested last November a total of 30 additional A-4s and 36 additional F-4s for delivery in 1974 and 1975 after current contracts are filled. In addition, as we mentioned in our Memorandum to the President of February 27, Israel has indicated it is thinking of requesting delivery of 18 more of each aircraft each year beginning in 1976 for the indefinite future. The Israelis seem to be planning therefore to acquire a total of 72 F-4s and 66 A-4s over the next four years.

Our options are as follows:

F-4

Option A - Delivers 36 aircraft in two years, as requested, but concentrates deliveries in the second year, thus reducing the adverse impact on USAF caused by diversion.

SECRET/NODIS

XGDS-3

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SECRET/NODIS

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Option B - Delivers 36 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition, plus enough aircraft for one additional squadron; it is less (36 vs. 72) than we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years. Stretching deliveries through 1977 reinforces the principle of continuity, minimizes the impact of diversions on our own forces, and begins the long-term supply, attrition-oriented policy we recommended in our February 27 memorandum.

Option C - Delivers 48 aircraft over four years. This would provide liberally for peacetime attrition plus enough aircraft for almost two additional squadrons. It would have psychological advantage over B in that it would provide a larger number of F-4s than Israel has requested for 1974/75, although deliveries would be stretched over four years, and fewer aircraft (48 vs. 72) than their total anticipated four-year request.

Option D - Delivers 20 aircraft for attrition for four years (1974-1977) as proposed in the February 27 memorandum, assuming an annual loss rate to 5%. This is a liberal attrition figure in view of Israel's actual peacetime attrition of 1-3% (i.e., 1-3 aircraft per year).

A-4

Option A - Delivers 30 aircraft in two years as Israel desires and is almost identical to the Israeli request, but with deliveries adjusted to fit efficiently into present production schedules.

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Attachments:

1. Letter to Ambassador, Tel Aviv, from Minister Sapir, May 17, 1972
2. Letter to Dr. Hannah, AID Administrator, from Economic Minister Alexandroni, October 5, 1972.
3. State telegram 230709 to Embassy Tel Aviv, December 22, 1972.
4. Tel Aviv telegram 5991 to State, July 30, 1973.
5. Proposed telegram from State to Tel Aviv.
6. Proposed telegram from State (Treasury position) to Tel Aviv.

Drafters: SER/H:PMKimm-NEA/IAI:JCDean:df
x22294 9/23/73

Concurrences: NEA/IAI:HHStackhouse
NEA:ALatherton, Jr.
NEA:JJSisco
AID/SER/H:PMKimm
AID/PPC/DPE:FKimball
AID/ASIA/NE:BLangmaid

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SECRET/NODIS

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Option B - Provides for 42 aircraft delivered over the period June 1974-December 1977. Covers estimated attrition at 5% or 10 A-4s a year (slightly less in 1974), which is liberal based on past experience, plus 5 additional training aircraft in the first year, as the Israelis requested. This option provides more aircraft (42 vs. 30) than requested but over a longer period of time and is designed to support a principle of continuity based primarily on attrition replacement. It is less (42 vs. 66) than what we expect the Israelis will eventually request for delivery over the four years.

The options are summarized in terms of total aircraft deliveries per year by type on the attached table.

Consistent with your guidance and our recommendations in the State-Defense memorandum of February 27, we recommend Option B for both aircraft. These options provide as many F-4s as requested and more A-4s than requested for 1974-75, but spread deliveries through 1977 -- and (barring unforeseen circumstances) obviate the need for further aircraft decisions over the next four years -- an approach we strongly endorse. Also, they reflect the principles of continuity and longer-term commitment which Israel values highly.

Timing of deliveries, particularly of A-4s, depends on an early decision. Delivery schedules for CY 1975 and beyond can be varied, however, within rather broad production line constraints.

If the President wishes to be even more generous, such an option is described in Option C which would call for 48 F-4s over a four-year period rather than 36.

Upon receipt of the President's decision, the Department of Defense, as in the past, will work out

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the technical details, including delivery schedules, with the Israelis.

As a related matter, and in accordance with your memorandum of March 2, 1973, the necessary arrangements are being made to assist Israel in the production of 100 Super Mirage aircraft.

The Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have seen and approved this memorandum.



Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Table - Options on F-4 and A-4
Deliveries to Israel

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SECRET/NODISOptions on
F-4 and A-4 Deliveries to Israel

The top line on each chart shows Israel's current request of 36 F 4s (18 each in 1974 and 1975) and 30 A 4s at a rate of 2 or 3 each month. The 18 of each aircraft the Israelis are thinking of requesting in 1976 and following years are not shown on the chart.

<u>F-4*</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

<u>A-4**</u>					
GOI Request	14***	16***	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

* Current F-4 deliveries end December 1973.

** Current A-4 deliveries end May 1974.

*** Request is for 30 aircraft, at 2 or 3 per month, beginning June 1974; the chart assumes delivery at 2 per month.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PREL E

DOC	RECD	OG Nbr	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	1827	Sounders

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS _____ UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER X RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS X
 SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____
 ELIOT X S X CODEWORD _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: State reply re: Options on A-4 + F-4 Deliveries to Israel.

REFERENCE: S/S 7305748 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT					MEMO FOR HAK _____
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES. _____
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR _____
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					APPROPRIATE ACTION _____ <u>X</u>
MID-EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS _____
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO _____
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE _____
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP					DUE DATE: 4/8
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	CY TO
4/16/73	Sounders and Sounders	HAK	X	Pres for decision (4/20)	HAK
4/24	S	Sounders	S	Rebo/See HAK notes (4/30)	
4/27	Sounders	HAK	X	Pres for decision (4/30)	
5/17		Pres	P	Decision	
5/29				Pres approved recom	
5/24	Sounders	S	S	further action (6/01)	
5/30	Sounders	NSC/S	C	OK to release HAK memo	

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
		ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT					MEMO FOR HAK.....	
STAFF SECRETARY					MEMO FOR PRES.	
FAR EAST					REPLY FOR	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					APPROPRIATE ACTION	X
MID EAST /NO. AFRICA /SO. ASIA	X				MEMO TO	
EUROPE / CANADA					RECOMMENDATIONS	
LATIN AMERICA					JOINT MEMO.....	
UNITED NATIONS					REFER TO FOR:	
ECONOMIC					ANY ACTION NECESSARY ?	
SCIENTIFIC					CONCURRENCE	
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP					DUE DATE: 4/8	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING						
CONGRESSIONAL						
OCEANS POLICY						

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):		CY TO
4/16/73	Saunders and Grande	HAK	X		Pres for decision (4/20)	HAK	
4/24	S	Smith	S		Relo/See HAK notes (4/30)		
4/27	Saunders	HAK	X		Pres for decision (4/30)		
5/1/7		Pres	P		Decision		
5/29					Pres approved recom		
5/29	Saunders	S			Further action (6/10)		
5/30	Saunders	NSC/S	C		OK to release HAK memo		

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH		NOTIFY		DATE	
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	OR RECORD COMMENT:					
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:					
	730 1002					
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	SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.					
	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:					

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CYS FOR: SA _____

ORIG: HP _____

TO: 1973 PA **X**

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* GPO: 1973-489-668

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

1827

SECRET/NODIS(XGDS)

April 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Aircraft for Israel

During Prime Minister Meir's visit last month the Israelis were told that we would help them to produce up to 100 of their own aircraft--the Super Mirage--and would continue to supply A-4 and F-4 aircraft in 1974 and 1975. We agreed to view sympathetically the Israeli request for delivery of 30 A-4s and 36 F-4s over the next two years, but did not commit ourselves to any specific number.

The Departments of State and Defense have now responded to your directive of March 2 by sending an options memo to you [Tab B] seeking a decision on numbers and delivery schedules. The Israeli requests and possible options are presented simply in the table below. Discussion follows the table.

<u>F-4</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
Option B	6	12	12	6	36
Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

A-4

GOI Request	14	16	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

Phantoms

The Israelis have requested 36 F-4 Phantoms in 1974 and 1975. They have talked about asking for 18 more each year in 1976 and 1977, but this request has not been made formally. The options presented are:

- A. Deliver the requested 36 aircraft in 1974 and 1975, with the bulk of these (28) in the second year in order to allow providing most of them in an orderly way from the production line rather than by diverting them from the USAF inventory. This would allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory of F-4s.
- B. Deliver 36 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977-- thereby meeting the Israeli desire for continuity of supply, but not satisfying them on numbers.
- C. Over the same four-year period--1974 to 1977--provide 48 aircraft. This would provide a long-term commitment, more planes than they have asked for in two years, but less than they might ask for over four years. Deliveries would be lowest in the first year (6), highest in the third (18).
- D. Deliver 20 aircraft over the four-year period. The effect would be replacement of Israel's attrition losses, but only very little increase in overall strength. This would be seen as a sharp change in the US-Israeli arms relationship by Israelis and Arabs.

Skyhawks. The Israelis have requested 30 Skyhawks at 2 or 3 per month beginning in June 1974. It is anticipated that they will request 18 per year in 1976 and after. The options include:

- A. Deliver 30 in two years as requested, but adjust deliveries to fit production schedules (20 in 1974, 10 in 1975).
- B. Deliver 42 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977. This is more than the Israelis have requested for the next two years, but less than we anticipate they will want over four years.

// State and Defense recommend Option B for both aircraft--namely 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s, over a four year period.

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 3 -

Two issues are involved in whatever decision is made on aircraft for Israel:

First is whether to use our policy on aircraft supply as a signal of our intentions to both Israel and the Arab states. The only option that meets this criterion is the one that recommends an attrition replacement policy on F-4 Phantoms (5 aircraft per year over four years). This choice is so far from what the Israelis have requested that they would read it as a sign that we intend to reverse the very generous supply policy of the past years. Likewise the Arabs would notice that we are holding back on Israeli aircraft requests. The other higher options would earn us little credit in the Arab world, and, insofar as they fall significantly short of Israeli requests, would be a shock there. Thus, we assume that the low option can be dismissed and that the real choice is among the more forthcoming ones.

The second, and more significant question, therefore, is whether to aim for a four-year delivery program now, even though the Israelis have formally requested aircraft only for the next two years. A strong argument for a four-year program is that it could eliminate the need for new decisions on aircraft for Israel during the rest of this Administration. The principles of continuity and long-term commitment to Israel's defense would be preserved. In addition, we might avoid the periodic crises in our relations with the Arab states stemming from leaks of new agreements every other year. The technical argument is that this longer time frame would permit us to get the Israelis back into the Phantom production line rather than diverting planes from the USAF inventory.

If the four-year framework is preferred, the question of numbers still remains. We might reasonably anticipate that the Israelis will want approximately 72 F-4 Phantoms during this period. State and Defense recommend 36, but present an option for 48. There is no reason why we could not go a bit higher--say 60--in order to be more fully responsive.

One way of being responsive while retaining flexibility and allowing the USAF to rebuild its inventory would be to agree to a four-year program for the delivery of 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (or 60 of each).

In addition to these issues, there is a problem of timing. If it were not for the Beirut raid, we could just go ahead in the normal course of business. Now it would seem best to wait until reaction settles down.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 4 -

However, there is a technical problem on Skyhawk production that may make it desirable to permit some of the practical arrangements to be worked out immediately. When I know the President's decision I shall propose a way of doing this.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President recommending a four-year program for Israel involving 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (with readiness to go to 60 of each if the Israelis wish). Once there is a decision, we shall draft an appropriate directive.

Concurrence: R. T. Kennedy *[Signature]*

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

May 29th
1215 hrs

Mr. Murphy:

Mr. Saunders is aware of this package and
has requested that you show this package to him
before memo to State/Defense is dispatched.

tom

ALSO SHOW HIM
MEMO UNDER THIS
ONE W/OTHER YELLOW NOTE.

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

5043

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. MURPHY
NSC Secretariat

SUBJECT: OMB's Recommendation on the AID Housing Guaranty
for Israel (S/S 7318063 - NSC 5543)

We concur with the State Department recommendation that
the \$25 million Housing Guaranty for Israel be approved
with no stipulations.



Edward G. Sanders
Chief, Economic Affairs
International Affairs Division

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 205063042
JSE
INFORMATIONSECRET (XGDS)

May 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hol*
WILLIAM B. QUANDT *wb2.* *HK*

SUBJECT: Dayan's Views on Peace with Egypt and Jordan

Israeli Defense Minister Dayan's views on possible peace arrangements with Egypt and Jordan have been conveyed to an official of the US embassy in Tel Aviv by a "political ally" of Dayan who is now Deputy Minister of Transport [Cable at Tab A]. As usual, Dayan's views are unorthodox, imaginative, and probably subject to considerable modification. His thoughts are nonetheless of interest for the following reasons:

- On the Egyptian front, Dayan's reported ideas are fully compatible with the concept of transitional measures leading to the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in most of Sinai.
- Dayan's thinking suggests that Israeli views on the terms of a peace settlement are probably more fluid than is generally believed.
- Dayan shows enough flexibility on the Egyptian front to suggest that the US should not be intimidated from trying new ideas on the Israelis.
- On the question of a settlement with Jordan, Dayan takes a very hard line on territory, but has a number of ideas that might be of interest in the absence of a settlement.

Dayan's reported views are outlined in detail below.

The Egyptian Front

Dayan believes that nothing concrete can be done about new arrangements with Egypt until after Israeli elections this fall. His most recent thinking is reflected in the following points:

XGDS - 1
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BYAUTH - Attached Cable

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SECRET (XGDS)

- 2 -

--Dayan would like to see a "military vacuum" in Sinai with neither Israeli nor Egyptian combat forces there.

--The only military presence in Sinai would be Israeli and Egyptian technical crews located on high ground in central Sinai to maintain surveillance of military airfields in populated areas of Egypt and Israel.

--Dayan now thinks that Israeli forces should remain at Sharm al-Shaykh, but he might agree to their removal if Egypt were to accept the concept of a military vacuum for the entire Sinai and Israeli "administration" over Sharm al-Shaykh and a land corridor to it.

--The present consensus in the Israeli Labor Party is that the final Israeli-Egyptian border should run from Sharm al-Shaykh to a point just east of Al-Arish on the Mediterranean Coast. Dayan agrees with this position now, but he is reported to be among the many Israeli leaders who would completely rethink their assumptions about the territorial issue if genuine peace negotiations ever began.

--The most important territorial issues for Dayan on the Egyptian front are the Rafah junction--at the south-western edge of the Gaza strip--and a strip along the coast toward Sinai, plus an area around Eilat. In return, Dayan might consider conceding a small bit of Israeli-controlled territory at Al-Auja to Egypt. [See map at Tab C for sketch of Dayan's alleged position on the Egyptian-Israeli border.]

--Dayan favors the idea of new boundary in Sinai, but he reportedly has never said so explicitly. Dayan will not necessarily insist on Israeli sovereignty in these areas, but he has spoken of the need for Israeli administration and control.

Our embassy's comments on these views is that they demonstrate Dayan's strong desire for a stable relationship with Egypt and that Dayan is the one Israeli leader who thinks imaginatively about these problems.

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SECRET (XGDS)

- 3 -

The Jordan Front

Dayan's views on the Jordan-Israel front are consistent with his belief that a peace settlement in which Israeli troops would have to withdraw from the West Bank is not desirable. His thinking is based on the assumption that Israel will remain in control of these areas for another generation. Dayan has been focusing primarily on what Israel should do in the West Bank pending a final settlement. His thoughts are reported to be as follows:

--A final settlement with Jordan will not come for another 20 years. By then Jordan will have been taken over by the Palestinians, which may simplify a final settlement.

--In the lengthy interim period prior to a settlement, Israel should encourage the West Bankers to orient themselves toward Amman. To this end, Dayan favors expansion of the open bridges policy and other measures to facilitate movement back and forth across the Jordan River.

--Israelis should be allowed to settle everywhere in the West Bank and not just within the lines of the Allon plan. The only qualification Dayan makes is that Israelis should not settle in Arab metropolitan areas, with the exception of Jerusalem, which should expand to include Bethlehem and Ramallah.

--Israeli forces must maintain security control throughout the West Bank. At the same time, local municipalities should be given greater autonomy.

--In Dayan's tentative views on the shape of a final territorial settlement, the area of Nablus-Jenin would be under the sovereignty of the Arab nation east of the Jordan River. [See map at Tab D.] The Greater Jerusalem area would be expanded and incorporated into Israel and its inhabitants would become Israeli citizens. The rest of the West Bank should also be annexed to Israel, but its Arab inhabitants should be citizens of the Arab state on the other side of the river. Gaza might be an autonomous area affiliated with the Arab state east of the river.

SECRET (XGDS)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

Tab B
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SECRET 439

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02756 221206Z

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WALSH _____

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, IS, JD, XF

SURJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH
JORDAN AND EGYPT — *Emb. Amman Comments*

REF: TEL AVIV 3903

SUMMARY: REFTEL PROVIDES FASCINATING INSIGHTS INTO DAYAN'S PERCEPTIONS, WORDS AND DEEDS. IF THIS IS PREVIEW OF LIKELY GOI POLICY LINE, ROAD TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS CONSIDERABLY LONGER THAN WE HAD IMAGINED. END SUMMARY.

*London
farms, etc*

1. DAYAN'S IDEAS ON POSSIBLE PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT NOT ONLY GIVE US CLUES ON THINKING OF KEY GOI LEADER BUT ALSO VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PLOT IMPORTANT LOCUS OF ISRAELI OPINION ON PEACE MAP. APPARENT DISTANCE BETWEEN DAYAN POSITION AND THAT OF JORDAN (PRESUMABLY THAT OF EGYPT TOO) IS FAR GREATER THAN WE HAD ASSUMED AND, AS SUCH, FRIGHTENING. IT NO LONGER SEEMS THAT PRO-
NOUNCEMENTS BY DAYAN AND OTHER GOI LEADERS REFLECT PRE-NEGOTIATION TACTICS. YAOCUBI APPEARS TO HAVE DESCRIBED WHAT HIS MENTOR REALLY BELIEVES. ✓

2. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY TO SUBJ

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02756 221206Z

OF WEST BANK AND JORDAN SETTLEMENT AND ARE NUMBERED TO CORRESPOND WITH REFTEL PARAS.

3. IF THESE ARE THE TERMS, ESTIMATE THAT JORDAN PEACE WILL TAKE TWENTY YEARS IS OVER-OPTIMISTIC.

3A. CONCEPT OF PERPETUATING OCCUPATION OF ANOTHER'S TERRITORY WITH EXPECTATION THAT CITIZENRY EVENTUALLY WILL DEMAND--AND GET-- VOTING RIGHTS WITH LOSER REGIME MAY BE EXAMPLE OF DAYAN'S IMAGINATIVE THINKING (SEE PARA 7), BUT IT PRESUPPOSES EXTRAORDINARY NAIVETY OR NON-EXISTENT DESPERATION ON PART OF HUSSEIN. IDEA OF WEST BANKERS HAPPILY VENTING FRUSTRATIONS IN AMMAN POLITICAL ARENA WHILE REMAINING UNDER DE FACTO GOI CONTROL IS FANTASY KING DOES NOT SHARE. DAYAN IS OFFERING PRECISELY WHAT HASHEMITES DO NOT WANT OR NEED; A BIGGER POLITICAL VOICE FOR POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME PALESTINIAN SUBJECTS.

3B. EXPANSTON OF OPEN BRIDGE POLICY IS LOGICAL DEVICE TO ORIENT WEST BANKERS TOWARD AMMAN, BUT IT TAKES TWO SIDES TO KEEP BRIDGES OPEN. GOJ WILL COOPERATE ONLY AS LONG AS BENEFITS ARE MUTUAL. DAYAN'S GIFT BAG IS SHORT ON BENEFITS.

3C. THIS IS BLUEPRINT FOR ANNEXATION, NOT PEACE. UNDER COMMON ENGLISH USAGE, ONLY "METROPOLITAN" AREA IS JERUSALEM. SINCE BAN ON JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN ARAB "METROPOLI" EXCLUDES GREATER JERUSALEM (INCLUDING BETHLEHEM AND RAMALLAH), PROPOSAL IS MEANINGLESS.

3D. REQUIREMENT IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT IF SECURITY IS TO BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY BY ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES, DAYAN IS TALKING ABOUT CONTINUING OCCUPATION RATHER THAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. QUESTION AGAIN ARISES, WHY SHOULD HUSSEIN SIGN?

4B. INCORPORATION OF RAMALLAH AND BETHLEHEM INTO ISRAELI GREATER JERUSALEM IS MOST GALLING PROPOSAL OF ALL. THIS IS TOO INCONCEIVABLE TO MERIT COMMENT IN CONTEXT OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. ALARMING FEATURE IS THAT IT REVEALS EVEN TOUGHER STAND ON PART OF SOME GOI DECISION MAKERS THAN WE ENVISIONED.

5. GAZA PROPOSAL BY CONTRAST IS REALISTIC. CREATION OF AUTONOMOUS REGION HAVING EVEN LOOSE AFFILIATION WITH AMMAN LIKELY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 02756 221206Z

TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ, ESPECIALLY SINCE SOME OF HUSSEIN'S ADVISERS WARY OF TOO-CLOSE TIES.

7. TEL AVIV COMMENTS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL USEFUL INSIGHTS INTO DAYAN AS POLITICAL STRATEGIST. WHILE REALIZING THAT HE DOES NOT SPEAK FOR ENTIRE GOI, WE SUGGEST THAT REFTEL MERITS SPECIAL ATTENTION AND ANALYSIS AT U.S. POLICY MAKING LEVEL. IF ISRAELI STRATEGY EVOLVES ALONG THESE LINES, PROSPECTS FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE THAT THE USG PROFFESSES TO SEEK WILL BE REMOTE. BROWN

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROC E

DOC	RECD	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
MO DA MG DA HR		3042	<i>Launders</i> <i>Quandt</i>
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SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES F FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NO DIS
 KISSINGER F RICHARDSON LOW EYES ONLY EXDIS
 SCOWCROFT C SCHLESINGER S CODEWORD X
 ELIOT TS SENSITIVE X

SUBJECT: *Sudan's Views on Peace with Egypt and Jordan*

REFERENCE: 5/3 OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
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LATIN AMERICA			
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NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED

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 ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
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 DUE DATE:

COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

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NSC/S DISP INSTR

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 OR RECORD COMMENT:
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CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG # SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

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JUL 12 1973

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON1198
*Original in E.C.*CONFIDENTIAL

April 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: KEN DAM

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: European Community Preferences
for Spain and Israel

As you know, the President has approved the proposed scenario (copy of the memorandum at Tab A) concerning consultations with the European Community, Spain, and Israel on the Community's preferential trade agreements which impair our trade. The President has directed that Secretary Shultz handle the initial presentation to the parties involved.

Subject, of course, to the Secretary's concurrence, we would like to offer several suggestions for the presentation, designed to keep political risk at a minimum.

1. The Secretary may wish to take advantage of the visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Abba Eban on May 10-11 to make the presentation to Israel.

2. With regard to the presentation to the European Community and Spain, alternate approaches might be:

a. For the Secretary to make the presentation to the representatives of the Community and Spain accredited in Washington; or

b. To request Under Secretary Casey or another appropriate official to visit Brussels and Madrid to make the presentations. It is important that the three presentations be made simultaneously or nearly so and that they be completely confidential. It is also important that the action be closely held within our government, lest the fact that we are going to undertake this GATT action get to the press or the country involved before it is placed in a proper political

CONFIDENTIAL

CDS - December 31, 1979

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 1827
(revised)

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

April 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel--Revised Package

As you requested, I have revised the memorandum for the President at Tab A to reflect the judgment expressed in your note on my earlier memo (next page).

Two changes have been made in the memorandum for the President:

1. The recommendation is revised to reflect the numbers you propose.
2. A decision memorandum is now attached to the memo for the President for your signature if he approves.

There is one issue I would like you to think about before sending this memorandum forward: What will be our answer if the Israelis either insist on a higher number now or reserve their right to increase the number in a year or two? I particularly raise this in connection with the Skyhawks. We could provide a larger number now relatively easily if they wished and the Skyhawk has less symbolic importance.

This leads to even a more fundamental issue: What rationale should be used in explaining to the Israelis why we are providing fewer aircraft than they would be likely to request over the four-year period ahead? Over that long a period, it is difficult to cite our own aircraft requirements because the production line over that period could be geared to larger output. The only approach I can see is to say that our decision is a combination of other needs and the US desire to see some restraint introduced into the Mid-East arms race. Do you agree?

Yes

Other rationale

Recommendation: That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President and, if he approves, that you sign the decision memorandum attached to it.

XGDS- 3

DECLAS - Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
1827

SECRET/NODIS(XGDS)

April 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Aircraft for Israel

During Prime Minister Meir's visit last month the Israelis were told that we would help them to produce up to 100 of their own aircraft--the Super Mirage--and would continue to supply A-4 and F-4 aircraft in 1974 and 1975. We agreed to view sympathetically the Israeli request for delivery of 30 A-4s and 36 F-4s over the next two years, but did not commit ourselves to any specific number.

The Departments of State and Defense have now responded to your directive of March 2 by sending an options memo to you [Tab B] seeking a decision on numbers and delivery schedules. The Israeli requests and possible options are presented simply in the table below. Discussion follows the table.

<u>F-4</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>Total</u>
GOI Request	18	18	-	-	36
Option A	8	28	-	-	36
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Option C	6	12	18	12	48
Option D	5	5	5	5	20

A-4

GOI Request	14	16	-	-	30
Option A	20	10	-	-	30
Option B	12	10	10	10	42

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF" E

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
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FROM: ROGERS

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SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Dev Loan Staff Com mends except Treasury approve a new \$25M Housing Guaranty authorization for Israel*

REFERENCE: S/S 7318063

OTHER

NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION

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ACTION REQUIRED

ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT

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LATIN AMERICA

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NET ASSESSMENT GROUP

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

NSC PLANNING

CONGRESSIONAL

OCEANS POLICY

MEMO FOR HAK

MEMO FOR PRES.

REPLY FOR

APPROPRIATE ACTION

MEMO TO

RECOMMENDATIONS

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ANY ACTION NECESSARY?

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DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

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10/03

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Recommendations (10/08)

Cooper
Saunders

10/09

Recd OMB concurrence

10/09

Cooper

Memo for HAK (10/14)

Saunders

11/07

Schroft

X Ign memo to Pickering (11/12)

11/12

C Schroft sgd memo to Pickering

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FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 2 -

Phantoms

The Israelis have requested 36 F-4 Phantoms in 1974 and 1975. They have talked about asking for 18 more each year in 1976 and 1977, but this request has not been made formally. The options presented are:

- A. Deliver the requested 36 aircraft in 1974 and 1975, with the bulk of these (28) in the second year in order to allow providing most of them in an orderly way from the production line rather than by diverting them from the USAF inventory. This would allow the USAF to rebuild its own inventory of F-4s.
- B. Deliver 36 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977-- thereby meeting the Israeli desire for continuity of supply, but not satisfying them on numbers.
- C. Over the same four-year period--1974 to 1977--provide 48 aircraft. This would provide a long-term commitment, more planes than they have asked for in two years, but less than they might ask for over four years. Deliveries would be lowest in the first year (6), highest in the third (18).
- D. Deliver 20 aircraft over the four-year period. The effect would be replacement of Israel's attrition losses, but only very little increase in overall strength. This would be seen as a sharp change in the US-Israeli arms relationship by Israelis and Arabs.

Skyhawks. The Israelis have requested 30 Skyhawks at 2 or 3 per month beginning in June 1974. It is anticipated that they will request 18 per year in 1976 and after. The options include:

- A. Deliver 30 in two years as requested, but adjust deliveries to fit production schedules (20 in 1974, 10 in 1975).
- B. Deliver 42 aircraft over a four-year period--1974 to 1977. This is more than the Israelis have requested for the next two years, but less than we anticipate they will want over four years.

// State and Defense recommend Option B for both aircraft--namely 36 F-4s and 42 A-4s, over a four year period.

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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

- 3 -

Two issues are involved in whatever decision is made on aircraft for Israel:

First is whether to use our policy on aircraft supply as a signal of our intentions to both Israel and the Arab states. The only option that meets this criterion is the one that recommends an attrition replacement policy on F-4 Phantoms (5 aircraft per year over four years). This choice is so far from what the Israelis have requested that they would read it as a sign that we intend to reverse the very generous supply policy of the past years. Likewise the Arabs would notice that we are holding back on Israeli aircraft requests. The other higher options would earn us little credit in the Arab world, and, insofar as they fall significantly short of Israeli requests, would be a shock there. Thus, we assume that the low option can be dismissed and that the real choice is among the more forthcoming ones.

The second, and more significant question, therefore, is whether to aim for a four-year delivery program now, even though the Israelis have formally requested aircraft only for the next two years. A strong argument for a four-year program is that it could eliminate the need for new decisions on aircraft for Israel during the rest of this Administration. The principles of continuity and long-term commitment to Israel's defense would be preserved. In addition, we might avoid the periodic crises in our relations with the Arab states stemming from leaks of new agreements every other year. The technical argument is that this longer time frame would permit us to get the Israelis back into the Phantom production line rather than diverting planes from the USAF inventory.

If the four-year framework is preferred, the question of numbers still remains. We might reasonably anticipate that the Israelis will want approximately 72 F-4 Phantoms during this period. State and Defense recommend 36, but present an option for 48. There is no reason why we could not go a bit higher--say 60--in order to be more fully responsive.

One way of being responsive while retaining flexibility and allowing the USAF to rebuild its inventory would be to agree to a four-year program for the delivery of 48 F-4s and 42 A-4s (or 60 of each).

In addition to these issues, there is a problem of timing. If it were not for the Beirut raid, we could just go ahead in the normal course of business. Now it would seem best to wait until reaction settles down.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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NSC #1827

Feb 5

April 2, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Options on A-4 and F-4 Deliveries
to Israel

In response to your request of March 2, we have prepared a number of options for both F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel.

As you know, Israel requested last November a total of 30 additional A-4s and 36 additional F-4s for delivery in 1974 and 1975 after current contracts are filled. In addition, as we mentioned in our Memorandum to the President of February 27, Israel has indicated it is thinking of requesting delivery of 18 more of each aircraft each year beginning in 1976 for the indefinite future. The Israelis seem to be planning therefore to acquire a total of 72 F-4s and 66 A-4s over the next four years.

Our options are as follows:

F-4

Option A - Delivers 36 aircraft in two years, as requested, but concentrates deliveries in the second year, thus reducing the adverse impact on USAF caused by diversion.

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APPROVED IN S 3/22/73;J

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MADE IN NY

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 9, 1973

SUBJECT: MFN, Israel and Russian Jewish Emigration

PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel

Mr. Avner Idan, Minister, Embassy of Israel

Mr. Moshe Raviv, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State

Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. H. H. Stackhouse, Country Director, NEA/IAI

COPIES TO: S,D,P, S/S, WH, EUR, NEA, American Embassy MOSCOW, TEL AVIV

In the course of Ambassador Rabin's farewell call March 9 the Secretary raised the subject of MFN legislation before Congress and its relationship to problems of Russian Jewish emigration to Israel. The Secretary said that as Rabin knew, we had consistently discussed the matter of Soviet exit fees at the highest levels with the USSR. We thought we had been able to be helpful; this we believed was manifest in the way the numbers of emigrants each had gone up. Moreover, we did detect some liberalization in the requirements for emigration as actually applied; there was some exercise of administrative discretion.

We had no complaint about public or Congressional discussion of the issue of Soviet exit fees the Secretary said; this was understandable. We were concerned, however, that Congressional interest was being translated into blocking improvement in US-USSR relations. The fact was settlement of the lend-lease debt question rested on the outcome of the MFN issue, and other trade legislation rested on settlement of debt. In our improving relationship with USSR we thought it was essential that we go ahead with our part of the bargain. MFN for USSR would permit the President to go ahead with MFN for China and

NEA/IAI:HHStackhouse:kha

(Drafting Office and Officer)

Concurrence:

NEA - J.J. Sisco

NEA - A.L. Atherton

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others. In a sense, MFN legislation was the key to the President's whole foreign policy. We hoped Jewish leaders could be convinced it would be counter-productive if this legislation were blocked. If in fact this legislation were blocked, this would be a setback to the President's foreign policy. We would be meeting with Jewish leaders shortly to say we would be continuing to express to the Soviets privately our opposition to exit fees. But we will also say we believe any effort to link this effort with MFN legislation before Congress would be a mistake. We did not believe the Soviets would back down before such a threat, anyway. If there was anything Israel could do to help us, it would be appreciated.

Rabin responded that the Israelis had to look at this matter both as Jews and as Israelis. They believe that there was some sort of moral commitment to do all that could be done, to bring about an increase in the numbers emigrating, to liberalize emigration procedures, and to assure that those who want to emigrate did not have to live under unbelievable threats. Israel could not accept an exit fee which was related to education received by the applicant. He was not talking about repeal of Soviet legislation but about practical arrangements that are made. He did not believe that Israel could say this was not an important issue. The whole education exit fee issue had been introduced a year ago by the Soviets; why had they done it?

Secretary said we did not expect Israel to change its policy. What concerned us was the most effective US approach to the matter. We thought events demonstrated our help had had a good effect. Larger emigration to Israel was evidence of this. We thought we could continue to be effective if our relations with USSR continued to improve. But we did not believe we could be as effective if there was a reversion to a Cold War situation because of opposition on this issue. We were not asking Israel to make public statements, but to pass word to those who respect Israel's word that Israel did not want the President's long run policy fouled up.

The Secretary said we could be certain that if Congress refuses to pass MFN legislation unless the Soviets disavow their exit visa policy, this would not have the desired effect on the Soviets. We gathered the Soviets were trying to apply their legislation more flexibly; it seemed to us best if we could find ways to get them to apply their laws with more fairness and flexibility. Rabin expressed doubt the Soviets would be more flexible without a threat hanging over them. Secretary again noted we had frequently discussed matters with the Soviets and could continue to do so. He had mentioned it to Gromyko when he saw him last. They said there were many other

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countries that had similar kind of arrangements. The U.S., for example, required that Annapolis and West Point graduates discharge the obligation of their USG-financed education by service or payment. Rabin argued this was not the same thing. The Secretary said he did not want the Ambassador to think we were arguing the Soviet position. But they did say that they provided free education to their best people; therefore they were entitled to have compensation in the form of work or pay for this education. This was their argument. There was flexibility in the Soviet regulations; they did have administrative flexibility. Each time we had had discussions with them, we presented a list of people we were interested in, and the list got longer each time. Gromyko had said that in 1971 there were 15,000 Jewish emigrants, and in 1972, 30,000; don't we Russians get any credit?

The Secretary summed up that we would continue to do all we could to help Israel in this matter. But it would be a major setback for Israel and U.S. Jews if, because we were unsuccessful in getting MFN, the President's foreign policy with respect to the USSR was aborted. Everything was based on the fate of MFN legislation.

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		P
PLACE DAY BEGAN				DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 1, 1973
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME DAY 8:50 a.m. SUNDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY
In	Out	Lo	LD	
8:50				The President had breakfast.
9:09				The President went to his office.
9:23	9:25	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.
9:54	10:10			The President met with C. G. Rebozo.
10:10	11:47			The President met with: Mr. Ziegler Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant
11:50	12:05			The President met with Mr. Rebozo.
12:11	12:13	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.
12:12	12:40			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.
12:42	12:44			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.
2:17	4:05			The President motored through the San Clemente area. He was accompanied by: Tricia Cox Julie Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo
4:05				The Presidential party returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.
4:25	5:17			The President walked along the beach with: The First Lady Tricia Cox Julie Eisenhower
5:17				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.
7:15	7:40			The President had dinner with: The First Lady Tricia Cox Julie Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo
7:45	9:15			The Presidential party saw the movie "Daisy Kenyon."

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 2, 1973
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME DAY 9:05 a.m. MONDAY
TIME		PHONE Placed Has Received		ACTIVITY
In	Out	Lo	ID	
9:05				The President had breakfast.
9:19				The President went to his office.
9:25	10:35			The President met with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.
10:36				The President went to the lawn outside his office.
10:36	10:41			The President participated in a swearing-in ceremony for James R. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense. Judge Spencer Williams of the Federal District Court of Northern California administered the oath of office. For a list of guests, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u> Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out
10:41				The President returned to his office. He was accompanied by: Secretary Schlesinger Mrs. James R. Schlesinger Cora Schlesinger, 18-year-old daughter Anne Schlesinger, 15-year-old daughter Emily Schlesinger, 11-year-old daughter Claire Schlesinger, six-year-old daughter Tommy Schlesinger, eight-year-old son
10:43				The Presidential party stepped outside the President's office. The President bade farewell to Secretary Schlesinger and his family.
10:45				The President returned to his office.
10:46	12:40			The President met with his Assistant, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. The President met with: Mr. Ziegler Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant
12:45	1:15			
12:55	1:20			
1:35	2:00			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.
2:01	2:23			The President met with Gen. Haig.
2:27				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.
2:32	4:28			The President and Mr. Rebozo motored through the San Clemente area.

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)	
PLACE DAY BEGAN				DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				JULY 2, 1973	
				TIME	DAY
				4:28 p.m. MONDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	In	LD		
4:28				The President and Mr. Rebozo returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
4:39	4:40	P		The President talked with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.	
4:40	4:41	P		The President talked with Miss Woods.	
4:49	5:27			The President walked along the beach.	
5:31				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
5:37	6:00	P		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
6:45	7:04	P		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
7:05	7:10	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
7:20	8:00			The President had dinner with: The First Lady Tricia Cox Julie Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo	
8:20	10:15			The Presidential party saw the movie "Railway Children."	

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APR 1973
Attest: confirmed
by E. R. Schlesinger's
office
All : = : f

SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR JAMES R. SCHLESINGER AS SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

San Clemente Compound, California

July 2, 1973

President Nixon

James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense

Mrs. James R. Schlesinger

Cora Schlesinger, 18-year-old daughter

Anne Schlesinger, 15-year-old daughter

Emily Schlesinger, 11-year-old daughter

Claire Schlesinger, six-year-old daughter

Tommy Schlesinger, eight-year-old son

Brig. Gen. John Wickham, Military Aide to Secretary Schlesinger

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the JCS

Maj. David Mabry, Aide to Adm. Moorer

M. Marty Hoffmann, Special Assistant to Secretary Schlesinger

Mrs. Evelyn Irons, Secretary to Secretary Schlesinger

Joseph Zeide, Security Assistant to Secretary Schlesinger

Larry Bryant, Security Officer for the CIA

Judge Spencer Williams of the Federal District Court of Northern
California

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION NEA-12

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TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJ: ALLON EXPRESSES STRONG HOPE FOR PEACE

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION, NON-ESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED, OF PRESS SUMMARY INCLUDING SOME DIRECT QUOTES) OF SPEECH DELIVERED BY DEP PRIMIN YIGAL ALLON NOVEMBER 26. (OFFICIAL TEXT UNAVAILABLE.)

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON SAID AT LECTURE AT VAN LEER INSTITUTE IN JERUSALEM LAST NIGHT THAT GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL REGARDS PEACE AS CONCRET OBJECTIVE, NOT SOMETHING FOR DAYS OF MESSIAH, BUT AS SUBJECT THAT HAS TO BE TREATED WITH FULL CONFIDENCE AND HOPE, SO AS NOT TO LEAVE ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT WE MIGHT NOT HAVE DONE WHAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DO.

3. " JUST AS WE HAVE WAR ROOMS, SO I WOULD WISH WE HAD PEACE ROOM, IN WHICH ALL ALTERNATIVES COULD BE EXAMINED,

092842

ANDERSON _____
 HOLDRIDGE _____
 HORMATS _____
 JORDEN _____
 KENNEDY _____
 LEHMAN _____
 LEVINE _____
 NEGROFONTE _____
 ODGEN _____
 RAYL F _____
 RONCH _____
~~ROSEN~~ _____
~~SCHEIDT~~ _____
 V. I. G. _____
 WALSH _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		p	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				JULY 3, 1973	
				TIME DAY	
				8:15 a.m. TUESDAY	
TIME		PHONE		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	RD		
8:15			R	The President was telephoned long distance by his brother, F. Donald Nixon, in Santa Ana, California. The President's Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull, took the call.	
9:15				The President had breakfast.	
9:18				The President went to his office.	
9:28	10:55			The President met with: Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant	
9:40	11:40			Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant	
11:30	11:40			Mr. Ziegler	
10:05	10:06		P	The President talked long distance with Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson in Washington, D.C.	
10:53			R	The President was telephoned long distance by Attorney General Richardson in Washington, D.C. Gen. Haig took the call.	
11:40	11:55			The President met with C. G. Rebozo.	
11:55	12:10			The President met with: Mr. Ziegler Gen. Haig	
12:15	12:25			The President met with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.	
12:25	12:40			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
12:40				The President went to the barber shop.	
1:10				The President returned to his office.	
1:13	1:15			The President met with Miss Woods.	
1:25				The President had lunch.	
1:27	1:29			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
1:36	1:38			The President motored by golf cart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.	
1:50	2:00			The President met with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (Use Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 3, 1973			
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA		TIME DAY 2:01 p.m. TUESDAY			
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	Li		
2:01	4:15			The President met with: J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., Special Counsel	
2:01	4:15			Gen. Haig	
2:08	4:15			Mr. Ziegler	
4:15	4:27			The President and Gen. Haig walked through the San Clemente Compound grounds.	
4:28	4:30			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
4:48				The President went to the beach.	
5:38				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
5:53	5:55	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
6:40	6:49	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
6:51	7:03	P		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
7:15				The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox Mr. Rebozo	
7:56	8:00	R		The President talked with Miss Woods.	
8:00	9:50			The Presidential party saw the movie "Rebel Without a Cause."	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 4, 1973	
PLACE DAY BEGAN				TIME DAY 9:10 a.m. WEDNESDAY	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA					
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	In	Out		
9:10				The President had breakfast.	
9:19	9:22			The President motored by golf cart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.	
9:37	10:46			The President met with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.	
10:46	10:57	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.	
10:50	1:05			The President met with: Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant	
11:42	11:48			Mr. Ziegler	
11:38		P		The President requested that Mr. Ziegler join him.	
1:22	1:23	P		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
1:41	1:43			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
2:49	3:05			The President, accompanied by C. G. Rebozo, motored from the San Clemente Compound to Red Beach.	
4:47	5:05			The President and Mr. Rebozo motored from Red Beach to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
5:06			R	The President was telephoned long distance by Rev. Billy Graham in Montreat, North Carolina. The call was not completed.	
5:09	5:10	P		The President talked with his daughter, Julie.	
6:12	6:16			The President motored from the San Clemente Compound to the San Clemente Inn. He was accompanied by: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox Mr. and Mrs. David Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo	
				The Presidential party was greeted by: Paul Presley, owner of the San Clemente Inn Mrs. Paul Presley	
6:17	8:04			The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Cox Mr. and Mrs. Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
PLACE DAY-REGAIN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		JULY 4, 1973	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME	DAY
				8:04 p.m. WEDNESDAY	
TIME		PHONE P. (Inland) R. (Revised)		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
8:04	8:07			The Presidential party motored from the San Clemente Inn to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
8:17	8:22	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
8:30	10:30			The President saw the movie "North to Alaska" with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Cox Julie Eisenhower Mr. Rebozo	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		JULY 5, 1973	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME	DAY
				8:45 a.m.	THURSDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
8:45				The President had breakfast.	
8:54	8:57			The President motored by golf cart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.	
9:00	10:10			The President met with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.	
10:10	11:26			The President met with: Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant	
11:00	11:02			Mr. Ziegler	
11:22	11:24			Brig. Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant	
11:22	11:24			Lt. Cdr. T. Stephen Todd, Military Aide	
11:26	12:11			The President met with: Gov. Daniel J. Evans (R-Washington) Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Executive Director of the Domestic Council Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out	
12:15	1:00			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
1:25	1:30			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
1:40	2:33			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
2:00				The President had lunch.	
2:33	2:41			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
2:41	2:43			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente residence.	
2:49	2:50	P		The President talked with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.	
3:01	3:03	R		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
3:39	3:41			The President motored by golf cart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.	
4:24	4:26			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
4:29				The President went to the beach.	
5:11				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY			
PLACE DAY BEGAN		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)			
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA		JULY 5, 1973			
		TIME DAY			
		7:20 p.m. THURSDAY			
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
7:20				The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox Mr. and Mrs. David Eisenhower C. G. Rebozo Herbert G. Klein, Vice President for Corporate Relations for Metromedia Paul W. Keyes, television writer and producer Mrs. Paul W. Keyes Miss Woods Maj. Gen. Walter R. Tkach, Personal Physician	
8:15				The Presidential party saw the movie, "Alexander the Great."	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 6, 1973	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		TIME DAY 9:30 a.m. FRIDAY	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA					
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
9:30				The President had breakfast.	
9:54				The President went to his office.	
10:01	11:05			The President met with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.	
11:10	11:50			The President met to discuss Dr. DeBakey's trips to the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China with: Dr. Michael DeBakey, Surgeon-in-Chief, Ben Taub General Hospital, Houston, Texas Maj. Gen. Walter R. Tkach, Personal Physician Dr. William M. Lukash, Personal Physician Members of the press White House photographer	
11:10	11:50				
11:10	11:50				
11:42	11:45				
11:42	11:45				
12:03	12:38			The President met to discuss U.S.-Chinese relations with: Huang Chen, Chief of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office in the U.S. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant Chi Ch'ao Chu, interpreter Members of the press White House photographer	
12:03	12:38				
12:03	12:38				
12:08	12:10				
12:08	12:10				
12:41				The President went to the San Clemente Compound residence. He was accompanied by: Mr. Huang Mr. Kissinger Mr. Chi	
				The President bade farewell to: Mr. Huang Mr. Chi	
12:49	12:50			The President motored by golf cart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.	
12:53	12:54			The President met with Marjorie P. Acker, Secretary to Rose Mary Woods.	
12:54	4:35			The President met with: Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant Rose Mary Woods, Executive Assistant Miss Woods	
3:20	3:23				
4:16	4:18				
4:31	4:36			The President motored by golf cart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN					DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 6, 1973
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA					TIME DAY 4:50 p.m. FRIDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
4:50			P	The President telephoned long distance to C. G. Rebozo in Key Biscayne, Florida. The call was not completed.	
4:55	5:43			The President walked along the beach.	
5:43				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
6:42		P		The President telephoned Gen. Haig. The call was not completed.	
6:43		P		The President telephoned Mr. Ziegler. The call was not completed.	
6:44	6:45		P	The President talked long distance with Mr. Rebozo in Key Biscayne, Florida.	
7:15	8:00			The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox Mr. and Mrs. David Eisenhower	
7:56	7:57	P		The President talked with Miss Woods.	
8:15	10:00			The Presidential party saw the movie "Tom Sawyer."	

PLACE DAY BEGAN

DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)

JULY 7, 1973

TIME DAY

8:45 a.m. TUESDAY

THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY
In	Out	Lo	LD	
8:45				The President had breakfast.
8:58	9:00			The President motored by golfcart from the San Clemente Compound residence to his office.
9:17	9:28			The President met with: Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant
9:23	9:41			Rose Mary Woods, Executive Assistant
9:45	10:15			The President met with: Gen. Haig
9:47	9:52			Miss Woods
10:00	10:05			Miss Woods
10:32	11:05			The President met to discuss the chairmanship of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with: Ray Garrett, Jr., partner with Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Children and Waud
10:32	11:05			Gen. Haig
10:40	10:42			Members of the press
10:40	10:42			White House photographer
11:03	11:13	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.
11:05	11:07			The President met with Miss Woods.
11:15	11:22			The President met with his Special Assistant, Stephen B. Bull.
11:23	11:24			The President met with Miss Woods.
11:24	11:25	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.
11:26	11:28			The President met with Miss Woods.
11:30	11:55			The President met with Gen. Haig.
11:57	12:00			The President met with Miss Woods.
12:11	1:00			The President met with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.
12:13	12:16		P	The President talked long distance with Robert H. Finch, partner with McKenna, Fitting and Finch, in Los Angeles, California.
12:30				The President had lunch.
12:58	1:03	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY			
		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN				DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				JULY 7, 1973	
				TIME	DAY
				1:10 p.m. TUESDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
1:10	1:11			The President met with Miss Woods.	
1:25	1:48			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
1:51	1:53			The President motored by golfcart from his office to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
1:58	2:06	R		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
2:22	2:30	P		The President talked with Gen. Haig.	
3:48	4:51			The President walked along the beach.	
4:51				The President returned to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
6:30	7:10			The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox	
7:15	8:00			The Presidential party saw the movie "His Majesty O'Keefe."	
8:45	8:46	P		The President talked with Mr. Bull.	

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SO AS NOT TO MISS THAT CHANCE, WHICH HAS PERHAPS BEEN CREATED, AGAINST BACKGROUND OF THE WAR. WE MUST DO EVERY-THING WE CAN SO AS TO MAKE THIS LAST WAR BETWEEN OURSELVES AND ARABS.

4. " OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE IS STABILIZATION OF CEASEFIRE, THROUGH DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND CREATION OF UN BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THEM. WITH DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO CREATE NEW " STATUS QUO" IN STYLE OF 1971. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SEPARATION OF FORCES; FURTHER EFFORTS WILL BE MADE, AND IF WE DO NOT SUCCEED (AT STAGE OF OFFICERS MEETINGS AT KM 101) SUBJECT WILL COME UP AT GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 18.

5. " WE RECOGNIZE SOVEREIGNTY OF EGYPT ON BOTH SIDES OF SUEZ CANAL AND WANT TO DEEPEN IT SO THAT TI COULD SERVE FOR NAVIGATION OF LARGE SHIPS. WE DO NOT INSIST ON ELEMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC SYMMETRY AS FAR AS SEPARATION OF FORCES IS CONCERNED, BUT ON ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC SYMMETRY. THE MILITARY ARRANGEMENT IS TEMPORARY--UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA."

6. ALLON SAID THAT, AT CABINET SESSION LAST SUNDAY, GOVERNMENT RESPONDED NOT UNANIMOUSLY TO PROPOSAL MADE BY US SECRETARY OF STATE AS REGARDS PLACE AND TIME OF TALKS. " INORDER TO SIGN PEACE TREATY, WHICH WILL CONTAIN PAINFUL COMPROMISES, MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE IS REQUIRED, BUT THIS IS NOT ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO START TALKS. A PEACE TREATY HAS TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH SECURITY SHE NEEDS AND TO RESPOND TO INTERESTS OF ARAB SIDE. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT CANNOT BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT ASYMMETRY OF POSITIONS OF TWO SIDES. IT WOULD BE BETTER IF WE COULD MEET IN GENEVA WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH ARAB COUNTRY SEPARATELY. WHEN THEY ARE TOGETHER THEY" STRAIGHTEN OUT THEIR LINE" IN ACCORDANCE WITH MOST EXTREMIST FACTOR."

7. ALLON CALLED FOR AN EARLY DEBATE ON SUBSTANCE OF PEACE

BEFORE DEBATE ON PEACE MAP. "IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES, I WOULD PREFER MINOR BORDER CHANGES. I FEAR THAT THE DAY MAY COME WHEN PEOPLE WILL LOOK BACK WITH LONGING ON THE MAPS I DREW. TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES I

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		JULY 8, 1973	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME	DAY
				8:30 a.m. SUNDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
8:30				The President had breakfast.	
1:19	1:20	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.	
1:21	1:34	P		The President talked with his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.	
1:40	3:31			The President motored through the San Clemente area to Red Beach.	
4:37	4:50			The President motored from Red Beach to the San Clemente Compound residence.	
5:56		P		The President telephoned his Assistant, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. The call was not completed.	
5:58	6:03	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
6:30				The President had dinner with: The First Lady Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox Mr. and Mrs. David Eisenhower	
7:15				The Presidential party saw the movie "Far Country."	
9:01		P		The President telephoned his valet, Manolo Sanchez. The call was not completed.	
9:04		P		The President telephoned Chief White House Steward Zosimo T. Monzon. The call was not completed.	
9:13	9:14	P		The President talked with his Personal Physician, Dr. William M. Lukash.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		P	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 9, 1973	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME DAY 8:00 a.m. MONDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
8:00				The President had breakfast.	
8:20				The President and the First Lady went to the San Clemente Compound helipad.	
8:22	8:36			The President flew by helicopter from the San Clemente Compound to El Toro MCAS. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u>	
<u>PDT</u> 8:43	<u>CDT</u> 1:12			The President flew by the "Spirit of '76" from El Toro MCAS, California to the Kansas City Municipal Airport, Missouri. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u> (Actual flying time - 2 hours 29 minutes)	
<u>PDT</u> 8:43	11:12			The President's activities during this time occurred in flight and are recorded in Pacific Daylight Time.	
8:40	9:00			The President met with his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler.	
9:01	9:05			The President met with Staff Assistant Thomas W. Hart.	
9:10	9:50			The President met with his Assistant, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	
9:55	10:15			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
<u>CDT</u> 1:12				The President deplaned. The President and the First Lady were greeted by: Governor Christopher "Kit" Bond (R-Missouri) Clarence M. Kelley, Chief of Police, Kansas City and Director-designate of the FBI Mrs. Clarence M. Kelley Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out	
1:18	1:27			The President and the First Lady motored from the Kansas City Municipal Airport to the Kansas City Federal Office Building. The President and the First Lady, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Kelley, went to the speaker's platform.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY	
PLACE DAY PAGE		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 9, 1973 TIME DAY 1:18 p.m. MONDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received	ACTIVITY
In	Out	Lo	ID
			The President and the First Lady participated in a swearing-in ceremony for Mr. Kelley as Director of the FBI. William H. Becker, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, administered the oath of office. For a list of platform guests, see <u>APPENDIX "C."</u> Members of the press, in/out White House photographer, in/out
1:58			The President and the First Lady returned to their motorcade.
1:59	2:05		The President and the First Lady motored from the Federal Office Building to the Kansas City Municipal Airport.
			The President and the First Lady were greeted by: Mrs. M. Stanley "Rosemary" Ginn, National Committee-woman for the Republican National Committee Richard Berkley, State Republican Chairman, Missouri Jack Egan, County Republican Chairman, Jackson County, Missouri
CDT 2:13	EDT 5:02		The President flew by the "Spirit of '76" from the Kansas City Municipal Airport, Missouri to Andrews AFB, Maryland. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u> (Actual flying time - 1 hour 49 minutes)
CDT 2:13	4:02		The President's activities during this time occurred in flight and are recorded in Central Daylight Time.
2:15	3:00		The President met with Gen. Haig.
3:15	3:50		The President met with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.
3:51	4:05		The President met with Gen. Haig.
EDT 5:02			The President deplaned.
5:09	5:18		The President flew by helicopter from Andrews AFB, Maryland to the South Grounds of the White House. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u>
5:21			The President went to the second floor Residence. He was accompanied by: The First Lady

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)	
PLACE DAY BEGAN				DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				JULY 9, 1973	
				TIME DAY	
				1:18 p.m. MONDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
				<p>The President and the First Lady participated in a swearing-in ceremony for Mr. Kelley as Director of the FBI. William H. Becker, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, administered the oath of office. For a list of platform guests, see <u>APPENDIX "C."</u></p> <p>Members of the press, in/out</p> <p>White House photographer, in/out</p>	
1:58				<p>The President and the First Lady returned to their motorcade.</p>	
1:59	2:05			<p>The President and the First Lady motored from the Federal Office Building to the Kansas City Municipal Airport.</p> <p>The President and the First Lady were greeted by:</p> <p>Mrs. M. Stanley "Rosemary" Ginn, National Committee-woman for the Republican National Committee</p> <p>Richard Berkley, State Republican Chairman, Missouri</p> <p>Jack Egan, County Republican Chairman, Jackson County, Missouri</p>	
CDT 2:13	EDT 5:02			<p>The President flew by the "Spirit of '76" from the Kansas City Municipal Airport, Missouri to Andrews AFB, Maryland. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u></p> <p>(Actual flying time - 1 hour 49 minutes)</p>	
CDT 2:13	4:02			<p>The President's activities during this time occurred in flight and are recorded in Central Daylight Time.</p>	
2:15	3:00			<p>The President met with Gen. Haig.</p>	
3:15	3:50			<p>The President met with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.</p>	
3:51	4:05			<p>The President met with Gen. Haig.</p>	
EDT 5:02				<p>The President deplaned.</p>	
5:09	5:18			<p>The President flew by helicopter from Andrews AFB, Maryland to the South Grounds of the White House. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u></p>	
5:21				<p>The President went to the second floor Residence. He was accompanied by:</p> <p>The First Lady</p> <p>David Eisenhower</p>	

THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
PLACE DAY PERMANENT				JULY 9, 1973	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME DAY 1:18 p.m. MONDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
				<p>The President and the First Lady participated in a swearing-in ceremony for Mr. Kelley as Director of the FBI. William H. Becker, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, administered the oath of office. For a list of platform guests, see <u>APPENDIX "C."</u></p> <p>Members of the press, in/out</p> <p>White House photographer, in/out</p>	
1:58				<p>The President and the First Lady returned to their motorcade.</p>	
1:59	2:05			<p>The President and the First Lady motored from the Federal Office Building to the Kansas City Municipal Airport.</p> <p>The President and the First Lady were greeted by: Mrs. M. Stanley "Rosemary" Ginn, National Committee-woman for the Republican National Committee Richard Berkley, State Republican Chairman, Missouri Jack Egan, County Republican Chairman, Jackson County, Missouri</p>	
CDT 2:13	EDT 5:02			<p>The President flew by the "Spirit of '76" from the Kansas City Municipal Airport, Missouri to Andrews AFB, Maryland. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u></p> <p>(Actual flying time - 1 hour 49 minutes)</p>	
CDT 2:13	4:02			<p>The President's activities during this time occurred in flight and are recorded in Central Daylight Time.</p>	
2:15	3:00			<p>The President met with Gen. Haig.</p>	
3:15	3:50			<p>The President met with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.</p>	
3:51	4:05			<p>The President met with Gen. Haig.</p>	
EDT 5:02				<p>The President deplaned.</p>	
5:09	5:18			<p>The President flew by helicopter from Andrews AFB, Maryland to the South Grounds of the White House. For a list of passengers, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u></p>	
5:21				<p>The President went to the second floor Residence. He was accompanied by: The First Lady</p>	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY			
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE				JULY 9, 1973	
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA				TIME	DAY
				6:17 p.m.	MONDAY
TIME		PHONE		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	P=Placed	R=Received		
In	Out	Lo	LD		
6:17				The Presidential party had dinner.	
6:38	6:39	P		The President talked with his valet, Manolo Sanchez.	
6:42			P	The President telephoned long distance to C. G. Rebozo in Miami, Florida. The call was not completed.	
6:50	6:58		P	The President talked long distance with Mr. Rebozo in Miami, Florida.	
7:16			R	The President was telephoned by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz. The call was not completed.	
7:54			P	The President telephoned Secretary Shultz. The call was not completed.	

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APPENDIX "A"

HELICOPTER MANIFEST
July 9, 1973

FROM: SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA
TO: EL TORO MCAS, CALIFORNIA

President Nixon
Mrs. Nixon
Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox
David Eisenhower
Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant
Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant
Rose Mary Woods, Executive Assistant
Maj. Gen. Walter R. Tkach, Personal Physician
Thomas W. Hart, Staff Assistant
Maj. John V. Brennan, Military Aide
USSS agents

FROM: ANDREWS AFB, MARYLAND
TO: SOUTH GROUNDS OF THE WHITE HOUSE

President Nixon
Mrs. Nixon
David Eisenhower
Miss Woods
Gen. Haig
Mr. Hart
Maj. Gen. Tkach
Maj. Brennan
Maj. George Joulwan, Aide to Gen. Haig
Stephen B. Bull, Special Assistant
USSS agent

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PASSENGER MANIFEST

APPENDIX "B"

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AIR FORCE ONE
MISSION 967

—El Toro MCAS CA to Kansas City Muni Arpt MO

9 July 1973 Dep: 8:45am Arr: 1:15pm 2+30 1380SM

—Kansas City Muni Arpt MO to Andrews AFB Wash DC

9 July 1973 Dep: 2:15pm Arr: 4:05pm 1+50 975SM

1. The President
2. Mrs Nixon
3. Mrs Tricia Cox
4. Mr Edward Cox
5. Mr David Eisenhower
6. Gen A M Haig Jr, Assistant
7. Mrs Haig
8. Ron Ziegler, Assistant
9. Miss R M Woods, Executive Assistant
10. Mr Raymond K Price, Special Consultant
11. Dr W R Tkach, Personal Physician
12. S B Bull, Special Assistant
13. W Henkel, Staff Assistant
14. John Andrews, Staff Assistant
15. Mrs Rita DeSantis, Personal Secretary to the First Lady
16. Maj J V Brennan, Military Aide
17. LCDR T S Todd, Military Aide
18. MAJ George A Joulwan, Aide to Gen. Haig
19. Tom Hart, Staff Assistant
20. Ronald L Jackson, White House Food Service Coordinator
21. Mrs Pat McKee, Secretary to Gen. Haig
22. Mrs Margaret Foote, Secretary to Mr. Price
23. Mr Ollie Atkins, White House photographer
24. MSG Abel Araiza
25. MSG Herbert G Oldenburg
26. SDCS Zosimo Monzon
27. R Kaiser, USSS
28. R Pontius, USSS
29. S Miller, USSS
30. W Hartwig, USSS
31. M Miller, USSS
32. T Bondurant, USSS
33. J Glenn, USSS
34. P McFarland, USSS
35. R Hall, USSS
36. Frank Cancellare
37. Jim Palmer
38. Wade Bingham
39. Miss Frances Lewine
40. Miss Helen Thomas
41. Mr Forrest Boyd
42. Henry Trewitt
43. John Deakin

UPI Photo

AP Photo

CBS Cameraman

AP

UPI

Mutual Broadcasting

Newsweek

St Louis Post Dispatch

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APPENDIX "C"

Attendance confirmed by
Advance Office
All present

PLATFORM GUESTS, SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR CLARENCE M. KELLEY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE FBI

July 9, 1973

FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

President Nixon
Mrs. Nixon
Mr. and Mrs. Edward F. Cox
David Eisenhower
Clarence M. Kelley, Director of the FBI
Mrs. Clarence M. Kelley
Congressman William R. Roy (D-Kansas)
Congressman Larry Winn, Jr. (R-Kansas)
Congressman Gene Taylor (R-Missouri)
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas)
Senator James O. Eastland (D-Mississippi)
Senator Roman L. Hruska (R-Nebraska)
Governor Christopher Bond (R-Missouri)
Governor Robert D. Docking (D-Kansas)
Attorney General John C. Danforth (R-Missouri)
Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General
Lt. Governor William C. Phelps (R-Missouri)
William D. Ruckelshaus, former Acting Director of the FBI
Mayor Charles Wheeler, Jr. (D-Kansas City, Missouri)
Rev. Lawrence Bash, Pastor of the Country Club Christian Church, Kansas City
Rabbi William E. Silverman, Congregation of B'Nai Jehudah, Kansas City
Ilus W. Davis, former Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri and President of
the Board of Police Commissioners
William Becker, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Western District
of Missouri
Rev. George Fitzsimmons, Pastor of St. Joseph Church, Kansas City
Rev. John Williams, Pastor of St. Stephens Baptist Church, Kansas City

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN					DATE (Mo., Day., Yr.) JULY 10, 1973
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.					TIME DAY 8:13 a.m. TUESDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
8:13				The President went to the Oval Office.	
8:19		P		The President requested that his Assistant, Ronald L. Ziegler, join him.	
8:19	8:32			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
8:32				The President went to the Cabinet Room.	
8:32	10:24			The President met to discuss Phase IV economic controls with Republican Congressional leaders. For a list of attendees, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u> White House photographer, in/out	
10:24				The President returned to the Oval Office. He was accompanied by: George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan) Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pennsylvania) William E. Timmons, Assistant Mr. Ziegler	
10:24	11:02			The President met with: Secretary Shultz	
10:24	10:45			Senator Scott	
10:24	10:45			Congressman Ford	
10:24	10:45			Mr. Timmons	
10:24	10:45			Mr. Ziegler	
11:22	12:18			The President met with his Assistant, Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.	
12:24	12:28			The President met for a departure handshake and photo with: Robert F. Froehke, departing Secretary of the Army Stephen B. Bull, Special Assistant White House photographer, in/out	
12:29	12:43			The President met with: Verl M. Buxton, farmer and mayor of Cornish, Utah Mrs. Verl M. Buxton Carol Buxton, 20-year-old daughter Mack Buxton, 17-year-old son Dale Buxton, 13-year-old son Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah) Richard Fairbanks, Associate Director of the Domestic Council Members of the press, in/out	

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WOULD SUGGEST (CHERISHING THEIR) SOVEREIGNTY AND AVOIDANCE OF DEPENDENCE ON THE SUPERPOWERS. THERE ARE DIFFICULT DAYS AHEAD, UNTIL WE REACH THE OBJECTIVE "

8. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SOLDIERS SHOULD KNOW THAT GOVERNMENT HAS DONE EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD IN ORDER TO TURN CEASEFIRE INTO PEACE TREATY. ALLON WARNED AGAINST DUAL CLAIM THAT WE WANT PEACE BUT REJECT SIX-POINT AGREEMENT.

9. ALLON EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT WILL BE HONORED. "I HAVE NO DOUBT AS TO OUTCOME OF FIGHTING IF ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO FORCE US INTO BATTLE; YET, WE DO NOT WANT BATTLES, NOT BECAUSE WE ARE AFRAID OF THEIR OUTCOME. WE DO NOT WANT TO SUFFER LOSSES (OF LIVES), OR DEFEAT AND FRUSTRATION ON OTHER SIDE. ANOTHER ARAB DEFEAT WILL PUT AN END TO THE CHANCES OF PEACE WHICH HAVE RECENTLY CROPPED UP."

10. ALTHOUGH ALLON DID NOT MENTION GALILI DOCUMENT EXPLICITLY, HE ATTACKED THE EXTREMIST PLAN CONCERNING TERRITORIES, WHICH HAS CREATED IMAGE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE VIS-A-VIS ARAB MODERATION. ATTEMPT TO RENEW THE DEBATE (ON YAMIT) HAS CAUSED POLITICAL DAMAGE TO ISRAEL. ALLON ARGUED AGAINST PROPOSAL VOICED BY DAYAN, ACCORDING TO WHICH " TIME WORKS IN OUR FAVOR." IN MILITARY SPHERE WE HAVE MAINTAINED BALANCE OF POWER, BUT IN POLITICAL SPHERE, TIME WAS ON " THEIR" SIDE. BOTH ARABS AND THE US THINK THAT OUR BARGAINING POSITIONS HAVE BEEN WEAKENED IN THIS WAR. IT IS OUR AIM TO ACHIEVE PEACE TREATY, BASED ON FAIR TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. ISRAELIS AND ARABS HAVE TO REMEMBER, THAT, IN VIEW OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN SUPER-POWERS, THEY BEAR A GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY. END TEXT.
KEATING

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY			
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 10, 1973			
		TIME DAY 12:29 p.m. TUESDAY			
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
				The President congratulated the Buxton family on their selection as National Farm Family of the year, an award sponsored by the Farmer Home Administration.	
12:45				The President went to his office in the EOB.	
12:50	1:20			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
2:51				The President returned to the Oval Office.	
2:52	3:17			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
3:17				The President, accompanied by Gen. Haig, returned to the Cabinet Room.	
3:17	5:18			The President met to discuss economic policies with the Troika and other economic advisers. For a list of attendees, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u>	
				White House photographer, in/out	
5:18				The President returned to the Oval Office.	
5:20	6:10			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
6:11	6:45			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
6:12	6:13	P		The President talked with the First Lady.	
6:45				The President and Mr. Ziegler went to the South Grounds of the White House.	
6:49	6:59			The President and Mr. Ziegler motored from the South Grounds of the White House to Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.	
7:02	8:40			The President went boating on the <u>Sequoia</u> . He was accompanied by: Mr. Ziegler Lt. Cdr. T. Stephen Todd, Military Aide Manolo Sanchez, valet	
7:40				The President and Mr. Ziegler had dinner on board.	
8:40				The <u>Sequoia</u> docked at Pier One of the Washington Navy Yard.	
8:43	8:52			The President and Mr. Ziegler motored from the Washington Navy Yard to the South Grounds of the White House.	
8:54				The President returned to the second floor Residence.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN					DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 10, 1973
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.					TIME DAY 9:02 p.m. TUESDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
9:02	9:08	R		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
9:10	9:21		P	The President talked long distance with C. G. Rebozo in Key Biscayne, Florida.	
9:22	9:24	P		The President talked with his daughter, Julie.	
9:25	9:31		P	The President talked long distance with his daughter, Tricia, in New York City.	
10:42	10:48		P	The President talked long distance with Mr. Rebozo in Key Biscayne, Florida.	

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APPENDIX "A"

Attendance confirmed

✓ indicates present

REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING

Cabinet Room

July 10, 1973

- ✓President Nixon
- ✓Vice President Spiro T. Agnew.
- ✓George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury.
- ✓Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
- ✓John T. Dunlop, Chairman of the Cost of Living Council

- ✓Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pennsylvania).
- ✓Senator Norris Cotton (R-New Hampshire).
- ✓Senator John Tower (R-Texas).
- ✓Senator William Brock III (R-Tennessee).
- ✓Senator William Scott (R-Virginia).
- ✓Senator Robert Packwood (R-Oregon).
- ✓Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois).

- ✓House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan).
- ✓Congressman Leslie C. Arends (R-Illinois).
- ✓Congressman John Anderson (R-Illinois).
- ✓Congressman John Rhodes (R-Arizona).
- ✓Congressman Jack Edwards (R-Alabama).
- ✓Congressman Samuel Devine (R-Ohio).
- ✓Congressman David T. Martin (R-Nebraska).
- ✓Congressman Barber Conable (R-New York).
- ✓Congressman Robert H. Michel (R-Illinois).
- ✓Congressman William Stanton (R-Ohio).
- ✓Congressman Joel Broyhill (R-Virginia).

- ✓George Bush, Chairman of the Republican National Committee

- ✓Melvin R. Laird, Counsellor
- ✓Bryce N. Harlow, Counsellor
- ✓Anne Armstrong, Counsellor
- ✓Roy L. Ash, Director of the OMB
- ✓Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant
- ✓Peter M. Flanagan, Assistant
- ✓William E. Timmons, Assistant
- ✓Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., Executive Director of the Domestic Council
- ✓Max L. Friedersdorf, Deputy Assistant
- ✓Frederick L. Webber, Special Assistant

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APPENDIX "B"

Attendance confirmed

All present

MEETING WITH TROIKA AND OTHER ECONOMIC ADVISERS

Cabinet Room

July 10, 1973

President Nixon

George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury

Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Roy L. Ash, Director of the OMB

John B. Connally, Special Advisor

Melvin R. Laird, Counsellor

Bryce N. Harlow, Counsellor

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant

John T. Dunlop, Chairman of the Cost of Living Council

Anne Armstrong, Counsellor

William E. Timmons, Assistant

Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant

Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant

Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 11, 1973	
PLACE DAY BEGAN		(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)		TIME DAY 8:15 a.m. WEDNESDAY	
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.					
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	In	LD		
8:15				The President went to the Oval Office.	
8:20	8:32			The President met with: Stephen B. Bull, Special Assistant	
8:25	8:26			Ronald L. Ziegler, Assistant	
8:33	8:38			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
8:39				The President went to the Cabinet Room.	
8:39	10:32			The President met with members of the Cabinet. For a list of attendees, see <u>APPENDIX "A."</u> White House photographer, in/out	
10:32				The President returned to the Oval Office.	
10:32	10:59			The President met with: George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury	
10:54	11:31			Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor White House photographer, in/out	
11:32	12:08			The President met with his Executive Assistant, Rose Mary Woods.	
12:09	12:17			The President met with: Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota), Vice President of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society	
12:09	12:17			House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Michigan), member of the Honorary Board of Trustees of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society	
12:09	12:17			Arthur B. Hanson, partner with Hanson, O'Brien, Birney and Stickle and member of the Active Board of Trustees of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society	
12:09	12:17			William E. Timmons, Assistant	
12:11	12:13			Members of the press	
12:11	12:13			White House photographer	
				On behalf of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society, Senator Humphrey, Congressman Ford and Mr. Hanson presented the President with medallion number 1776 commemorating the laying of the cornerstone of the U.S. Capitol in 1793.	
12:24	12:55			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
12:55				The President went to the office of his Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger.	
12:55	1:10			The President met with Mr. Kissinger.	

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THE WHITE HOUSE		PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY (See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN					DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.) JULY 11, 1973
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.					TIME DAY 2:28 p.m. WEDNESDAY
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY	
In	Out	Lo	LD		
2:28	2:34	P		The President talked with Mr. Ziegler.	
3:00				The President returned to the Oval Office.	
3:03	4:22			The President met with: John B. Connally, Special Advisor	
3:08	3:10			Miss Woods	
4:24	5:05			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
5:06		P		The President telephoned Gen. Haig. The call was not completed.	
5:07	5:13			The President met with Gen. Haig.	
5:16	5:41			The President met with Mr. Ziegler.	
5:42	6:04			The President met with Miss Woods.	
6:06				The President went to the White House Library.	
6:06	7:12			The President hosted an informal reception for selected Republican Senators. For a list of attendees, see <u>APPENDIX "B."</u>	
7:12				The President returned to the second floor Residence.	
7:40				The President had dinner with: The First Lady Julie Eisenhower	

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APPENDIX "A"

Attendance confirmed
by Thomas Hart
All present

CABINET MEETING

July 11, 1973

Cabinet Room, White House

President Nixon
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General
Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior
Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture
Frederick B. Dent, Secretary of Commerce
Peter J. Brennan, Secretary of Labor
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of HEW
James T. Lynn, Secretary of HUD
Claude S. Brinegar, Secretary of Transportation
Roy L. Ash, Director of the OMB
Anne Armstrong, Counsellor
Melvin R. Laird, Counsellor
Bryce N. Harlow, Counsellor

John B. Connally, Special Advisor
George Bush, Chairman of the Republican National Committee
Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
John T. Dunlop, Director of the Cost of Living Council

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant
John Love, Director of the Energy Policy Office and Assistant to
the President
Ronald L. Miegler, Assistant
Peter M. Flanagan, Assistant
Raymond E. Price, Special Consultant
William E. Timmons, Assistant
Frederic V. Chalok, Deputy Director of the OMB
Arthur Schwan, Administrative Assistant to the Vice President
David R. Gergen, Special Assistant
David M. Parker, Special Assistant

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APPENDIX "B"

Attendance confirmed
by William Timmons'
office
All present

RECEPTION FOR REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE SENATE
July 11, 1973
White House Library

President Nixon
Senator Carl T. Curtis (R-Nebraska)
Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah)
Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-Oklahoma)
Senator Norris Cotton (R-New Hampshire)
Senator Clifford P. Hansen (R-Wyoming)
Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina)
Senator Milton R. Young (R-North Dakota)
Senator John C. Tower (R-Texas)
Senator Paul J. Fannin (R-Arizona)
Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina)

Bryce N. Harlow, Counsellor
William E. Timmons, Assistant

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THE WHITE HOUSE				PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON'S DAILY DIARY		P	
				(See Travel Record for Travel Activity)			
PLACE DAY BEGAN						DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
						JULY 12, 1973	
THE WHITE HOUSE						TIME	DAY
WASHINGTON, D.C.						5:43 a.m. THURSDAY	
TIME		PHONE P=Placed R=Received		ACTIVITY			
In	Out	Lo	ID				
5:43	5:45	P		The President talked with his Personal Physician, Maj. Gen. Walter R. Tkach.			
5:50	5:51	P		The President talked with his valet, Manolo Sanchez.			
?	?			The President met with Maj. Gen. Tkach.			
8:33	8:34	P		The President talked with Mr. Sanchez.			
1:31	1:47	R		The President talked with Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D - North Carolina), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.			
2:15				The President went to the Oval Office.			
2:15	2:29			The President met with:			
2:15	2:29			Maj. Gen. Tkach			
2:18	2:36			Dr. William M. Lukash, Personal Physician			
2:33	2:36			Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Assistant			
				Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant			
2:50	2:53			The President met to discuss U.S.-European relations with:			
				Walter Scheel, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany			
				Mr. Kissinger			
				Heinz Weiber, German interpreter			
2:53				The Presidential party went to the Rose Garden.			
2:53	2:56			The President party participated in a photo opportunity.			
				Members of the press, in/out			
				White House photographer, in/out			
2:56				The Presidential party returned to the Oval Office.			
2:56	3:25			The President met with:			
				Foreign Minister Scheel			
				Mr. Kissinger			
				Mr. Weiber			
3:26	4:00			The President met with Gen. Haig.			
4:01	4:22			The President met with his Assistant, William E. Timmons.			



73 Department of State

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TELEGRAM

 OCT 10 PM 11:28
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 WHITE HOUSE
 SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 2561Q

RECD: 10 OCT '73 3:29P

*****CORRECTED COPIES TO FOLLOW*****

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 E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS, US, SII
 SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ALLON

1. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH MORNING WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON, HE GAVE ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION (SEE SEPTELS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS). ALLON NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT THE AUTHORITATIVE GOI POINT OF VIEW AND HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PROJECT HIMSELF INTO THE ROLE OF GENERAL ZEIRA, WHO HE KNOWS IS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH SITUATION. I ASSURED HIM THAT I WELCOMED HIS VIEWS AND UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION.

2. ALLON INITIATED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT, STRATEGICALLY SPEAKING, THE GREATEST DANGER TO COME FROM SYRIAN ATTACK IN THE NORTH. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SYRIAN TWO-PRONG ATTACK BE BLUNTED SINCE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SHE RAN A GRAVE RISK OF ALSO LOSING NORTH ISRAEL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ATTACK BY THE SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS ON YOM KIPPUR HAD, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY HELPED RATHER THAN HINDERED THE ISRAELI MOBILIZATION SINCE THE RESERVISTS WERE EITHER AT HOME OR CONCENTRATED AT SYNAGOGUES. HE NOTED THAT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTIES GAVE THE JOYNT CARTE BLANCHE WITHOUT HESITATION TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE ON THIS MOST HOLY DAY.

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 USIA=15 ACDA=19 OMB=01 DRC=01 AID=20 /145 W
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 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS : PFOR, IS

SUBJECT : EBAN CALLS FOR ISRAELI POLICY REASSESSMENT

ANDERSON _____
 RATLIFF _____
 HORMATS _____
 HOLDRIDGE _____
 V.I.G. _____
 NEGROPONTE _____
 KENNEDY _____
 LEHMAN _____
 ODEEN _____
 SONNICHSEN _____
 SANDERS _____
 RONDON _____
 JORDEN _____
 WALTON _____

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL TEXT OF FONMIN EBAN'S SPEECH NOVEMBER 27 TO CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS. (FULL TEXT HAS BEEN POUCHED NOVEMBER 28).

2. EBAN AID THAT ISRAEL MUST UNDERTAKE FAR-REACHING CONCEPTUAL REASSESSMENT. PARADOX IS THAT AGONIZED NATIONAL DEBATE GOES FORWARD WITHIN OBJECTIVE REALITY OF TRIUMPH. ISRAEL HAS NOT BEEN DEFEATED OR CONQUERED, NON-COMBATANT POPULATION WAS SPARED WORST OF WAR, AND ARAB ATTACKS DID NOT ACHIEVE THEIR MILITARY AIMS.

3. YET THIS IS A VICTORY WITHOUT CELEBRATION. PERILS OF FIRST WEEK OF WAR ARE JUST AS MUCH A POLITICAL REALITY AS TRIUMPH OF SUBSEQUENT DAYS. THIS HAS MODIFIED STANDARDS BY WHICH WORLD APPRAISES ISRAELIS AND ARABS, AND BY WHICH WE APPRAISE EACH OTHER. QUOTE. IT APPEARS THAT THE UNIQUELY CRUSHING

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7. ALLON SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD "EXPLOIT HER SUCCESS" ON THE GOLAN TODAY AND CRUSH THE SYRIANS. HE THEN FUZZED THE TIMETABLE A BIT SINCE, AS HE POINTED OUT, HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR A WHILE. CORRECTED VERSION WAS THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT, ALLON STATED THAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE UNTIL THE SYRIAN PROBLEM WAS SETTLED. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, HE CONFESSED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TASK IN DISLOGGING THE EGYPTIANS, (AGAIN) PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SAM COVER. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WERE LOATH TO RISK LEAVING THIS COVER BEHIND AND HE SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO SEE THE EGYPTIANS STRIKE EAST FROM THE CANAL.

9. COMMENT: ALLON IS NOT ONLY A SENIOR GOI FIGURE BUT SURVIVED FORMER GENERAL. I WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING DURING WHICH IDF REITERATED ALLON'S CLAIM ISRAEL IN CONTROL OF ALL GOLAN (MINUS PARTS OF MT. HERMON). AS OF THIS EVENING, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFO RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI THRUST ACROSS CEASEFIRE LINE AS PROPOSED BY ALLON. AS DATT IS REPORTING, AMMO SHORTAGES MAY BE HOLDING UP ISRAELI MOVES.

10. AS CONCERNS SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY, I DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO REPORT OF THIS EVENING BY DATT THAT IDF CLAIMS AT LEAST 16 SOVIET CARGO PLANES ARE FLYING TO SYRIA AND SUPPOSITION IS THAT CARGO IS MISSILES. I ALSO HAVE NOTED REPORT FROM OUR CAIRO MISSION (CAIRO 3031) THAT SOVIETS ARE REPORTEDLY PROMISING TO SUPPLY AMMUNITION FOR EGYPTIANS.

KEATING

BT

#7955

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DURING RECENT SAPIR VISIT WITH DR. HANNAH THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES WERE DESCRIBED, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO PRESENT AVAILABILITY OF ONLY DOLS 25 MILLION FOR ACTUAL AUTHORIZATION AND CONSEQUENT NECESSITY THAT AUTHORIZATION OF REMAINING DOLS 75 MILLION REQUESTED IN ISRAEL APPLICATION WOULD DEPEND ON INCREASE IN GUARANTY AUTHORITY BY THE CONGRESS. THIS SITUATION ACKNOWLEDGED IN MINISTER ALEXANDRONI LETTER TO DR. HANNAH DATED OCTOBER 5, 1972, A COPY OF WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO JACK BUTTON.

4. SPECULATION AS TO WHAT CHANGES IN FAA EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL SEE FIT TO PROPOSE AND CONGRESS TO ADOPT IS PURELY CONJECTURAL. WILL KEEP AMEMBASSY ADVISED AS SITUATION DEVELOPS.

5. PROCESSING OF DOLS 100 MILLION LOAN APPLICATION BY AID/W IN ACCORDANCE FOREGOING OBSERVATIONS NOW UNDERWAY. TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENTS BEING CONSIDERED. AS SOON AS FORMAL DECISION BY ROI IDENTIFYING BORROWER HAS BEEN RECEIVED, PREPARATION FEASIBILITY STUDY WILL BE INITIATED. WILL COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH AMEMBASSY CONCERNING LOGISTICS GOVERNING THIS UNDERTAKING.

ROGERS

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ACTION AID-59

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AIDAC

E.O. 11652 N/A

SUBJECT: EMBASSY COMMENTS ON HOUSING INVESTMENT GUARANTY PROGRAMS

1. SUMMARY. FIRST \$50 MILLION HOUSING GUARANTY WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN PROVIDING NEW HOUSING FOR OVER 8,593 ISRAELI FAMILY GROUPS, INCLUDING RUSSIAN AND OTHER NEW IMMIGRANTS, NEWLY MARRIED COUPLES, AND SLUM DWELLERS. FUNDS FROM US ENABLED GOI AVOID INFLATIONARY IMPACT OF DOMESTIC DEFICIT FINANCING THAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO MEET HIGH-PRIORITY HOUSING NEEDS. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM UNDER-PRIVILEGED CONCENTRATES HEAVILY ON HOUSING SHORTAGE AND MAKES US ASSISTANCE IMPORTANT TO STABILITY HERE. EMBASSY HOPES FURTHER PROGRAM ALONG LINES DISCUSSED BY GOI WITH VARIOUS WASHINGTON OFFICIALS CAN BE APPROVED. END SUMMARY.

2. DOLLARS 50 MILLION AID HOUSING GUARANTY PROGRAM APPROVED FEBRUARY 1972 HAS RESULTED IN NEW HOUSING FOR FAMILIES IN FOLLOWING CATEGORIES DISTRIBUTED BROADLY OVER ENTIRE COUNTRY:

3,015 NEW IMMIGRANTS
1,324 NEWLY MARRIED COUPLES
553 SLUM DWELLERS
369 MINORITIES
2,146 IN DEVELOPMENT AREAS
8,593 TOTAL

ALL OF THESE ARE TOP PRIORITY CATEGORIES IN ISRAEL SOCIO-ECONOMIC PICTURE, AS ADEQUATE HOUSING INCREASINGLY BECOMES MARK OF WELFARE CONDITION IN COUNTRY. JEWS OF ORIENTAL ORIGIN, IN PARTICULAR, NEED

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TFL AV 05991 310641Z

TO BE BROUGHT INTO MAINSTREAM OF ISRAELI SOCIETY AND HOUSING IS ^{B5, ms, Ph.D.}
SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR THIS END.

3. AVAILABILITY OF HIG FUNDS HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR GOI TO INCREASE SIZE OF AVERAGE MORTGAGE THEREBY REDUCING BURDEN OF HIGH REQUIRED DOWN PAYMENTS.

4. THERE IS HEAVY PRESSURE ON HOUSING MARKET FROM ALL ABOVE CATEGORIES PLUS ALL OTHER SEGMENTS ISRAELI SOCIETY. WITHOUT HIG FUNDS, GOI WOULD HAVE HAD TO TAKE AGONIZING DECISIONS ABOUT USE OF SCARCE BUDGETARY FUNDS FOR COMPETING EDUCATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, HEALTH SERVICES AND NORMAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

5. ISRAEL HAS SHOWN GOOD ABILITY TO SERVICE ITS RISING FOREIGN DEBT. SEE TELAVIV A-15, JAN 20, 1973. FAST PACE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH WHICH HAS CONTINUED ALMOST UNABATED SINCE EARLY 1950'S GIVES GOOD PROMISE OF ABILITY TO COVER PAYMENTS OVER LONG TERM AVAILABLE IN HIG PROGRAM.

6. EXPERIENCED LABOR FULLY EMPLOYED IN HOUSING INDUSTRY WITH INCREASED NUMBERS OF UNSKILLED WORKERS NOW HIRED. AVAILABILITY OF DOLLAR FUNDS SHOULD FACILITATE IMPORT OF LABOR-SAVING EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOLOGY.

7. ISRAEL ALREADY HAS WELL-DEVELOPED SCHEMES TO MOBILIZE LOCAL SAVINGS FOR HOUSING WHICH INCLUDE PROVIDING LOANS TO MATCH FIVE YEARS ACCUMULATED SAVINGS AND LIFE INSURANCE/SAVINGS PROGRAM TO PAY OFF MORTGAGE. WHILE GOVT POLICY IS TO BASE HOUSING INVESTMENT ON LOCAL SOURCES OF FINANCE WITH ULTIMATE GOAL OF MAKING IT INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN LOANS, LOCAL SOURCES (SAVINGS FUNDS AND CAPITAL MARKET) ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET ENTIRE PRESENT DEMAND.

8. HIG PROGRAM PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE DEMONSTRATION US INTEREST ^{Heavily seems necessary to}
IN ISRAEL AS IT AFFECTS GROUPS AT LOWER RANGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ^{commitments}
SCALE, WHO WILL INCREASINGLY BE OBJECT OF GOI ATTENTION. FINANCE ^{the church}
MINISTER SAPIR RECENTLY ANNOUNCED THAT THERE ARE 77,000 DISTRESSED FAMILIES INADEQUATELY HOUSED IN OVERCROWDED (3-4 PERSONS PER ROOM) OR IN SUBSTANDARD HOUSING. GOI CURRENT FISCAL YEAR BUDGET (WHICH BEGAN APRIL 1) WILL ONLY PROVIDE ADEQUATE HOUSING FOR ABOUT 22,000 SUCH CASES. GOI FIVE-YEAR PLAN CALLS FOR BUILDING 40,000 HOUSING

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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UNITS PER YEAR (TOTAL 200,000 UNITS) AT COST OF IL 4,000 MILLION
(ABOUT \$950 MILLION).

9. EMBASSY HOPES AID WILL EMBARK ON NEW PROGRAM UP TO \$100 MILLION
ALONG LINES REQUESTED BY GOI MAY 17 AND OCT 5, 1972.
VELIDIES

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

Scowcroft

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RECD: 17 NOV 73 10:30PM

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O 180324Z NOV 73 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8457
INFO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5155
BT
SECRET STATE 227670

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, IS
SUBJ: ISRAELI PASSAGE AT BAB AL-MANDAS

REF: CAIRO 3557

FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW STRICTLY FYI THAT I PASSED ON TO
AMBASSADOR DINITZ THE INFORMATION FROM FAHMI CONTAINED
REFTEL.

2. DINITZ HAS NOW INFORMED ME THAT ISRAEL WILL DO EVERY-
THING IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT PUBLICITY BUT CANNOT CONTROL
WHAT APPEARS IN FOREIGN PRESS. DINITZ SAID ISRAEL HAS
"TAKEN NOTE" OF EGYPTIAN STATEMENT THAT SHIPS BOUND TO AND
FROM EILAT MAY BE ASKED TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES. FINALLY,
I HAVE SUGGESTED TO DINITZ THAT ISRAELIS NOTIFY US OF
SAILINGS OF SHIPS TO AND FROM EILAT SO THAT WE CAN PASS
THE INFORMATION ON TO EGYPTIANS. THIS ACT ON OUR PART
WOULD CONSTITUTE NOTIFICATION TO THE GOE.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

APPROVED BY: THESECRETARY

CLEARANCE: S/S-O:GTWOHIE

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
58	telegram	Sec State to Amconsul Jerusalem	1/16/74	B
78	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	3/15/74	B
112	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	4/17/74	B
115	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	4/13/74	B
147	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	1/14/74	B
160	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Tel Aviv	3/16/74	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

611

FOLDER TITLE

2

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTIO.
7A	report	Biographies, 8 pgs	2/73	B
11	telegram	Amemb Brussels to Scowcroft SANITIZED	12/8/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/29 1 p. per 9-7-04 letter	per 3.3(4)(1)	
18	memo	Scowcroft to HAK 3 pages	12/7/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-07/20 SANITIZED per EO 12958	per 3.4(1)(1)(6)	
52	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/28/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/30 1 p. Declassified		
58	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/23/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/31 1 p. Declassified		
69	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/13/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/32 2 p. Declassified		
77	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/9/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/33 5 p. Declassified		
82	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State SANITIZED	11/4/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/34 2 p. per 3.3(h)(1) 9-7-04		
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 04-22/6 SANITIZED per EO 12958	per 3.3(1)(1) 11/3/73	
92	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/3/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/35 2 p. Declassified 11-3-04		
124	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/26/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/36 1 p. Declassified 11-3-04		
126	telegram	Amemb Tel Aviv to Sec State	11/24/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		NW 02-27/37 1 p. Declassified 11-3-04		

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Country Files - Middle East

BOX NUMBER

611

FOLDER TITLE

(1)

Israel Vol. 13

October 1973 - January 1974

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIALACTION

March 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

R. C. MCFARLANE

HAL SAUNDERS *HS*

SUBJECT:

Moshe Dayan/Senator Stennis

Bill Timmons' office has requested your views on Senator Stennis' formal request to General Moshe Dayan that he come before the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the impact of U.S. assistance on the outcome of the conflict. Senator Stennis' motive for such an appearance by General Dayan is related to the Committee's consideration of funds for the replacement of the equipment provided to Israel from our inventories and the favorable impact Dayan's views would have. The Senator indicated that this was a "personal" request and that the session could be private, open, executive, or based on whatever ground rules we want to set up.

Such a meeting could provide useful testimony not only to the effectiveness of U.S. weapons but also to the necessity of our having taken them from inventory to meet Israel's urgent needs. Although Dayan's meeting might prove a liability in terms of your ongoing negotiations if there were much publicity, this problem could be met by arranging that the meeting be informal and off-the-record. For balance, King Hussein met openly with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees during his recent visit.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve General Dayan's meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee, informally and off-the-record, and that you authorize us to so indicate to Senator Stennis.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
THROUGH: WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
FROM: TOM C. KOROLOGOS *TK*
SUBJECT: Moshe Dayan/Senator John Stennis

Senator John C. Stennis (D-Miss), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has formally requested that Moshe Dayan come before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Stennis said this was a "personal" request and the session could be "open", "Executive", "official", "unofficial", or whatever ground rules we want to set up.

Stennis' rationale is that "much of the Defense Bill we are considering contains funds for replacement parts for the Israeli war...I would like to hear how the tanks and the anti-tank weapons functioned... how the planes and the defenses worked, etc.", he said.

Stennis told me to tell you and Moshe that "he will not be embarrassed in any way...I will take good care of him...I am not trying for a show or a gimmick...I am genuinely concerned about the Defense Bill and my main interest is in building up support for the Floor debate."

He said that as of now the Committee is "split" on the overall budget and he would like to marshall all the forces he can.

He also said that if you wanted to, you could bring him up.

I promised him an answer soonest.

What say ye?

cc: Brent Scowcroft *✓*

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF" 7

DOC	RECD	ING NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	74 11 23	Lehman

KOROLOGOS, T / Timmons, W

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: X UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS

KISSINGER X RICHARDSON LOU EYES ONLY EXDIS

SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C X CODEWORD

ELIOT S SENSITIVE

TS

SUBJECT: Request for Sen James Stennis for appearance of Mashe Dayen before Senate Armed Svc Comm re defense budget bill

REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>X</u>	MEMO FOR HAK <u> </u> <u>X</u>
STAFF SECRETARY	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		MEMO FOR PRES. <u> </u>
FAR EAST	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		REPLY FOR <u> </u>
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		APPROPRIATE ACTION <u> </u>
MID-EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u> </u>	<u>X</u>		MEMO <u> </u> TO <u> </u>
EUROPE / CANADA	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		RECOMMENDATIONS <u> </u>
LATIN AMERICA	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		JOINT MEMO <u> </u>
UNITED NATIONS	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		REFER TO <u> </u> FOR: <u> </u>
ECONOMIC	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <u> </u>
SCIENTIFIC	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		CONCURRENCE <u> </u>
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	DUE DATE: <u>3/26</u>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
CONGRESSIONAL	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>		
OCEANS POLICY	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION/REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/26			C	Script approved Reem. See note	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE

SPECIAL DISPOSITION:

OR RECORD COMMENT:

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG #

SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

MAR 27 1974 BY

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

April 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY *RK*
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HHS*

SUBJECT: Israeli Aid Decision

As you know, Mr. Rush has sent the President a memorandum reflecting your recommendation to waive payment now on \$1 billion for equipment purchased by Israel, leaving the remainder of the \$2.2 billion for decision later.

Before you present this to the President, we believe you will want to be aware of the implications of not making a decision on the entire \$2.2 billion now. In order that you may consider these implications before discussing this decision with the President, we are providing two memoranda.

- At Tab A is a memorandum recommending \$1 billion in grant now with the rest to be considered later.
- At Tab B is a memorandum which explains the reasons for making a decision on the entire \$2.2 billion now.

This is written so that you may see the arguments for this course before you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

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discussed in my memorandum to you of January 23, 1974). From a political point of view, our generosity toward Israel must be tempered by careful assessment of its expected impact upon the Arab states.

4. To the extent that the memorandum recognizes the importance of anticipating accurately the reaction to the grant-credit decision by Arab states, it states that we should minimize this reaction by moving "with minimum visibility and publicity." I see no possibility whatsoever of minimizing such visibility and publicity. We should make a sound decision which balances the interests and anticipated responses of Arab states and Israel, rather than making a decision in response to Israeli pressure and relying upon "minimum visibility and publicity" to "minimize further negative Arab reactions."

The grant-credit decision, its relationship to other issues, and the implications of alternative options have been extensively described and evaluated in my earlier memorandums, which you have reviewed. Therefore, I will not recapitulate them at this time. However, shifting circumstances suggest that one modification of my previous recommendations is appropriate:

- ° Provision of some reasonable level of grant aid, which I recommended against in January, is probably now indicated. Although the economy of Israel does not require grant aid, political reasons cited by Deputy Secretary Rush must be weighed. Beyond indicating continued support for Israel, however, the level of grant aid should also suggest compromise and balance to Arab nations. I recommend, therefore, that you waive \$750 million - half the possible \$1.5 billion -- as a responsible mid-course to steer and that the remaining \$750 million be extended as credit.

I again recommend, in conclusion, that this decision be made at the same time that you provide policy guidance on overall shipments of war materiel to Israel, determine the overall composition of the Middle East package and the Foreign Aid Bill, decide whether we should seek additional funds for South Vietnam, and approve tactics related to submission of the Foreign Aid Bill to the Congress.

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grant/credit mix appears too generous to the Saudis (who are talking about lowering oil prices) or the Syrians (who are talking about disengagement).

- There will be opposition in Congress to large amounts of grant to Israel. It may not impact on aid to Israel, however, as much as on the rest of your aid requests.

For these reasons I recommend you approve \$1 billion in grant (waiver of payment on bills due) and authorize extension of \$1.2 billion in credit. In doing this you will retain the option to waive repayment (and thus authorize a further grant) on up to \$500 million of the \$1.2 billion credit should you wish to do so between now and June 30.

2. Credit Terms

Your guidance is also needed as to whether concessional terms should be offered on credits provided.

State would offer concessional credits in view of our political interest. Treasury prefers conventional terms, but acknowledges that there might be overriding political interests to justify concessional terms. Roy Ash opposes concessional terms.

Israel doesn't need the concessional terms on economic grounds. Additionally, such concessions could set an undesirable precedent and generate some resentment in Arab and Congressional circles. Nevertheless, concessional terms will be a help to Israel whose debt service problem will be increasingly serious. It will be perceived there as a generous gesture, thus strengthening Israel's confidence in the constancy of our support. This cannot help but have a beneficial effect on the upcoming difficult disengagement negotiations.

I, therefore, recommend that you authorize concessional credit terms.

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Your Decisions:

1. As to Grant/Credit Mix

Approve \$1.0 billion grant (waiver of payment of bills due) and \$1.2 billion in credit now.
(Kissinger recommends)



Approve \$750 million grant and \$1,450 million credit now with the decision on the \$700 million credit to be made only in context of decisions as to our overall military supply policy to Israel. (Ash recommends)




Approve \$1.0 billion grant (waiver of payment); hold other decisions until later (Rush recommends)



2. As to Credit Terms

Give concessional terms (Kissinger and State recommend)



No concessional terms (Ash recommends and Treasury prefers)



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FORM DS 322{OCR}

ROUTINE

TEL AVIV

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: EAID, IS
SUBJECT: AID HOUSING GUARANTY PROGRAM

REF: STATE 18591

1. DOLS. MILLION HOUSING GUARANTY AUTHORITY FOR ISRAEL APPROVED.
2. NO FURTHER HOUSING GUARANTY FUNDS WILL BE APPROVED FOR ISRAEL IN FY-74.
3. DEPT WILL ADVISE EMBASSY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE. YY

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S/S 7407639

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Emergency Security Assistance for Israel

The Problem:

You are asked to make an interim determination regarding the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to Israel as authorized by the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973. The law authorizes the furnishing of up to \$2.2 billion in FY 1974 emergency military assistance and credits to Israel and places a ceiling of \$1.5 billion on the amount of grant assistance that can be provided. The \$700 million balance in credits cannot be obligated until twenty days after you determine that it is important to our national interest for Israel to receive such additional assistance and report this to the Congress.

This memorandum recommends that you make an initial \$1 billion of emergency security assistance available to Israel in the form of a waiver of payment for defense articles and defense services purchased since October 6, 1973. Recommendations on the terms and conditions for providing the balance of the \$2.2 billion will be made to you prior to June 30, 1974, at which time authority under the Act expires.

Discussion:

The Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973, Public Law 93-199 (hereinafter "the Act") and the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1974, Public Law 93-240 authorize you to determine, within certain limits, the terms and conditions for providing to Israel defense articles and defense services valued at up to \$2.2 billion.

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Since October 6, 1973, the United States has furnished to Israel defense articles and defense services valued in excess of \$1.5 billion. Most of these articles and services have been furnished under the Foreign Military Sales Act on terms of full payment within 120 days after delivery. Israel is technically in arrears with respect to deliveries made last October and November.

Israel has been pressing for an early decision on both the \$1.5 billion in grant assistance and the \$700 million in credits authorized to be provided under the Emergency Security Assistance legislation. There is also considerable interest among supporters of Israel in the Congress for such a decision. The confidence factor is of over-riding importance in our relations with Israel, and I believe we should now move on a generous portion of grant aid as an earnest of our intentions. Israel and its Congressional supporters expect that the full \$1.5 billion will ultimately be grant assistance and the balance of \$700 million will be on generous credit terms.

At the same time, at this delicate stage of our negotiations on Syrian/Israeli disengagement, and given Arab sensitivities about our support for Israel, we want to move with minimum visibility and publicity. While some publicity is unavoidable, the brunt of the negative political effect in the Arab world of the provision for \$2.2 billion in emergency security assistance to Israel was taken by us last fall when the Administration requested and last winter when the Congress authorized and appropriated the funds. I believe we can minimize further negative Arab reactions if provision of the \$2.2 billion is done in stages, beginning with a decision to make \$1 billion available on a grant basis.

The Secretary has discussed this approach with the Israeli Ambassador and we anticipate no difficulties on the Israeli side or from the Congress. We would, of course, quietly inform interested members of Congress of what we were doing and why, and publicity--especially in Israel--would be unavoidable, but there would be no requirement for a formal announcement or notification to Congress at this time. At such a time as your decision is made on the balance of the \$2.2 billion, the determinations on the disposition of the entire \$2.2 billion must be reported to Congress at least 20 days before the funds are obligated or expended. In addition, those determinations should be published in the Federal Register.

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Legal Considerations:

Section 2 of the Act authorizes the President to determine whether emergency security assistance for Israel shall be in the form of grants or credits and Section 4 of the Act authorizes the President to release Israel from its payment obligations for defense articles and defense services purchased or financed between October 6, 1973 and June 30, 1974, after which the waiver authority expires.

In addition, Section 2 of the Act requires a Presidential determination and report to Congress that assistance to Israel is important to our national interests, but only in the case of assistance exceeding \$1.5 billion. For the present, therefore, no determination or report under Section 2 is necessary. However, the Presidential authority in Section 4 to release Israel from obligations was not included among the functions delegated to the Secretaries of State and Defense in your memorandum of March 1, 1974, and can therefore be exercised only by you.

This action under Section 4 of the Act has the practical effect of converting Foreign Military Sales to grants. However, it does not have the legal effect of changing the sales transactions to assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act. Therefore, it will not be necessary for you to make the findings and determinations that would be required to establish Israel's eligibility for such assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act. In addition, the proposed release from repayment liability will not operate to relieve Israel from its other obligations under the sales contracts and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in force between the United States and Israel, e.g., to refrain from transferring the articles furnished without U.S.G. consent.

Congressional Considerations:

Although Congress amended the Emergency Assistance legislation as proposed by the Administration so as to narrow your discretion in the provision of the funds, we do not believe Congress intended to apply a generally restrictive policy in the provision of aid to Israel. Although there is an increasingly vocal group of Congressmen who feel our assistance levels to Israel are too high, assistance to Israel continues to have general

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Congressional support. We are continuing to receive indications from members of Congress who hope that Presidential determinations affecting the implementation of the legislation will be taken shortly, and that they will be liberal. It is our judgment that the action we propose would be in harmony with past expressions of Congressional intent on this matter and with present thinking in the Legislative Branch. We believe there would be no significant Congressional opposition to this interim action we propose you take.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum.


Kenneth Rush

Attachment:

Tab A - Presidential Memorandum

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Emergency Security Assistance for Israel

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Public Law 93-199, the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973, and by Public Law 93-240, the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1974, I hereby release Israel from its contractual liability to the extent of \$1,000,000,000 to pay for defense articles and defense services purchased under the Foreign Military Sales Act (83 Stat. 1320, Public Law 90-629), as amended, during the period beginning October 6, 1973, and ending March 31, 1974.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

February 23, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Arms Aid to Israel

Bills for the arms we began to ship to Israel during the October war have begun to fall due. By the end of February all the bills for the month of October--about \$500 million--will be due. A decision is needed as to how to finance this amount and the other \$1 billion of arms and services we have sent or agreed to provide Israel since 6 October.

To finance this \$1.5 billion, the President has three options under the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973:

- to grant Israel equipment. He can grant up to \$1.5 billion of the \$2.2 billion maximum, but he must first sign a Presidential Determination saying grant military aid to Israel will "strengthen the security of the US". This declaration--and a number of other such statements required by law of the President--pose some risk of seriously irritating the Saudis and provoking another strong negative reaction in the Arab world. Grant also poses some US administrative problems: we would have to set up a MAAG, check end-use of items, secure promises of non-transfer, and apply all other MAP regulations. These steps would irritate the Israelis.
- to extend Israel credit. Israel has long been eligible for credit. No new Presidential Declaration is required. As bills become due, we would make credit terms available. By law, the President can subsequently waive payment or soften terms before the end of this fiscal year.
- to waive payment on bills. This unique feature in the Emergency Act is grant in all but name, but requires no Presidential Deter-

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mination. As bills become due, we simply tear them up. This would reduce (but not eliminate) adverse Arab reaction. We would not quarantee against the headline reporting a "new" US decision on aid to Israel. The waiver limit, as with grant, is \$1.5 billion within the \$2.2 billion maximum.

The practical options are waiver and credit, not "grant".

There are three broad questions to consider:

- When to decide;
- Whether waiver should be provided from the outset, or just credits;
- If waiver, how much.

1. Timing

The Defense Department needs a decision before it can begin procurement of badly needed replacement items with these funds. In addition, by the end of February Israel will be in arrears on about \$500 million of debt. Israel has never been in arrears and wants zealously to avoid this to protect its credit rating. Therefore, both Defense and the Israelis would find delay awkward.

You may nevertheless wish to delay the decision, which will almost certainly leak to the press, and could complicate your mediation efforts in Syria. If so, delay is possible. DOD procurement time will be quite lengthy regardless of when the money becomes available. Furthermore, although Israel will be in arrears in a few days, no report of delinquency will be made to the Treasury until June 30th. If Israel is not delinquent then, her name will not be on the list. As a GAO audit is improbable, Israel's credit rating should not suffer. Thus, if you want to delay financing until after your trip to Damascus, we believe you can do it, but you will have to inform the Israelis clearly that delay is temporary and in their interest.

A preferable alternative, we believe, is to get a decision now from the President but not to release it until you tell both the Arabs and the Israelis during your up-coming trip. Then the arrearage problem would not arise and you might offset adverse Arab reaction.

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- 3 -

2. Grant or Credit?

Deputy Secretary Rush has recommended with Defense concurrence that--for the moment--only credits be offered for the \$1.5 billion worth of defense articles and services (Tab B). Terms would be conventional--cost of money to the US government and a normal repayment period. With the information available now, there is no evidence these terms would put an unacceptable burden on Israeli economy. This leaves until the end of the fiscal year a Presidential option (and perhaps leverage) to waive payment or soften terms on this credit.

Roy Ash strongly supports the credits-only option (Tab B). He argues that:

- there is no economic justification now for grant assistance;
- the US should retain the leverage that grant aid provides over Israel for the negotiations of the next several months;
- lifting of the oil embargo could be delayed by grant aid; and
- the vast majority of Congressmen and Senators want you to act prudently in offering grant.

We do not agree with the State/OMB/Defense recommendation.

First, we do not feel that we can gain leverage over the Israelis by financial manipulations.

Second, although credit would not impose unmanageable economic hardship on Israel, political considerations make some grant highly advisable from the outset.

- The Israelis will press hard for full \$1.5 billion use of the grant or waiver authority. Ambassador Keating has recommended an immediate waiver on \$1 billion.
- If the President offers only credit now, some members of Congress will immediately call for--and later take credit for--any grant element the President may decide to offer. We conclude if we are ultimately going to offer grant aid, the President should make that decision at the outset, use it to diplomatic advantage, and avoid unnecessary complications with the Israelis.

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- 4 -

Third, it is true that disclosure of financing Israeli arms will provoke a hostile Arab reaction, and that grant will tend to alienate Arabs more than credit will. However, our bona fides as an evenhanded mediator will depend more on our disengagement efforts than on our aid to Israel. Nevertheless, we should look closely at the level (as well as the timing) of our aid to make sure it will not prejudice Arab willingness to lift the embargo or to agree on disengagement.

3. How much grant?

The question is: How large an "amount" now? Rationale exists for two potential levels:

- \$250 million, roughly the cost of all the aircraft transferred to Israel during the war, or
- \$500 million, roughly the cost of all the material airlifted to Israel during the war and the amount of the bills falling due in February.

The arguments for \$250 million are as follows:

- We should restrict grant to the minimum required by pressing economic need in Israel or political reasons at home.
- There is no evidence of unusual economic need in Israel at this time. Projections are for balance of payments surplus, in fact.
- Some on the Hill will always call for more favorable terms, but the majority believe that the availability of large credits with favorable terms make it unnecessary and undersirable to provide large amounts of grant. If you provide \$250 million now, there will be little adverse Congressional reaction now. You can enlarge on US generosity before June 30th, but the sum of \$250 million is all the evidence Congress needs of your generosity now.
- Grant of \$250 million covers all the aircraft delivered during the war. This will have great impact on the Israelis and deflect pressures for more grant now.
- The adverse psychological impact on the Arabs is likely to be somewhat less if we offer \$250 million in grant with five times as

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SECRET

- 5 -

much credit (\$1.25 billion) than we offer \$500 million grant and only twice as much credit (\$1 billion). The grant seems much greater in the latter offer.

The arguments for \$500 million are as follows:

- It would have the aspect in Israel of a decisive and very generous move at the outset which would deflect negative Israeli reaction for the time being. It would waive payment on all items delivered during the October month of war. Diplomatically, we would still be in a posture of unreserved helpfulness vis-a-vis Israel. This is much more likely to be effective than any appearance of bargaining over this aid.
- It would then put us in a position to suggest to the Israelis that they use credit until May or June, at which time we will take stock and, as necessary, make a final package of softened terms and perhaps a little additional waiving of payment.
- Containing Arab reaction will depend primarily on convincing them there is no new aid decision - that any news stories they read refer simply to administrative actions in handling old aid.

On balance, we believe a \$500 million waiver of payment with \$1 billion in credits is the right amount to offer Israel at this time. This reflects our best reading of our Congressional, diplomatic and economic considerations.

Mr. Timmons concurs in the description of likely Congressional reaction.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President forwarding the option of the State/Defense/OMB position - all credits - but recommend he waive payment on \$500 million immediately and to extend \$1 billion in credits now.

Approve (Memo at Tab I) _____

Disapprove _____

I prefer:

_____ To recommend only \$250 million waiver now, with remainder credit.

_____ All credits for now (State/Defense/OMB recommendation).

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Bushnell
National Security Council

FROM: Richard F. Larsen **RL**

SUBJECT: Israel Housing Guarantee

The memorandum from Mr. Pickering to General Scowcroft, drafted by State/AID, contains a statement of Treasury dissent that was not communicated to or cleared by Treasury. Attached is a statement of our objection to the recommended program that we would like substituted for the State language.

Attachment

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4/22 # 936
Noted by
Sawcraft

MICROFILM DATA	
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23343

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Finding and Determinations under Sections 503, 504 and 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with respect to the Grant of Defense Articles and Defense Services to Israel

Introduction

Your emergency security assistance request for Israel has passed the Congress. This legislation contemplates for the first time a grant military assistance program for Israel under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA). The FAA requires that certain findings and determinations be made by the President before grant military assistance is furnished to any country. This memorandum recommends that you make the requisite statutory finding and determinations with respect to Israel.

Legal Considerations

a. In order to provide military assistance to Israel under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the President must find pursuant to Section 503, FAA, that assisting Israel will "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." A finding to this effect was made on March 9, 1962 by President Kennedy with respect to Israel. While we are aware of nothing which has since occurred that might alter these conclusions, they were made at a time when foreign military sales were authorized by the FAA and were not made in a grant context. Upon the enactment of the Foreign Military Sales Act in 1968, it was thought desirable and appropriate to review, update, and renew in a single consolidated eligibility list the countries and international organizations to which sales thereunder might be made. On July 22, 1969, you made a finding for the purposes of Section 3(a)(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act that "the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to Israel will strengthen the security of the United States

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- 2 -

and promote world peace." You reiterated that finding with respect to Israel on January 2, 1973. It is appropriate that you make the finding required by Section 503 of the Foreign Assistance Act with particular regard to the initiation of a grant military assistance program for Israel at this time.

b. In order to grant any underdeveloped country, including Israel, sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, under the FAA, the President must determine, pursuant to Section 504(a) that "the furnishing of such weapons systems is important to the national security of the United States." The Congress itself, in enacting an analogous provision in Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, has expressly exempted Israel from a similar condition on the financing of the sale of such weapons systems to underdeveloped countries.

c. In order to grant more than \$3 million worth of defense articles in any one fiscal year to Israel, the President must make four determinations specified in Section 505(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, namely, "(1) that such country conforms to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2) that such defense articles will be utilized by such country for the maintenance of its own defensive strength, or the defensive strength of the free world; (3) that such country is taking all reasonable measures, consistent with its political and economic stability, which may be needed to develop its defense capacities; and (4) that the increased ability of such country to defend itself is important to the security of the United States."

d. Should you sign the proposed determination, negotiations with the Government of Israel would be initiated in order to conclude the standard military assistance bilateral agreement containing the commitments required by Section 505(a) of the FAA regarding use of the articles furnished.

Congressional Considerations

The recommended finding and determinations are appropriate now that the emergency security assistance legislation has been passed by the Congress with strong support in both houses.

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- 3 -

Determinations to furnish sophisticated weapons systems under Section 504 of the FAA are required by that same section to be reported to the Congress, and findings of eligibility under Section 503 are required by the last sentence of Section 634(d) of the FAA to be notified promptly to the Senate Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees and to the Speaker of the House. Although the other determination under Section 505(b) of the FAA is not required to be reported, we have included all of these actions in a single document for administrative convenience. This procedure assures that the Congress is informed about the implementation of the FAA, and the emergency security assistance to Israel.

Publication

Similarly, Section 654, FAA, requires publication in the Federal Register of only those findings and determinations which are required to be reported to the Congress. Publication of a single document containing all three statutory findings will provide more complete information to the public.

Recommendation

I recommend that you sign the attached finding and determinations, thereby approving the attached justification therefor. The finding and determinations will be transmitted to the Congress together with the justification. The finding and determination also will be published in the Federal Register. The Department of Defense concurs with this recommendation.



Kenneth Rush

Attachments:

1. Presidential Determination.
2. Justification.

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 STATE 009124

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ORIGIN SS-30

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DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR:GP

APPROVED BY EUR:AAHARTMAN

S/S: DWMILLER

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 009124

EXDIS, TOSEC 115

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: DRAFTING IN "THOUGHT GROUP"

REF: USNATO 170

1. FOR USNATO: WE APPRECIATE PRESSURES YOU ARE UNDER TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN RESTRICTED COUNCIL "THOUGHT GROUP" DISCUSSIONS ON REVISIONS TO TEXT OF NATO DECLARATION. AT THIS STAGE, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE YOU WITH SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REQUESTED REFTEL. US POSITION CONTINUES UNDER REVIEW.

2. PENDING RECEIPT OF DETAILED GUIDANCE, WE WOULD PREFER THAT YOUR PARTICIPATION IN "THOUGHT GROUP" BE LOW KEY, AND YOU SHOULD NOT ADVANCE FORMULATIONS, RATHER MAINLY LISTEN TO VIEWS OF OTHERS. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD PREFER THAT YOU NOT DRAW UPON FORMULATIONS CONTAINED USNATO 6153 WITH REGARD TO ASPECTS OF PARAS 3, 4 AND 5.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 009124

3. YOU MAY ADVANCE, HOWEVER, YOUR PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF PARA 10 OF DECLARATION SET FORTH IN PARA 3, REFTEL, ON PERSONAL BASIS, INVITING VIEWS OF OTHERS ON THIS REFORMULATION.

4. WE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY: IN VIEW AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S URGENT REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE (REFTEL BEING REPEATED TO YOU), DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU ARE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE REGARDING THE SECRETARY'S DECISIONS ON THE FORMULATIONS FOR NATO DECLARATION BASED UPON OPTIONS OUTLINED IN MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY, A COPY OF WHICH WAS PROVIDED TO YOU PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

RUSH

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
14a	MEMO MANDATORY REVIEW	Jennings to Kissinger 9p/2 EXEMPT per REQUEST NLNS 02-01/11 EO 12958 sec 3.4(b)(1) FBI letter 8-19-02	7/27/73	B
14B	transmittal slip MANDATORY REVIEW	Glauch to Robertson w/ attachments 12p/2 REQUEST NLNS 02-02/12 EO 12958 sec 3.4(b)(1) DIA letter 12-26-01	7/27/73	B
21	memo	Memorandum For Record	5/19/73	B
31	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
32	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
33	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
35	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/30/73	B
36	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/31/73	B
37	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/31/73	B
41	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/9/73	B
42	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
43	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B
44	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

BOX NUMBER

NSC Country Files Middle East

1010

FOLDER TITLE

(2) Israel Vol. 12 March-Oct 1973 (p 183)

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
45	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/7/73	B
46	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/6/73	B
48	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
49	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	10/1/73	B
50	telegram	Jerusalem to Secstate	9/30/73	B
65	telegram	JS to USDAO	10/29/73	B D
72	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/21/73	B
74	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/21/73	B
88	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate [ipp] UN 04-22/2	10/14/73	B
100	telegram	DIA to State	9/13/73	B
105	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	10/1/73	B
134	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/12/73	B
136	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	6/5/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC - Country Files Middle East

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE



Israel Vol. 12 March-Oct 1973 (p. 293)

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
143	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	5/4/73	B
150	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
151	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate	3/14/73	B
182	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 page	10/25/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
189	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 page	10/10/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
193	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 2 pgs	10/11/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
194	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 p	10/12/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
196	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 1 p	10/19/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
199	telegram	Tel Aviv to Secstate 2 pgs	10/19/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		
217	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv	10/20/73	B
220	telegram	Secstate to Tel Aviv 1 pgs	10/17/73	B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST		EXEMPT per EO 12958 sec 3.4 (b) (1) (6)		

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

-Country Files Middle East

BOX NUMBER

610

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

Israel vol. 12

March-Oct 1973 (p393)

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: LOUISE NSC/S

FR: PBB - Peter Burke

I HAVE TAKEN ACTION
5091 ~~OFF~~ AND PUT IT
ON THE PRESS REQUEST
LIST. PLEASE DE-LOG
IT.

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Treasury does not concur with the \$25 million housing guarantee authorization on economic grounds. The project in Israel does not conform with AID's own guidelines for shelter programs, or with Congressional intent expressed in the appropriate section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. According to these guidelines, priority is to be given to the "creation or strengthening of institutions needed to meet housing needs", and to "promote the development of thrift and credit institutions engaged in programs of mobilizing local savings for financing the construction of self-liquidating housing projects". Israel already has a more advanced set of housing and credit institutions than most developed countries, including a Ministry of Housing, which exercises control over the public housing sector and has considerable influence over the private housing sector; the Israel Land Authority which allocates land for housing projects, new communities and settlements; the Ministry of Finance which allocates funds supplied to the various institutions; and the National Planning Council which prepares a national master plan designating land for residential, agricultural, commercial and recreational uses. Secondly, the housing program's guidelines indicate that priority should be placed in low-income housing. However, if the average monthly payments required under this program are assumed to account for one-third of a family's monthly income, the lower 25 percent of the Israeli income distribution would be unable to make payments on the proposed housing units. Finally, the guidelines indicate that judgements should be made as to "whether housing credits will replace or be additional to other commercial borrowing or supplier credits." Unlike other potential recipients of housing guarantees, Israel has little difficulty in selling its bonds on world markets and obtaining private bank credits at reasonable terms.

Treasury will concur with a \$25 million housing guarantee for FY 74 if the record shows that it is in response to a political commitment rather than on economic grounds, and with the understanding that no additional guarantee authorization for Israel will be extended in the present fiscal year. Even under the increased Congressional authorizations (\$305 million), if Israel's authorization is opened up to \$100 million (as originally requested), it would represent a full one-third of the Congressional Housing Guarantee Authorization world wide and would throw serious doubt on the credibility of the stated objectives of the program.

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TO: PRESS REQUEST LIST (IRENE)

5091

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *hhs*
SUBJECT: Appointment with JERUSALEM POST
Correspondent

Dan Gottlieb, Washington Correspondent of the Jerusalem Post, has asked for an interview with you.

He has asked whether it would be possible for such an interview to take place in time for the September 27 (New Year) edition of the Post, but he would obviously like to keep his request on the books for an appointment at any later time when you might be granting interviews of this kind.

I simply told him that I would pass along his request so that you might have it on your list. I assume that you are receiving many of these.

RECOMMENDATION: I do not recommend that you do this unless you are going to make some systematic effort over time to see selected foreign newsmen.

Agree: no appointment now _____

Disagree: schedule an appointment now _____

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION
9/11	9/12/11	2091	

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES Launders FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS NO FORN NODIS
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 SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER C CODEWORD
 ELIOT S SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Requests appt w/ HAK for Dan Opttlieb of the Jerusalem Post on Sept 27

REFERENCE: S/S OTHER NOT XEROXED

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			
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FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
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EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
 MEMO FOR PRES. ()
 REPLY FOR ()
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 MEMO TO ()
 RECOMMENDATIONS ()
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
9/12		HAK	X	Decision (9/17)	
9/25			C	Close per Burke	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY & DATE
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
 OR RECORD COMMENT:
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
 CROSS REF W/ JOINED BY LOG #
 SEE # FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/P/D BY

SEP 27 1973
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4918

ACTIONSECRET (GDS)

September 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Israel's Policy Toward Occupied Territories

As you know, the Israeli Labor Party has developed a program for dealing with the occupied Arab territories over the next four years. There is nothing we can do to affect the adoption of the program, but its eventual implementation is yet to be determined. In the past, Israeli leaders have read our silence as acquiescence in the steps Israel has taken toward annexing or settling parts of the occupied areas. The most explicit statement made on this topic was by Ambassador Yost in 1969 [Tab B], which was reaffirmed by the State Department on August 23.

Three elements of the new Israeli program could cause us difficulties if a genuine negotiation were ever to take place. First, the Labor Party is calling for an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Second, the policy of restricting private land purchases by Israelis in the occupied territories may be loosened. Third, a sizable Israeli town is planned for the northeastern Sinai, which would effectively cut Gaza off from the Egyptian town of al-Arish.

Ambassador Keating has suggested in a cable to you [Tab A] that we should talk to the Israelis to try to persuade them to delay implementation of the new program. He feels that Ambassador Dinitz would be the proper person to discuss this with at the outset, and that he be authorized later to raise the matter officially in Israel before the elections are held.

Henry note
Assistant Secretary Sisco has indicated an interest in talking to the Israelis about this when he gets back to Washington this week. Before then, you may want to make the point quietly with Dinitz that any Israeli actions in the occupied territories that make negotiations less likely will not have our support. In addition, if this process leads toward disguised annexation, the US and Israel will end up inevitably on opposite

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
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SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

sides of some of the key issues of a peace settlement. One purpose of talking to Dinitz yourself is to avoid the appearance of a major public US demarche on the subject.

RECOMMENDATION: That you talk informally with Ambassador Dinitz about our concern with Israel's new policy toward the occupied territories.


_____ Approve

Let Sisco talk to Dinitz about this,
but tell him not to make a public
demarche.

SECRET (GDS)

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Tab A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 6, 1973

SECRET/EXDISMEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Occupied Territories Policy

The Labor Party's Secretariat has now overwhelmingly approved a platform plank on occupation policy that will give a new and substantial fillip to Israeli settlement and investment in the occupied territories. Approval by the full Party Central Committee and ultimate adoption as Government policy now seem certain. The Acting Secretary and Assistant Secretary Sisco have been considering what action we might take to minimize the damage to our interests from this step and have concluded that the Acting Secretary should make a low-key demarche to Ambassador Dinitz setting out our concern and objections. This would be followed up by Ambassador Keating to Eban in Jerusalem. We believe, if this demarche is to have the desired impact, the Israelis should know that it is done with approval in the White House. This course is consistent with what we have done over the past four years - to indicate our disassociation with Israeli unilateral actions in the occupied territories and Jerusalem, which in our judgment prejudices any ultimate solution.

The Israelis now have 47 settlements in the occupied territories with a population of over 5,000, exclusive of some 15,000 in East Jerusalem. We have in the past taken public issue with this development on the grounds that it is contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions proscribing movement by the occupying power of its own population into occupied territory, and is a further obstacle to inducing the Arabs to come to the negotiating table. We believe it is important now that we restate our position to the Israelis. Our silence in the face of this latest development may be construed by them as acquiescence,

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GDS

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SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

and so encourage the pace of this activity. Our demurrer would give some help to Israeli minimalists who, though badly outnumbered, are speaking out against this platform plank, which was an election compromise made by Meir and Sapir to keep Dayan in the Labor Party fold. For example, some of the doves in Israel have rightly branded this action as creeping annexation.

A demarche at this time would be useful to Dr. Kissinger during his UNGA discussions. We may expect Arab and non-aligned interest here in New York in this matter and what we are doing about it; it will help blunt criticism if we can say we have talked to the Israelis and that our policy continues to be opposed to any such actions prejudicial to a solution.

With your concurrence, the Acting Secretary will express to Ambassador Dinitz our concern at this latest Labor Party action and what it portends for GOI policy, and our objections to such actions which are prejudicial to a peaceful settlement and to King Hussein in particular.



Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

SECRET/EXDIS

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION4992

(Supersedes 4918)

OBF

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

September 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*WILLIAM B. QUANDT *w.b.2.*

SUBJECT:

Israeli Policy Toward the Occupied Territories

This memorandum seeks your decision on whether Acting Secretary Rush should express our concern over Israeli policies toward the occupied areas, as developed most recently in the Labor Party platform. Ambassador Dinitz has asked to see Mr. Rush on Monday, September 10, at 4:30, prior to the Ambassador's departure for Israel the following day for consultation. The State Department asks for your concurrence in having Mr. Rush make clear our reservations about actions in the occupied territories that might be prejudicial to a peaceful settlement and to King Hussein in particular [See Tab A]. The background to this issue is given below.

The Israeli Labor Party has recently adopted a program for dealing with the occupied Arab territories over the next four years. For the moment we cannot expect to influence election year rhetoric, but eventual implementation of this program is yet to be determined. In the past, Israeli leaders have read our silence as acquiescence in the steps Israel has taken toward annexing or settling parts of the occupied areas, and the issue now is whether we want that to happen at this possibly crucial point.

Three elements of the new Israeli program could cause us difficulties if a genuine negotiation were ever to take place. First, the Labor Party is calling for an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Second, the policy of restricting private land purchases by Israelis in the occupied territories may be loosened. Third, a sizable Israeli town is planned for the northeastern Sinai, which would effectively cut Gaza off from the Egyptian town of al-Arish.

Ambassador Keating has suggested in a cable to you [tab B] that we should talk to the Israelis to try to persuade them to delay implementation of the new program. He feels that Ambassador Dinitz would be the proper person to discuss this with at the outset, and that he be authorized later to raise the matter officially in Israel before the elections are held.

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SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

- 2 -

The Jordanians are also asking us to make our views on this issue known.

The only thing that has been said to date is the State Department's reaffirmation on August 23; in response to a question, of a statement made by Ambassador Yost in 1969 [Tab C].

One alternative to having Mr. Rush talk to Ambassador Dinitz about this on Monday would be for you to make the point quietly with Dinitz after his return that any Israeli actions in the occupied territories that make negotiations less likely will not have our support. If this process leads toward disguised annexation, the US and Israel will end up on opposite sides of some of the key issues of a peace settlement.

On balance, it is probably worth having Acting Secretary Rush raise this issue now with Ambassador Dinitz in a low-key way. We will have made a point, and if necessary you can follow up later.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize General Scowcroft to call Acting Secretary Rush to give your concurrence in his mentioning to Ambassador Dinitz briefly and for the record our concern over Israeli policy in the occupied areas.

_____ Approve

_____ I'll talk to Dinitz about this after his return
from Israel.

_____ Other.

SECRET/EXDIS (GDS)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

August 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assistant Secretary Sisco's Interview
on Israeli Television, August 1, 1973

Mr. Sisco asked that the attached interview on Israeli television on August 1 be sent to you for your information. He calls to your attention in particular the question and answer on pages 9 and 10.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Tom Pickering".

Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Assistant Secretary Joseph J. Sisco's
Interview with Israeli Television,
August 1, 1973

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOSEPH J. SISCO'S INTERVIEW
WITH ISRAELI TELEVISION AUGUST 1, 1973

Q. Mr. Secretary are you satisfied by the present status quo in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I can't say that we're satisfied with the present status quo in the Middle East. There are both positive and less positive elements in it. Obviously, here we are in August, it will be just a few days and this will be three years of the cease-fire as tenuous as it has been along the Egyptian-Israeli front. Now this is obviously a good thing. Moreover, I believe the situation in Jordan is stable. I'm glad to say that the situation along the Israeli-Lebanese border is reasonably quiet as well as other borders. I think in that sense the present status quo is very good indeed. On the other hand, there's been an obvious lack of progress toward a political solution and as long as the no-war no-peace situation exists in the area instability is there and therefore there are risks. We've just concluded the Summit in Washington a few weeks ago, and certainly the risks of confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union have been reduced. I think the key is still to find a way to get a negotiating process started because from the point of view of the

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NEA/AI
C. A. B. A.

8-15-73

10/10 - 10/12/73

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: AID Housing Guaranty for Israel

Summary: All members of the Development Loan Committee except Treasury have approved a new \$100 million Housing Guaranty Authorization for Israel. Treasury would like to explicitly concur, but the Housing Guaranty Program to \$25 million in FY 74 and to have USC approval. State and AID believe the \$25 million should be authorized now and that question of timing and amounts of further funding is left open at this time.

Background: In FY 72, AID authorized a \$50 million Housing Guaranty for Israel. During the implementation of that Guaranty, Pinchas Sapir, the Israeli Minister of Finance, met with Dr. Hannan and requested an additional Housing Guaranty for \$100 million. At that time, Minister Sapir was advised that AID has only \$100 million in available Housing Guaranty Authority, which any amount in excess of \$25 million would have to be conditioned on the availability of additional Housing Guaranty Authority, which depended upon future legislation.

An application for \$100 million was subsequently made and feasibility studies were conducted by AID's Office of Housing. These studies resulted in a determination of feasibility by AID for the full \$100 million recommendation that \$25 million be authorized at this time from existing authority. A determination of 1974, if any, additional guaranty authority is required depends on Congressional action and AID's ability for guaranty resources.

State and Treasury on August 6, 1973 and AID on August 1, 1973, a \$100 million guaranty authorization.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

August 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador
to Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, National Security
Affairs Adviser to the President
William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

DATE AND PLACE: 12:10 - 12:45 p.m. Monday, August 13, 1973
in Dr. Kissinger's Office

Keating: Israel runs the risk of getting itself into problems with
activities such as the diversion of the Lebanese plane.

Kissinger: If they had got those four fedayeen leaders though it would
have been quite a coup.

Keating: Yes, but it would have been very hard to justify.

Kissinger: No, no. I agree. It couldn't be justified.

Keating: It would have been good if they had caught them, but it
couldn't be justified.

Kissinger: It's a weird war. The problem for the Israelis is that when
they get hit they have no way of holding any government respon-
sible. Yet whenever they hit back it becomes an international
incident. There is an asymmetry there.

Keating: I was surprised to see that the United States has been blamed
by the Palestinians.

Kissinger: That's standard. It's totally unreasonable. Well, we'll have
to condemn Israel in the vote in the United Nations.

XGDS-3

DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH- Dr. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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Keating: If the Lebanese don't press the issue, the sanctions won't be in the resolution. How will we vote? What if there are sanctions?

Kissinger: We'll try to split any such resolution into two parts. If the resolution simply calls on the ICAO to do something to prevent future measures of this sort we might vote for it. If the resolution insists on expelling Israel, then we can't vote for it.

Keating: Some action has to be taken though in a case of this sort.

Kissinger: The problem is that the Arabs can hijack a plane and fly it to Abu Dhabi and no one can do anything about it. We need some symmetry. Perhaps sanctions could be brought against the government that allows such a plane to land.

Keating: The Arabs must be very opposed to sanctions against terrorism.

Kissinger: That's right; they're very opposed.

Keating: I want to ask about this other recent incident and how it was handled.

Kissinger: Which, the hijacking?

Keating: No, Sisco's interview on Israeli T.V.. And then when he called in Dinitz.

Kissinger: That's not the White House method for doing things. It's childish. How would we like it for the Israeli Ambassador to get on US television and give us advice? It doesn't help to just urge the Israelis to be flexible in the abstract. We have to know what we want from them. To begin with, the Arab position now is inflexible. If it were to change, we could go to Golda at the right moment and urge flexibility on the Israelis, which is something we do want. But we don't want to hit them with it publicly, particularly in the midst of their own election campaign.

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 3 -

I also wouldn't have handled the hijacking the way State Department wanted. I wouldn't have condemned the action on Saturday. I would have held out until Monday to condemn it, and that would have given us a better bargaining position. Instead, by condemning it on Saturday, we move on to the question of sanctions on Monday. Rogers wanted to use this gambit of only stating our position on an "if asked" basis. But that's a bad tactic.

It's insane to stir up the Jewish groups when we have nothing concrete in mind and nothing to work with. If Egypt were to make a proposal, then we could go to the Israelis and urge them to shape up. We're prepared to do this. But if the Egyptians say the entrance price for negotiations is Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and then the Israelis should negotiate with the Palestinians, this is a dream land. No Israeli will accept it. Even if Israel were to make some minor modifications in its position now, it would be of no use. We need to try first to get the Arabs to come up with a reasonable position. Sisco's statement simply doesn't help. He did it for nothing.

Keating: The President has enough problems now without stirring up the Jewish community against him.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Keating: Dinitz talked to me about his discussion with Sisco. He felt we were pressing hard. I think it was all right to explain to the Israelis the problems we faced after casting this veto, but it's important to do it quietly, not in public.

Kissinger: Absolutely. I'm going to get Joe Sisco under control. If you have trouble out there in Israel, you can back-channel me.

Keating: I don't like to do that in principle.

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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Kissinger: Then don't. It's up to you.

Keating: If I need to I will.

Kissinger: We don't want to make this Arab-Israeli conflict a major political problem to the President now, in addition to its being a major international problem.

Keating: You don't want to lose the Jewish community's good will. You may have noticed a recent advertisement in the New York Times supporting the President. Most of the signatories were Jews.

Kissinger: I didn't see that.

Keating: On this issue of a settlement, I guess it's impossible without both sides making some concessions.

Kissinger: There is no question about that. But we need to stop grandstanding and we need to get Sisco to stop. The way he operates, we get caught from both directions. If we move away from Israel now without getting anything in return from the Arabs, it will simply whet their appetite. I am willing to press Israel hard at the right time. In fact, if a settlement comes Israel may want us to press them to accept compromise terms. In the Vietnam situation, people kept telling me that we should squeeze Thieu, but until the right time came and the stakes were important enough I didn't do so. It's the same situation with Israel. What do the Arabs want now? Even if Golda were to come up with some new proposals, it wouldn't help.

Keating: Joe Sisco agrees that there can't be any political concessions from Israel until after the elections.

Kissinger: Of course. Well, it's up to you. You can get in touch with me if you want through the back-channel. I'll protect it.

Keating: It would be helpful if you were to take the initiative and ask me questions through the back-channel to which I could respond.

Kissinger: But you may get some instructions that we don't even see. If I do see the instructions and have problems with them, I'll get in touch with you.

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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Keating: I thought any important instructions would be cleared here.

Kissinger: That's normally true. Joe Sisco has a free-wheeling tendency. The President, of course, won't allow a major blow-up with Israel without making sure we know about it. But sometimes information from the Israeli embassy about what we are doing is better than what I am told from State. The Israelis eventually tell me, so I do get informed.

Keating: If an ambassador gets definite instructions, and if he doesn't agree...

Kissinger: It's up to you. When I am aware of problems, I'll query you.

Keating: That's the best way. But if I find problems with my instructions, I'll take the bull by the horns. I work for the President after all. Maybe things will get moving after the October elections. We'll need to do some hard work then. If I could, I would like to take a letter from the President with me. I'm leaving on Friday.

Kissinger: We'll get the letter done for you. We'll have it by Thursday. Do you want it sent to New York or to the State Department?

Keating: Send it to 200 Park Avenue, New York City. Mark it for the 52nd floor. It gets to me more rapidly that way. Well, we've covered most of what I wanted to cover.

Kissinger: I talked to Joe Sisco on the category 1 recommendation. I gather it's gone to the administrative types.

Keating: It got bogged down in Curtis Tarr's shop. He's taking over Macomber's duties.

Kissinger: I don't see how the administrative people can disagree with political instructions.

Keating: Tarr is very good, but this is the first time I've ever seen administrators act that way. But that's not a very important issue.

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May 29th

Mr. Saunders:

This is the duplicate memo I was speaking to you about earlier, we had it pulled at the last minute before it went in to Pres/ as you can see the May ~~27th~~ 17th is a duplicate with the exception of (revised) after log # ???

tom

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copy sent to Sonnenfeldt 9-22-70 Ed

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Outside System)

URGENT INFORMATION
September 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

HK

SUBJECT: Additional Comments on the Soviet Position on Jordan

The approach made by Vorontsov to Davies bears out the main point in my earlier memo on Soviet reactions; namely, that the Soviets vastly prefer to insulate the Jordanian crisis, even if the fedayeen are defeated, but are especially worried over Israeli intervention. Indeed, if Vorontsov's statement can be accepted at face value the Soviets are at least using some of their political capital to restrain Syria and Iraq and the UAR, and in effect are virtually appealing for us to restraint.

Israel

As to the prospect of our involvement, the Soviet approach in Washington as well as the remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to Beam in Moscow and public output also tend to bear out what we said in yesterday's memo; that is, that the Soviets would not intervene militarily but would not stand by without raising a major campaign against us. As Beam pointed out the Soviets probably feel that Kuznetsov has passed a warning to reinforce the more formal diplomatic demands of Vorontsov, who really did not touch directly on our possible intervention.

Again, there are two aspects that deeply concern the Soviets as Kuznetsov mentioned. First, outside intervention risks "widening hostilities." Second, it creates difficulties for all nations which have "interests in the area." The Soviet interests are plain. They want to forestall situations which could force them into ^{the} unpalatable decision of going to the defense of the Arab states with their own personnel. This means primarily to avoid Israeli involvement, and a resumption of fighting along the canal (at least until they are ready for it). Second, they want to demonstrate to us, to the Arabs, and to the world at large that the Middle East is a Soviet preserve where the US can no longer act with impunity. But the situation in Jordan and our possible intervention might force the Russians to choose between protecting their clients at considerable new risks to themselves and accepting the fact that they cannot yet dictate American policy in the area.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Outside System)

URGENT INFORMATION
September 19, 1970

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FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

HK

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

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I understand that at the WSAG the consensus was if any intervention is necessary, it should be done by Israel rather than the US. While not arguing the relative effectiveness of Israeli vs. US intervention, I want to stress that from the Soviet viewpoint American intervention is more tolerable than Israeli. American intervention could be dealt with in the Great Power context, and, from the Soviet viewpoint, somehow managed. But Israel intervention raises new questions and above all, the risks that the whole area will lapse into unrestrained warfare, bringing into play Soviet commitments and the probably involvement of Soviet personnel in the UAR.

One further aspect of this crisis is that it may be bringing home to the Soviets the risks they have run lately in upsetting the ceasefire standstill. As I noted in my memo of a few days ago, there was some sign of Soviet apprehension in the Vinogradov-Beam talk, and a hint of willingness to talk about rectification. The latest demarche on Jordan suggests that the Soviets may believe that some gesture on the UAR-Israeli front may be necessary to limit the chances of our or Israeli intervention in Jordan.

In sum: the type of intervention that might be most dramatic but least effective in terms of controlling the situation on the ground in Jordan may be least likely to produce direct Soviet intervention; whereas the intervention most likely in the short run, at least, to be effective in controlling the situation on the ground (Israeli) may be most likely to produce Soviet intervention because it is most likely to reopen general Arab- Israeli hostilities and hence involve Soviet commitments and personnel.

The Soviets clearly prefer neither form of intervention even though, on balance, they would probably prefer to see the King remain in power.

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ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on
Jordan Contingency

1. Attached is a memo for the President which would permit him to work his way through the problem in the same way you did at last night's WSAG.
2. A directive will be put out this morning for consolidating into a single scenario the plans now available.

Attachment

HHS:mlc 9-15-70

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN 01-19/33 letter 8-8-02

By KMB NARA, Date 5-17-2004

[9 pages]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/18/76
7:30
p.m.

General Haig:

I hope this
is responsive to
what you said
this morning. HAK
wondered we to do

ds.

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Ed

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

URGENT

INFORMATION

(Outside System)

September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Handwritten mark

Handwritten initials AK

SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction to US Involvement in Jordan

The Soviet attitude toward the latest round between the King and the Army and the Fedayeen is probably mixed.

On the one hand, the King appears to be the preferable alternative to a radical guerrilla regime, which the Soviets have treated with some disdain, which could turn out to be sympathetic to the Maoist brand of revolution and more "spontaneous" than the Soviets like. The probable chaos resulting from the King's overthrow and the psychological impetus that would give to the Iraqi and Syrian regimes cannot be something the Soviets would watch with much satisfaction or equanimity.

On the other hand, Jordan has never been of special concern to the Soviets except in that it reflected the basic policy toward the UAR. The disappearance of a regime influenced by, and sympathetic toward the US would also represent a gain of sorts for the USSR. In the end if faced with the new situation, the Soviets might convince themselves that they could work with Arafat, who, of course, has been in Moscow, and that the new pressures on Israel would strengthen the Soviet hand and weaken ours.

Whatever their theoretical ruminations, the practical matter is that the Soviets will not be happy to see US military power used in the area in any way. They will have to denounce it, harass us (including by horse play and close UAR-based reconnaissance against the 6th Fleet), and generally oppose us. The precedent is what will worry them most of all, and the demonstration that we could and will use our air power and naval presence will cast a shadow over their calculations about how far we might go in support of Israel at a later date in a new crisis, and our international posture generally. (This may be all to the good if our operations are, and are perceived to be successful.)

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Israel and Iraq

1. Air strikes in support of Jordan against the fedayeen alone; this would be the least complicated for the Soviets and call for the least physical riposte; mostly propaganda and agitation, as long as the Arab states stood by.

2. Huessin vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops; if the conflict remains limited to these participants, no Soviet military action would be likely, especially if the US intervention was quick and effective; a more prolonged US air intervention, however, might produce some Soviet diplomatic actions, say in the UN, to castigate and condemn, to force the US to desist.

-- If the Israelis became involved against the Iraqi troops, Soviet reaction could become more problematical and dangerous for two reasons: first, the Israelis might feel compelled to launch preemptive strikes against the air defense build-up along the canal, and second, the UAR might feel it had to activate that front.

-- If this occurred, then the Soviets would be involved, and might shift to an entirely different diplomatic position and military calculation.

-- It would be a situation in which the June war would be reopening piecemeal; the Soviets would be concerned that the Israelis would launch a massive attack on the new air defense complex; in which case, the UAR would almost certainly want to begin using the TU-16s against the Bar-Lev line; Soviet pilots would probably be flying missions, etc.

-- In this contingency the Soviets would still want to avoid a confrontation with the US, but might engage in a greater show of force in the Mediterranean.

-- The main danger would be a de facto Soviet-American air battle in the entire area, with Soviet pilots flying out of the UAR, and Syria and perhaps Iraq.

3. Armed Intervention for evacuation: Soviet calculations might be similar to the first case; i. e., that our action could be tolerated, but they would be concerned that we leave the area; and permanent entrenchment of American forces in Jordan would be a radical change in the situation and might lead the Soviets into a tough threatening stand.

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

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-- One danger would be that the Soviets would begin putting in organized ground units in the UAR, if it looked as if the American forces were in to stay for some time to come.

-- Again, the total Soviet reaction would also be affected by Israeli involvement; Israeli intervention, plus US landings of ground troops would look to the Soviets like a power play changing the ball game in a major way in Israel's favor.

-- The Soviets and the UAR would then have to consider whether to put pressure on the canal front, ranging from raids to a full scale attack; the Soviets would probably not encourage such a course, but they also could not afford to veto such a decision; thus the Soviets themselves could become involved at this point.

* * * *

In sum, the Soviets want, first of all, to protect their stake in the UAR. Their decisions and actions will be influenced by Nassir, and, in turn, the Soviets will be counseling him to think of his own security first and his prestige as an Arab leader second.

The secondary, but still important Soviet aim will be to limit and prevent American intrusion with any military action or presence. They are probably not prepared to take much of a risk to do this in the situation in Jordan but the critical factor is whether Israel becomes involved and the fighting erupts along the canal. Should it do so, a proxy war would be underway, and the Soviets might just figure that decisive action along the canal would be preferable to a war of attrition. This is the main danger.

One important area of uncertainty is the impact of a crisis on the top Soviet leadership, which was sharply criticized after the June war for being too soft, and for mismanaging the entire affair. In another major crisis, particularly one in which the US demonstrated it was free to act militarily, the Soviets might feel they had to justify themselves. On the other hand, they could not afford to open up charges of mismanaging a risky affair by imprudent actions.

On balance, it seems that the Soviets would probably conclude they had little choice but to let the US get away with a limited intervention, as long as Israeli forces were not involved in attacks against the forces of Arab governments.

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 NMOC - LDX'ed.
 WH/gbskwr - LDX'ed

OPSCEN: THIS UNNUMBERED ITEM IS TRANSMITTED TO YOU SEPARATELY FROM THE REGULAR FBIS WIRE.

MOSCOW RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ENGLISH TO AFRICA 1430 GMT 8 SEP 70 L

(TEXT) NEW FACTS HAVE COME TO LIGHT ON THE UNDERMINING ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE IN JORDAN. MANY EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THAT COUNTRY ARE ACTUALLY MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ARE CONDUCTING UNDERMINING ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR OF WORLD ZIONISM AND ISRAEL. THE AIMS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES CONSIST OF HAMPERING ANY SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLES. THE AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE IS (WORKING TIRELESSLY) TO INCREASE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JORDAN, SYRIA, AND IRAQ SO THAT THEIR EAST ARAB FRONT WOULD BE WEAKENED AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY FROM THE EAST WOULD BE GUARANTEED.

HIDING BEHIND THEIR DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS IN JORDAN ARE SUCH MEN FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, JOHN O'CONNELL, AND LEADERS OF THE AMERICAN SPY SERVICE IN AMMAN SUCH AS (HERMANN) FERNALD, JON STEWART, AND (CHRISTOPHER PICKARD). (THEY) ARE SPYING AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE BANNED PARTY CALLED ISLAMIC LIBERATION.

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN AMMAN, COL GERARD COSGROVA, HEADS THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHICH IS UNDER THE PENTAGON.

THE OPINION IS EXPRESSED IN INFORMED CIRCLES THAT THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JORDAN, LEWIS BROWN, IS ALSO CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ROYAL JORDANIAN COLLEGE, WHICH IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH THE ZIONIST CIRCLES. PREVIOUSLY HE WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN DEPARTMENT IN THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND DID HIS BEST TO STRENGTHEN TIES BETWEEN THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL.

OBSERVERS POINT OUT THAT CIA AGENTS, DISGUISED AS AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, HAVE DIRECT CONNECTIONS WITH THE SANGUINARY EVENTS IN JORDAN.

8 SEP 2244Z AO'D/CAT

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Files
Jordan
INFORMATION~~SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~September 8, 1970
no notes

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 

Attached at Tab A is an important intelligence report on the situation in Jordan which you should read carefully. At Tab B is a further elaboration on the deteriorating situation in Jordan which, in my view, has already approached crises proportions. These two reports combined with the ultimatum message given by the Israelis to King Hussein which you read earlier all suggest that the time has come for a coordinated interdepartmental crisis management initiative. I do not believe we can afford to continue to mush along leaving this critical set of circumstances in the hands of the Department of State which is just about totally engulfed in manipulating -- and not very well at that -- the hijacking situation.

At Tab C is the latest Beam message on the Soviet problem which also reflects the lack of finesse which is characterized in our dealings with them on the missile issue. This problem also must be worked into a carefully coordinated Middle East policy control mechanism. As you know, contrary to the State line, USIA, for example, has been strongly pushing the theme of Soviet culpability for the turn of events. I understand that Shakespeare left a meeting at State this morning totally disillusioned and dismayed at the Secretary's inference that the cheating which has taken place thus far is minor and of no consequence. This kind of self-delusion cannot but culminate in disaster.

Attachments ~~SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [1 pages total]

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SECRET/NODIS

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Talking Points - September 15 Appointment with
Emory C. Swank, Ambassador to Cambodia

Background: Although Ambassador Swank has never visited Cambodia, he served as DCM in adjoining Laos from 1964-67 and is familiar with regional problems. Since his designation some six weeks ago he has had the opportunity to read-in comprehensively on current Cambodian problems and U. S. policy positions, consult with the appropriate U. S. officials in Washington, and to discuss Cambodian sentiments and problems with the resident Cambodian Ambassador and those few Cambodian officials who have visited Washington. *Bergin*

in a 2-20 (A)
Your meeting with Mr. Swank will be an opportunity to give him a clear impression of your policy toward Cambodia. A firm statement by you will arm him for his difficult task and help him to overcome the attitude of reticence which has characterized our Embassy in Phnom Penh under Charge Rives up to now.

Talking Points: You may wish to make the following points:

-- You do not want to see a Communist government in Cambodia and want to do everything we can to prevent this.

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-2-

-- Lon Nol should be given no reason to question the firmness of your intent to support Cambodia in its effort to protect its neutrality.

-- You are going to continue to seek maximum possible help for Cambodia from its Asian neighbors.

-- The flow of U. S. military aid and economic assistance will continue; our air interdiction program will be broadly interpreted.

-- You want to stress the importance of the psychological benefits to Lon Nol and Cambodia which our aid can have.

-- Every effort should be made to get more balanced and objective reporting of the situation in Cambodia by the press. This is vital to our securing the understanding and support needed in the U. S. as basis for Congressional support of increased MAP and economic assistance to Cambodia.

-- The Lon Nol Government should be encouraged to make a greater effort to visit the countryside in order to rally popular support and counter the effects of enemy propaganda and organizational efforts.

-- You consider Ambassador Swank as your personal representative and the head of the Country Team. You will back him to the hilt and look forward to hearing from him directly on his impressions and any recommendations he may have on ways to strengthen our mission and to make our effort more effective.

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-3-

-- Ask Ambassador Swank to convey your personal warm best wishes to Lon Nol and your admiration for Cambodia's efforts to defend its neutrality.

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BY WIRE (Please transmit on an urgent basis)

SECRET

September 4, 1970

TO: General Haig
FROM: Colonel Kennedy
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Swank

On re-reading draft talker, I realized one item which we had discussed earlier had not been covered. If possible, you might wish to add following talking point:

-- You do not want to create a large American presence in Cambodia. Military assistance must be carefully managed but you do not want to establish a MAAG. The position of the Political/Military Counselor (Ladd) was established to meet this need."

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ED

sent to S/C B/W/RZ
9/2/70

SECRET

Jordan

TO: General Haig

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

Following are talkers for President's meetings with Ambassadors

Brown and Swank prepared by Saunders and Holdridge. Recommend you
sign off for HAK.

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AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN
Ambassador to Jordan

Background

Ambassador Brown has just returned from being U.S. Ambassador to Senegal. Before that he was one of the outstanding younger country directors in the African Bureau. He had previously been our Deputy Chief of Mission in Morocco from 1962-1965. In addition to his recent tour as Ambassador, he has in the past year chaired one State Department task force on the role and function of the diplomatic mission and worked on another dealing with reducing U.S. personnel overseas, with particular attention to intelligence activities under diplomatic cover.

Talking Points

1. You might want to ask him about his past experience with moderate Africans. For instance, how does a moderate leader like Senghor see the U.S. at this time?
2. In relation to his next post, how does he view the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians? How does he plan to open enough of a door to the moderate Palestinians to make them feel that we are concerned without undercutting the efforts of the Jordanian government to bring them along in a Jordanian negotiation? You have long understood the need somehow to meet the sense of injustice of those Palestinians who have now spent much of their lives in the refugee camps. [Ambassador Brown, like most of us, recognizes the problem but realizes the difficulty of getting a handle on it without disrupting on-going relationships with the Jordanian government. His conclusion seems to be the right one: The Palestinian movement has a momentum that we are not likely to change but which we must be sensitive to.]
3. You send your best wishes to King Hussein. We will continue to do all we can to help achieve an honorable peace settlement.

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sent by wire 9/3/70

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Talking Points - September 15 Appointment with
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Talking Points: You may wish to make the following points:

-- You do not want to see a Communist government in Cambodia and want to do everything we can to prevent this.

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APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH J SISCO

S/S:MR BREWSTER

030466

O 211824Z SEP 70 ZFFS

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 154557

EXDIS

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH SISCO NOON SEPTEMBER 21 AMBASSADOR RABIN PROVIDED FOLLOWING RUNDOWN OF ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ON MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN AS OF APPROXIMATELY 9 A.M. TODAY.
2. IN RAMTHA/IRBID SECTOR, SYRIANS HAVE 2 ARMORED BRIGADES PLUS ONE TANK BATTALION AND HEADQUARTERS UNITS OF FIFTH INFANTRY DIVISION, WITH APPROXIMATELY 300 TANKS AND SIXTY 120 MM. ARTILLERY PIECES.
3. SINCE IRBID WAS ALREADY UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL, THERE NO NEED FOR SYRIANS TO ATTACK CITY AND THEY HAVE THEREFORE DEPLOYED FORCES AROUND IRBID WITH ONLY SMALL UNITS ENTERING CITY. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT SYRIANS MOVING SOUTH; ON CONTRARY, CONSTRUCTION WORK INDICATES DEFENSE PREPARATIONS IN IRBID AREA. SUBSEQUENT PHOTO INTERPRETATION AS OF 10:30 THIS MORNING REVEALED ESSENTIALLY SAME PICTURE OF "MASSIVE" SYRIAN OPERATION PLUS SOME WITHDRAWAL OF JORDANIAN FORCES TOWARD SOUTH. JORDANIANS HAD INFLICATED SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES ON SYRIANS AND HAD NOT SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES THEMSELVES IN IRBID AREA, BUT THEY HAD LOST ONE OF THEIR BEST OFFICERS --

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PAGE 02 STATE 154557

COMMANDER OF JAA 40TH ARMORED BRIGADE. JORDANIANS HAVE 3 INFANTRY BRIGADES PLUS 120-140 TANKS IN IRBID AREA.

4. SISCO ASKED WHAT RABIN'S JUDGMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION WOULD BE IF SYRIANS DECIDED TO MOVE ON AMMAN. RABIN SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE EASY UNLESS THEY BROUGHT IN MORE TANKS. ISRAEL ESTIMATES SYRIANS HAD 900 TANKS BETWEEN DERA'A AND DAMASCUS, OF WHICH ABOUT ONE-THIRD HAD BEEN COMMITTED IN JORDANIAN OPERATION.

5. THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT THIS MORNING OF IRAQ ARMORED COLUMN FROM MAFRAQ TO RAMTHA JUNCTION AND FROM MAFRAQ TO JERASH.

6. JORDANIAN ARMY POSITION IN AMMAN IS REASONABLY GOOD. ON SUNDAY JORDANIANS OVERCAME MOST TERRORISTS CENTERS IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN PARTS OF CITY AND CAPTURED NO. 2 MAN IN FATAH (ABU AYYAD). WHILE SITUATION IN AMMAN MUCH BETTER, THERE REMAIN SOME CENTERS OF RESISTANCE ESPECIALLY IN REFUGEE CAMPS.

7. JORDANIAN ARMY POSITION HAD ALSO IMPROVED IN SALT, AJLUN AND ESPECIALLY IN JERASH. ONLY IRBID, RAMTHA AND MAFRAQ REMAINED UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL.

GP-3. ROGERS

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Flash

VV EHA101
*****ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 51970 2641639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 211630Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211623Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 7016
BT
S E C R E T STATE 154501

EXDIS

TREAT AS NODIS

YOUR 5213 PASSED AMMAN. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS
PASSED TO AMMAN:

A. AMBASSADOR SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT PALACE AND PASS MESSAGE
FROM ISRAELI ACTING PRIME MINISTER TO HUSSEIN. YOU SHOULD
ENCOURAGE KING TO SET UP A MEETING IMMEDIATELY SINCE THIS BEST
WAY FOR ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS TO CONCERT TOGETHER ON HOW EACH
COULD BE HELPFUL TO ONE ANOTHER IN PRESENT SITUATION.

B. WE NOTE YOUR JUDGMENT THAT KING'S REQUEST FOR LAND ACTION WAS
LIMITED TO US AND UK. SINCE ISRAELIS ARE CONSIDERING ACTIVELY
BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR AND GROUND ACTION, PLEASE ASCERTAIN
WHAT THE KING'S VIEWS WOULD BE RE THIS. STRESS THAT NO REPEAT NO
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY ISRAELIS IN THIS REGARD.

GP-3 ROGERS

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Sanders

SECRET 7/13

VV EHA087
ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 5122Q 2641255
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z R 211233Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 6288
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7014
BT
S E C R E T STATE 154462

EXDIS

(TREAT AS NODIS)

AS YOU KNOW ISRAELIS HAVE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE
DECISION TO INTERVENE BOTH IN THE AIR AND ON THE GROUND.
WITHOUT GOING TO THE JORDANIANS, WE WANT YOUR IMMEDIATE JUDGMENT
ON WHETHER ISRAELI GROUND INTERVENTION IS ENCOMPASSED IN KING'S
MESSAGE CONVEYED TO US AS CONTAINED IN AMMAN 4988.

GP-3. ROGERS
BT

SECRET 7/13

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VV EHA100
*****ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 5195Q 2641627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 211624Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211616Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 6292
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 7015
BT
SECRET STATE 154496

EXDIS

TREAT AS NODIS

FYI. FOR YOUR INFORMATION YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WHILE NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN, ISRAELI VIEW IS THAT AIR STRIKES UNLIKELY TO BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT SITUATION IN BORTH WOULD ALSO REQUIRE ISRAELI GROUND FORCES. WE FLAG THIS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND SINCE IT IS OBVIOUS FROM YOUR MESSAGES THAT HUSSEIN'S PRESENT THINKING IS QTE AIR STRIKES FROM ANY QUARTER UNQTE BUT GROUND INTERVENTION FROM US AND UK. WE DOUBT ISRAELIS WILL UNDERTAKE AIR STRIKES WITHOUT AN ADVANCE UNDERSTANDING THAT OPERATION WOULD ALSO REQUIRE GROUND ACTION AND WOULD HAVE TO BE COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH JORDANIANS. END FYI.
GP-3. ROGERS
BT

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Flash SECRET

NODIS

STATE

25

VV EHA069
*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUEHCR 50590 2640750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 210730Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
Z 210730Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 7008
BT
S E C R E T STATE 154454

NODIS

FOR CHARGE

REF: TEL AVIV 5188

1. BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED STATE 154448 WHICH REPRESENTS
ESSENCE OF WHAT WE ARE IN POSITION TO CONVEY TO YOU AT THIS TIME.
WE FEEL IT ESSENTIAL TO CENTRALIZE COORDINATION WITH GOI AT
WASHINGTON END.

2. YOU SHOULD REFER QUESTIONS ARISING FROM CONFERENCE TO DEPT
IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISE GOI REPS TO PASS SAME TO RABIN. WE WILL
COORDINATE WITH RABIN.

ROGERS

BT

SECRET

NODIS

NNNN

10. Was auch immer Sie in Betracht ziehen, werden wir Sie unterstützen. Ich bin bereit, Ihnen zu helfen, wenn Sie das wünschen.

[illegible]

Summary

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05224 261819Z

1. BELIEVE HEALTH AND FOOD SITUATION POSSIBLY CRITICAL BUT FRANKLY DOUBT WE OR ANYONE ELSE KNOW PRECISE DEMINSIONS.
2. RE SECURITY BELIVE AMMAN AIRPORT QUITE SECURE AS WITNESS LARGE NUMBER OF PLANES GOING IN AND OUT WITHOUT INCIDENT PLUS JAA ASSURANCES. THOUGH FRENCH FIRST AIR-CRAFT REPORTED 3 ROCKETS "IN VICINITY" AIRPORT. WHILE SECURITY AMMAN CITY IS SPOTTY WE CONFIDENT JAA WILL NOT MOVE RELIEF ACTION INTO AREAS OF CITY IT REGARDS AS INSECURE. ON BASIS OUR EXPERIENCE THEY BEING, IF ANYTHING, OVERLY CAREFUL. THEY PROVIDE MOVEMENT IN AND OUT OF EMBASSY ONLY BY ARMORED CONVOY WITH GREAT APPEARANCE CONCERN WHILE EMBOFFS AND ITALIAN EMBASSY NEAR HERE MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON FOOT AS NECESSARY WITHOUT PROTECTION.
3. BELIEVE MASH WHAT IS NEEDED HERE AND STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT CHOICE. WOULD ALSO LIKE C-130S WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND MEDICAL STAFF AS FOLLOW-UP FLIGHT AFTER RPT AFTER MASH OPERATION SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED.
4. RIFAI TODAY REQUESTED INCIRCLIK US MILITARY FLIGHTS CLEARED VIA SAUDI ARABIA. IF THIS IMPOSSIBLE INFORM US SOONEST AND WE WILL ASK AGREEMENT TO ISRAELI OVERFLIGHT.

GP-3. BROWN

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05223 261726Z

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 SSO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
DOT-12 E-15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00
O-03 OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00
SY-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 PPT-02 P-03 RSR-01 /150 W
----- 076089

Z 261650Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1583
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN FLASH
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA

SECRET AMMAN 5223

SUBJ: HOSTAGES

1. WE UNABLE AND BRITS UNABLE GET ANY CONFIRMATION AS OF
1830 LOCAL THAT HOSTAGES IN HAND OF EGYPTIANS. UK AIR ATTACHE
JUST RETURNED FROM SO-CALLED PRESS CONFERENCE IN FEDYEEN COUNTRY
ON JEBAL ASHRIFIYYAH WHICH SHED NO LIGHT ON ANYTHING.

2. UK SURMISES PLO TRYING TO CASH IN ON MOVE OF PFLP BY
GIVING ADVANCE REPORT OF FREEING OF HOSTAGES AND THUS REGAIN
SOME OF PRESTIGE LOST BY FACT FIRST GROUP WERE LIBERATED
BY JAA RATHER THAN RELEASED BY ANY FEDAYEEN GROUP.

GP-2. BROWN

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O-03 OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00
SY-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 PPT-02 PER-02 P-03 RSR-01 /152 W
----- 075865

Z 261630Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1581
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN FLASH
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO

SECRET AMMAN 5221

1. GOJ HAS NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF REUTER'S STORY (WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN) FROM PFLP THAT REST OF HOSTAGES RELEASED INTO HANDS OF UAR EMBASSY HERE. EMBOFF REPORTS, HOWEVER, THAT GOJ JUBLIANT OVER STORY.

2. WE TRYING HARDEST GET CONFIRMATION. WILL CONTINUE REPORT FLASH.
BROWN

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 DOT-12
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SY-03 PER-02 RSR-01 /142 W

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Z 261555Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1579
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 5219

SUBJECT: HOSTAGE RELEASE

1. ABOUT 1700L PERSON CLAIMING BE MIDDLE MAN, CONFIDANT UAR EMBASSY AMMAN PASSED NOTE TO JOURNALIST AT INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL. NOTE ALLEGES THAT REMAINDER HOSTAGES WILL BE TURNED OVER UAR EMBASSY FOR ONWARD PASSAGE ICRC (NO DATE OR TIME SPECIFIED). NOTE ALSO CLAIMS THAT PFLP HAD TAKEN ORIGINAL 16 HOSTAGES TO AN ASHRIFIYETH HOSPITAL WHERE THEY IN PROCESS TURNING HOSTAGES OVER TO UNSPECIFIED GROUP WHEN HOSPITAL CAME UNDER JAA SHELL FIRE. ACCORDING TO NOTE, HOSPITAL STAFF THEREAFTER SUBJECTED JAA ARREST OSTENSIBLY FOR THEIR ROLE IN PROCEEDINGS.

2. AS ADDEES AWARE, JAA VERSION RELEASE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT; AUTHENTICITY SOURCE AND NOTE ITSELF HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE; BUT

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Page 11 of 12

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WITH CONDITIONS IMPROVING IN POWER, WE THINK THE SHOULD PERHAPS
STRESS AGAIN TO GOI OUR WISE THAT ALL JUDICIAL POWERED CALLING
ACTION THAT MIGHT COMPLETION MANDATE CIRCUIT. ARE
BROWN

SECRET

De la Cruz et al.

الحمد لله رب العالمين

15

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000-242 PW-03 17-12 1950-00 1800 00000000 10000000 10000000 10000000

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PLATE 21. 7140. W.

[illegible]

2003

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1477

INTE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

U. S. N. I. 6:11:14 AM 5/2/00

1. ENSOFF RECEIVED FOLLOWING OFFER FROM ZALO AKA1
LARRY SEPTEMBER 201 WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE SOUTH OF
LEMON/INLE JUNCTION/CANINA LINE HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY JIM
JOHN TAYLOR, AND LARRY HAS ALCOHOL. JIM HAS RECEIVED
BUT 70-75 SYNTHETIC FIBRE AND NOW HAS RECEIVED THAT PART 1.
REPORTS RECEIVED THAT SYNTHETIC ARE WITHDRAWING.

2. ATLAS ALSO REPORTS THAT IRAG HAS PROVIDED NO TO THE
CONTINUED THROUGH THE AIRWAY FROM THE SAME THAT IT SHOULD
BUT NOT HAVE BEEN RECONSTRUCTED AND IT IRAG AND NOT TO FOLLOW
THE PROBABLY OTHER COULD HAVE BEEN DONE.

U. On Anna's statement, dated June 1961 that she discovered the hidden bones of Valerio Costa not buried. Contradicting her this as proof of plot by government agents. Defendant JURY. Noting the same was part of plot, but finding her testimony off because she had moved twice. This was not relevant and finding none, he said.

4. ARAI SAID THAT LAST WEEK SHE HAD HEARD TWO DISCREPANCY ON
RECAPTURE. IT NOW HAD POINTS OF CODE RECAPTURE. 1000g. THE ONLY
HSA WAS CONCENTRATING ON JAPANESE RECAPTURES AND CONCENTRATED IN
HUBBARD HOUSE. SHE SAID OF ARAI IN THE HUBBARD UNIT. A RECAPTURE,
ARAI REPORTED THAT NUMBER OF RECAPTURES APPROXIMATE 10 IN A DAY.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

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QSL

WWE 234

VV EHA215
*****ZZ RUEHGX
DE RUEHCR 5581Q 2651935
ZNY SESSSS ZZH
Z 221931Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE FLASH
Z 221840Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1462
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3464
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5065

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 2015. WE DOUBLE-TALKED AGAIN BUT JUST TO MAKE SURE THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS WHAT DOUBLE-TALK MEANS I AM QUOTING EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID.
2. REFERRING TO KING HE SAID, "HE PREFERS ACTION FROM UP HIGH. IF ANYTHING IS TO BE DONE DOWN LOW IT SHOULD NOT BE HERE BUT AWAY. WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. WE WILL DISCUSS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL BE."
3. DISCUSSION OF DETAILS MEANS TALK WITH ABOUT ISRAELIS.
4. RIFAI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, THE PRIME MINISTER OF TUNISIA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AND THE UAR CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ARRIVED BY AIR AT MAFRAK. THEY ARE ON THEIR WAY BY CAR TO SEE ONE KING.
5. RIFAI SAID IT IS IMPORTANT FOR USG TO KEEP UP PRESSURES IT HAS ALREADY ASSERTED. I REPLIED THAT I WAS GRATIFIED TO LEARN THAT JORDAN UNDERSTOOD WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THIS PART OF WORLD.
6. RIFAI SAID PRINCIPAL AIM MUST BE TO GET THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. IF THEY STAY, IT WILL COMPLICATE EVEN FURTHER THE JOB THAT GOVERNMENT HAS IN AMMAN. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, HE CONCLUDED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WILL GIVE IRAQIS IDEA THAT THEY TOO CAN GET AWAY WITH SOMETHING IN JORDAN.

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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O 212201Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1453
INFO AMEMBASSY TEZ AVIV IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO IMMEDIATE TO LONDON BERN MOSCOW PARIS CINCSTRIKE
CINCUSNAVEUR COMSIXTHFLEET

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: AMMAN 5004, STATE 154527

1. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT DEPARTMENT AND AMMAN THINKING ALONG
SAME LINES: THAT EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL AMERICANS
FROM JORDAN IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE. AT TIME OF RECEIPT OF
REFTEL B, EMBASSY WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING RECOMMENDATION
FOR MULTINATIONAL EFFORT AIMED AT VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE OF
FOREIGNERS.

2. WHILE EMBASSY HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATING MUCH BROADER
INTERNATIONAL COVER, WE AGREE THAT TIMELINESS ARGUES
FOR JOINT US/UK OR POSSIBLY US/UK/FRENCH EFFORT. WE AGREE
WITH DEPARTMENT THAT UNSC RESOLUTION ON EVACUATION (PARA 3
REFTEL B) IMPRACTICAL. AT SAME TIME PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT
FROM SYGNE THANT MIGHT BE VALUABLE ASSIST IN MAKING DEPARTURE
OF OUR NATIONAL MORE PALATABLE TO JORDANIANS AND ARAB WORLD AS
A WHOLE.

3. EMBASSY NOTES THAT ICRC HAS THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO
RE-ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY OF PARTIES
IN AMMAN--GOJ, FEDAYEEN, OR FOREIGN EMBASSIES. IN ADDITION,

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ICRC'S VERY THIN STAFF ALREADY OVERTAXED WITH BURDEN OF MASSIVE MEDICAL RELIEF PROGRAM AND CONTINUING PROGRAM OF NEGOTIATING FOR RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. ACCORDINGLY, WHILE ANY SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION FROM ICRC WOULD BE WELCOME, EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ICRC SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR EITHER ORGANIZATION OR EXECUTION OF ANTICIPATED EVACUATION. IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOT THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GIVEN UK AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS BY KING, GOJ CAPABLE AND WILLING TO GUARANTEE SAFETY OF FOREIGN EVACUEES TO POINT OF DEPARTURE.

4. ROLE OF GOJ MUST GO BEYOND ARRANGING FOR CONVOY. WITH COLLAPSE OF NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS, NOTICE OF PENDING EVACUATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE VIA RADIO. AS STATED REFTEL A, THIS SHOULD BE DONE OVER VOA, BBC AND RBS (SEPTIL FOLLOWS.) COOPERATION OF GOJ ESSENTIAL, BUT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN GIVEN FACT THAT JORDANIANS HAVE LONG REGARDED PRESENCE OR DEPARTURE OF WESTERNERS AS BELLWETHER OF THINGS TO COME. BLOW CAN BE PERHAPS BE SOFTENED BY ASSURANCE TO GOJ THAT WE NOT PROPOSING OFFICIAL EVAC.

5. EMBASSY CONCURS WITH BRITISH REPORTING TO EFFECT THAT AMMAN SOMEWHAT QUIETER TODAY. HOWEVER, SYRIAN INVASION (AND POSSIBILITY OF) FURTHER INTERVENTION FROM OTHER QUARTERS) RAISES SPECIES THAT WE MAY BE PASSING THROUGH EYE OF HURRICANE. IN ADDITION, DISRUPTION OF NORMAL SERVICES (E.G., WATER, FOOD SUPPLY, MEDICAL CARE) AND PROBABILITY OF CONTINUING SPORADIC VIOLENCE APPEAR TO US TO BE SO BROAD IN SCOPE AND LONG LASTING IN EFFECT THAT THERE IS LITTLE ARGUMENT TO BE MADE AGAINST URGING EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL AMERICANS. AS EMBASSY HAS REPORTED, (AMMAN 5027) ZAID RIFAI HAS WARNED US TO EXPECT AT LEAST ONE MONTH PERIOD OF CHAOTIC AND INSECURE CONDITIONS.

6. EMBASSY ALSO NOTES THAT THERE ARE LARGE NUMBERS OF MEMBERS OF PRESS WHO HAVE BEEN TRAPPED IN AMMAN HOTELS FOR SEVERAL DAYS. UNLESS EFFORTS MADE TO GET THESE PEOPLE OUT ASAP, PRESS ACCOUNTS OF USG ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO BE UNHELPFUL TO SAY THE LEAST.

7 AS OUTLINED REFTEL A EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT CHOICE BETWEEN USE OF AMMAN AIRPORT VERSUS ACABA ROUTE STILL OPEN IF AMMAN AIRPORT CAN BE USED, AND THERE MIGHT BE

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POSSIBILITY OF UTILIZING ICRC AIRCRAFT EVEN THOUGH THAT ORGANIZATION WOULD NOT BE IN CHARGE OF OPERATION. WE ENVISION POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF ICRC AIRCRAFT WHICH BRING IN RELIEF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

8. EMBASSY WOULD PLAN ON REDUCING MISSION PERSONNEL AS ADJUNCT TO ANTICIPATED EVACUATION. PERSONS TO BE EVACUATED WILL BE SELECTED AT LATER POINT IN EXERCISE.

9. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT WE MOVE FORWARD WITH EVACUATION ON THIS BASIS ASAP AND THAT DEPARTMENT MAKE CONTACTS AND ARRANGEMENTS AS NECESSARY.
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NOTE: NOT PASSED BY CC/T.

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SECTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 SSC-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00

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NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 RSR-01 /116 W

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Q P 211800Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1430
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO

AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 5020

SUBJECT ARAB SUMMIT AND JORDANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

1. ARAB SUMMIT MEETING WHICH SCHEDULED TO CONVEENE IN CAIRO SEPT 22 IS INCONVENIENT TO GOJ IN ITS TIMING AND SUBJECT MATTER. PALACE STATES THEY HAD REQUESTED POSTPONEMENT BUT THAT THIS REQUEST HAD BEEN REJECTED. AS A CONSEQUENCE, GOJ WILL ONLY BE REPRESENTED AT SUMMIT BY ITS AMB IN CAIRO WHO WILL BE HEAVILY OUTGUNNED BY OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE. JORDAN, THEREFORE, IS ADOPTING DEFENSIVE POSITION IN CAIRO AND WILL INSIST THAT SOLE TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION BE SYRIA'S INVASION OF JORDAN. EVEN WITH PRESENCE OF FRIENDS AMONG ARAB STATES - SUCH AS MOROCCO AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND ABSENCE ALGERIA - IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD TO THIS LINE, GIVEN LIKELIHOOD OF YASIR 'ARAFAT'S PRESENCE.

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WH WE SUSPECT, MOREOVER, THAT BEHIND VIEWS ON TIMING OF CONFERENCE EXIST BASIC POLICY DIFFERENCES. ON ONE HAND, NASSER AND 'ARAFAT MIGHT LIKE EARLY COMPROMISE SOLUTION THAT WOULD RELIEVE THE ONE OF RADICAL PRESSURES AND GRANT OTHER A POLITICAL VICTORY OVER KING HUSSEIN. SYRIA ALSO MIGHT PREFER AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AS THIS WOULD REDUCE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES BEING APPLIED TO THEM AND REMOVE THREAT ISRAELI ATTACK ON THEIR FLANK.

3. JORDANIANS, ON OTHER HAND, ARE LESS INCLINED TO ACCEPT HALF-WAY MEASURES OVER ISSUE INVOLVING THEIR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. POSSIBILITIES OF DEADLOCK AT CONFERENCE COULD BE INCREASED BY LACK OF FLEXIBILITY WE SEE IN GOJ'S POSITION (AND NECESSARILY LIMITED MANDATE OF ITS AMB). KING HUSSEIN MAY NOW BE IN DIFFICULT SPOT (AS WE HAD FORESEEN EARLIER) BUT HIS RESPONSE TO SYRIANS AND CONTINUED TROUBLE WITH FEDAYEEN IN AMMAN HAS NOT BEEN TO CAST ABOUT FOR COMPROMISE SOLUTION. WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO INDICATION HE WILLING NEGOTIATE WITH SYRIANS. ON SEPT 21, FURTHERMORE, KING HUSSEIN MADE FIRST PUBLIC ADDRESS SINCE BEGINNING OF CLASH WITH FEDAYEEN. ADDRESS BRIEF AND UNCOMPROMISING, AND CALLED UPON ARMY TO RALLY AGAINST SYRIAN INVASION.

4. JORDANIANS MIGHT IN FACT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MEDIATED SOLUTION IF CAST IN TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ'S VIEWS OF VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. (CEASEFIRE OF EVENING SEPT 21 PERHAPS ANNOUNCED WITH CAIRO SUMMIT IN MIND, AND TO GIVE GOJ'S POSITION APPEARANCE OF REASONABLENESS.) BUT GIVEN MAGNITUDE OF DISPUTE BETWEEN GOJ AND FEDAYEEN, AS WELL AS COMPOSITION ARAB LEAGUE, WE ATAE WH SURE THAT TOMORROW'S MEETING CAN YIELD THIS TYPE OF PROPOSAL. ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, COULD LEAD TO INCREASED TENSIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND UAR. THIS COULD BE AS HARMFUL TO POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT AS A MEDIATED SOLUTION THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SETBACK TO KING HUSSEIN. WHAT WE MUST WORK FOR OBVIOUSLY IS EARLY AND DIGNIFIED SOLUTION TO HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM.

5. FOR OPENERS, AND FOR WHAT GOOD IT MIGHT DO, I RECOMMEND THAT WE SEEK TO IMPRESS UPON EGYPTIANS THAT ANY DEFEAT OF HUSSEIN BY FEDAYEEN COULD HARM POLITICAL INTERESTS OF UAR AND ALSO SET BACK CHANCES FOR PEACE IN AREA. WE SHOULD ATTEMPT MAKE REPRESENTATION ALSO TO CHIEFS OF STATE PLANNING BY ATTEND CONFERENCE AND WHO MIGHT BE FRIENDLY TO HUSSEIN. LEAD TIME

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 05020 211935Z

AVAILABLE, THOUGH, IS SHORT.
AS FINAL POINT, FRENCH MIGHT BE
HELPFUL WITH IRAQIS WHO IN PAST FEW DAYS - PERHAPS AS RESULT OF
SYRIAN ACTIONS AND UAR ATTACKS - HAVE SEEMED TO MODERATE THEIR
HOSTILITY TO JORDAN'S REGIME. GP-3.
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ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 52110 2641706
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 211703Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
Z 211638Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1425
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NY FLASH 1840
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5020

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PLS PASS LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW.

REF: AMMAN 4983

1. KING HAS SENT US ANOTHER LETTER WHICH WE RECEIVED THROUGH SAME CHANNEL REPORTED REFTEL.
2. LETTER IS ADDRESSED TO GOVTS OF THE FOUR POWERS AND LABELED AS MOST URGENT. ITS MESSAGE IS THAT SYRIAN AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING AND HAS NOW EXTENDED TO IRBID AND SURROUNDING AREAS, WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER. PRISONERS INCLUDING CIVILIANS ARE BEING SENT BACK TO SYRIA. SITUATION IS CRITICAL.
3. LETTER'S FINAL SENTENCE, OPERATIVE PARTS OF WHICH WE RECEIVED VERBATIM, QTE REQUESTS PERMANENT REPS OF UNSC DO ALL YOU CAN IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HALT THIS INVASION AND TO EVICT SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY. UNQTE
4. SINCE MESSAGE RECEIVED IN DOUBLETALK, SUGGEST WE REQUEST EXACT TEXT FROM BRITISH.

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*****ZZ RUEHGX
DE RUEHCR 5144Q 2641404
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 211400Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211345Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1415
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3432
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5008

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

REF STATE 154462

1. THE ANSWER IS NEGATIVE. REQUEST FOR AIR IS "FROM ANY QUARTER" BUT LAND ACTION REQUESTED OF US AND UK. I HAVE HAD NO INTIMATION IN ANY OF MY TALKS WITH KING OR RIFAI OF ANY THOUGHT OF ISRAELI GROUND ACTION.
2. IF THIS IS INDEED POSSIBILITY, WE'LL WANT TO LET KING KNOW SOONEST AS--I AM SURE-- GROUND AND AIR ACTIVITY ARE TWO VERY DIFFERENT THING'S IN KING'S MIND.
3. SEE AMMAN 5007 FOR SOMEWHAT CHANGED SENSE OF URGENCY. FOR THIS REASON BELIEVE IT WORTH CAUTIONING ISRAELIS TO AVOID PREMATURE, UNILATERAL MOVEMENT ON GROUND OR IN AIR.

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VV EHA096
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Z 211457Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211435Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1421
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3436
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5015

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO TO LONDON

SUBJ SYRIAN THREAT

1. RIFAI CALLED TO SAY THAT SYRIANS ARE ON THE MOVE.
THEY HAVE OCCUPIED THE REST OF IRBID AND ARE MOVING
INTO SURROUNDING VILLAGES. JORDANIANS TANKS HAVE ENGAGED THEM.
JORDANIAN AIR FORCE IS ATTACKING. HTERE HAS BEEN NO
RESPONSE FROM SYRIAN AIR FORCE.

2. HE SAID THE KING WANTS AN IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKE.

3. I SAID THAT THE KING'S ORIGINAL MESSAGE HAD ASKED
FOR A STRIKE QTE FROM ANY QUARTER UNQTE. IS THIS WHAT
THE KING WANTS? HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. I SAID
HE WOULD KNOW WHO WAS IN THE POSITION TO MAKE THE STRIKE.
HE ASKED ME IF THAT MEANT IT WOULD BE A UNILATERAL STRIKE
ON THE PART OF THE NEIGHBOR. I SAID I WAS NOT SURE BUT
ASSUMED SO. HE SAID THAT THE KING WOULD MUCH PREFER A
COORDINATED RESPONSE. ACTUALLY HE ADDED THE KING'S FIRST
PREFERENCE IS FOR A US STRIKE BUT AS THE SITUATION SEEMS TO
BE COMING TO THE WORST THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO HIT
THE SYRIANS NOW.

4. I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

5. REQUEST INSTRUCTION.

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DE RUEHCR 51350 2641353
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Z 211350Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211310Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1414
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3430
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5007

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO TO LONDON

SUBJ SYRIAN THREAT

1. RIFAI FINALLY GOT THROUGH TO ME AT 1400 HOURS. I GAVE HIM THE GENERAL RUNDOWN OF TEL AVIV 5201 AND 5210. HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE.

2. HE SAID THAT THIS INFORMATION GENERALLY ACCORDS WITH WHAT JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. THE SITUATION AS OF NOON IS BETTER THAN IT WAS THIS MORNING. THE JORDANIANS HAVE ALSO NOTICED DIGGING IN AROUND IRBID AREA. THEY ARE PUZZLED BY FACT THAT SOME TANKS SEEM TO BE RETURNING TO SYRIA. THERE IS A QUESTION IN JORDANIAN MINDS WHETHER SYRIANS ARE CONSTRUCTING PERMANENT POSITIONS AT IRBID OR WHETHER THEY ARE SIMPLY PREPARING TO COVER A RETREAT. THEIR PRESENT INACTIVITY GIVES JORDAN AN OPPORTUNITY TO REASSEMBLE ITS FORCES AND TO TAKE ON DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THERE IS NO FIGHTING GOING

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3. HE FINDS VERY PUZZLING THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTF 'S STATEMENTS DENYING ANY A CCK OR INTERVENTCLN WHATSOEVER. HE HAS SEEN THE SYRIAN DE JUNCTION OF SECRETARY ROGERS AND WONDERS IF IN FACT THE SYRIANS ARE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS. HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD BOTH BE THINKING ABOUT THIS, STUDYING INTELLIGENCE AND THEN WE SHOULD CONSULT LATER AS TO WHAT WE THINK IRAQI AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS ARE.

4. I THEN ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANYTHING ON THE IRAQIS. HAD THEY TAKEN ANY NEW ACTIONS AT MAFRAK? HE SAID THAT THEY HAVE SURROUNDED THE RADAR STATION WEST OF MAFRAK. THEY HAVE NOT OCCUPIED IT BUT HAVE ZEROED MORTARS IN ON IT. OTHER THAN THIS INCIDENT THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN QUITE COOPERATIVE. THEY CONTACTED JORDANIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS RECENTLY AND ASKED THE JAA TO REDEPLOY ITS FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM MAFRAK, WHERE THEY ARE NOW STATIONED, TO H-5. THEY GAVE AS THEIR REASON FOR THIS REQUEST THEIR DESIRE NOT TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN POSSIBLE AIR COMBAT BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA. DESPITE THIS APPEARANCE OF COOPERATION, SAID RIFAI, HE DOES NOT TRUST THEM.

5. RIFAI SAID THAT DESPITE CHANGED CONDITIIONS THE KING'S REQUEST TO US STILL STANDS BUT WITH LESS URGENCY. SHOULD THE TIME COME THAT THE SYRIANS DECIDE TO ATTACK SOUTHWARDS THEY WOULD BE ONLY A FEW HOURS FROM AMMAN. THIS IS WHY THE KING WANTS OUR ASSISTANCE PLANNED COMPLETELY IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE COULD LAY ON AN AIRSTRIKE AND TAKE GROUND ACTION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLWING A LAST-MINUTE APPEAL FROM THE KING.

6. RIFAI ASKED IF I HAD A REPLY TO KING'S MESSAGE. I SAID THAT US, UK AND "A NEIGHBOR" DISCUSSING MATTER AND EXCHANGING INFO. I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF OUR BEING PROVIDED LATES INFOR AND ASSESSMENTS OF SITUATION. HE SAID WE

ULD KEEP IN TOUCH.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05004 211022Z

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ACTION OPR-02

INFO OCT-01 EIR-20 NEA-15 IO-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 E-15 DOT-12 RSR-01 SCS-04
AID-28 OCO-00 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02 INR-03 L-04 NIC-01
NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 P-03 PER-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SCA-01
SS-20 SY-03 /180 W

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P 211040Z SEP 70 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1411
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
CICSTRIKE
DIA
CINCUSAFE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO
ANCONSUL/JERUSALEM 2835
RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

SECRET AMMAN 05004

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SUBJ POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICANS

1. PRESENT APPROVED E&E PLAN AMMAN OF LITTLE RELEVANCE

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ACTION OPR-02

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-15 IO-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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AID-23 CCO-00 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02 INR-03 L-04 NIC-01
NSC-10 O-03 CC-06 P-03 PER-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SCA-01
SS-20 SY-03 /180 W

030404

P 211040Z SEP 70 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1411
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO
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RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVELR
CINCUSAREUR
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

SECRET AMMAN 03004

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT PARA. 1, LINE 11)

SUBJ POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICANS

1. PRESENT APPROVED E&E PLAN AMMAN OF LITTLE RELEVANCE
TO CURRENT SITUATION. WE DO NOT RPT NOT PRESENTLY SEE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05004 211822Z

EVACUATION AS IMMINENT NEED BUT BELIEVE PLANS SHOULD BE REVISED ON BASIS PRESENT FACTS. WE AWARE AND APPRECIATIVE OF MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING NOW BEING DONE FOR EVACUATION. HOWEVER, BELIEVE SEVERAL OPTIONS MAY BE AVAILABLE AT LOWER POLITICAL AND MILITARY COST AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE AVAILABLE FOR USE. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS OUTLINE OUR PROPOSED REVISED E&E PROCEDURE AND OPTIONS. THEY ASSUME GOJ COOPERATION, JAA CAPABILITY GIVE SOME PROTECTION MOVEMENT OF AMCITS OUT OF AMMAN (AND THEREFORE POSSIBLE GOJ CONTROL AMMAN AIRPORT. IN EVENT THESE ASSUMPTIONS NOT OPERATIVE, WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT STAND FAST OR EVACUATION BY MILITARY ACTION.

A. NOTIFICATION MUST BE GIVEN TO AMERICAN COMMUNITY. SINCE ALL NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS NOW HAVE COLLAPSED, ONLY PRACTICAL SUGGESTION FOR SUCH NOTIFICATION IS TO BROADCAST STATEMENT OVER RADIO--VOA, BCB AND HBS. SUGGESTED TEXT OF STATEMENT FOLLOWS BY SEPTTEL.

B. MOVEMENT TO INTERMEDIATE COLLECTION POINTS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN TWO WAYS. UNFORTUNATELY PRIVATE RESIDENT AMERICAN (SCATTERED THROUGH CITY) WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THEIR WAY AS BEST THEY CAN TO SUCH COLLECTION POINTS. MISSION PERSONNEL AND LARGE POCKETS OF NONRESIDENT AMERICANS LATTER ESSENTIALLY IN HOTELS INTERCONTINENTAL AND SHEPHERD, WOULD BE CONVOYED TO COLLECTING POINTS UNDER AS MUCH GOJ COVER AS MAY BE PROVIDED.

C. FROM INTERMEDIATE COLLECTION POINTS, PROTECTED CONVOYS WOULD MOVE AMERICANS TO ONE OF TWO ASSEMBLY POINTS FOR EVACUATION. SITE OF THIS ASSEMBLY AREA TO BE DETERMINED

ACCORDANCE WITH OPTIONS OUTLINED BELOW.

D. FROM FINAL ASSEMBLY AREA, ALL AMERICANS TO BE EVACUATED WOULD BE MOVED IN SINGLE PROTECTED CONVOY TO FINAL EVACUATION POINT.

2. IN CONSIDERING EVACUATION ROUTES, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THERE ARE THREE OPTIONS. IN DESCENDING ORDER OF DESIRABILITY THEY WOULD BE:

A. OPTION 1. FINAL ASSEMBLY POINT WOULD BE AT SPORTS CITY ON NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN. FROM THERE (ASSUMING LIKELY GOJ

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CONTROL OF AIRPORT) CONVOY WOULD MOVE TO AMMAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR EVACUATION VIA USAF AIRCRAFT, UNDER NORMAL AIRPORT PROCEDURES. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IN THIS RESPECT, MOST DESIRABLE PLAN MIGHT BE TO BRING IN TWO C-141 AIRCRAFT OVER ISRAELI AIR SPACE. TIME FACTOR IN GETTING AIRCRAFT TO SITE AND ELIMINATING NECESSITY FOR REFUELING ARE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS.

B. OPTION GX

UNDER THIS OPTION FINAL ASSEMBLY POINT WOULD BE AREA OF QUEEN MOTHER'S PALACE ON JEBEL AMMAN. FROM TMC

PROTECTED CONVOY WOULD MOVE EVACUEES WEST THEN SOUTH VIA NAUR ROAD AND DESERT HIGHWAY TO AQABA. DISADVANTAGE OF LONGER TRAVELTIME WOULD BE OFFSET BY HIGHER DEGREE OF SECURITY ONCE OUTSIDE AMMAN AND PARTICULARLY AT EVACUATION SITE. WE ENVISAGE EVACUATION BY USAF AIRCRAFT ON AQABA-ISRAEL SHUTTLE.

C. OPTION 3. FINAL ASSEMBLY AREA WOULD BE SAME AS OPTION TWO, FROM WHENCE PROTECTED CONVOY WOULD MOVE OVER LAND TO ALLENBY BRIDGE FOR EVACUATION THROUGH ISRAEL. POLITICAL DRAWBACKS THIS OPTION OBVIOUS TO ALL.

3. EMBASSY HAS NO RPT NO AMPLIFYING INFORMATION RE AIRPORTS, ETC., OTHER THAN THAT IN AMMAN'S MOST RECENT E&E PLAN AND INFO BEING PROVIDED FOR DOD CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANNING. HOWEVER BELIEVE BASIC REQUIREMENT IS DOD READINESS TO LAY ON AIRCRAFT (FOR MINIMUM 100 MAXIMUM 200 PEOPLE) ABLE MOVE AMMAN ON 3 HOURS' NOTICE OR AQABA 6 HOURS' NOTICE. IF DEPARTMENT APPROVES REQUEST YOU PROCEED WITH PLAN FOR AIRLIFT REQUIREMENT.

4. ABOVE PLANS ARE PROPOSED AS LESS DRASTIC ALTERNATIVES THAN PRESENT DOD PLAN FOR MILITARY MOVE INTO AMMAN FOR EVACUATION. FURTHERMORE, OUR OPTIONS WOULD POSE MUCH LESS THREAT TO HOSTAGES THAN MILITARY ALTERNATIVE. BELIEVE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY PERMIT USE ONE OF THESE OPTIONS. THEREFORE REQUEST DEPARTMENT APPROVAL. WE PROCEEDING WITH DETAILS OF EVAC PLANNING ON ABOVE LINES.

BROWN

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HCE459

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05002 211021Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SS0-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

026938

Z 211005Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1409
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

SECRET AMMAN 5002
EXDIS

1. SYRIANS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF PROVING
REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS BY TANGIBLE SUPPORT TO FEDAYEEN.
HAVING WON A VICTORY IN RIBID AND HAVE PROVED SELVES, THEY MAY
NOT BE DISPOSED TO MOVE FURTHER SOUTH THOUGH MILITARY
CAPABILITY EXISTS. THE FURTHER SOUTH THEY MOVE THE MORE
VULNERABLE MILITARILY AND (AS THEY SURELY AWARE) THE
MORE INTERNATIONAL TENSION THEY CREATE.

2. A MAJOR FACTOR IN SYRIAN CALCULATIONS MUST BE HOW MUCH
FURTHER THEY CAN MOVE WITHOUT RISKING ISRAELI INTERVENTION OR
EVEN WORSE WHAT THEY WOULD CALL IMPERIALIST INTRUSION IN THE
SCENE. THEY MAY BE HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SPOOKING AND DISPOSED
TO PULL BACK OR AT LEAST STAND FAST IF THERE INDICATION OF
CHALLENGE FROM OUTSIDE.

3. IN THIS REGARD IDF RECON FLIGHT AND FAINT SIGNS POSSIBLE
IRAQI REACTION MOST HELPFUL. FURTHER SMOKE SIGNALS THIS CHAR-
ACTER EXTREMELY USEFUL NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS SYRIANS BUT AS SOME
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUPPORT WE CAN OFFER
HUSSEIN.

E.G., ESCALATION ISRAELI ACTIVITY, REAL OR MANUFACTURED
SIGNS, IRAQI ACTIVITY, CAREFUL LEAKS RE CONTINGENCY
PREPARATIONS US AND OTHERS (AS SUGGESTED EARLIER
TELS) MIGHT CONTRIBUTE.

4. IN BRIEF, WE BELIEVE THIS MAY BE CRITICAL MOMENT IN BRING-
ING MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON SYRIANS CALCULATED
TO DISCOURAGE FURTHER AGGRESSIVE MOVES
AND BOLSTER HUSSEIN'S MORALE. GP-3.

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DE RUEKCR 50510 2540610
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
Z 240647Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1403
BT
SECRET AMMAN. 4993

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PASS LONDON FLASH

SUBJECT: KING'S LATEST MESSAGE

1. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT KING MEANS WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT BREAKDOWN. I IMAGINE THAT GOING THROUGH HIS MIND IS POSSIBILITY THAT DEFEAT OF HIS NORTHERN ARMY BY OVERWHELMING SYRIAN FORCE WOULD SO DEMORALIZE HIS TIRED AND CONFUSED TROOPS HERE IN AMMAN THAT THEY WOULD CEASE TO FUNCTION AS AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. I SIMPLY CANNOT MAKE A JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER THAT COULD OR WOULD HAPPEN.

2. AS BACKGROUND TO ABOVE IS FACT THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN AMMAN. IT WAS QUIET LIGHT DURING NIGHT BUT RESUMED AT DAWN ON A LESS INTENSE LEVEL THAN PAST FEW DAYS. AT PRESENT MOMENT (0800 LOCAL) ARTILLERY FIRE IS PICKING UP IN INTENSITY.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NW 01-26/9 am 13 Dec. 04

By DE Date 20 APR 09

[p. 1 of 2]

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Flash

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1399
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4989

43

EXDIS (TREAT AS MODIS)

DIPT PASS INFO LONDON FLASH

1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 0700L. HE READ TO ME STATEMENT FROM KING WHICH KING WISHES TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS.
2. STE KING BELIEVES AIR STRIKE WILL TIP THE BALACE BUT IF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US BREAK AS RESULT OF COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN AMMAN THAN YOU HAVE MY ADVICE AND AUTHORITY TO LAND. UNSTE
3. WE HAD NO TIME TO TALK. HE SAID HE HAD TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID HE WOULD PHONE BACK SOON AND, IN ANY CASE, IF THERE ARE NEW DEVELOPMENTS. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION, I SAID THAT I HAD HAD NO REPLY YET BUT THAT I SURE IT WAS RECEIVING CAREFUL STUDY PDAT HIGHEST LEVELS.
4. COMMENT: THESE PHONE CALLS NECESSITATE A CROUCHED SPRINT OF A HALF BLOCK. IT'S EASIER AT NIGHT.

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Flash

Appeals

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4988

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EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO FLASH LONDON

TREAT AS NODIS)

. THE KING PHONED ME AT THREE A.M. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED
ME TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MOST URGENT MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO THE
PRESIDENT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

. QTE SITUATION DETERIORATING DANGEROUSLY FOLLOWING SYRIAN
MASSIVE INVASION. NORTHERN FORCES DISJOINTED. IRBID OCCUPIED.
THIS HAVING DISASTROUS EFFECT ON TIRED TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL
AND SURROUNDINGS. AFTER CONTINUOUS ACTION AND SHORTAGE SUPPLIES
MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF ADVISE. I REQUEST
IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL INTERVENTION BOTH AIR AND LAND AS PER THE
AUTHORIZATION OF GOVERNMENT TO SAFEGUARD SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JORDAN. IMMEDIATE RPT IMMEDIATE
AIR STRIKES ON INVADING FORCES FROM ANY QUARTER PLUS AIR COVER
ARE IMPERATIVE. WISH EARLIEST WORD ON LENGTH OF TIME IT MAY
REQUIRE YOUR FORCES TO LAND WHEN REQUESTED WHICH MIGHT BE VERY
SOON. UNQTE

. KING SAID HE UNABLE TO CONTACT BRITISH AND ASKED US TO
SET THIS MESSAGE TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT MOST URGENTLY.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1398

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4988

EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO FLASH LONDON

(TREAT AS NODIS)

1. THE KING PHONED ME AT THREE A.M. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MOST URGENT MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. QTE SITUATION DETERIORATING DANGEROUSLY FOLLOWING SYRIAN MASSIVE INVASION. NORTHERN FORCES DISJOINTED. IRBID OCCUPIED. THIS HAVING DISASTROUS EFFECT ON TIRED TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL AND SURROUNDINGS. AFTER CONTINUOUS ACTION AND SHORTAGE SUPPLIES MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF ADVISE. I REQUEST IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL INTERVENTION BOTH AIR AND LAND AS PER THE AUTHORIZATION OF GOVERNMENT TO SAFEGUARD SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JORDAN. IMMEDIATE RPT IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES ON INVADING FORCES FROM ANY QUARTER PLUS AIR COVER ARE IMPERATIVE. WISH EARLIEST WORD ON LENGTH OF TIME IT MAY REQUIRE YOUR FORCES TO LAND WHEN REQUESTED WHICH MIGHT BE VERY SOON. UNQTE

3. KING SAID HE UNABLE TO CONTACT BRITISH AND ASKED US TO GET THIS MESSAGE TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT MOST URGENTLY.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

WLN 01-26/10 per Tr 13 Dec 04

By *[Signature]*

Date 20 Apr 07

[p. 1 of 1]

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04986 210038Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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Z 210013Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1396
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

S E C R E T AMMAN 4986

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEDICAL MISSION AND SECURITY AMMAN AIRPORT

REF: STATE 154418

DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS AS REQUIRED

1. DURING TALK WITH ROYAL CONFIDANT ZAID RIFAI (0100L)
I STATED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE TWO COMPLETE
FIELD HOSPITALS WHICH WOULD BE TRANSPORTED TO JORDAN
IN US MILITARY AIRCRAFT UNDER ICRC AUSPICES. I DID NOT
GO INTO THE QUESTION OF STAFFING OF THE HOSPITALS AS MY
STATEMENT OF WHAT WE WERE DOING SATISFIED HIM. I
EMPHASIZED THAT ENTIRE OPERATION WOULD BE UNDER SPONSOR-
SHIP OF ICRC AND THAT WE AND OTHER NATIONS WOULD BE TAKING
PART.

2. I SAID THERE MIGHT BE A PROBLEM OF OVERFLIGHTS AND ASKED
WHAT THE JORDANIAN REACTION WOULD BE TO OVERFLIGHT OF ISRAEL.
HE ASKED WHY THE AIRCRAFT DID NOT OVER-FLY SYRIA. I REPLIED
ICRC WAS SEEKING SUCH PERMISSION BUT DID NOT KNOW IF IT
WOULD BE GRANTED. I WAS ONLY RAISING QUESTION WITH HIM
IF OTHER MEANS OF ACCESS TO JORDAN WERE NOT POSSIBLE. I
ADDED AIRCRAFT WOULD PROBABLY BE PAINTED WHITE WITH RED CROSS AND
UNDER ICRC DIRECTION. IN THAT CASE HE SAID GOJ WOULD HAVE
NO OBJECTION TO OVERFLIGHT OF ISRAEL.

3. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT SOMEHOW INFORMATION
ON CONDITIONS AT THE AMMAN AIRPORT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04986 210038Z

I SUGGESTED GOJ OPEN CONTROL TOWER AND PERMIT IT TO TALK DIRECT TO THE BEIRUT CONTROL TOWER. THROUGH THIS MEANS NECESSARY INFORMATION ON NAVIGATION, FUEL SUPPLIES, ETC., WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE ICRC AND TO THOSE NATIONS PROVIDING AIRCRAFT.

4. I THEN TURNED TO AIRPORT SECURITY. I SAID IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR ALL THOSE TAKING PART IN ICRC OPERATION TO BE ASSURED THE GOJ WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD AN EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN FIRED UPON TODAY. THIS SEEMED TO SURPRISE HIM AND HE ASSURED ME GOJ WOULD PROVIDE TROOPS TO GUARD AIRPORT. GP-3. BROWN

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THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND
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I have been thinking about you very much lately. I hope you are well and happy. I am still in the same old place, but I feel like I have grown a little more. I wish I could see you often.

Your friend,
John Doe

[illegible]

RECEIVED: JULY 1968

[illegible]

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1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the purpose of the study. It is to determine the effect of the new teaching method on the students' learning.

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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. The subjects were divided into two groups: the control group and the experimental group. The control group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group. The experimental group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group.

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Figure 1

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Figure 1. The structure of the proposed model.

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1. 2017-2018 was the
 first year that the
 1st and 2nd year students were
 given the opportunity to
 participate in the

U. F. C. N. = H. Anderson 4.5.70

2. Δ 1.9

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[illegible]

as it is of the defendant to decide whether to request
time to examine the facts. One point of view is that
within that scope of what reasonably we are entitled to.

John H. Williams, 1222 1/2 E. 12th St., Minneapolis, Minn.

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process of the development of the curriculum is the identification of the needs of the community. This is done through a series of interviews and focus groups with community members. The second step is the selection of the content to be included in the curriculum. This is done through a review of the literature and consultation with experts in the field. The third step is the development of the curriculum materials. This is done through the writing of lesson plans and the development of activities and materials. The fourth step is the implementation of the curriculum. This is done through the delivery of the curriculum to the community. The fifth step is the evaluation of the curriculum. This is done through the collection of feedback from community members and the assessment of the impact of the curriculum.

1. ADMINISTRATIVE AT THE BOTTOM TO THE TOP OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS THE LINE OF COMMUNICATION. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF CONTROL. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF ACCOUNTABILITY. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF DISCIPLINE. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF ORDER. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF EFFICIENCY. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF EFFECTIVENESS. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IS THE LINE OF SUCCESS.

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Figure 1

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الحمد لله رب العالمين

Philippe de France, comte de Flandre

1. The first observation is that the world is not a simple place. It is a complex and ever-changing environment. We must be able to adapt to these changes and find ways to survive.

See also: [1997](#), [1998](#), [1999](#), [2000](#), [2001](#), [2002](#), [2003](#), [2004](#), [2005](#), [2006](#), [2007](#), [2008](#), [2009](#), [2010](#), [2011](#), [2012](#), [2013](#), [2014](#), [2015](#), [2016](#), [2017](#), [2018](#), [2019](#), [2020](#), [2021](#), [2022](#), [2023](#), [2024](#), [2025](#), [2026](#), [2027](#), [2028](#), [2029](#), [2030](#), [2031](#), [2032](#), [2033](#), [2034](#), [2035](#), [2036](#), [2037](#), [2038](#), [2039](#), [2040](#), [2041](#), [2042](#), [2043](#), [2044](#), [2045](#), [2046](#), [2047](#), [2048](#), [2049](#), [2050](#), [2051](#), [2052](#), [2053](#), [2054](#), [2055](#), [2056](#), [2057](#), [2058](#), [2059](#), [2060](#), [2061](#), [2062](#), [2063](#), [2064](#), [2065](#), [2066](#), [2067](#), [2068](#), [2069](#), [2070](#), [2071](#), [2072](#), [2073](#), [2074](#), [2075](#), [2076](#), [2077](#), [2078](#), [2079](#), [2080](#), [2081](#), [2082](#), [2083](#), [2084](#), [2085](#), [2086](#), [2087](#), [2088](#), [2089](#), [2090](#), [2091](#), [2092](#), [2093](#), [2094](#), [2095](#), [2096](#), [2097](#), [2098](#), [2099](#), [2100](#), [2101](#), [2102](#), [2103](#), [2104](#), [2105](#), [2106](#), [2107](#), [2108](#), [2109](#), [2110](#), [2111](#), [2112](#), [2113](#), [2114](#), [2115](#), [2116](#), [2117](#), [2118](#), [2119](#), [2120](#), [2121](#), [2122](#), [2123](#), [2124](#), [2125](#), [2126](#), [2127](#), [2128](#), [2129](#), [2130](#), [2131](#), [2132](#), [2133](#), [2134](#), [2135](#), [2136](#), [2137](#), [2138](#), [2139](#), [2140](#), [2141](#), [2142](#), [2143](#), [2144](#), [2145](#), [2146](#), [2147](#), [2148](#), [2149](#), [2150](#), [2151](#), [2152](#), [2153](#), [2154](#), [2155](#), [2156](#), [2157](#), [2158](#), [2159](#), [2160](#), [2161](#), [2162](#), [2163](#), [2164](#), [2165](#), [2166](#), [2167](#), [2168](#), [2169](#), [2170](#), [2171](#), [2172](#), [2173](#), [2174](#), [2175](#), [2176](#), [2177](#), [2178](#), [2179](#), [2180](#), [2181](#), [2182](#), [2183](#), [2184](#), [2185](#), [2186](#), [2187](#), [2188](#), [2189](#), [2190](#), [2191](#), [2192](#), [2193](#), [2194](#), [2195](#), [2196](#), [2197](#), [2198](#), [2199](#), [2200](#), [2201](#), [2202](#), [2203](#), [2204](#), [2205](#), [2206](#), [2207](#), [2208](#), [2209](#), [2210](#), [2211](#), [2212](#), [2213](#), [2214](#), [2215](#), [2216](#), [2217](#), [2218](#), [2219](#), [2220](#), [2221](#), [2222](#), [2223](#), [2224](#), [2225](#), [2226](#), [2227](#), [2228](#), [2229](#), [2230](#), [2231](#), [2232](#), [2233](#), [2234](#), [2235](#), [2236](#), [2237](#), [2238](#), [2239](#), [2240](#), [2241](#), [2242](#), [2243](#), [2244](#), [2245](#), [2246](#), [2247](#), [2248](#), [2249](#), [2250](#), [2251](#), [2252](#), [2253](#), [2254](#), [2255](#), [2256](#), [2257](#), [2258](#), [2259](#), [2260](#), [2261](#), [2262](#), [2263](#), [2264](#), [2265](#), [2266](#), [2267](#), [2268](#), [2269](#), [2270](#), [2271](#), [2272](#), [2273](#), [2274](#), [2275](#), [2276](#), [2277](#), [2278](#), [2279](#), [2280](#), [2281](#), [2282](#), [2283](#), [2284](#), [2285](#), [2286](#), [2287](#), [2288](#), [2289](#), [2290](#), [2291](#), [2292](#), [2293](#), [2294](#), [2295](#), [2296](#), [2297](#), [2298](#), [2299](#), [2300](#), [2301](#), [2302](#), [2303](#), [2304](#), [2305](#), [2306](#), [2307](#), [2308](#), [2309](#), [2310](#), [2311](#), [2312](#), [2313](#), [2314](#), [2315](#), [2316](#), [2317](#), [2318](#), [2319](#), [2320](#), [2321](#), [2322](#), [2323](#), [2324](#), [2325](#), [2326](#), [2327](#), [2328](#), [2329](#), [2330](#), [2331](#), [2332](#), [2333](#), [2334](#), [2335](#), [2336](#), [2337](#), [2338](#), [2339](#), [2340](#), [2341](#), [2342](#), [2343](#), [2344](#), [2345](#), [2346](#), [2347](#), [2348](#), [2349](#), [2350](#), [2351](#), [2352](#), [2353](#), [2354](#), [2355](#), [2356](#), [2357](#), [2358](#), [2359](#), [2360](#), [2361](#), [2362](#), [2363](#), [2364](#), [2365](#), [2366](#), [2367](#), [2368](#)

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FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]
[illegible text follows, appearing to be a memorandum format with a subject line and several paragraphs of text, though the content is mostly illegible due to the quality of the scan.]

THE PRESIDENT
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Abel, L. W., 1964-1965

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

ANNE SCHULZ

Abstract

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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1. moreover, the above research will forming tells be involve the no significant answer to whether solution in domestic monetary will be involving to come on business strains and domestic firms along the relationship especially all it is not really failed. "then as the effective position with confidence and ability through apparently not as well identifiable with. however said the new no information on the of domestic firms action the involved in domestic by firm it would be said that firms involved in domestic the same can control moves in that is means but will allow what it is in domestic firms.

2. MAKING A VOUCHER AND RECEIPT OF STOCK Following receipt of the inventory the employee should be given a receipt for the stock received. The receipt should be made out in duplicate and received by the employee. The receipt should be made out in duplicate and received by the employee. The receipt should be made out in duplicate and received by the employee.

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STORY ABOUT ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS TO BET SHEAN AREA HAS
NOT KNOWN HERE SO FAR AS WE KNOW. FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS
ARE AWARE OF IT BUT STORY IS APPARENTLY BEING HELD UP BY IDF
CENSOR. NONETHELESS FROM PAST EXPERIENCE WE KNOW DOMAINS
AND REVEAL ALMOST ALWAYS KNOW OF IDF TROOP MOVEMENTS IN BET SHEAN
AREA AND STEPS VERY LIKELY STAIRS, WHO NOW HOLD INFO
HEIGHS, ARE INFORMED OF THEM. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT LACK OF PUBLICITY WILL ENFORCE, WITHIN THEM
DETACH FROM, PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE. GP-3
ZURHELLEN

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INFO RUQMG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3897

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 5248

EXDIS

HANDLE AS NODIS

1. CHARGE CONTACTED GAZIT EARLY SEPTEMBER 22 TO TELL HIM WE HAD INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 155165) TO FOLLOW UP ON SISCO-RABIN CONVERSATION WITH EMPHASIS ON THAT ALTERNATIVE CALLING FOR MOVE INTO SYRIA.

2. GAZIT NOTED RABIN HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IT WAS USG "ESIMATE" THAT GOJ WOULD FIND ACTION OUTSIDE JORDAN LESS OF A PROBLEM. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS GOJ POSITION. CHARGE NOTED THIS HAD BEEN TRUE AT TIME OF LATE AFTERNOON SISCO-RABIN CONVERSATION, BUT THAT SUBSEQUENTLY USG HAD SUPPLIED ANSWERS TO GOI QUESTIONS WHICH INDICATED BY QUOTATION FROM ZAID RIFAI THAT THIS MIGHT BE JORDANIAN POSITION ALTHOUGH WE WERE SEEKING FURTHER CLARIFICATION. IT DEVELOPED GAZIT HAD NOT YET SEEN ANY REPORT FROM ISRAELI EMBASSY WASHINGTON OF OUR ANSWER AND HE SAID HE WOULD CHECK.

3. GAZIT TOLD CHARGE AT 0950 LOCAL THAT NO REPORT HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED OF ANSWERS AND CABINET, WHICH WAS MEETING AT 10:00 A.M., WOULD NOT HAVE ANSWERS BEFORE IT FOR CONSIDERATION. CHARGE CONFIRMED TO GAZIT THAT ANSWERS HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO ARGOV AT 10:30 WASHINGTON TIME LAST NIGHT OR 4:30 A.M. THIS MORNING ISRAELI TIME. GAZIT INDICATED HE MIGHT TELEPHONE ARGOV TO SEE WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO REPORT.

4. WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW UP AND HAVE TOLD GAZIT WE ARE AVAILABLE FOR WHATEVER DISCUSSION GOI MAY WANT TO HAVE. GP-1.

ZURHELLEN

BT

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NODIS

1. AT AIRPORT LATE AFTERNOON SEPT 21 TO GREET RETURNING PRIME MINISTER MEIR, DEFMIN DAYAN SOUGHT OUT CHARGE FOR PRIVATE TALK. DAYAN SAID WITH SOME ASPERITY THAT HE HAD TOLD USG BACK IN APRIL THAT IN EVENT OF TROUBLE IN JORDAN ONLY POWER ABLE TO BRING FORCE TO BEAR WOULD BE ISRAEL, AND HE HAD ASKED FOR PERIODIC MILITARY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN USG AND GOI TO CONSIDER SUCH CONTINGENCIES. HE HAD NOT HAD ANY REPLY AT ALL TO THIS SUGGESTION, AND RIGHT DOWN TO LAST FEW DAYS USG HAD CONSTANTLY URGED ISRAEL TO REFRAIN FROM ANY KIND OF ACTION IN JORDAN. NOW, SAID DAYAN, WHEN IT IS TOO LATE, YOU COME TO US WITH PROPOSAL FOR ACTION. IF ISRAEL HAD ACTED AS LATE AS TWO DAYS AGO, HE MAINTAINED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE "PROVOCATIONS" WHICH WOULD HAVE DETERRED BOTH SYRIANS AND IRAQIS FROM MOVING AGAINST JORDAN. EVEN THOUGH OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN LOST THIS TIME, DAYAN CONCLUDED, HE HOPED WE WOULD NOW FIND IT POSSIBLE TO START CONSIDERING TOGETHER WHAT NEW CONTINGENCIES WE WILL HAVE TO FACE SIX MONTHS FROM NOW.

2. AFTER DAYAN HAD MOVED AWAY RAFAEL, WHO HAD JOINED CONVERSATION MIDWAY, TOLD CHARGE THAT DAYAN'S REMARK ABOUT IT BEING TOO LATE WAS MEANT TO REFER ONLY TO EFFICIENT ADVANCE PLANNING, AND DID NOT MEAN THAT GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED AGAINST USG PROPOSALS. THAT WAS STILL OPEN QUESTION, HE SAID, AWAITING ANSWERS WHICH RABIN HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ASK FOR IN WASHINGTON. GP-1.

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O 211340Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9712
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5222

NODIS

1. BY ARRANGEMENTS MADE COINCIDENTALLY SOME TIME AGO, CHARGE AND POLOFF HAD LUNCH SEPTEMBER 21 WITH MINISTER SHIMON PERES. PERES HAD JUST COME FROM CABINET SECURITY COMMITTEE MEETING WHICH HE SAID HAD DECIDED TO INSTRUCT RABIN TO PURSUE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION FURTHER WITH USG AND REQUEST "CLARIFICATIONS" OF US POSITION. PERES ADDED THERE WAS A HINT OF ADVICE ALSO INCLUDED IN RABIN'S INSTRUCTIONS.

2. IN HOUR'S CONVERSATION, PERES MADE IT PLAIN HE PERSONALLY FAVORS USG INTERVENTION IN FORCE AND RAPIDLY ENOUGH TO HAVE DECISIVE EFFECT. IN HIS VIEW, FIRST MOVE SHOULD BE LANDING OF TROOPS IN AMMAN AREA TO SECURE CITY AND THEN MOVE NORTH AGAINST SYRIAN TANK FORCES. HE SAID THAT IF USG WENT IN, "OTHERS" WOULD ALSO; IF USG DID NOT, THEN "OTHERS" NOT LIKELY TO MOVE ON THEIR OWN. BY "OTHERS" HE MADE IT PLAIN HE MEANT ISRAEL. ON OTHER HAND, HE SAID, IF THERE WERE DIRECT REQUEST FROM HUSSEIN TO ISRAEL FOR INTERVENTION, GOI MIGHT DECIDE TO GO AHEAD ON ITS OWN.

3. WITHOUT INTERVENTION, PERES THOUGHT, GOJ LIKELY TO COLLAPSE AND COUNTRY TO BE TAKEN OVER BY SYRIA AND IRAQ IN NORTH AND PERHAPS SAUDI ARABIA IN SOUTH. HE THOUGHT NASSER WOULD FIND THIS MOST DISTASTEFUL BUT WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT FAIT ACCOMPLI. USSR WOULD BE HIGHLY PLEASED WITH SITUATION, HE THOUGHT, SINCE IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE CONSIDERED BY REST OF WORLD AS MAJOR DEFEAT FOR US POLICY AND INTERESTS ANF THUS AUTOMATICALLY AN ADVANTAGE TO SOVIETS.

4. PERES ASKED WHAT USG LIKELY TO DO AND WE TOLD HIM THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS BEING CONSIDERED ONLY IN WASHINGTON AND WE HAD NO INFO ON SUBJECT.

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Syria Interview

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5211

NODIS

REF: STATE 154454

1. AT ISRAELI REQUEST, CHARGE AND DATT NET 10:00 A.M. LOCAL SEPTEMBER 21 WITH BRIG GEN GILBOA, ACTING CHIEF IDF INTELLIGENCE, ASST DIR GEN MFA GAZIT, AND OTHER ISRAELI MILITARY STAFF OFFICERS. CHARGE HAD RECEIVED AND READ STATE 154448 PRIOR TO MEETING. REFTEL ARRIVED DURING MEETING AND SUBSTANCE WAS COMMUNICATED TO CHARGE BY TELEPHONE.

2. GILBOA SAID THAT GOI WAS CONSIDERING ON CONTINGENCY BASIS WHAT IT HAD HEARD FROM USG AND FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO WHATEVER DECISION MADE AT GOVERNMENT LEVEL, IDF WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER USG WILL BE ABLE TO SET UP OPERATIONAL LIAISON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AS WELL AS POLITICAL LIAISON. IF GOI DECIDES IDF IS TO GO IN, IDF WILL NEED TO KNOW HOW TO IDENTIFY AND DISTINGUISH BETWEEN JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES AND WILL NEED TO KNOW LOCATION OF FRONT LINES. IDF ESPECIALLY NEEDS:

A. BY RADIO, DETAILED JORDANIAN POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, I.E. WHETHER STANDING STILL, MOVING FORWARD, ETC; JORDANIAN KNOWLEDGE OF SYRIAN POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS.

B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR IDENTIFICATION ON GROUND, I.E. SIGNALS, COLORED ROCKETS, COLORED SMOKE, DAY AND NIGHT TO MARK JORDANIAN FRONT LINES.

C. WOULD USG CONSIDER IDEA OF COMMON STAFF FOR "PROJECT MANAGEMENT" OF OPERATION?

2. GILBOA AGAIN EMPHASIZED HE WAS MENTIONING THESE QUESTIONS ONLY IN CASE GOI WHOUDL DEICIDE TO TAKE PART.

3. GAZIT SAID GOI WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER AIR OPERATION ALONE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE NOW. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE A DAY OF 36 HOURS AGO, BUT GOI NOW WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER USG BELIEVES AIR ACTIVITY, EVEN IF BY BOTH

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4. IN RESPONSE QUERY AS TO PRESENT SITUATION, GILBOA SAID PHOTOT RECON MISSION WAS CARRIED OUT 0830 LOCAL THIS MORNING AND READOUT WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE AFTERNOON. IN GENERAL, HE THOUGHT APPROXIMATELY 250-300 SYRIAN TANKS HAD COME INTO IRBID AREA. EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THEM HAD ENTERED CITY PROPER, HE THOUGHT THEY WERE STILL GROUPED TOGETHER AND NOT DISPERSED AMONG CITY STREETS. SECOND ECHELON NOW MOVING IN FROM SYRIA, SUPPLY VEHICLES, BULLDOZERS FOR DIGGING TANKS IN, ETC. WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT IDF CONSIDERS THERE STILL VULNERABLE TARGETS BETWEEN IRBID AND SYRIAN BORDER BUT NOT SO VULNERABLE AS YESTERDAY. GILBOA SAID THAT IF "TAIL" OF SYRIAN MOVEMENT IS CUT OFF HEAD WOULD BE SERIOUSLY CRIPPLED.

5. GILBOA SAID THAT, PURELY FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT, HE THOUGHT PREFERRED OPERATION WOULD BE COMBINATION OVERLAND MOVEMENT OF ARMOR AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES IN VICINITY IRBID, ACCOMPANIED BY AIR AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT. AS TO MOVEMENT ACROSS GOLAN HEIGHTS INTO SYRIA WITH OBJECTIVE CAUSING SYRIANS TO TURN AROUND AND COME BACK, GILBOA SAID SUCH DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN AS PREFERABLE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS BUT NOT MILITARILY; FACT WAS THAT SYRIAN FORCES IN SYRIA WERE NOT THREAT TO ISRAEL, WHILE SYRIAN FORCES IN IRBID WERE; MILITARY REASON THEREFORE PRESCRIBES HIT DANGER WHERE IT IS.

6. AT THIS POINT INFO STAT 154454 COMMUNICATED TO CHARGE BY TELEPHONE. CHARGE INFORMED GILBOA AND GAZIT. GILBOA SAID HE COULD NOT QUARREL ABOUT LOCUS FOR MAJOR DECISIONS BUT HE THOUGHT LIAISON ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS HE HAD BROUGHT UP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED HERE.

7. AFTER MEETING BROKE UP, GAZIT TOLD CHARGE PRIVATELY HE THOUGHT GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE MAKE DECISION WITHIN HOUR OR TWO ON SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER TO US IN PRINCIPLE.

8. COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT FEELING IT ESSENTIAL TO CENTRALIZE COORDINATION WITH GOI AT WASHINGTON END. BELIEVE WE SHOULD REMAIN CLUED IN FOR INFO, HOWEVER, AGAINST CONTINGENCY THAT WE HAVE TO GET INTO ACT AT SOME LATER STAGE
GP-1.

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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMMAN FLASH 3892
SECSTATE WASHDC 9206

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5210

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 5201

1. FURTHER TO REFTTEL, ACTING CHIEF IDF INTELLIGENCE TOLD CHARGE AND DATT THAT THERE APPROXIMATELY 250 - 300 SYRIAN TANKS IN GENERAL AREA OF IRBID. SOME TANKS HAVE ENTERED CITY BUT ARE REMAINING IN GROUPS AND NOT DISPERSED AMONG CITY STREETS. OTHER TANKS REMAIN IN GROUPS OUTSIDE CITY. SECOND ECHELON CONSISTING OF SUPPLY VEHICLES AND BULLDOZERS, ETC. BETWEEN SYRIAN BORDER AND IRBID. IDF SURMISES BULLDOZERS TO BE USED FOR DIGGING IN TANKS WHICH IDF BELIEVES USUAL SYRIAN TACTIC. ON BASIS THIS INFO AND FACT THAT NO MOVEMENT FROM IRBID TOWARDS AMMAN HAS YET BEEN DETECTED, SEEMS POSSIBLE TO IDF THAT SYRIAN INTENTIONS ARE TO HOLD IRBID AREA, DIG IN THERE, AND EXERT INFLUENCE FROM "LIBERATED AREA" ON GOJ IN AMMAN BUT, OF COURSE, FURTHER FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ARMOR FORCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

2. ABOVE MAY BE SPECULATIVE BUT WE PASS IT ON FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH. GP-3.
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NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. MCGAFFEY - S/S-O.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5590Q
RECD: SEP 22, 1970
4:00 P.M.

P 221845Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1787
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 3054

MODIS

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 22. HE EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT-ELECT FRANGIE HAD REQUESTED THAT I OBTAIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE USG RESPONSE TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

2. WHAT WOULD BE THE REACTION AND THE ACTION OF THE USG SHOULD THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS ARISE IN LEBANON:

(A) IF CIVIL WAR ERUPTED IN LEBANON SIMILAR TO THAT NOW IN PROGRESS IN JORDAN AS RESULT ACTION PFLP OR SIMILAR PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION;

(B) IF CIVIL WAR AROSE AS IN SITUATION (A) AND SYRIANS INTERVENED EITHER DIRECTLY OR IN PALESTINIAN GUISE AS IN JORDAN, AND

(C) IF SITUATION (A) OR (B) AROSE AND IF GOL OR PRESIDENT FRANGIE WERE TEHN TO REQUEST USG INTERVENTION.

I AGREED TO PASS ON IMMEDIATELY PRESIDENT-ELECT FRANGIE'S REQUEST BUT POINTED OUT THAT SIMILAR QUESTIONS HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT HELOU AND HAD BEEN ANSWERED BY USG. I DOUBTED IF OUR POSITION HAD CHANGED. I EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY IN ANSWERING HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS OF THIS NATURE AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION IT EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL USG WOULD GIVE NEW ANY UNDERTAKING AS TO WHAT IT WOULD DO IN ADVANCE RE SITUATIONS SUCH AS THESE. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT SAID HE HAD EXPLAINED TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE THAT HELOU HAD RECEIVED USG ANSWERS TO SIMILAR QUESTIONS BUT FRANGIE INSISTED THAT QUESTIONS NONETHELESS BE PUT TO USG. I ALSO NOTED PHRASE "GOL OR PRESIDENT FRANGIE" IN SITUATION 2(C) AND POINTED OUT HE WAS PERHAPS SUGGESTING TWO DIFFERENT SITUATIONS. IN THE FIRST, PRESIDENT FRANGIE MIGHT BE MAKING THE REQUEST ON HIS OWN AND IN THE SECOND HE WOULD BE DOING IT WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS). HE RESPONDED THAT IN EITHER CASE FRANGIE WOULD STILL BE THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON.

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3. I ASKED PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT IF GOL VIEWED PROSPECTS FOR LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY DIFFERENTLY THAN HE HAD DESCRIBED THEM TO ME LAST WEEK (BEIRUT 7927). HE REPLIED HIS GENERAL ASSESSMENT REMAINED MUCH THE SAME ALTHOUGH SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN JORDAN HAD INCREASED SOMEWHAT THEIR CONCERN. HE POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE WAS NEW AND CONSEQUENTLY PERHAPS A BIT MORE NERVOUS THAN PRESIDENT HELOU OR HE.

4. COMMENT. I AM SURE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE WILL BE SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS REPLIES TO SIMILAR QUESTIONS. NOTWITHSTANDING, IN VIEW OF NEWNESS OF PRESIDENT, IT WOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITY IN COURSE OUR RESPONSE TO ASSURE HIM OF OUR CONCERN FOR STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON. ALTHOUGH I AM FULLY AWARE OF PREOCCUPATION DEPARTMENT AT THIS TIME WITH JORDAN CRISIS, WOULD APPRECIATE URGENT RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S REQUEST.

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ACTION NEA-15

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P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 ACDA-19 O-03 OPR-02
OC-06 SY-03 UID-28 RSR-01 /177 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9703
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5198

SUBJ: JORDANIAN SITUATION

1. WHEN EMBOFF TALKED TO HADASS (DIRECTOR RESEARCH FONMIN) THIS MORNING HADASS DID NOT HAVE UP TO MINUTE INFO BUT SAID THAT AS OF YESTERDAY EVENING (SEPT 20) ONE REGIMENT PLUS ONE BATTALION OF SYRIAN TANKS WERE MOVING IN DIRECTION OF IRBID. JAA WAS TRYING TO SET UP A DEFENSE LINE TO STOP THEM. HADASS SAID HE WOULD BE CHECKING URGENTLY RE NIGHT'S DEVELOPMENTS AND GIVE US A CALL SOONEST.
2. HADASS SAID LIBYIANS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET FORCES INTO JORDAN TO HELP FEDAYEEN. REMARKED THAT WHATEVER FORCES LIBYANS COULD BRING IN WOULD PROBABLY BE INCONSEQUENTIAL AS FAR AS FIGHTING CONCERNED BUT THIS WOULD CERTAINLY COMPLICATE SITUATION.
3. VERED (DIRECTOR FONMIN MIDDLE EAST DEPT) CALLED JUST AFTER EMBOFF SPOKE TO HADASS TO SAY SYRIANS ARE NOW IN IRBID. VERED

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SAID SHE HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER SYRIANS ATTEMPTING TO
MOVE SOUTHWARD FROM IRBID BUT SAID THEIR PRESENCE THERE CREATES
"U VERY SERIOUS SITUATION." GP-3.
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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2323

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 4113

EXDIS

SUGGEST DEPT PASS SECDEF, USCINCSRIKE/CINCMEMAFSA AND
OTHER INTERESTED POSTS AS APPROPRIATE

SUBJ: SHAH'S VIEWS AND INITIATIVES RE JORDAN SITUATION

REF: (A) STATE 154391
(B) TEHRAN 4059

SAW SHAH AT 11:00 A.M. SEPT 21 AND OUR TALK COVERED (A)
INITIATIVE HE TOOK YESTERDAY RE JORDAN; (B) SITUATION FREE
WORLD WILL SOON FACE IF KING HUSSEIN IS OVERTHROWN.

I. INITIATIVES

1.. I OPENED BY EXPRESSING SINCERE APPRECIATION
OF PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE FOR SHAH'S FRANK SEPT 19 ASSESSMENT
RE JORDAN (REF B) AND GAVE HIM OUR OWN LATEST ASSESMENT
BASED ON DEPT'S HELPFUL MESSAGES. ALSO INFORMED HIM IN
STRICTEST CONFIDENCE WE PREPARED INTERVENE IF NECESSARY TO
EVACUATE AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD THERE BE COMPLETE BREAK-
DOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER IN JORDAN AND AMERICAN LIVES IN GRAVE
DANGER.

2. I THEN NOTED THAT BOTH SHAH AND USG FELT SURVIVAL OF
KING HUSSEIN VITALLY IMPORTANT FOR SHOULD HE DISAPPEAR FROM
SCENE AND BE REPLACED BY PALESTINIAN REGIME OPPOSED TO
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, CHANCES FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE WOULD BE
VERY DIM INDEED. IN LIGHT OF THIS, I SAID WE WOULD BE
MOST GRATEFUL FOR HIS LATEST VIEWS AND THOUGHTS ON WHAT

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INITIATIVES MIGHT BE TAKEN TO HELP KING HUSSEIN AND AT SAME TIME (A) OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES; (B) DETER INTERVENTION IN JORDAN BY IRAQIS. SHAH REPLIED THAT SINCE IRAN IS NOT AN ARAB STATE THERE SEEMS LITTLE IRAN ITSELF CAN DO AT THIS JUNCTURE TO HELP HUSSEIN, WHO HAD SENT SHAH SEVERAL MESSAGES YESTERDAY (SEPT 20 ASKING FOR HELP BUT NOT REQUESTING ANY SPECIFIC KIND OF AID. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE TO THESE APPEALS SHAH WANTED PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ROGERS TO KNOW IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD YESTERDAY INSTRUCTED ACTING FORMIN KHALATBARI TO CALL IN UAR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WITH MESSAGE FROM SHAH TO NASSER. MESSAGE PROPOSED THAT UAR, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, IRAN, TURKEY AND LEBANON (ALL OF WHOM SUPPORT OR HAVE NOT OPPOSED ROGERS' PLAN) ISSUE FORMAL APPEAL FOR ALL NATIONS IN AREA (READ SYRIA AND IRAQ) TO REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. SUBSEQUENTLY, KHALATBARI HAD CALLED IN SAUDI, KUWAIT AND TURK DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, EXPLAINING PROPOSAL SHAH HAD MADE TO UAR AND URGING THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT IT.

3. SHAH DOES NOT KNOW WHAT REACTION TO HIS PROPOSAL WILL BE BUT PROMISED TO KEEP ME INFORMED. HIS COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE REACTIONS FOLLOWS:

(A) UAR. WHILE SHAH AGREES WITH US THAT NASSER WOULD PREFER TO SEE HUSSEIN STAY IN POWER AND WHILE HE PROBABLY NOT HAPPY ABOUT SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND POSSIBILITY OF IRAQ INTERVENTION, IN FINAL ANALYSIS NASSER "WHO IS VERY TRICKY AND CALCULATING" WILL DECIDE ON BASIS OF HOW IT WOULD AFFECT HIS OWN PERSONAL POSITION. ABOVE ALL NASSER WILL NOT WISH TO BE ISOLATED IN ARAB WORLD. NOW (RPT) THAT LIBYA, "WHICH HAS STOPPED ITS AID TO JORDAN," HAS JOINED IRAQ, SYRIA AND ALGERIA IN SUPPORTING PALESTINIANS, NASSER MAY BE FEELING A BIT LONELY. FURTHERMORE SHAH DISTURBED BY TONE OF NASSER'S TWO MESSAGES TO HUSSEIN YESTERDAY SINCE BOTH IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED HUSSEIN WITHOUT BALANCING APPEAL TO PALESTINIANS. THEREFORE, IT JUST NOT POSSIBLE TO KNOW HOW NASSER WILL RESPOND TO SHAH'S PROPOSAL.

(B) KUWAIT. KUWAITIS ARE ABOVE ALL DOMINATED BY FEAR OF IRAQIS AND THEIR DECISIONS USUALLY GOVERNED BY DESIRE TO AVOID OFFENDING IRAQ AT ALL COST. KUWAITIS THEREFORE MAY WITHHOLD THEIR DECISION RE SHAH'S PROPOSAL UNTIL THEY KNOW UAR POSITION WHICH MAY SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE KUWAITI

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RESPONSE.

(C) SAUDI ARABIA. WHILE SAUDIS GIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PALESTINIANS, FAISAL HAS DEEP VESTED INTEREST IN SURVIVAL OF KING HUSSEIN, AND PROBABLY REALIZES IF HUSSEIN DISAPPEARS, SAUDIS WILL FACE VERY GRAVE SITUATION. THEREFORE, IN PRINCIPLE THERE SHOULD BE NO BARRIER TO SAUDI SUPPORT ALTHOUGH THIS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN AND MAY DEPEND ON RESPONSES OF OTHERS.

(D) TURKEY. WHILE TURKS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY SHOWN DESIRE TO BE CONCILIATORY AND FRIENDLY WITH IRAQ BECAUSE OF DEEP TURKISH CONCERN RE AN AUTONOMOUS KURDISH MOVEMENT CENTERED IN IRAQ WHICH COULD EMBARRASS KURDS OF TURKEY AND IRAN, SHAH

SEES NO RPT NO REASON WHY IN THEIR OWN INTEREST TURKS SHOULD NOT SUPPORT HIS PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF TURK FEELINGS RE SYRIA. SHAH OBSERVED THAT FOR YEARS TURKISH DEFENSE PLANNING HAS BEEN DOMINATED BY CONCEPT THAT ONLY REAL THREAT TURKS FACE IS FROM OVERT ATTACK BY RUSSIA ON TURK'S NORTHEAST FRONTIER. TURKS HAVE IN PAST WORRIED LITTLE ABOUT THEIR SOUTHERN FRONTIER WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ EXCEPT IN TERMS OF KURDISH PROBLEM. DURING RECENT VISIT OF TURKISH CHIEF OF STAFF, SHAH HAD POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST TURKEY, EXCEPT IN CONTEXT OF MUCH LARGER WAR, UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF SOVIET DETENTE POLICY RE WEST EUROPE AND TURKEY'S NATO TIES, HOWEVER, SHOULD SOVIETS SUCCEED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN STRONG POSITION OF PRIMARY INFLUENCE IN SYRIA AND IRAQ THROUGH EVENTUAL FORMATION OF "POPULAR FRONT" GOVTS THAT INCLUDE COMMUNIST IN THESE TWO STATES, TURKEY COULD BE SUBJECTED TO SIMULTANEOUS PRESSURE ON TWO FRONTS.

II. PROSPECTS IF HUSSEIN OVERTHROWN.

4. SHAH SAID ALL WITH INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE TODAY ASSESSING LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF HUSSEIN GOES UNDER. HE ENTIRELY CLEAR IN HIS OWN MIND THAT IF THIS HAPPENS IN ABOUT A YEAR'S TIME CHANCES ARE THAT KUWAIT WILL ALSO GO UNDER AS RESULT OF IRAQI SUBVERSION AND AT SAME TIME SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE FORTALLY THREATENED FOR

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IT CERTAIN IF JORDAN DISAPPEARS SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE TARGET OF SUBVERSIVE OFFENSIVE FROM THE NEW PALESTINIAN STATE, IRAQ, SYRIAN AND SOUTHERN YEMEN. IN SUCH EVENT AND IN ABSENCE OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS HE WOULD NOT GIVE SAUDI ARABIA MUCH MORE THAN A FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE OF SURVIVING OVER LONGER TERM ALTHOUGH "FAISAL IS A GOOD MAN WHO IS MOVING ALONG WITH HIS REFORMS ABOUT AS FAST AS CAN BE EXPECTED GIVEN ULTRA CONSERVATIVE NATURE OF HIS BEDOUIN AND MULLAH SUPPORTERS."

5. IF RADICAL ARABS WITH SOVIET SUPPORT OVERTHROW SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, THE TRUCIAL STATES AND REMAINING GULF SHEIKHDOMS WILL OF COURSE FOLLOW. THIS MEANS IRAN WILL BE ONLY REMAINING POSITION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE IN GULF AREA BUT IT WILL BE STANDING ALONE WITH HOSTILE NEIGHBORS ON ITS WESTERN AND GULF FRONTIER. RADICAL REGIMES THAT WILL HAVE TAKEN OVER IN ARAB SIDE OF GULF WILL CERTAINLY BE UNDER STRONG INFLUENCE OF SOVIETS WHO HAVE HELPED THEM WITH MILITARY AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, THUS ENABLING THEM TO OVERTHROW MODERATE TRADITIONALIST REGIMES. AND, OF COURSE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT OBJECTIVES OF SOVIETS AND RADICAL ARABS IN GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA AREA ARE THE SAME: NAMELY, ELIMINATION OF ALL US AND WESTERN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE. THIS MADE QUITE CLEAR BY JOINT SOVIET-IRAQI COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 12 1970.

GP-3

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2324

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EXDIS

6. UNDER FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT BENEVOLENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN WILL INEVITABLY UNDERGO CHANGE AS NEITHER SOVIETS NOR RADICAL ARABS WOULD WISH TO SEE A STRONG IRAN WITH CLOSE TIES WITH WEST PREVENTING COMPLETE DOMINATION OF AREA PARTICULARLY GULF, BY SOVIET-RADICAL ARAB COALITION. THEREFORE

IF ARAB SIDE OF GULF FALLS, SHAH EXPECTS SOVIETS TO ALTER THEIR PRESENT

AMIALE ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN, REVERTING TO HOSTILITY, CRITICISMS AND PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AS IN LATE FIFTIES WHEN THEY DID THEIR BEST TO PREMENT US-IRAN UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENTS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES SHAH EXPECTS SOVIETS TO RECOMMENCE PRESSURES OF IRAN, SIMILAR TO THOSE OF 1950'S WITH SOVIETS TAKING TIME THEY CANNOT TOLERATE US IMPERIALIST INSTALLATIONS AND ACTIVITIES ON IMPORTANT

SOVIET SOUTHERN

FRONTIER. IN THIS CONNECTION SHAH REFERRED TO VISIT OF JAMES LINEN INVESTMENT GROUP LAST MAY FOLLOWING WHICH SOVIET AMB COMPLAINED TO PRIMIN HOVEYDA AND CRITICIZED

IRAN FOR SEEKING AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN IRAN, PARTICULARLY IN NORTH WHICH SOVIET AMB SAID ADVERSLY AFFECTED LEGITIMATE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS (SEE TEHRAN 2564).

- SHAH HOPED WE UNDERSTOOD SOVIET PLAN, WHICH IS TO ELIMINATE ALL US INTERESTS FROM ENTIRE AREA OF MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING IRAN. HE ALSO HOPED WE UNDERSTOOD SOVIETS USING

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RADICAL ARABS TO THIS END. HE AGAIN SAID (PARA 6 REF B)
HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE FAILED TO TAKE SERIOUSLY
SOVIET BLUEPRINT FOR DOMINATING GULF AREA AS ENUNCIATED IN
JOINT SOVIET-IRAQ COMMUNIQUE. WE MIGHT BE INTERESTED TO
KNOW THAT WHEN SHEIKH OF RAS-AL-KHAIMAH HAD VISITED BAGDAD
DURING SUMMER IRAQ HAD PRESSED HIM HARD FOR LONG-TERM LEASE
ON TUNBS ISLANDS IN MOUTH OF GULF ALTHOUGH ISLANDS ABOUT
1,000 KILOMETERS DOWN GULF FROM IRAQ. WHY DID THEY WANT
THESE ISLANDS THAT DOMINATE MOUTH OF GULF? IT WAS BECAUSE
IT COULD GIVE THEM AND INDIRECTLY SOVIETS CONTROL OF GULF ACCESS.
SOVIETS WERE TODAY CONSTRUCTING NAVAL BASE AND PORT FACILITIES
IN IRAQ AT UMM QASR ON GULF. IF IRAQ OR OTHER RADICAL REGIME
HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS OBTAINED TUNBS THROUGH LEASE OR
OTHERWISE, SOVIETS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO CONSTRUCT
FACILITIES, ETC., ON THESE ISLANDS, NOMINALLY FOR THEIR
RAD CAL ARAB FRIENDS, BUT ACTUALLY TO HELP INSURE SOVIET
ABILITY TO CONTROL ACCESS TO GULF IF NEED BY SOVIETS SHOULD
ARISE.

3. SHAH SUMMARIZED BY SAYING IRAN MUST FACE POSSIBILITY OF
STANDING ALONE IN GULF AREA AS ONLY REMAINING COUNTRY
FRIENDLY TO INTERESTS OF WEST AND WILLING TO COOPERATE.
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IRAN MUST EXPECT HEAVY PRESSURES
FROM BOTH RADICAL ARABS AND SOVIETS WHO SEEK TOTAL
ELEMINATION FROM GULF, AS SOVIET-IRAQI COMMUNIQUE STATES, OF
US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE. SHAH SAID SOMBERLY THAT IF IRAN
IS OBVIOUSLY STRONG HE CONVINCED IRANIAN PEOPLE WILL STAND
FIRMLY WITH HIM TO OPPOSE SUCH PRESSURES BECAUSE HIS
PROGRAMS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM HAVE GIVEN THEM NEW
HOPE FOR
FUTURE AS WELL AS PRIDE IN IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE.

HOWEVER, TO WITHSTAND SUCH PRESSURES HE NEEDED TO BUILD UP
IRAN'S STRENGTH AND IN THIS HE NEEDS COOPERATION AND
ASSISTANCE OF HIS FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY US. A STRONG IRAN

COULD WITHSTAND PRESSURES UNLESS ACCESS TO GULF FELL INTO
UNFRIENDLY HANDS AND IRAN'S
VITAL OIL LIFELINE ON WHICH ITS
VERY LIFE DEPENDED WERE SEVERED. IN THIS CASE JIG WOULD IN
ANY EVENT BE UP.

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PAGE 03 TEHRAN 04113 02 OF 02 211511Z

9. HE CONCLUDED BY HOPING WE UNDERSTAND ALL THIS AND ALSO
UNDERSTOOD WHY HE FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO STRENGTHEN IRAN'S

MILITARY CAPABILITIES SINCE EVEN IF HUSSEIN SURVIVES,
SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE RELENTLESSLY THEIR EFFORTS TO ATTAIN
THEIR OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS TO EXPEL US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE
FROM AREA AND DOMINATE VITALLY IMPORTANT PERSIAN GULF.

UNFRIENDLY STATES IN CONTROL OF GULF COULD, HE SAID,
EXERCISE GREAT PRESSURES ON JAPAN AND NATO EUROPE BY
LIMITING OR DENYING THEM OIL FROM GULF. THIS WAS BUT
ANOTHER REASON THAT BESPOKE COOPERATION ON OUR PART, AND IN
OUR OWN INTEREST, IN SHAH'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ADEQUATE
STRENGTH.

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ACTION NEA-15

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E-15 H-02 INR-03 IO-13 L-04 NSAE-05 NSC-10 NSCE-00
O-03 OC-05 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00
SY-05 SCA-01 SCS-04 UPW-01 RSR-01 /146 W
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FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3946
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA

SECRET BERN 2595

SUBJECT: GRABER ON THE ISRAELI POSITION

1. I CALLED ON GRABER AT THIS REQUEST THIS AFTERNOON.
HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN TO ME SOME IMPORTANT PREOCCUPATIONS
OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL. WE WERE UNITED IN THE SAME
AFFAIR BUT NOT IN THE SAME SITUATION SINCE OUR
PRESPECTIVES WERE DIFFERENT. FOR US, THE WHOLE
HIJACKING AFFAIR IS A CASE OF PEACE OR WAR IN THE MIDDLE
EAST. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION
WHERE THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CONCERNED HAD THE OFFER
OF A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WHILE THE RELEASE OF THE
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IS LINKED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
ISRAELI EXCHANGES. THUS THE QUESTION WHICH SWITZERLAND
HAS TO CONFRONT IS NOT THE SAME AS THAT WHICH THE U.S.
MUST CONFRONT.

2. SWITZERLAND HAS NEVERTHELESS FROM THE FIRST SOUGHT
AND MAINTAINED A SOLID FRONT WHICH, WITH SOME MURMURING,
HAS BEEN MAINTAINED. SWITZERLAND IS PREPARED TO STAY

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IN A SOLID FRONT SO LONG AS THIS CONTINUED TO OFFER A REAL POSSIBILITY FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS IMPLIES RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THERE WAS NOW CONSIDERABLE IMPATIENCE IN THE FEDERAL COUNCIL SINCE IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT THE TALKS BETWEEN MRS. MEIR AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD SETTLE THE QUESTION OF WHAT ISRAEL MIGHT DO. THERE HAS APPARENTLY, HOWEVER, BEEN NO MOVEMENT.

3. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT NO MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE IS A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE BY ISRAEL TO SOME SORT OF PRISONER EXCHANGE. IT IS HARD TO INTERPRET WHETHER THE ISRAELI POSITION TO DATE IS TACTICAL, A HARD POSITION, OR A WAITING POSITION. BUT SINCE NOTHING HAS CHANGED, THE FEDERAL COUNCIL MUST NOW TAKE A VIEW WHETHER THE ISRAELI POSITION IS NEGATIVE AND/OR PERMANENT. IF IT IS EITHER OR BOTH, THIS IS TANTAMOUNT TO ABANDONING THE HOSTAGES FOR AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD. AS FAR AS SWITZERLAND IS CONCERNED, THE MOMENT HAS COME FOR THE ISRAELIS TO SPEAK AS TO WHETHER HOPE IS POSSIBLE OR NOT.

4. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TIMING BY CITING A TELEPHONE CALL WHICH HE HAD JUST HAD WITH BOISSIER IN BEIRUT WHO HAD SAID THAT WITHOUT AN ISRAELI DECISION IN PRINCIPLE, NO FURTHER NEGOTIATION IS POSSIBLE.

5. I RESPONDED ALONG THE LINES OF STATE 154468. ON THE BASIS OF THE BEAUDRY-SEELEY-VINE TELCON, I USED THE FORMAT IN PARA. 4 OF BERN'S 2380, ELIMINATING POINT B AND THE REFERENCE TO THE LEBANESE IN POINT C. I ALSO POINTED OUT TO GRABER THAT LEBAN WAS STILL IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN ADDITION TO OFFICIAL PRESSURE THERE WAS POWERFUL UNOFFICIAL PRESSURE BUILDING UP FROM INFLUENTIAL AMERICAN JEWS ALONG THE LINES OF THE DEPARTMENT'S 152282.

6. GRABER INTERPRETED THIS AS BEING A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE ON ISRAEL'S PART. MICHELI DEMURRED AS DID WE. WE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS PERHAPS AN IMPLIED DECISION BUT IT WAS NOT EXPLICIT. THIS WOULD BE

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DEMONSTRATED BY ISRAELI ACTIONS AS THE SITUATION EVOLVES. WE RECITED THE TWA EXPERIENCE IN SYRIA AND DWELT ON THE POSITIVE SIGNS IN THE ISRAELI POSITION. I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST WORTHWHILE TO SPEAK TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON AND GRABER SAID HE HAD THAT VERY MUCH IN MIND. I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD NOT HURRIED TO STATE THE RESULTS OF THE WASHINGTON TALKS SINCE WE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO ISRAELI FACE THAT THEY BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR OWN INTENTIONS.

7. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT CALMING EFFECT ON GRABER DESPITE THE LIMITED POSITIVE ELEMENTS I COULD REFER TO. I WOULD JUDGE NEVERTHELESS THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST MAKE A MORE CONCRETE MOVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE IF THEY EXPECT CONTINUED SWISS COOPERATION.

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IO-13 PM-05 SS-20 WSC-10 CIAE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00

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O 212050Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1105

SECRET VIENNA 0414

DEPARTMENT PASS JCS AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

SUBJ: GOA CONCERN RE MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS

REF: VIENNA 5387

1. SECRETARY GENERAL PLATZER CALLED DCM WHITE THIS EVENING AND SAID THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD ON AUSTRIAN RADIO THAT AMERICAN AIRBORNE UNITS HAD BEEN ALERTED IN BAVARIA FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT TO JORDAN. PLATZER EXPRESSED IN STRONGEST TERMS GOA CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY THAT U.S. MILITARY UNITS WOULD OVERFLY AUSTRIA SINCE SUCH OVERFLIGHTS WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPROMISE AUSTRIA'S NEUTRALITY. HE REMINDED DCM OF PROBLEMS ARISING FROM 1958 VIOLATION OF AUSTRIAN AIRSPACE BY U.S. MILITARY FORCES FLYING TO LEBANON. HE SAID THAT GOA HAD DISCUSSED TODAY PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED BY POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY OVERFLIGHT AND WAS FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY. HE STRONGLY URGED THAT IF SUCH A DEPLOYMENT WERE PLANNED A ROUTE NOT INCLUDING OVERFLIGHT OF AUSTRIA BE USED.

2. PLATZER SAID THAT THEIR POSITION APPLIED TO POSSIBLE OVERFLIGHTS OF MILITARY UNITS AND DID NOT REPEAT NOT APPLY TO HUMANITARIAN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE OVERFLIGHTS AS AUTHORIZED IN VIENNA'S 5387.

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3. COMMENT: WE ASSUME AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WILL RAISE GOA CONCERN "RE" MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS WITH DEPARTMENT. WE ALSO CANNOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT GOA WILL LEAK TO PRESS FACT THEY HAVE MADE THIS APPROACH TO US. PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY POSITION WE SHOULD TAKE IN ANSWERING INQUIRIES "RE" AUSTRIAN CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS TO CONFORM WITH DEPARTMENT'S POSITION.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2460
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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DEPT PASS BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SUBJ: SYRIA AND JORDAN

1. RELIABLE MEMBER OF UAR MISSION TELLS US THAT SOVS
MADE DEMARCHE TO SYRIANS SEPT. 21ST THROUGH CHARGE AT
DAMASCUS IN RESPONSE TO APPEAL FROM KING HUSSEIN.
APPEAL REPORTEDLY ASKED SYRIANS TO WEIGH VERY
CAREFULLY THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS IN
JORDAN. MISOFF ASKED WHETHER SOVS USED WORD WITHDRAWAL
AND WAS TOLD UAR MISSION HAD ONLY GIST OF MESSAGE BUT
IT IS THEIR IMPRESSION THAT MESSAGE VERY CLEAR IN
CONVEYING TO SYRIANS THE USSR DESIRE THAT THEY REMOVE
THEIR TROOPS.
YOST

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

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Page 61 LONDON, 1/10/54 2013204

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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LEAD 15

SUBJ: SOVIET AIRCRAFT ON GALE AT TROUSERS. 22

1. SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON WASHINGTON AT 1000 APT.
22 NO MADE SHORT MESSAGE TO MRG. EMPHASIZED SOVIET GOVERN-
MENT'S MORE FAVORABLE VIEW ON NO MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
CUBAN CASE; MORE ON NO COMPENSATING INTERESTS AND
MORE THAT US WOULD RESISTANCE OTHERS WHO WISH TO CONSIDER
MILITARY INTERVENTION.

2. CHANGING REPRISAL ONLY ONCE CONFIDENTIALITY INTERVIEW
FROM MR. SYLVAN. SELLER CONSIDERS THAT SHE HAS REACHED
ABOUT WHAT SOVIETS HAVE SAID TO SYLVAN AND NOW SYLVAN
HAS NEGOTIATED SELLER'S REPRISAL IS STILL.

2. CRIMINALS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT MURKIN AND
WELL FOR MURKIN IN JUNE. ANOTHER EXPRESSION OF
STANDING ABOUT CONCERN OVER MURKIN, AND MAYBE WOULD
THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM ANYMORE.

APPENDIX D

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TO SECRETARY WASHINGTON IMMEDIATE 7010
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY SYDNEY

SEE 000000 GENEVA 0000

ATTN: DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS Section 000000 000000

SUBJECT: EVACUATION

1. MISCELLANEOUS IN REFERENCE TO EVACUATION OF AMERICAN
AMERICANS IN GENEVA IN REFERENCE TO EVACUATION OF AMERICAN
WE HAVE ALSO NOTED IN OTHER SOURCES THAT AMERICAN AMERICAN
BEIRUT MAY BE IN POSITION TO BE EVACUATED IN REFERENCE TO
RED GROUPS UNDER AN AMERICAN EVACUATION IN REFERENCE TO

2. WE AGREE THAT AMERICAN EVACUATION WILL BE A
POSSIBLE EVACUATION IN REFERENCE TO EVACUATION OF AMERICAN
LONG EVACUATION OF AMERICAN EVACUATION OF AMERICAN
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INR-22 IO-13 L-04 NSAF-00 NSC-10 NSCE-02 O-03 OC-06
PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-02 USSS-00 SY-03 SC2-04
SCA-01 PPT-00 SSO-00 FER-01 /147 W

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Z 271250Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4054
INFO AMEMBASSY FLASH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 1703

SUBJECT: HIJACKED HOSTAGES

1. AS REPORTED, 32 HOSTAGES ARRIVED NICOSIA 1145 LOCAL.
ALL IN GOOD CONDITION AND SPIRITS. NAMES AND DATA FOLLOW.
2. THOUGH WE HAD ONLY 15 MINUTES ADVANCE NOTICE PLANES ARRIVAL,
WE MANAGED WITH FINE COOPERATION AIRPORT AUTHORITIES TO HANDLE
HOSTAGES SMOOTHLY. NOW TAKING THEM TO LUNCH, THEN TO CYPRUS
HILTON.
3. WE WORKING WITH LOCAL TWA REP REE ONWARD CHARTER-TENTATIVELY
TWA SPECIAL FLIGHT WILL LEAVE NICOSIA TOMORROW SEPT 28 AT
0930 LOCAL FOR A WESTERN EUROPEAN DESTINATION,
THENCE ONWARD TO US.
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INFO CCI-01 201-22 10-10 CCI-02 CCI-03 CCI-04 CCI-05 CCI-06 CCI-07 CCI-08 CCI-09 CCI-10 CCI-11 CCI-12 CCI-13 CCI-14 CCI-15 CCI-16 CCI-17 CCI-18 CCI-19 CCI-20 CCI-21 CCI-22 CCI-23 CCI-24 CCI-25 CCI-26 CCI-27 CCI-28 CCI-29 CCI-30 CCI-31 CCI-32 CCI-33 CCI-34 CCI-35 CCI-36 CCI-37 CCI-38 CCI-39 CCI-40 CCI-41 CCI-42 CCI-43 CCI-44 CCI-45 CCI-46 CCI-47 CCI-48 CCI-49 CCI-50 CCI-51 CCI-52 CCI-53 CCI-54 CCI-55 CCI-56 CCI-57 CCI-58 CCI-59 CCI-60 CCI-61 CCI-62 CCI-63 CCI-64 CCI-65 CCI-66 CCI-67 CCI-68 CCI-69 CCI-70 CCI-71 CCI-72 CCI-73 CCI-74 CCI-75 CCI-76 CCI-77 CCI-78 CCI-79 CCI-80 CCI-81 CCI-82 CCI-83 CCI-84 CCI-85 CCI-86 CCI-87 CCI-88 CCI-89 CCI-90 CCI-91 CCI-92 CCI-93 CCI-94 CCI-95 CCI-96 CCI-97 CCI-98 CCI-99 CCI-100

INFO CCI-01 201-22 10-10 CCI-02 CCI-03 CCI-04 CCI-05 CCI-06 CCI-07 CCI-08 CCI-09 CCI-10 CCI-11 CCI-12 CCI-13 CCI-14 CCI-15 CCI-16 CCI-17 CCI-18 CCI-19 CCI-20 CCI-21 CCI-22 CCI-23 CCI-24 CCI-25 CCI-26 CCI-27 CCI-28 CCI-29 CCI-30 CCI-31 CCI-32 CCI-33 CCI-34 CCI-35 CCI-36 CCI-37 CCI-38 CCI-39 CCI-40 CCI-41 CCI-42 CCI-43 CCI-44 CCI-45 CCI-46 CCI-47 CCI-48 CCI-49 CCI-50 CCI-51 CCI-52 CCI-53 CCI-54 CCI-55 CCI-56 CCI-57 CCI-58 CCI-59 CCI-60 CCI-61 CCI-62 CCI-63 CCI-64 CCI-65 CCI-66 CCI-67 CCI-68 CCI-69 CCI-70 CCI-71 CCI-72 CCI-73 CCI-74 CCI-75 CCI-76 CCI-77 CCI-78 CCI-79 CCI-80 CCI-81 CCI-82 CCI-83 CCI-84 CCI-85 CCI-86 CCI-87 CCI-88 CCI-89 CCI-90 CCI-91 CCI-92 CCI-93 CCI-94 CCI-95 CCI-96 CCI-97 CCI-98 CCI-99 CCI-100

INFO CCI-01 201-22 10-10 CCI-02 CCI-03 CCI-04 CCI-05 CCI-06 CCI-07 CCI-08 CCI-09 CCI-10 CCI-11 CCI-12 CCI-13 CCI-14 CCI-15 CCI-16 CCI-17 CCI-18 CCI-19 CCI-20 CCI-21 CCI-22 CCI-23 CCI-24 CCI-25 CCI-26 CCI-27 CCI-28 CCI-29 CCI-30 CCI-31 CCI-32 CCI-33 CCI-34 CCI-35 CCI-36 CCI-37 CCI-38 CCI-39 CCI-40 CCI-41 CCI-42 CCI-43 CCI-44 CCI-45 CCI-46 CCI-47 CCI-48 CCI-49 CCI-50 CCI-51 CCI-52 CCI-53 CCI-54 CCI-55 CCI-56 CCI-57 CCI-58 CCI-59 CCI-60 CCI-61 CCI-62 CCI-63 CCI-64 CCI-65 CCI-66 CCI-67 CCI-68 CCI-69 CCI-70 CCI-71 CCI-72 CCI-73 CCI-74 CCI-75 CCI-76 CCI-77 CCI-78 CCI-79 CCI-80 CCI-81 CCI-82 CCI-83 CCI-84 CCI-85 CCI-86 CCI-87 CCI-88 CCI-89 CCI-90 CCI-91 CCI-92 CCI-93 CCI-94 CCI-95 CCI-96 CCI-97 CCI-98 CCI-99 CCI-100

INFO CCI-01 201-22 10-10 CCI-02 CCI-03 CCI-04 CCI-05 CCI-06 CCI-07 CCI-08 CCI-09 CCI-10 CCI-11 CCI-12 CCI-13 CCI-14 CCI-15 CCI-16 CCI-17 CCI-18 CCI-19 CCI-20 CCI-21 CCI-22 CCI-23 CCI-24 CCI-25 CCI-26 CCI-27 CCI-28 CCI-29 CCI-30 CCI-31 CCI-32 CCI-33 CCI-34 CCI-35 CCI-36 CCI-37 CCI-38 CCI-39 CCI-40 CCI-41 CCI-42 CCI-43 CCI-44 CCI-45 CCI-46 CCI-47 CCI-48 CCI-49 CCI-50 CCI-51 CCI-52 CCI-53 CCI-54 CCI-55 CCI-56 CCI-57 CCI-58 CCI-59 CCI-60 CCI-61 CCI-62 CCI-63 CCI-64 CCI-65 CCI-66 CCI-67 CCI-68 CCI-69 CCI-70 CCI-71 CCI-72 CCI-73 CCI-74 CCI-75 CCI-76 CCI-77 CCI-78 CCI-79 CCI-80 CCI-81 CCI-82 CCI-83 CCI-84 CCI-85 CCI-86 CCI-87 CCI-88 CCI-89 CCI-90 CCI-91 CCI-92 CCI-93 CCI-94 CCI-95 CCI-96 CCI-97 CCI-98 CCI-99 CCI-100

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FM AMEMBASSY PHOENIX

TO DIRECTOR WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4040

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SALT LAKE

AMEMBASSY YERREY

AMEMBASSY ZAGREB

DELEGATION BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

DELEGATION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

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১৯৪৭ সালের ১৫ আগস্ট তারিখে ভারতের স্বাধীনতা লাভের পরেই মুক্তিযুদ্ধের আগুন জ্বলতে শুরু করে। মুক্তিযুদ্ধের সময়কালে মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের সংখ্যা ছিল প্রায় ৩০ লাখ। মুক্তিযুদ্ধের সময়কালে মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের সংখ্যা ছিল প্রায় ৩০ লাখ। মুক্তিযুদ্ধের সময়কালে মুক্তিযোদ্ধাদের সংখ্যা ছিল প্রায় ৩০ লাখ।

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FM US MISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2453
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T USUN 2013

EXDIS

DEPT PASS BEIRUT

SUBJECT: SYRIA/JORDAN - POSSIBLE SC MEETING

REF:USUN 2011; AMAN 4983

1. YOST SPOKE TO EL FARRA AM SEPT 21. LATTER SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO AMMAN SC MTG NOT RPT NOT BE CALLED AND THAT PROBLEM BE DEALT WITH IN ARAB LEAGUE. EL FARRA SAID EL ZAYYAT (UAR) CONCURRED IN THIS APPROACH. EL FARRA HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING SIMILAR TO REQUEST AMMAN 4983 AND SAID THAT HE WOULD DO NOTHING FURTHER UNTIL ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED.

2. UKUN SAYS LONDON HAS DECIDED, IN VIEW GRAVITY OF SITUATION, THAT UK MUST BE SEEN TO BE WORKING FOR SC MTG. WE FILLED IN UK ON OUR TALK WITH EL FARRA AND FOR TIME BEING UKUN IS CONFINING ITS ACTIVITIES TO CONSULTING FRENCH AND WILL NOT RPT NOT IMMEDIATELY SUBMIT REQUEST FOR MTG.

3. NEITHER UK NOR FRENCH MISSION HERE HAVE WORD OF REQUEST FROM KING FOR IMMEDIATE SC MTG. GP-3
YOST

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53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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Z 211510Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM US MISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2453
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T USUN 2013

EXDIS

DEPT PASS BEIRUT

SUBJECT: SYRIA/JORDAN - POSSIBLE SC MEETING

REF:USUN 2011; AMAN 4983

1. YOST SPOKE TO EL FARRA AM SEPT 21. LATTER SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO AMMAN SC MTG NOT RPT NOT BE CALLED AND THAT PROBLEM BE DEALT WITH IN ARAB LEAGUE. EL FARRA SAID EL ZAYYAT (UAR) CONCURRED IN THIS APPROACH. EL FARRA HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING SIMILAR TO REQUEST AMMAN 4983 AND SAID THAT HE WOULD DO NOTHING FURTHER UNTIL ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED.

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YOST

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$\mathbb{Q}(\zeta_3) = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-3})$

2007-08-08

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Figure 1

UNIT: Practical Skills and Techniques

65531 : JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLIMATE ACTION

TABLE 1. Summary of the 1995-1996 season

1. THAT SGT. ALFONSO GONZALEZ TO CHARGE THAT HE
THAT GONZALEZ HAS ALSO RECEIVED AWARD FROM SAID AGENCY, IN RECOGNITION
AND, FOR HIS ROLE "CONSIDERING HIS EAR VIOLATION OF JOURNALISM
STANDARDS."

2. An investigative committee established in 1968 (attached) has reviewed the seriously handicapped difficulties encountered (a) after the Russian failed to meet power demands, and also after specifically committed to Russian intervention. Committee has advised Moscow to Soviet Ambassador to urge the United States Administration, (b) after the Russian has met the commitment of invasion and the full United States effort to achieve or possible intervention with America (from the American).

2. AIRMAILS SAID NOT TO HAVE REACHED NO DECISION ON THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTICAN AFFAIRS AND NOTED THAT THERE IS CLARITY DISCREPANCIES THAT A FURTHER CLARITY MUST BE OBTAINED

W. C. GUYDOL

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SAUNDERS

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46

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CCG-00 SSO-00 ³³ CIAE-00 DOT-12 E-15

M-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 NSCE-30 O-03 GC-05

PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-00 USCIE-00 USSS-00 / SY-03 SR-01

ORM-03 HPV-01 SCS-04 SCA-01 HEW-08 AID-28 IGA-02

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

CINSTRIKE

CINCUSNAVEUR

CINCUSAFEUR

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CIAE-03 DODE-03 PN-05 H-32 INR-05

L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-23 NSCE-03

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET PARIS 12683

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: SYRIAN ACTION IN JORDAN -- FRENCH VIEWS

1. CHARGE PHONED QUAI DIRECTOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS BEAUMARCHAIS EVENING SEPTEMBER 20 (ALPHARD UNAVAILABLE) TO BRIEF HIM ON USC ACTIONS RE SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN JORDAN (STATE 154413) AND PROVIDE HIM TEXT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT CONTAINED STATE 154415.

2. BEAUMARCHAIS SAID GOF HAS TAKEN TWO STEPS IN RESPONSE TO HUSSEIN'S APPEAL: (A) QUAI RECEIVED SOVIET AMBASSADOR AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 20 AND EXPRESSED TO HIM GOF VIEW OF DANGER INHERENT IN ANY EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN JORDANIAN SITUATION; AND (B) QUAI WAS INSTRUCTED KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET IN NEW YORK TO SEE HIS US, UK, AND SOVIET COUNTERPARTS TO EMPLORE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING FOUR-POWER STATEMENT ON SYRIAN INTERVENTION WHICH ZAID RIFAI HAD REQUESTED OF FRENCH AMBASSADOR MERILLON IN AMMAN (PARIS 12681).
GP-3 CULLEY

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO CAISDOBYTUC/T.

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SUBJ: MEDICAL AID TO JORDAN -- FRENCH PLANNING

REF: PARIS 12680

1. FOLLOWING UP MEETING WITH ALPHAND (REFTEL), CHARGE SEPT 20 CALLED QUAI JORDAN RELIEF COORDINATOR DE CHAMBRUN FOR EXCHANGE LATEST INFO.

2. AFTER
CHARGE HAD REVIEWED MAIN POINTS GENEVA 3237 AND USCINCEUR ECJC 13117 (201300Z), DE CHAMBRUN COMMENTED THAT FRENCH HAVE BASICALLY SAME PROBLEM AS USG. ONLY MEDICAL TEAMS WHICH ARE READY FOR PROMPT MOVEMENT ARE MILITARY, WHICH GOF DOES NOT WANT TO USE AS SUCH. DE CHAMBRUN SAID GOF GETTING IN TOUCH WITH FRENCH RED CROSS RE AVAILABILITY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHICH DE CHAMBRUN SAID GOF MUCH PREFERENCES TO USE, BUT THIS INFORMATION NOT LIKELY BE AT HAND UNTIL TOMORROW. THUS, GOF UNLIKELY KNOW TODAY WHAT IT WILL BE ABLE PROVIDE IN TERMS PERSONNEL FOR FIELD HOSPITAL WHICH IT IS PREPARED MAKE AVAILABLE.

3. ICRC HAS TOLD FRENCH THAT PLASMA IS MOST URGENT NEED. ACCORDING DE CHAM7,, GOF HAS SOME PLASMA AVAILABLE AND IS LOOKING INTO TRANSPORTING IT TOMORROW ON URGENT BASIS.

4. ON GENERAL PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTING AID TO AMMAN, DE CHAMBRUN SAID ICRC DUE MEET 1830 TONIGHT AND TO ADVISE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS AFTER MEETING.

5. WE WILL HAVE FURTHER EXCHANGE WITH DE CHAMBRUN THIS EVENING
GP-3 CULLEY

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-03
L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 NIC-01 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /124 W
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4351
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T PARIS 12694

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: SYRIAN ACTION IN JORDAN -- FRENCH VIEWS (II)

REF: PARIS 12683

1. QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS JURGENSEN GAVE POLCOUNSELOR AND EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 21 BRIEF RUNDOWN ON GOF VIEWS AND ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN JORDAN.
2. ACCORDING JURGENSEN, QUAI SAW SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZORIN TWICE DURING WEEKEND. ZORIN WAS RECEIVED AT HIS OWN REQUEST FRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 18, AT WHICH TIME HE DELIVERED MESSAGE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL WITH THAT CONVEYED TO USG (STATE 154000). SECOND MEETING SEPTEMBER 20, UT QUAI INITIATIVE, PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR GOF TO EXPRESS ITS VIEW OF DANGER INHERENT IN ANY EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN JORDAN SITUATION (REFTEL).
3. FRENCH ON SEPTEMBER 20 ALSO MADE "STRONG DEMARCHE"

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DIRECTLY TO SYRIANS IN DAMASCUS REGARDING POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. JURGENSEN REMARKED THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE GOF DEMARCHE -- OR, INDEED, SOVIET EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS -- WOULD PRODUCE DESIRED RESULTS, BUT FRENCH FELT IT WAS MOST CONSTRUCTIVE STEP OPEN TO THEM.

4. AS FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, JURGENSEN SAID, IT SEEMED "UTOPIAN" UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THIS ESPECIALLY TRUE SINCE, IN QUAI VIEW, SOVIETS SITTING UNCOMFORTABLY "ON THE FENCE" BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND FEDAYEEN AND TRYING TO AVOID TAKING SIDES. AT BEST, FOUR-POWER STATEMENT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A WEEK'S WORK TO AGREE ON TEXT, BUT FRENCH WOULD KEEP TRYING IN NEW YORK DESPITE FACT THAT PROSPECTS "ALMOST NIL".

5. MEANWHILE, JURGENSEN CONCLUDED, GOF PUBLIC POSTURE WOULD PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO STATEMENT THAT QUAI CONSULTING WITH US, UK AND SOVIETS. GOF NOT PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATING ANY UNILATERAL STATEMENT SIMILAR TO THAT ISSUED BY USG.

6. WIRE SERVICES AND SEPTEMBER 21 PARIS PRESS CARRY APPARENT QUAI BACKGROUNDER EXPRESSING GOF CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF MIDEAST VIOLENCE ARISING FROM CURRENT JORDAN FIGHTING. "ANY FOREIGN INTERVENTION" SAID TO RISK "GRAVE CONSEQUENCES" FOR JORDANIAN PEOPLE, INCLUDING HOSTAGES, AS WELL AS IN TERMS SOLUTION OF PROBLEM AND PURSUIT OF WORLDWIDE DETENTE. SITUATION SAID TO FURTHER JUSTIFY FRENCH VIEW THAT PEACE ATTAINABLE ONLY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AS REPRESENTED BY FOUR POWERS, AND NOT THROUGH DIVISION OF AREA INTO ZONES OF INFLUENCE.

GP-3. CULLEY

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT
NUMBER | DOCUMENT
TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------|------------------|---|--------------------|-------------|
| J | telegrams | Amemb Amman and Amemb Tel Aviv
traffic re: Sandstorm | various
[69-71] | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(3)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|---|---------|-------------|
| 1 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 15 NLN 01-26/11 2 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec 04 E 012958 | 6/16/70 | B |
| 2 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 14 NLN 01-26/12 1 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec 04 E 012958 | 6/15/70 | B |
| 4 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 13 NLN 01-26/13 3 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec 04 E 012958 | 6/15/70 | B |
| 5 | report | Jordan Task Force | 6/15/70 | B |
| 6 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 12 | 6/14/70 | B |
| 8 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/14/70 | B |
| 10 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 11 | 6/14/70 | B |
| 11 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 10 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 13 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/13/70 | B |
| 14 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 9 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 15 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 7 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 16 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 6 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 17 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 8 | 6/12/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files Country File Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(4) Jordanian Situation

[1 of 4]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|--|---------|-------------|
| 1 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 15 NLN 01-26/11 2 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec. 04 E 012958 | 6/16/70 | B |
| 2 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 14 NLN 01-26/12 1 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec. 04 E 012958 | 6/15/70 | B |
| 4 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 13 NLN 01-26/13 3 pp.
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
per sec. 1.4(c) ltr. 8 Dec. 04 E 012958 | 6/15/70 | B |
| 5 | report | Jordan Task Force | 6/15/70 | B |
| 6 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 12 | 6/14/70 | B |
| 8 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/14/70 | B |
| 10 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 11 | 6/14/70 | B |
| 11 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 10 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 13 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/13/70 | B |
| 14 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 9 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 15 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 7 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 16 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 6 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 17 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 8 | 6/12/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files Country File Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(4) Jordanian Situation

[p. 1 of 4]

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 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 18 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/12/70 | B |
| 19 | report | Jordan Sitrep | 6/12/70 | B |
| 21 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 6 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 22 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/12/70 | B |
| 24 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 5 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 25 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 3 | 6/11/70 | B |
| 26 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 2 | 6/11/70 | B |
| 28 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/11/70 | B |
| 29 | report | Jordan Sitrep No. 1 | 6/11/70 | B |
| 30 | list | phone list, Executive Secretariat | 6/10/70 | B |
| 31 | cable | Amman to DIA | 6/16/70 | B |
| 32 | telegram | Amemb Amman to SecState | 6/15/70 | B |
| 36 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/15/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(4) Jordanian Situation

[2 of 4]

RESTRICTION CODES

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 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
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 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------------|--|--------------------|--------------|
| 37 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 38 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 39 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 40 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 41 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 42 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 48 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/14/70 | B |
| 56 | telegram | Amemb Tehran to Sec State NLN 01-26/14 3pp
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
Declassified per Ltr. 13 Dec. 04 EO 12958 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 57 | telegram | Amemb Tehran to Sec State NLN 01-26/15 4pp
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
Declassified per Ltr. 13 Dec. 04 EO 12958 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 58 | telegram | Sec State to Amemb London NLN 01-26/16 2pp
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
Declassified per Ltr. 13 Dec. 04 EO 12958 | 6/13/70 | B |
| 61 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/13/70 | B |
| 62 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/13/70 | B |
| 63 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/13/70 | B |
| 71 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/12/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(4) Jordanian Situation

[p.3 & 4]

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| 74 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/13/70 | B |
| 75 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/12/70 | B |
| 77 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/12/70 | B |
| 84 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/12/70 | B |
| 89 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/12/70 | B |
| 121 | telegram | USINT Cairo to Sec State NLN 01-26/20
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUESTED
Declassified per Ltr. 13 Dec. 04 E.O. 12958 | 6/12/70 | B |
| 161 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 6/11/70 | B |
| 162 | report | re: commando ambush | 6/11/70 | B |
| 166 | cable | Amemb Amman to DIRNSA | 6/11/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(4) Jordanian Situation

[4 of 4]

RESTRICTION CODES

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JORDAN SITREP NO. 14

1.4(c)

SANITIZED

(1800 15 June 1970)

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Current Situation

3.3(b)(1)

According to the press, fedayeen and government leaders began patching up differences and restoring stability to Jordan; fedayeen leader Arafat stated it would be several days before it would be known if these efforts were successful.

Lebanon was likewise calm after the government's restriction on fedayeen activity went into effect. According to the press, Palestinian commandos are complying with the Lebanese government ban on unauthorized carrying of weapons in towns and villages; the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has reportedly said it also will comply with the regulation.

Soviet Naval Activity in Mediterranean

A light cruiser and a guided-missile frigate probably continue shadowing the USS FORRESTAL task group south of Cyprus. A destroyer, two minesweepers, and an intelligence collector are operating south of the cruiser and frigate. At least four Soviet submarines are possibly in the eastern Mediterranean. Most other Soviet units are in ports or at anchorages.

3.3(b)(1)

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1.4(c)

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

WLN 01-26/18 per SA 1.4(c) Hr. 8 Dec. 04

By [signature] Date 23 Apr 07

[p. 1 of 1]

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3.3(b)(1)

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1.4(c)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

June 14, 1970

OPERATIONS CENTER

JORDAN TASK FORCE

Jordan Sitrep No. 10 - 1600

Evacuation

With the arrival in Athens of 61 Americans late June 13 (last Sitrep), the reduction of the Embassy Amman staff down to a core of 37 persons and the evacuation of dependents and those nonofficial Americans wanting to leave Amman has been completed. Notification of next of kin is continuing and is largely completed.

We understand that Dr. Shrum (last Sitrep) is alive and well, and Embassy Amman is actively negotiating for his release.

A Fatah official told the N.Y. Times correspondent in Amman June 14 that the Fatah conducted its own investigation of the alleged rape of two American women June 11 and consequently arrested and executed two men. According to the UAR wire service, Arafat at the end of his June 14 news conference in Amman "spoke about certain individual mistakes during the crisis and said that the culprits had received immediate deterrent punishment," which may have been an allusion to the same reported executions.

Major Perry's remains arrived in Athens, with funeral at Arlington National Cemetery being planned. The date is not being set until Mrs. Perry's checkup at a Beirut hospital for an infection is completed. Although Arafat said to the N.Y. Times correspondent after his June 14 press conference that Perry's shooting was accidental, other fedayeen representatives have alleged to journalists--and also our defense attache when he visited Perry's home--that Perry was firing on fedayeen in the street from his house and killed several.

Jordan Security Situation

There have been no reports of further violence since 0600 (last Sitrep), and Jordanian media assert all is calm throughout

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

June 14, 1970

OPERATIONS CENTER

JORDAN TASK FORCE

Jordan Sitrep No. 10 - 1600

Evacuation

With the arrival in Athens of 61 Americans late June 13 (last Sitrep), the reduction of the Embassy Amman staff down to a core of 37 persons and the evacuation of dependents and those nonofficial Americans wanting to leave Amman has been completed. Notification of next of kin is continuing and is largely completed.

We understand that Dr. Shrum (last Sitrep) is alive and well, and Embassy Amman is actively negotiating for his release.

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the country. A despatch by Reuters' local reporters in Amman puts the total dead and wounded over the past three days at 1,000.

During the day King Hussein issued another public appeal for discipline, this time addressed to the security forces and the intelligence service. He emphasized he did not want another drop of blood spilled and referred amicably to the fedayeen and Iraqi troops in Jordan. We do not yet know whether Iraqi Vice President Ammash has left Jordan.

Arafat in his June 14 press conference blamed the US for the Jordan crisis in propagandistic terms, asserted that the CIA plot to create dissension between Jordan and the fedayeen had failed, and warned the US rhetorically not to send the 82nd Airborne Division. Feigning surprise at the evacuation of foreigners from Jordan, Arafat stressed that the fedayeen are opposed not to individuals but the policies of certain governments, and added "we welcome the foreigners as guests in both our hearts and homes."

The GOJ and the Central Committee of the Resistance (fedayeen) were reported on June 14 to have formed a joint committee late the previous day "to control the local situation and prevent provocative actions or disturbances by any means;" the joint committee will operate out of army headquarters. An Amman newspaper (the only one publishing) has given some credit to Ammash and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika for this compromise, which evidently is working.

Lebanese Security Situation

Embassy Amman has reported a rumor that the widespread commandeering of vehicles in Amman by the fedayeen in the past few days has been for the purpose of going to Lebanon on June 15 to stir up trouble. The Embassy is somewhat skeptical, noting the stringent shortage of gasoline. According to Reuters in Beirut, the head of the Beirut office of the PLO said there would be no violence in Lebanon on June 15, and other elements in Beirut were not expecting an eruption. However, Arafat in his Amman press conference is quoted by AP as having warned the GOL not to make the "teacherous error" of cracking down on fedayeen in Lebanon.

Related Developments

No new activity on the Israel-Jordan ceasefire line has been reported after Israel's incursion last night (last Sitrep), although Israeli planes and UAR artillery were active along the Suez Canal. According to a brief announcement in Cairo, the discussions between Syrian Foreign Minister as-Sayyid and his UAR hosts have concerned not only the Jordanian crisis, but also tensions in Syrian-Saudi relations.

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RICHARD NIXON'S
PRESIDENCY

The Daily Diary

1973
July - December

(nos. 9134-9964)

Box 10

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SA/ISRAEL

2206

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

May 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY
CHARLES A. COOPER

SUBJECT: Israeli Requests

Economic Counselor Sher informed Chuck Cooper and Don Stukel today that Minister Sapir will seek an appointment with you next week to discuss the following issues:

- Waiver of repayment of \$.5 billion of debts, as permitted under the Israeli Emergency Supplemental. These debts are presently covered by credits at concessional terms.
- Assurances that the U.S. will provide about \$3 billion over the next five years to cover the purchase of military equipment from the United States. They project their military imports to total \$10 billion over the next five years. We have not presently planned beyond next year, when we are seeking \$300 million in credits. Over a five year period this would be \$1.5 billion.
- A joint U.S.-Israeli agreement on economic cooperation similar to the U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia. They want this agreement to include a joint economic commission, a U.S. statement supporting private investment in Israel and assurances that Israel will not be allowed to fall short of strategic materials (oil, copper, iron ore, etc.).

Counselor Sher indicated that the first two items were discussed with you in Israel and that the Israeli Government will most likely raise these issues with the President during his visit.

If you agree we will work with the appropriate offices in the Department of State in looking into these issues and in preparing talking points for Sapir's visit and the President's trip.

AK Agree

Disagree

Mr. Saunders concurs.

SECRET - GDS

We want to ensure
that a commission on

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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| SUBJECT: <i>Proposed appt of HAK for Israeli Minister Saper re Israeli debt & economic & military assistance</i> | | | | | | |

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
3229

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

August 1, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: HENRY R. APPELBAUM *HA*
ROSEMARY NIEHUSS
SUBJECT: Contingency Talker for Possible
Presidential Meeting with Yigal Allon

Attached is a contingency talking paper, which was drafted at State by Hal Saunders today. We have just been told by State that the Secretary has approved it.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the attached talker to the President if this meeting is scheduled.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

3229

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

MEETING WITH YIGAL ALLON

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

To emphasize the importance we attach to the consultations we are holding with Arab and Israeli foreign ministers over the next few weeks, to reiterate our general support for Israel, and to stress the need for steady progress in the negotiations.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: You will recall that, during your trip to the Middle East, it was agreed that Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and Syrian representatives should come to Washington for a series of consultations designed to develop a clearer picture of what direction peace negotiations should take over the next several months. Allon, who is Foreign Minister and remains under Rabin the Deputy Prime Minister as he was under Mrs. Meir, is a moderate on Arab-Israeli issues and is known for the "Allon Plan" which he worked out in 1967-68 for a settlement between Jordan and Israel under which Israel would annex a narrow strip in the Jordan River valley and return the bulk of the West Bank to Jordan. The plan has never been adopted officially by the Israeli Government, but he has talked along these lines here.

Allon has shown two main interests in his talks with me:

(1) He has repeated the strong pitch you heard in Jerusalem for substantial long-term military and economic assistance

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to Israel. Secretary Schlesinger and I have simply promised to review Israel's military needs sympathetically. Secretary Simon is doing the same on the economic side. (2) On the question of peace negotiations, Allon started with a view that all further negotiations should be deferred until late in the year. I have told him we have no fixed position but that, in my view, Israel and the US will lose control of the diplomatic situation and pressures such as re-imposition of the oil embargo will begin to mount if there are no serious negotiations this fall. Allon has agreed to discuss a more flexible strategy for negotiations. Our discussions gave me a sense of what might be possible from the Israeli viewpoint in further Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel negotiations, and I will get the views of Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy when they are here during the next two weeks.

The point for you to emphasize is that: It is crucial for us to maintain control of the situation by developing a strategy for giving the Arabs hope of some progress.

- B. Participants: Foreign Minister Allon and Ambassador Dinitz. Secretary Kissinger.
- C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

Arms Assistance:

1. As you know, I feel that Israel's strength is an essential factor in the Middle East peacemaking process. We will consider your arms requests in that spirit.
2. As you know from Secretary Schlesinger, there have been problems with fulfilling some of your conventional weapons requests because of our low production rates and our limited available stocks. On some of the sophisticated items which Israel has requested, we have questions connected with the protection of our advanced military technology. The main point is that these be dealt with as problems we want to address together and that they not be made issues between us.

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Economic Assistance:

1. Again, on economic assistance we will be helpful, and I can assure you that this Administration will do what is necessary to be as responsive as possible.
2. In regard to Israel's request for \$1.5 billion annually in financial assistance to cover arms purchases and for another one-half billion in economic assistance, we will have to move carefully. These are very substantial amounts at a time when I have directed sharp limitation of spending to curb inflation here in the U.S.

Peace Efforts:

1. Concerning the next steps in seeking a political accommodation in the Middle East, we have no pre-conceived ideas. We want in this next month to hear out the parties, and that is why I encouraged Secretary Kissinger to invite you as the first Middle Eastern representative to come to Washington in this series of discussions. We hope later in August to have a clearer picture on such questions as to whether the next move should be between Israel and Egypt or Israel and Jordan, and how to relate any such move to the Geneva Conference.
2. Our objective is a steady ongoing political process that will aid Arab moderates to stay on a moderate course. We want to help Israel achieve peaceful conditions, and we believe that the modest increase so far of U.S. influence in the Arab world will contribute toward this end. Following our consultations with the Arab foreign ministers here, it may be desirable for us to get together again in early September.

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--|------------|-------------|
| 1
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | HAK to the President with attachments (6 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6/4/07 | c. 7/1969 | B |
| 2
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab A - Summary of the Situation and Issues (18 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 A <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6/4/07 | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 3
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab B - Scenario for Discussions with Israelis... (4 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 B <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 4
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab C - The Issues for Decision (7 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 C <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 5
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Yitzhak Rabin to Paul Warnke (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 D <i>Exempt per 3.4(b)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 2-27-03 | 11/22/1968 | B |
| 6
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 E <i>Declassified in full OSD 11-20-02 letter</i> | 11/27/1968 | B |
| 7
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (Fourth session) (4 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 F <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 11-20-02</i> | 11/12/1968 | B |
| 8
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Government of Israel (1 page)
NLNS 02-04/4 G <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 11-20-02</i> | 11/26/1968 | B |
| 9
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (3 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 H <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 10-20-02</i> | 11/29/1968 | B |
| 10
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo w/att. | Tab E - Davies to Kissinger (30 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 I <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6-4-07 | 05/29/1969 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

FOLDER TITLE (4)

Israel - Israeli Nuclear Program

BOX NUMBER

612

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information,
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information

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-- The JCS felt that if Israel's program becomes known, we should be in a position to say we did everything in our power to prevent Israel from going nuclear. JCS felt that we should try to stop Israel's missile production and use the Phantoms as leverage.

-- Defense felt that we could live with the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons provided they were not deployed. Defense agreed that we should try to stop missile production and that we should use the Phantoms as leverage to get the assurances we want.

-- State believed that we should try to keep Israel from going any further with its nuclear weapons program -- it may be so close to completion that Israel would be willing -- and make a record for ourselves of having tried. State has joined in suggesting asking the Israelis to halt production of the missiles. State would not threaten to withhold the Phantoms in the first approach to the Israelis but would be prepared to imply that threat if they were unresponsive to our first approach.

At the end of our discussions, State, Defense, and JCS agreed to describe a course of action which represented as nearly as possible the consensus of our group. Despite the different shades of opinion expressed in our discussions, the State, Defense and JCS members have concurred in the paper at Tab B which proposes asking the Israelis to:

1. Sign the NPT at an early date (by the end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.
2. Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices. [For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear device.]
3. Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile. [NOTE: I do not believe we can ask Israel not to produce missiles. Israel is sovereign in this decision, and I do not see how we can ask it not to produce a weapon just because we do not see it as an effective weapon without nuclear warheads. We might persuade them not to deploy what they

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This paper recommends approaching the Israelis in two steps:

1. First step. Richardson and Packard call in Rabin and say that, in connection with Israel's request to advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we want to tie up loose ends left by the exchange of letters surrounding that contract (i.e., the difference over what would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons). They would stress the importance of Israel's signature of the NPT and ask for Israel's confirmation that "possession" of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute "introduction". They would also say that Israel's development and deployment of missiles -- a nuclear weapons delivery system -- would cast doubt on its nuclear assurances. They would not in this first meeting explicitly link delivery of the Phantoms with Israel's response.
2. Second step. If Rabin tried to stonewall, Richardson and Packard would state exactly what we want and make clear that Israeli unresponsiveness would raise a question about our ability to continue meeting Israel's arms request.

THE DILEMMA WE FACE

Our problem is that Israel will not take us seriously on the nuclear issue unless they believe we are prepared to withhold something they very much need -- the Phantoms or, even more, their whole military supply relationship with us.

On the other hand, if we withhold the Phantoms and they make this fact public in the United States, enormous political pressure will be mounted on us. We will be in an indefensible position if we cannot state why we are withholding the planes. Yet if we explain our position publicly, we will be the ones to make Israel's possession of nuclear weapons public with all the international consequences this entails.

THE OPTIONS

In the end, we have these broad options:

1. Initiate discussion now and try to reach an understanding before delivery of the Phantoms becomes an active issue in September.

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a. The advantage of recording only the general judgment is that it permits us the freedom of acting as if we believe Israel is still short of assembling a weapon and of leaving to Israel the choice of whether to hide what it has or dismantle it. It also retains our freedom to press Israel to sign the NPT and prevent the USSR from reacting.

b. The disadvantage of not recording the more precise estimate is that only this underscores the immediacy of the problem if we are called on in the Congress, for instance, to justify our position.

4. In signing the contract for sale of the Phantom F-4 aircraft last December, Israel, in a letter, committed itself not to be "the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." The US stated in reply that circumstances requiring cancellation of the agreement would exist in the event of "action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth...."

5. We and Israel differ on what "introducing" nuclear weapons means. Ambassador Rabin believes only testing and making public the fact of possession constitute "introduction." We stated in the exchange of letters confirming the Phantom sale that we consider "physical possession and control of nuclear arms" to constitute "introduction."

6. Before negotiation of the sale, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk told Foreign Minister Eban we felt strongly about Israel's signature on the NPT and stated that political discussions on this issue would precede negotiation. Later, after strong pressure from the Israeli government and approaches from American Jewish leaders, the President instructed Secretary Clifford to sell the planes without conditions. Since the Israelis had already given us the commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in connection with the 1966 sale of the Skyhawk A-4 aircraft, Secretary Clifford permitted its repetition in the 1968 sale. What was new in the 1968 talks was the inconclusive attempt to define the word "introduction."

7. No one in Congress is yet officially aware of the exchange of letters on Israel's promise not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or our reply. Nevertheless, the Administration might have to defend someday the delivery of a nuclear weapons carrier despite our intelligence and the exchange of letters at the time of the sale.

8. Delivery of the Phantoms is scheduled to begin in September, 1969. The planes are almost ready, and the Israelis have asked to begin taking delivery in August.

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SENSITIVE

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that kind of confrontation, it would be easier for us to manage on the issue of proliferation than of borders, though it is doubtful that Israel would give on both.

- c. Conclusion: There is probably little constructive relationship between this nuclear problem and our diplomatic effort to achieve peace. The main issue is to structure our dialogue on the nuclear issue, if any, so as to leave Israel enough flexibility to minimize the damage on the peace effort.

IV. Conclusions

- A. We must reach some sort of understanding with Israel about its plans for its nuclear weapons program before we can deliver the Phantom aircraft.
- B. The logical bilateral Israeli commitment to press for is:
 - 1. Israeli ratification of the NPT within a stated period.
 - 2. Reaffirmation in writing that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East-- this time with a precise definition of what "introduce" means. [We may want to agree to ourselves that it will be sufficient if the Israelis live up to their own definition-- not test and not make public--but in talking to them and for the record we should stick to our own definition-- "introduce" means "possess." It is not in our interest that they possess nuclear weapons, but we do have to take into account the practical limits of what we can achieve and enforce.]
 - 3. Agreement at least not to deploy strategic missiles, though we may want to consider at the outset asking them to halt production.
- C. If we are to approach the Israelis, they will not take us seriously unless they believe we are prepared to withhold something they very much want. The problem is to couch

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SENSITIVE

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our request in such a way that they can accede without paying too high a price. These factors must be taken into account:

1. Israel has already--in buying the Phantoms--committed itself in writing not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Mid-East. Ambassador Rabin has defined "introduction" as testing and publicizing.
2. The proposal which represents the consensus of our special group--ask Israel to define "introduction" as "possession"--might just allow Israel enough flexibility of interpretation to permit acceptance without a showdown.
3. The positive side of implying a threat to withhold aircraft could be to promise to meet new Israeli needs if we can reach an understanding on this issue. They have already said they want more Skyhawks and more Phantoms. The hope of a positive response on those could be held out as an incentive.

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TAB B 370

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~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS
ON THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAMA. US Objectives

1. Our objectives are to persuade Israel to:

a) Sign the NPT at an early date (by the end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.

b) Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices.*

c) Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile.

2. Early signature and ratification of the NPT must be our minimum objective. The NPT provides the best basis for international confidence in Israel's intentions.

Bilateral assurances are equally important. They are also a desirable adjunct to the NPT because of the time factor. The Treaty does not enter into force until the three nuclear signatories and 40 others sign and ratify (present score is one nuclear and about 20 others) and this may take another six months to a year. Even after the Treaty is in force it gives a signatory six months to enter negotiations with the IAEA for a safeguards arrangement, and it gives the signatory an additional 18 months to conclude those negotiations. We need the bilateral assurances to cover the interim and we should do our best to get them.

*In presenting our requirements to the Israelis, we would not go beyond this formulation. For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear explosive device.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

NLN 02-04/46 4 pages pr 6-4-07 letter

By KMG NARA, Date 8-23-07

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Israeli agreement to stop production and not to deploy strategic missiles is important because the deployment of a delivery system that is militarily cost effective only as a nuclear weapons carrier would seriously vitiate confidence in Israel's adherence to the NPT. We should therefore make a determined effort, at least initially, to achieve this objective. However, if the Israelis show a disposition to meet us on the nuclear issue but are adamant on the Jericho missiles, we can drop back to a position of insisting on non-deployment of missiles and an undertaking by the Israelis to keep any further production secret.

B. Scenario

1. General Approach. The venue for our negotiations with the Israelis should be kept in Washington. Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv would be kept informed in detail of the negotiations as they proceed and would be asked to reinforce our representations to Rabin whenever this appeared desirable.

2. First Meeting. Ambassador Rabin would be asked to call upon Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard meeting jointly. The Under Secretaries would say that in connection with Israel's request to advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we wish to tie up loose ends left after the Warnke-Rabin negotiations in October, 1968, which led to our agreement to sell the aircraft. Accordingly, we would like to open discussions in Washington on Israel's adherence to the NPT and related questions concerning Israel's intentions with respect to nuclear weapons.

The Under Secretaries would stress the importance the US attaches to Israel's adherence to the NPT. Israel told us last December it was studying the implications of adherence to the NPT; we would be interested to hear what conclusions the GOI has reached. The Under Secretaries would also refer to the Warnke-Rabin exchanges last November and say we feel there are some unanswered questions concerning Israel's assurances to us on nuclear weapon forbearance. Specifically, we would wish to have Israel's confirmation that possession of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons. We would also like to pursue the question of the purpose of Israel developing and deploying a nuclear weapons delivery system -- the "Jericho" missile -- which can only cast doubt on its nuclear assurances.

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At the first meeting with Rabin the US side would not explicitly link deliveries of the F-4s to the Israeli response on the nuclear question, but our reference to the request for early deliveries and the Warnke-Rabin talks would clearly convey the direction of our thinking. Rabin's tactic will probably be to test how serious we are by refusing initially to go beyond the line Israel has taken with us in past meetings: that the GOI has not made up its mind about the NPT; that it has already given us assurances that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and nothing further is required. If he is unresponsive in this fashion, the Under Secretaries would make clear their dissatisfaction and ask Rabin to call again in five or six days time to continue the dialogue.

3. Second Meeting. If Rabin tries to stonewall us at the second meeting the US side would tell him that Israel's uncommunicativeness on the nuclear question does not strike us as consistent with the high level of cooperation which Israel expects of us in support of its security. Israel's nuclear policy also impinges directly on US worldwide security concerns and responsibilities. By the end of the meeting we should lay before Rabin precisely what we need, as outlined in section A above. We would make it clear to Rabin that a lack of response on Israel's part raises a question regarding our ability to continue meeting Israel's arms requests.

4. Subsequent. Having presented our needs, we would let the GOI formulate its response in its own time, allowing the approaching date for delivery of the F-4s to produce its own pressure on the GOI. Whenever and wherever the Israelis raised the subject of the F-4s, the response would be that, given the terms of the sales agreement and the uncertainties surrounding Israel's nuclear intentions, there are serious doubts about our ability to proceed with deliveries of the F-4s so long as the matters under discussion with Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard remain unresolved.

This would have the effect of turning down the Israeli request for advancing delivery to August. However, no decision would be taken to alter the scheduled September delivery of the F-4s until we get an initial reading on Israeli attitudes and intentions.

5. Mrs. Meir's Visit. When Prime Minister Meir gets here the President and other senior US officials would bear down on

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this subject, stressing that Israel's decisions in the nuclear weapons field have an important bearing on US security and global interests, and reinforcing the objectives set forth above.

6. Public Confrontation. The USG would take no initiative to make this a public issue. In the event that the Israelis maintain an unresponsive line with us and show signs of going to Congress in an attempt to undermine our position on deliveries of the F-4's, we should have ready a range of actions that the Administration might take to counter this move.

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TAB C

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-04/4C *Letter* 6-4-07By *AMZ*NARA, Date *8-27-07*THE ISSUES FOR DECISION

- I. Would Israeli possession of nuclear weapons be sufficiently detrimental to US interests that it is worth a confrontation to prevent it? Two decisions are possible:
- A. Leave the situation alone on grounds that we cannot stop proliferation and, anyway, the only development that could induce Israel to curb its nuclear weapons program is a peace settlement with the Arabs. Those who hold this view feel we should concentrate on achieving a political settlement and let this issue fall into place behind the settlement.
 - B. Make a major effort to keep nuclear weapons from being introduced into the Middle East on grounds that introduction would destroy any chances for a settlement, would sharply increase the chances of nuclear weapons being used in anger and would increase the risk of a US-USSR confrontation.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve judgment B.

Approve B _____

Lean toward A _____

- II. If we decide that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is against our interest, what exactly do we want Israel to do? (There is a difference between what we want and what we ask for.) These are the possibilities:
- A. Give up its nuclear option by dismantling any nuclear devices it may have and destroying components. [We think this is unrealistic.]
 - B. Freeze their nuclear weapons program where it is. [We do not know exactly what this would mean since we are not sure whether they have weapons now or not.]
 - C. Not assemble completed nuclear explosive devices. [The State-Defense paper at Tab B recommends this as our in-house definition of what we want. This may be the best statement of what we would like in terms of our opposition to nuclear proliferation, of what we want on the public record, and of what we should ask for. But it may be illusive. The significant act in terms of international

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 November 1968
 Refer to: I-35993/68
 (Fourth Session)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
 Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
 Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
 Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
 Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1530 - 1630 12 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Mr. Warnke opened the meeting by saying that, as he had indicated in a previous discussion, we are interested in substance and not form in the matters we have been addressing. We believe it is your feeling that Israel will not and cannot accept our request for advance assurances concerning strategic missiles and nuclear weapons as preconditions to the contract. You propose alternative formulations to be included in the contract which are essentially reaffirmations of earlier agreements: not to use American aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, and not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. In our discussions I believe I have made clear to you our interpretation of "unusual and compelling circumstances" which would require that we cancel the F-4 contract. The contract would provide that action inconsistent with these assurances would constitute such circumstances. On these bases I believe we can draft an agreement that will be acceptable to you and which will meet your requirements - although not fully meeting mine.

Mr. Warnke observed that he could not find in the record any understanding of what Israel means by the provision: "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Mr. Warnke asked the Ambassador what was meant by this term?

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-64/4F per letter 11-26-02

By *KAT*

NARA Date 8-27-07

COPY FOR: MR. WATSON

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Ambassador Rabin said that, "weapons serve policy, not vice versa. Since the UAR's goal is to destroy us I would take it with very great concern. Our policy is not to destroy the UAR. You must combine the weapon with the policy."

General Hod observed that a very good example of introduction was when Egypt introduced missiles into the area in 1963, claiming they were capable of hitting anything south of Beirut. Ambassador Rabin said: "My concern with Egypt is with missiles with chemical rather than nuclear war heads. If Egypt were to hit our densely populated areas, even in a limited way, it could be disastrous."

Mr. Warnke said, as he understood it, Ambassador Rabin applied two prerequisites to the word "introduction" -- notoriety and pre-testing.

Ambassador Rabin, saying that "I don't know what the Prime Minister said, but" there must be public acknowledgment. The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use their deterrent power. "I don't believe any powers that have nuclear weapons plan to use them, although you cannot ever be sure." Ninety-nine per cent of their value is deterrence. Mr. Schwartz said: "You mean deterrence against governments, to deter governments from specific actions." Ambassador Rabin agreed: "The fact that you have got it must be known."

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador also introduced the factor of intent: if the UAR has missiles, Israel would be concerned; if Israel has them, there is no cause for concern. The purpose of strategic missiles for Israel would be for deterrence.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are trying to combine strategic missiles and nuclear war heads. This is not necessary in the Middle East. To my mind, in the Middle East, missiles with war heads which are not nuclear weapons can play a role." Mr. Warnke asked, "What sort of role?" Ambassador Rabin said: "It depends on the other side. What we are concerned about in Egypt is their chemical warfare capability. As I explained in 1963 when I was here, one of our thoughts was that Egyptian missiles, even with conventional war heads, might contribute to their success if they made a surprise attack on our cities. They could interfere with the mobilization system under such circumstances, and this might play a great role in determining the outcome. Seventy per cent more or less of Army capability, although less for the Air Force, is based on mobilization, not just on manpower but vehicles, transport, supplies, and so forth. During the six day war we had mobilized so much of the resources of our cities that we had to devote a portion of our military effort to resupplying the cities."

General Hod observed that Egypt has sea borne (Styx) missiles with 35 mile range and may have or may be receiving even more sophisticated missiles. Although these have a short range, they can be used sea-to-shore as well as sea-to-sea, and therefore can raise havoc with coastal cities such as Tel Aviv.

Ambassador Rabin said that they had heard of a plan, although they could not know for certain, to sell to Egypt missile destroyers with missiles of about 100 miles range which, although normally sea-to-sea, could also be used sea-to-shore. Rabin said Israel was worried that Egypt might launch sea borne missiles during the six day war, "but they did not dare to do this." Rabin said he also understands

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that there is a C-400 missile on the TU-16s now in Egypt that can hit the centers of our cities. "Therefore, we look at missiles somewhat differently than you. It is not necessary to have nuclear war heads on our missiles. There are war heads between high-explosive and nuclear."

Mr. Warnke said: "Then in your view, an unadvertised, untested nuclear device is not a nuclear weapon." Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that is correct."

Mr. Warnke asked: "What about an advertised but untested nuclear device or weapon. Would that be introduction?" Ambassador Rabin said: "Yes, that would be introduction." Mr. Warnke said he would interpret mere physical presence in the area as constituting, in itself, "introduction".

Mr. Warnke concluded the discussion by saying that he would talk with Mr. Hoopes, that we would have a Memorandum of Understanding prepared within a few days incorporating the provisions we have discussed, and that General Hod could in the meantime meet with the Air Force to continue the technical discussions that we are at this time prepared to go ahead with. Mr. Warnke said that we ought to continue these discussions so that we might try to arrive at some understanding between us as to the problems of missiles and nuclear weapons. At this time, with respect to "introduction", Mr. Warnke said there was not much clarity and no agreement.

Prepared by

R. J. Murray
Robert J. Murray

Approved by

(Signed)

PAUL G. WERNKE

The Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)

Date 12 November 1968

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect. 3.5

By NLN0204/45 2/22 11-20-02 little
NARA Date 8-27-07

27 November 1968

In reply refer to:
1-26174/68

His Excellency
Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel
2916 Chesapeake Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier."

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

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
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It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul C. Warnke". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized initial "P".

Paul C. Warnke

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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 E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
 NLN02-04/46 pr 11-20-02 letter
 By Hub NARA, Date 8-27-07
[Page]

26 November 1968

Refer to: 1-26196/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations with the Government of Israel

On November 26, Ambassador Rabin called me and reported that he had received my letter in reply to his letter requesting that the United States Government sell 50 F-4 Phantoms to Israel. Ambassador Rabin said that the letter posed no problems for him except for the reference to the interpretation of the United States Government as to what would constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons by a Middle East power.

Ambassador Rabin said that he understood from our second conversation that we would not incorporate a definition of this term. I pointed out that this discussion had occurred in the context of an anticipated Memorandum of Understanding, to be subscribed by both parties. With a Memorandum of Understanding it would be necessary to arrive at an agreed upon interpretation and our conversation had made it clear that this was unlikely. I commented further that the existence of such differences of opinion had, as I understood it, been the reason for his proposal of an exchange of letters in lieu of a Memorandum of Understanding. I also commented that, as Ambassador Rabin had noted in our last conference on Friday, neither of us was responsible for the content of the other's letter.

I pointed out further that the interpretation of the United States Government was not directed exclusively at the circumstances under which Israel would be deemed to have introduced nuclear weapons into the Middle East but that it applied equally to the eventuality of such action by any other Middle Eastern power. In the event that another Middle Eastern power should acquire possession and control of nuclear weapons then this would relieve the Government of Israel from the restrictions of its announced policy.

Ambassador Rabin said that he recognized that our position was equally applicable to other Middle Eastern powers and asked again if I thought this paragraph should remain in the letter. I said that I did and Ambassador Rabin said "all right."

In response to my question as to how the negotiations are proceeding, Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met yesterday with Mr. Schwartz and had presented a list of the items desired in order that an appropriate letter of offer could be prepared. He also commented that he might want to talk with me at the end of the week with regard to the delivery schedule.

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NRN02-04/44 JA 11-22-02 (alt)

By KW Date 8-27-07

[3 pages]

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(1 of 2 documents under this no.)



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

29 November 1968

I-26232/68

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and U.S. Intelligence Requirements

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESR Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1630 - 1730 29 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin began by saying he had three subjects to discuss. The first concerned the definition of "introduction" in Mr. Warnke's letter to him of 27 November 1968. Rabin said "some people" in Israel are not happy that the definition appears in the letter; they feel that it may imply that Israel accepts that definition, and that nothing in the correspondence makes it clear enough that Israel has its own definition.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not see any ambiguity in the situation. The letter clearly states that this is the American definition and the last sentence was changed to preclude the construction that Israel agrees with it.

Ambassador Rabin said that some people say that by failing to comment on it, we in fact accept it. Mr. Schwartz suggested that, in order properly to clarify that issue, Israel should write down its own definition. Ambassador Rabin said that he would have to send Mr. Warnke another letter. Mr. Warnke said: "I can not of course stop you from sending me a letter." Ambassador Rabin laughingly replied: "Yes, I know, but I want you to answer it."

Mr. Warnke suggested that the Ambassador draft a letter to him and show it to him "and I'll tell you what I think."

COPY FOR: MR. WALSH - SUMMIT

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Ambassador Rabin said that the second problem concerned publicity. The Ambassador mentioned an article in today's Baltimore Sun and a recent Finney article. Mr. Warnke said that he doubted that this was recent information. Ambassador Rabin said that publicity in this case should be different than in the A-4 negotiations. In this case, it was public knowledge that F-4 negotiations were going on, as was clear from the President's announcement. The Ambassador said he was concerned about future leaks and that, while he didn't want to give the numbers of aircraft involved, he would like to say something. The Ambassador said that, "political figures are involved" and it wasn't fully under his control.

Mr. Warnke said that the press knew already that negotiations were underway, and that there really wasn't much more to be said that could satisfy them without giving the full details. Mr. Warnke asked what the Israelis wanted to say.

Minister Argov said that he gets three to four calls a day from the press, and he finds it difficult to keep repeating the same thing day after day. He would like to say a deal has been consummated. Mr. Warnke said that that would not be appropriate: no contract has been signed, no final arrangements made, and there are a variety of loose ends to tidy up. Mr. Warnke said that he would think about it and let the Ambassador know.

Mr. Schwartz asked if the requirement for publicity was in Israel. The Ambassador replied: "Not only in Israel, but also here." The Ambassador thought that if we could say that in principle a positive decision had been taken, it would take the pressure off. Mr. Warnke said that this wasn't a problem for the Defense Department alone, that he would have to check with others including the White House, but that he would let the Ambassador know.

Ambassador Rabin next raised the problem of delivery of F-4 aircraft. The Ambassador said: "We think we have justified reasons for earlier deliveries. Six or eight or ten aircraft by the middle of 1969 should not be too much of a problem for the big U.S. Air Force." Rabin said that he had spoken with General McConnell who had said there are two problems, one is the political and the other is technical. Rabin said that McConnell is working on the technical problem, but the two were related. "If a political decision can be made" said Rabin, "then this would help along the technical decision."

Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force was concerned about the technical difficulties of rapid introduction of this very sophisticated aircraft without adequate preparation. Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force had had similar difficulties in Australia and Iran. Ambassador Rabin suggested that we not compare Israel with Australia and Iran. Israel has great technical capabilities. He noted that Israel was already flying the MIG aircraft without any assistance and without spare parts.

Mr. Schwartz noted that Israel under this plan would be able to fly the aircraft, but could not maintain the electronics systems or use the weapons systems. Ambassador Rabin said: "You give them to us and we'll use them" Rabin said that what was wanted was "six to twelve" aircraft by mid-1969.

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Ambassador Rabin said that he had also raised the question of delivery with General Wheeler. Ambassador Rabin said, in reference to General Wheeler, "what he had to say at the Ranch was the most favorable from our point of view. When I met him again in May 1968, he (Wheeler) said Israel's situation depends on two things: if we get the MIRAGEs, and the rate of Soviet shipments." On the first, said Rabin, "although we don't like it, there is no sign" of delivery. On the second, Soviet shipments (to the Arab states) have been faster than expected.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not give an answer now but that he would look into the problem.

The Ambassador said he had a fourth problem. The fourth problem, the Ambassador said, concerns technical negotiations. He asked whether we could now proceed to such negotiations?

Mr. Murray said that we were already doing this, that Generals Roth and Carmon and others met with the Air Force on Wednesday and that the Air Force was now in the process of arranging follow-on briefings. Mr. Murray said that it was our understanding that these negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily.

General Carmon said that they had had useful discussions on Wednesday but that they had not obtained certain information on weapons systems, mentioning specifically the Sparrow missile. Mr. Schwartz said the Air Force was authorized to discuss with Israel all the systems that we are now prepared to release; that there were certain systems which Israel could not have because they are not releasable to anyone and were used only by the U.S. military forces, and these of course the Air Force was not permitted to discuss; and there was a third category of items we were prepared to talk about but for which no final decisions on releasability have been made. Mr. Murray said that we are prepared to continue these discussions and that the Air Force was now preparing a briefing schedule to this end. Mr. Warnke said that we could not release full information on systems as to which we had not taken a decision to release. He commented that it might not be in Israel's interest to push for immediate decisions on these unresolved items.

General Carmon agreed that there were no serious problems in this connection at this time.

Prepared by

Robert J. Murray
Robert J. Murray

Approved by

(Signed)
PAUL C. WARNKE
Assistant Secretary of
Defense, ISA

Date 29 November 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM NO. 40

TO : NSC - Dr. Kissinger.
U - The Acting Secretary

FROM : NEA - Rodger P. Davies RPD

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program - Issues
and Courses of Action

Attached there is a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program as requested in NSSM 40.

The following major issues emerged during meetings of the Ad Hoc Group.

1. Israel's Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions

SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)(6)

[REDACTED] there was no consensus as to whether Israel has already produced completed nuclear weapons. We know that Israel is in the process of deploying a nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile system (range of about 300 miles); there is circumstantial evidence indicating Israel has acquired fissionable material; there are unconfirmed reports that Israel has begun to construct nuclear weapons.

SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)(6)

[REDACTED] Department of State representatives believe more evidence is necessary before this conclusion is reached, and that Israel will not take this step lightly because it is aware that actual production and deployment of nuclear weapons could place severe strains on US-Israel relations.

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-04/45 3.3(6)(1)(6)

By *AKM* Date 8-27-02

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2. Israel's Assurances on Nuclear Weapons and Relation
to Delivery of F-4 "Phantom" Aircraft to Israel



Israel has committed to us that it will not be "the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area", but there are grounds for believing that Israel does not construe production of a weapon to constitute "introduction." During negotiations in November, 1968 for the sale of the "Phantom" F-4 aircraft to Israel, Ambassador Rabin expressed the view that introduction would require testing and making public the fact of possession of a nuclear weapon. In accepting as condition for the sale Israel's reaffirmation that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East and agreement that it would not use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier, our reply stated:

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle East power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

Inasmuch as our reply also made clear that we consider that "unusual and compelling circumstances" requiring cancellation of the F-4 agreement would exist in the event of "action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter," the door was left open to suspend or cancel the deliveries of the aircraft if Israel by our definition "introduced" nuclear weapons into the area.

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3. Will Raising this Issue with Israel now Complement or Undercut our Diplomatic effort to Achieve an Arab-Israeli peace Settlement?

Since we are already having a crisis of confidence with Israel over our peace efforts, will the renewal of the dialogue on the nuclear issue cause the Israelis to dig in even harder on their peace terms? It can be argued that the nuclear issue is overriding and that in any event a settlement is unlikely. On the other hand, progress toward peace would probably be the single most decisive factor making the nuclear issue easier to handle.

In defining options, the NSSM 40 study covers a range of pressures that the U.S. might apply to Israel -- for any purpose. If we choose to use the maximum option on the nuclear issue, we may not have the necessary leverage left for helping along the peace negotiations. We are proceeding with our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the nature of a settlement with the expectation that Israel will find the outcome difficult but not impossible to accept and that some pressure will be necessary to bring Israel into line. If there is a real possibility that pressure will be needed, these would not differ substantially from those in the study. Use of leverage on the NPT/nuclear issue may seriously detract from our capability to influence Israel on the settlement issue. On the other hand, if we decide to defer using pressure on the nuclear question so as to preserve leverage on a possible peace settlement, we must ask how long we are prepared to do this in the face of Israel's rapidly advancing program, and the knowledge that, the longer we put off making Israel feel the seriousness of our purpose, the harder it will be to arrest Israel's program.

4. Should we Move Directly into a Confrontation with Israel on the NPT/Nuclear Weapon Issue on the basis of Supply of F-4's and other pending Arms Deliveries or Should we Follow a Graduated Approach Relying Primarily on Political Suasion but Maintaining the Flexibility to Move to more Coercive Policies if Israel is Unresponsive

The Department of State believes that a policy of pressure has a fundamental built-in contradiction and involves difficulties for the U.S. that should be carefully

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examined. A threat to cut off Israel's supply of conventional arms could build military and psychological pressures within Israel to move rapidly to the very sophisticated weaponry we are trying to avoid. Moreover, to deny Israel arms needed for its defense would be most difficult to justify in the face of continuing Arab threats and commando attacks. Israel would see from the outset that we would be under considerable pressures not to sustain this position and we would have expended much leverage and good will needlessly.

State believes that for the present we should continue the course of using political argumentation, leaving implicit and for future decision possible sanctions if Israel does not respond to our initial representations and proceeds with its weapons program.¹ Our actions on the nuclear issue should be timed so as to complement or at least not undercut our diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement. Our objective would be Israeli signature of the NPT with (a) the tacit understanding that as long as Israel did not complete manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, we would regard this as being within the terms of the Treaty and, (b) a commitment that Israel would negotiate the IAEA safeguards agreement, and (c) an understanding that we will support the Israelis in a reasonable interpretation of Article III consistent with the difference we have drawn between maintaining and exercising the option to manufacture nuclear explosives, provided Israel assures us it will not produce weapons and will consult with us to define this concept in detail.

The Department of Defense (ISA and the Joint Staff) believes that pressures can be applied by the threat to cut off conventional weapons supply and assurances from Israel received with a reasonably good chance (say 75%) of avoiding a public confrontation. Important groups in Israel surely will want to avoid such a confrontation, and the military certainly will not wish to exchange assured conventional weapons supply from this highly preferred source for nuclear-armed missiles. Moreover, it will be difficult, to put it mildly, for Israel publicly to challenge our position on this issue - for our position can be easily and clearly presented as acting in the U.S.

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¹ J/PM differs with this view: see footnote on page 6.

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interest without jeopardizing Israel's security. (This would not be the case if, for example, we attempted to withhold arms supplies to achieve Israeli concessions to Arabs; our position would be more difficult to defend and sustain publicly in that instance.)

Defense believes that it is important, if we are to stop Israel from going ahead with missiles and nuclear weapons, to demonstrate to the Israelis the seriousness of our purpose so that Israel itself can see the desirability of avoiding confrontation. Israel will surely not stop its long range-nuclear weapons and missile programs unless it is made to feel that the United States is truly prepared to adopt policies which would adversely effect Israel's security with respect to more immediate threats. Moreover, the speed with which Israel is proceeding dictates that we must take steps very soon if we are to stop Israel's nuclear and missile activity before it is publicly known.

Defense recognizes that we cannot obtain absolute guarantees that Israel will forego strategic missiles and nuclear weapons over the long-run; we can, however, make it more likely that missiles and nuclear weapons will not be used by stopping their production now and by creating a political obstacle -- the necessity to renounce agreements and risk confrontation with the United States -- to their later use.

5. Should we Attempt to Obtain Israeli Assurances that it will halt its strategic missile as well as nuclear weapons program?

Defense believes that in addition to signature of the NPT and assurances of nuclear weapons restraint, we should seek Israeli assurances that it will not produce, further acquire, or deploy strategic missiles. They argue that since the present Israeli "Jericho" missile is not militarily cost effective as a means of delivering a high explosive warhead, the assumption will be made that they are designed for nuclear warheads, and the practical result may be the same whether or not the nuclear weapons actually exist.

The Department of State, on the other hand, believes that getting the Israelis to abandon their SSM program will be very difficult to achieve, given the program's already

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advanced stage. Trying to obtain assurances on missiles would therefore seriously compound the difficulty of obtaining assurances on what must be our main objective--the non-production and non-deployment of nuclear weapons.

6. Courses of Action

A. The Department of State holds the following view:

1. A dialogue with Israel on the nuclear question can and should be initiated immediately. We believe this will not affect adversely our current efforts to achieve a peace settlement. We should move to reaffirm our opposition to proliferation as soon as possible preferably at the Ambassadorial level both here and in Jerusalem and underscore that the U.S. Government considers it has a firm commitment in this respect from Israel. We believe strongly that we should not at this juncture link this approach to a suspension or slowing down of shipments of conventional weapons to Israel.¹ This possibility should be reviewed prior to September in the light of Israel's response and further intelligence on the progress of Israel's program.

2. At an early occasion a high-ranking U.S. official--preferably the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense--should make a public statement on our global non-proliferation objectives and, in particular, our hope that nuclear weapons can be kept out of sensitive areas such as the Middle East. Such a statement should note Israel's assurances to us that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area and urge Israel to sign the NPT.

¹J/PM, while in general agreement with the other formulations identified as the State position in this paper, differs with NEA on this point. J/PM believes:

- (a) The implications of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons are serious enough for US interests to warrant reminding the Israelis at the outset of the terms of the Warnke letter, and informing them of the possibility that we might not be able to carry through with deliveries of the F-4 and other aircraft if Israel pursues its weapons program;
- (b) Unless this warning is conveyed, the Israelis are not likely to pay much attention to our representations.

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B. The Department of Defense holds the following view:

1. There should be an early meeting with Ambassador Rabin of Israel for the purpose of conveying to Israel (a) the seriousness with which the U.S. views Israel's missile and nuclear developments, and (b) specific U.S. demands that Israel stop certain of its activities and give us assurances to this effect.

2. The assurances we require from Israel are: (a) private assurances (with inspection rights) that Israel will cease and desist from development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and (b) public assurances in the form of a NPT signature and ratification.

3. We should reiterate, on behalf of this Administration, that the American definition of "introduction" applies (e.g., the State of Israel will not physically possess nuclear weapons, including the components of nuclear weapons that will explode).

4. Rabin should be called in by the President, or by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Although the negotiations with Israel will be especially difficult, they will be less difficult if our demands for assurances are unequivocal and made at the highest level.

Drafted by:
State/Defense 5/29/69

[NWL 02-04/4I p7030]

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SANITIZED COPY

I. ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPON INTENTIONSSANITIZED
3.3 (4)(6)(6)

[REDACTED]

There is no conclusive evidence that Israel has fabricated a weapon,

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED
3.3 (4)(6)(6)

Given the impact of this decision on U.S. and world opinion, as well as the domestic political problem it would pose, this final step is one we believe the Labor Alignment in Israel would like to avoid. The fierce determination to safeguard the Jewish people, however, makes it probable that Israel would desire to maintain the ultimate weapon at hand should its security again be seriously threatened.

Last fall the Departments of State and Defense recommended making the supply of F-4 aircraft contingent upon the halting by Israel of its nuclear weapons and missiles program, but President Johnson did not approve the recommendations to that effect. We did, however, during the F-4 negotiations with Israel, accomplish at least three things: (1) we put Israel on notice that the USG is aware of what Israel is doing in the missile and nuclear field; (2) we identified a significant difference between U.S. and Israeli interpretations of what constitutes "introduction" of nuclear weapons (Israeli Ambassador Rabin said that "introduction" would not occur until a weapon had been tested and its existence publicly known: Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke made clear that the American definition is that mere possession of nuclear weapons constitutes "introduction"); and (3) we deliberately and explicitly left open the possibility that this Administration would reconsider the F-4 sale in light of Israel's nuclear programs.

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II. IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

The implications of Israel becoming a nuclear power need examination from several different aspects.

A. Arab Reaction

The Arabs are aware that Israel's capability in the nuclear field is well-advanced, but the fact of Israel's adding nuclear weapons to its arsenal would have profound political and psychological effect throughout the area.

Although operational nuclear weapons in the Israeli inventory would have a generalized deterrent effect upon the Arabs, it would not guarantee Israel against a wide range of military actions by the Arabs. Israeli nuclear weapons would do nothing to reduce Arab commando activity or the kind of sporadic across-the-lines shooting exchanges between the regular armed forces that we see today. This type of activity could well increase because of the Arab conclusion that, since Israel has a stronger weapon to use against organized forces, Arab strategy should concentrate on guerilla and limited engagement tactics to raise Israeli casualties and to wear Israel down over the long run. We would expect no dramatic change in the Arab-Israeli military impasse but some added impetus to Arab government support for guerilla tactics.

The appearance of nuclear weapons in Israel would probably cause the Arabs to withdraw from the NPT and to announce they were compelled to embark on a nuclear weapons program of their own.

The problem for the Arabs would not be money but the acquisition of technical knowledge and fissionable material. We do not believe that the USSR would provide either completed weapons or technical assistance in nuclear weaponry to the Arabs. We also believe it highly improbable that Communist China would provide such assistance. It would be possible, however, for the Arabs to hire on private contract a broad range of scientific and technical personnel from Western Europe.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger (Signed) HK

SUBJECT: Rabin's Proposed Assurances on Israeli Nuclear Policy

Ambassador Rabin has asked whether the following replies to our queries about Israeli nuclear policy would be satisfactory: (1) Israel will not become a "nuclear power"; (2) Israel will not deploy strategic missiles, at least until 1972; (3) the new Israeli government after the October 28 election will consider the NPT. Following are my analysis of the acceptability and my recommendations on each of these points:

I. Israel will not become a nuclear power.

- A. Our July request: The Israelis had promised in signing the Phantom contract "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." Rabin had informally defined "introduce" to mean "not test and not publicize." Elliot Richardson on July 29 asked him to accept our definition of "not introduce" as "not possess." The papers from which you worked in authorizing Elliot's approach defined "possess" for our own internal purposes as "Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear explosive device." In short, we tried to put ourselves in a position where we could act as if we assumed the Israelis do not have completed weapons while leaving to the Israelis' conscience the stage short of completion where they would stop.
- B. Implications of the Israeli response. Instead of accepting our words "not possess," Rabin simply says they "prefer" to say they will "not become a nuclear power."
1. "Nuclear power." Their phrase suggests the NPT distinction between a "nuclear-weapon State" and a "non-nuclear-weapon State." But it is quite possible they are simply proposing a suitably vague phrase that has no previous record of discussion between us and hence no earlier effort at precise definition.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 02-04/45 6-4-07 letter
By xsn/s Date 8-27-07

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2. In the context of the NPT, the concept "non-nuclear-weapon State" has the following meaning:

- a. "...a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."
- b. "Each non-nuclear-weapon State. . .undertakes . . . not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. . ."
- c. The treaty leaves deliberately obscure the position of a nation like Israel that might now already have manufactured but not exploded a nuclear device. There is no history of extensive discussion of this issue among the negotiators. Presumably each such nation is left to make its own good-conscience definition of what constitutes "manufacture." Any such nation signing the treaty would presumably be declaring that is not retaining such devices, though the state of dismantling would again be left to its own good-conscience judgment.

3. The reason for Rabin's preference is not clear. When I asked how a state could become a "nuclear power" without "possessing" nuclear weapons, he simply said they "prefer" their formulation. I can only guess that they are trying to break away from discussions last year in which US Defense negotiators interpreted the Israeli assurance about not introducing nuclear weapons to preclude the mere physical presence of weapons. They may figure they are on better ground with a concept that has some internationally recognized meaning but has been left deliberately vague.

C. Acceptability of the Israeli formulation.

- 1. Any of these phrases is vague and leaves definition to the Israelis. It is not practical for us to try to define them

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restrictively because we could not determine Israeli adherence to our definition. What we have to settle for, I believe, is an Israeli commitment that will prevent Israeli nuclear weapons from becoming a known factor and further complicating the Arab-Israeli situation.

2. Nevertheless, I am wary of accepting their phrase without some notion of what they mean by it.
 3. However, if we could tie their phrase to the NPT concept of remaining a "non-nuclear-weapon State," we would at least be working with an internationally accepted concept--albeit one with its own calculated vagueness of definition.
 4. The argument against giving up insistence on our word "possess" would come from those who believe we should make a maximum effort to keep Israel as far as possible from a real nuclear capability. They might believe the word "possess" carried with it a more restrictive meaning. However, this argument in my mind founders on two points: the obvious Israel unwillingness to confide the details of their program--as far as I know--and our inability to enforce an agreement we might theoretically reach.
- D. Recommendation--That I reply to Rabin as follows: Since the Israeli phrase "nuclear power" suggests the concepts of the NPT, you propose that Israel assure us it will remain a "non-nuclear-weapon State," assuming the obligations of such a state as defined by Article II of the NPT. ["...not to receive" and "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...."] This would in effect ask the Israelis to accept privately the key obligation of the NPT while allowing them more time to sort out their position on more generally unpalatable aspects of the treaty (e.g. safeguards and public renunciation of the nuclear option).

Approve _____

Other _____

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II. Israel will not deploy strategic missiles at least until 1972.

A. Our July request: Elliot said, "We hope Israel will agree not to produce or deploy the Jericho missile."

B. Implications of the Israeli response. I can only guess Israeli motivation. These are possibilities:

1. Rabin's offer not to deploy finesses our request not to manufacture missiles. This would permit them to run them off the production line and then to store them a few hours from launch readiness rather than putting them on the launching pads.
2. Although our intelligence suggests persuasively that the first missiles should be coming off the production line this fall, it might be that there is some complication in the production line or in the availability of a militarily significant number of warheads that would make the Israelis unready to deploy missiles until 1972 anyway.
3. More likely is the possibility that the Israelis estimate that their military superiority--especially if the additional Skyhawks and Phantoms they have requested are delivered in 1971--is almost certainly assured through 1971. That would be quite consistent with our estimates, although the Israelis present a more dangerous picture when making their case for the additional aircraft. They may figure their sacrifice would be marginal beside the risk of antagonizing the US and jeopardizing the added equipment and aid they want.

C. Acceptability of the Israeli proposal.

1. There was general agreement during our special Review Group discussions last July that our minimum requirement was for the Israelis not to deploy their missiles. If they were deployed, everyone would assume they had nuclear warheads because they are not accurate enough to be worth their cost just to deliver high explosives. It was my own conclusion that this was all we could expect the Israelis to accept.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

August 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*

SUBJECT: Richardson-Rabin Meeting on the Israeli Nuclear Program

✓
Encl.
in envelope
to Sanders

At Tab A, with an excellent summary on top, is the report of the talk with the Israelis on July 29. Elliot was completely responsive to your guidance by:

- Expressing our interest in early Israeli action on signing NPT and requesting a report from them on the subject.
- Requesting an Israeli assurance that when Israel said it would not "introduce" nuclear weapons it meant it would not "possess" such weapons.
- Requesting assurance that Israel would not produce or deploy the Jericho strategic missile.
- Avoiding making an explicit link between Israel's responses and our supply of conventional weapons to Israel (F-4 sale).

So far, we have heard nothing from the Israelis, and I agree with the recommendation that we should remind them of our concern if we hear nothing soon.

You should be aware that since this talk, Mrs. Meir has turned down our request for a one-day visit to the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona. A U.S. team visited there early in July but felt the Israelis did not allow enough time for an adequate examination. Ambassador Barbour feels he has pressed the Israelis as hard as he can on inspection and that there is no hope for another visit before Mrs. Meir comes to Washington (Tab B).

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Nuclear Program

As authorized by you, I called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin July 29 to carry out the first step in our scenario for discussions with the Israelis on their nuclear program. A full record of that meeting is enclosed.

To set the stage, I recalled that in Ambassador Rabin's talks with Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke last November there had been a discussion of what Israel means when it says it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In this connection I noted that there had been no meeting of the minds between us on the interpretation of "introduce". We would like Israel to accept our interpretation, which is that non-introduction means non-possession. Were Israel to possess nuclear weapons, we would see this as a direct threat to the national security of the United States since it would add a new dimension of danger to the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation.

I also made the point that there is some forward movement on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we feel it necessary to emphasize our concern over Israel's delay in signing. Noting that Prime Minister Eshkol had told us last December Israel was studying

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the implications of NPT signature, I said Israel's failure to sign would be a setback to our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Finally, I noted our concern that Israel was acquiring strategic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, a development which the world would see as weakening Israel's assurances in the nuclear field.

I put to Ambassador Rabin our specific requests for (a) a report on the results of the Israeli government's study of the NPT question, (b) an assurance that when Israel said it would not introduce nuclear weapons it meant it would not possess such weapons, and (c) an assurance that Israel would not produce or deploy the Jericho strategic missile. In doing so, I carefully avoided making any explicit link between Israel's response and our supply of conventional weapons to Israel.

We had informed Ambassador Rabin in advance that I wanted to discuss the nuclear question with him but had not indicated the nature of what I would say. Predictably, the Ambassador was not prepared to go beyond earlier Israeli positions. On instructions from his Government, which he had apparently sought before our meeting, he stated that Israel's study of the NPT question was continuing and that he was not authorized to comment before that study was completed. With respect to nuclear weapons, he said he could only repeat that Israel would not be the first Middle Eastern state to introduce them. He did not comment on the missiles question. He undertook, however, to convey our approach on all points to his government.

If we have not had a reply to our approach in about one week's time, I believe we should underline the seriousness with which we view this matter by reminding the Ambassador that we are awaiting an early response.



Acting Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 
SUBJECT: Israel's Nuclear Program

Attached is the package which we telegraphed to you on the above subject. Per your instructions I informed Eliot Richardson of your desire that no further action be taken on the matter until you had an opportunity to discuss it with him. Eliot informed me that the Israelis have not replied to the proposal made in his initial discussion with them on July 29, and that in any event he will make no new initiatives until you have both discussed the problem.

Attachments


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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-04/421 R2 3.4(6)(b) 6-4-07

By KMB Date 8-27-07

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Jeanne W. Davis
Secretariat

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 29, 1969

SUBJECT: Israel's Nuclear Weapon and Strategic Missile Policy

PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Yitzhak RABIN, Ambassador of Israel
Shlomo ARGOV, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Moshe RAVIV, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Elliot L. RICHARDSON, The Acting Secretary
David PACKARD, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Alfred L. ATHERTON, Jr., Country Director, Israel
and Arab-Israel Affairs

Mr. Richardson said he was aware of Ambassador Rabin's discussions last year with Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke relating to the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In light of subsequent progress toward ratification of the NPT, we believed it useful to review the status of this question as it was left in the exchange of letters between Rabin and Warnke of November 22 and November 27, respectively, of last year, which had brought out differing US and Israeli interpretations of what was meant by "introduce" nuclear weapons.

Rabin observed there were two problems: (a) nuclear weapons in the Middle East and (b) the NPT. Warnke had not discussed the NPT. Which, he asked, was the subject of today's talk?

Mr. Richardson said we saw the two problems as inseparable. The NPT question had moved forward since that time and we thought both questions should be reviewed together. Mr. Richardson then read the following oral statement:

"We want to discuss today a subject of deep concern to the United States -- the possibility that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems will be introduced into the Middle East.

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"This would be a development the United States would regard not only as a tragedy for the Middle East but as a direct threat to United States national security. Our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide would be dealt a severe blow and the possible risk of US-Soviet confrontation would be enhanced.

"For these reasons, Israel's nuclear policy is a subject of great importance to us. It transcends considerations of purely bilateral significance to our two nations.

"We are aware of Israel's assurances -- made publicly at the highest level of its government as well as to us privately -- that Israel will not be the first area state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. We attach great weight to these assurances. But with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in existence, unilateral assurances are no longer sufficient in themselves to give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to manufacture nuclear weapons.

"We are particularly troubled by Israel's continued delay in signing the NPT because of Israel's potential for nuclear weapons production. Israel is not just another state that for one reason or another is delaying its adherence to the Treaty. The world knows that unlike most other states Israel has the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. It knows that Israel has a 26 megawatt nuclear reactor capable of producing fissionable material in sufficient quantity to build bombs. It is also becoming aware that Israel has had developed and is acquiring surface-to-surface missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

"Because of this proximity to the nuclear weapons threshold, Israel's attitude toward the NPT is being closely watched by other small and medium-sized states who are waiting to see whether nuclear weapons non-proliferation can be made to prevail as a global principle.

"We therefore attach utmost importance to Israel's early signature and ratification of the NPT. Last December, Prime Minister Eshkol wrote to President Johnson that Israel was studying the implications of Israel's adherence to the NPT. We would welcome the Ambassador's comments concerning the conclusions the Government of Israel has reached.

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"Upon reviewing the Ambassador's conversations with Assistant Secretary Warnke last November, we were struck by the evident difference between our two governments over what constitutes "introduction" of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador expressed the view, as we understand it, that a state could possess a nuclear explosive device but so long as that device was "unadvertised" and "untested" it could not be considered as having been "introduced".

"The U.S. Government cannot accept this interpretation of "introduction", as was made clear in Secretary Warnke's letter to the Ambassador concerning the F-4 sale. We would like to have Israel's assurance that when it says it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area it means that it will not possess nuclear weapons.

"Israel has had developed and tested in France the so-called MD-620 or "Jericho" strategic missile which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Some of the missiles remaining after tests are already in Israel.

"We are disturbed at Israel's acquisition of this missile because it makes sense to us only as a nuclear weapons carrier. We recognize that Israel claims that it can be used with other warheads; this is not, however, the way the world will see it. Whatever assurances Israel extends with respect to nuclear weapons will be seriously weakened by deployment of strategic nuclear-capable missiles.

"For this reason, we hope Israel will agree not to produce or deploy the Jericho missile. There is no sign of an active SSM program in any Arab country and no sign of Soviet interest in providing any of their Arab friends with assistance in either this or the nuclear weapons field."

Mr. Richardson summarized by noting we were asking (a) for the Ambassador's comments on the results of the GOI's study of the NPT question, (b) for an assurance that "non-introduction" means "non-possession" of nuclear weapons and (c) for assurances about the production and deployment of the Jericho missile.

Concerning the NPT, Ambassador Rabin said he could only repeat what Prime Minister Eshkol had said in his December 4, 1968

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letter to President Johnson -- namely that Israel was studying the question of NPT signature. There had been no change in this respect in GOI policy. Rabin said the NPT had many aspects not directly related to the real problems of the Middle East. He had received instructions the previous day to the effect that Israel had not concluded its study and he is not authorized to comment before that study is completed. Deputy Secretary Packard asked if he could estimate when that would be. Rabin noted that there had been a Cabinet change in Israel and that the Government faced other issues which were more pressing and more immediate.

On the question of introducing nuclear weapons, Rabin said parenthetically he interpreted this as meaning introduction by Middle Eastern states, not by major powers which have them there already. First, Rabin continued, he wanted to clarify his November conversation with Warnke. When Warnke asked for an interpretation of "introduce" he (Rabin) had said he was not clear about the question and could not answer officially but would appreciate hearing the US interpretation from Warnke. Emphasizing that he personally had no knowledge of nuclear weapons, he had asked Warnke two questions: (a) Would Warnke consider an untested nuclear weapon to be an effective weapon? This would not be so in the case of conventional weapons. (b) Would Warnke consider a weapon, which had not been advertised and proven, to be a weapon that could be used? In asking these questions Rabin said he was seeking to learn the US interpretation; he was not representing the Israeli position. On the basic question of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, he could now only repeat his government's position that it would not be the first state in the Middle East to introduce such weapons.

Commenting on the Acting Secretary's oral statement, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He could say neither that Israel was capable nor that it was not. He wanted to note, however, that the US has arrangements with Israel of a kind that do not even exist between the US and its allies, and which demonstrate the extent to which Israel has given us the opportunity to have a close look at what Israel is doing in the nuclear field.

Mr. Richardson said that our purpose in raising the interpretation of the word "introduce" was not to reopen the Warnke-Rabin

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ACTIONTOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program *Revised*

You will recall authorizing a careful study of the current state of the Israeli nuclear program and analysis of our possible response to it.

We have now had two very good meetings of a special Review Group (Richardson, Packard, Wheeler, Helms and I) to review the situation and to refine our possible responses to it. We are now ready for you to consider the problem.

Our initial arrangement was that you would hold a special meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird, General Wheeler, Dick Helms and me. Since Elliot Richardson has played a major role in shaping the issue and may well turn out to be the executor of your decision, I would urge including him in this group.

We would be prepared to meet with you toward the end of next week. I believe this is something we should do before the trip. The course of action we have in mind should be put in train as soon as possible and could be at least launched while we are away.

Recommendation: That you approve a meeting as described above as soon after July 9 as possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

TOP SECRET/NODIS

HHSaunders:tmt 7/1/69

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MEMORANDUM

PRESERVATION COPY

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

July 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

Show to
1) General Davis
2) Mr. Helms
us copy

You will recall authorizing a careful study of the current state of the Israeli nuclear program and analysis of our possible response to it.

We have now had two very good meetings of a special Review Group (Richardson, Packard, Wheeler, Helms and I) to review the situation and to refine our possible responses to it. We are now ready for you to consider the problem.

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We would be prepared to meet with you toward the end of next week. I believe this is something we should do before the trip. The course of action we have in mind should be put in train as soon as possible and could be at least launched while we are away.

Recommendation: That you approve a meeting of a restricted group of the National Security Council on July 16.

Approve *AK*

Disapprove _____

Other _____

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02/04/4M

By *KMB* Date *8-28-07*

[5 pages]

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

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1786

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 13168

August 28, 1969

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Nuclear Program

During a meeting today with Israeli Ambassador Rabin, the Ambassador alluded to my approach to him of July 29 about Israel's nuclear intentions, noting this was one item he assumed would be on the agenda for Prime Minister Meir's visit next month.

I said we were interested in hearing Israel's response and asked whether the Ambassador had anything to say now or whether we could expect anything before the Prime Minister arrives. The Ambassador said he believed the Government of Israel would postpone a response. Speaking personally, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that this was a difficult subject for his government to deal with a month before elections.

I noted that there was a difference between what Israel said publicly and what it said to us privately. The questions of missile deployment and of Israel's definition of what is meant by "introduction" of nuclear weapons would not appear to depend upon elections. The Ambassador said only that in Israel's democratic system there were no secrets.

I concluded by noting that, since this question would apparently not be resolved before Mrs. Meir arrives, the Ambassador could assume that it would be on the agenda for her visit.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

RLN02-04/4N [page] 6-4-07 letter

By Kuh Date 8-28-07


Elliot L. Richardson

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

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ACTION

TOP SECRET/NODIS

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FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

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Recommendation: That you approve a meeting as described above as soon after July 9 as possible.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

TOP SECRET/NODIS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

July 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Mort Halperin *MS*
Hal Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Next Step on Israeli Nuclear Program

By the end of this week we should have the final paper requested by your Ad Hoc Group last Thursday--a paper spelling out precisely how we would approach the Israelis and what we would ask them for.

That would put us in a position to present this problem to the President toward the end of next week.

Recommendation: That you send the attached memo to the President recommending a meeting late next week.

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

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Authority E.O. 12958
BGC NARA Date 2/25/10

71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10 July.

HAK

Richardson's papers
due today - Books
will be ready
now Sunday



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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT
NUMBER | DOCUMENT
TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|---------|-------------|
| 1 | Telcon | HAK / Maw - 2 pgs | 6/27/73 | D |
| 2 | Telcon | HAK / Dr. Schlesinger - 2 pgs | 6/27/73 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

HAK Telephone Conversations

BOX NUMBER

20

FOLDER TITLE

1973 25-30 June ⑨

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT
NUMBER | DOCUMENT
TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------|------------------|---|--------|-------------|
| 1 | Telcon | HAK / The President
- 3 pgs

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NND04-01/7

SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6) EO 12958 17r. 6 Mar 05 | 7/9/73 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

HAK Telephone Conversations

BOX NUMBER

20

FOLDER TITLE

1973 2-9 July (10)

RESTRICTION CODES

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

TELCON (San Clemente)
Dave Kraslow/Kissinger
12:06 p.m. - 7/2/73

K: Hello.

DK: Sir, would you have any objection to my calling this young lady and telling her of our conversation.

K: No. But tell her I'm not asking for anything. I just think she should have checked it.

DK: All right. And tell Dick I will check with him - when you coming back?

K: Probably Sunday.

DK: You coming Sunday?

K: Yeh.

DK: Will the President be coming back as well?

K: I'm pretty sure.

DK: OK. Thank you, Henry.

K: Good. Right.

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TELCON (San Clemente)

Irving Lazar/Kissinger

12:48 p.m. - 7/2/73

K: Hello.

L: Hello.

K: Irving.

L: Yes, how are you sir?

K: OK. I just wanted to ask you one question. Since after these hearings are over I'll want to make some decisions.

L: You want to make a decision?

K: I have to consider my situation. And I wondered from your knowledge of the situation, do you think that the sort of thing we were talking about is still feasible in the same range?

L: Just a little better, that's all.

K: Better?

L: Yeh, I was conservative from the beginning as I ususally am in order not to be in a position of embarrassment. I can only tell you it's the same if not better - your position is the same if not better than it ever was. No question about it. I have never told you as much as I could have because you didn't want to hear it which is fine. But I can only tell you that from my analysis and also from my rather conservative and most delicate inquiry in just listening and not talking, it is my conviction that everything I told you is absolutely the case and not better.

K: Despite Watergate?

L: Oh, Watergate has nothing to do with it. If anything it enhances the potential of the enterprise many fold because of reasons I'll discuss with you when I see you.

K: Well, it makes it easier to write because one of the things I always said to you was I didn't know how to express my views.

(Con't.)

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TELCON

July 2, 1973

Mr. Kissinger - Irving Lazar

12:48 p.m. cont.

L: direction question...I will give you a direct answer and that is this: unequivocally the watergate situation makes the enterprise --enhances the enterprise for one thing--makes it far more dynamic, not that the other wouldn't have been but that as a dimension which is in addition rather than in some way a deletion or in any way removes some of the attraction.

K: I appreciate this.

L: Not ...when I think about you I think about you and in relation to your project and the possibilities and potentialities and where it could be in any way diminished and I assure you...this is not off the top of my head, I've thought about it many times...I can only tell you that, in the first place, if it does anything it enhances the project. And everything I've told you I've never pursued in accordance precisely with your directions to do more than listen and in my listening I've come to the conclusion that it was always ~~cool~~-conservative and fair and will not be embarrassed when the chips are down. Which means a lot to me.

K: Well, that I won't hold you to. I just wanted to get a rough estimate.

L: You haven't got a rough one. You've got a clear cut...

K: Right. Because some basic decisions of mine will be somewhat....

L: It is a clearcut response to what you've asked me.

K: Good, I appreciate it, Irving. It was good to see you yesterday.

L: I'm delighted always at the joy of seeing you. I'll look forward to seeing you are the Ziffren's and the only reason I never talk to you about anything....

K: No, I don't want you to.

L: If you don't want me to....so I don't.

K: No, no, I don't want you to. And the only reason I asked you this was because I'll have to do some thinking when these hearings are over.

L: OK, that's marvelous. Of course, that may be two years.

K: No, after Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Haldeman have testified the basic facts will be out.

L: You've Straughn, Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and then a number of

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K: Yeah, but the key ones you've mentioned and that should be finished by middle August.

L: Yeah, about that, but then they are going to be brought back to rebuttle... for rebuttle purposes.

K: Yeah, but that.....

L: I think you are right. I think that by Sept. 1 this thing will have crystallized into what they want to do one way or another.

K: Exactly.

L: So I think that will happen. By that time Cox will have made his decision as to what he wants to do and whether there are going to be any indictments or not. It may well be that there will be less than people think.

K: I doubt that. I know Cox.

L: Well, I'm hoping that there are.

K: I've got to run, Irving.

L: This had struck the country so much, it's an upheaval. At any rate, I'll see you at the Ziffrens. I give you my direct answer and I still don't do anything which could possibly cause you any kind of necessity for explanation of any sort.

K: Exactly.

L: I know exactly and I subscribe to it. I am most zealous about it.

K: Good, I appreciate that, Irving.

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TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

12:00 noon 7/3/73

HK: Hello, Anatol, how are you?

AD: Thank you very much, how are you?

HK: I'm fine.

AD: I see that you are very busy and I am lazy.

HK: Where are you?

AD: Right now, I am in the Embassy

HK: I see. well we are settling all problems out here.

AD: Is my impression really--it is very busy now. After Brezhnev. (laughs)

HK: No, not very. I told you about this thing yesterday and I am going to talk to you when I get back.

AD: Yeh.

HK: You know the invitation is only in the technical sense. But Anatol what I wanted to ask you is this, some leaders of the Jewish community wanted to come out here to see me, and including one of whom who claims he talked to you at the President's dinner. Stein.

AD: I already invite him--I didn't give answer yet.

HK: No, no, my problem is I don't want--probably I will not let them come out here--I'll see them in Washington. But the thing that puzzles me is we haven't talked to them at all about the results of the summit and you remember that first conversation I had with Brezhnev --

AD: Yes.

HK: And I have never understood what happened after that.

AD: Neither do I.

HK: And you see frankly if there is anything like that that I could tell them then it would be worth seeing them and it would help with the legislation

2

I think it would be better to delay it when you will be back here.

Well, I'll certainly--I tell you now I will not see them here, because I don't want to create the impression that we are having a special meeting that requires a long trip. But you see there has been no official WH discussion with them about the summit at all, except that Joe Sisco has been running around saying profound things. And he doesn't know what the hell he is talking about. So I'm wondering ^Anatol whether you could find out for me by the time I get back next week whether there is anything at all that I can say along the lines Brezhnev said to me that Sunday evening in Camp David.

D: Okay, I check with him once more, but now he is in Moscow--I will check with him what he really has in mind and I will tell you--and for the same reason he called me and that day I give him two days to come with his wife to have lunch--

K: That's your privilege--you can do with--

AD: No, no because you mentioned to me--that's why I'm just telling you.

HK: I think it is a good idea as a matter of fact to --it shows a spirit of conciliation. So that is not the point. The point is only that he is one of those who wants to see me and he wants to know, you know, what I can tell him. And it would of course--if what Brezhnev said that Sunday night could be repeated in some appropriate form, that would be a very significant statement.

AD: Okay--when will you be back more or less

HK: I'll be back completely on Monday--I'm completely also on Monday. No because you said when will you be back more or less, so I wanted to assure you when I'm back it will be com--I'll be completely back

AD: Now I owe you one okay?

HK: That's right--you owe me a lunch--I better fast for a few days. How about Wednesday? Hello?

AD: Just a minute--

HK: Or Thursday is perhaps even better for me.

because on Wednesday I have a lunch.

ge 3

: And Thursday with the Israeli ambassador--

D: What about Tuesday

K: All right--I'll shift, I have something on Tuesday but I will shift it in your honor.

D: 1:15 --all right

HK: 1:15 at the Embassy.

AD: At the embassy.

HK: Okay and and I will --then we can talk about the matter we discussed yesterday.

AD: Yes. I will try to get the answer before that time--

HK: Good excellent.

AD:receive the telegram that was from our Brezhnev to ~~max~~ President about your fourth day --national day

HK: Oh, I haven't seen that yet. But I appreciate that message you sent me about this last leg of your trip.

AD: Well I hope you will tell me something too

HK: Oh yes. No, no, no--you can count on--That's understood. I think though that it is better if I do it personally, don't you

AD: Oh there is no hurry--

HK: You can absolutely count on it and you can tell them in Moscow that I will do that.

AD: --to cement (?) the ~~israeli~~ mutual understanding

HK: No, I think it should be the general practice

AD: And you received the _____ on this one on the last SS-9?

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Page 4

HK: Yes, I did. Well our people aren't happy, but I'm going to try to keep it--

AD: This is really--

HK: No, I thought it was a quick reply.

AD: I received a postscript

HK:W Well let me see I may ask you--let's discuss it on Tuesday. I may ask you to repeat it--you and I may have to discuss to ~~form~~ find some formal way of stating the same thing again. Like in the standing committee.

AD: Okay

HK: And then we would accept^{it}/there.

AD: Oh you would like to have it there.

HK Let me think about--it's a

AD: because if you would like the letter to go to check with _____ I think it will not understand why he checked with them.

HK: Let me--Anatol let me see what our bureaucratic problem is on that.

AD: Okay--

HK: I assume the truth has been told because we would certainly find out if it wasn't.

AD: Oh I m sure you could find out

HK: I don't see any point--and it sounds plausible to me.

AD: Yes, because I could tell you our people--couldn't tell you anything ..

HK: No, I don't think the purpose of one of these buildings can remain secret for very long.

A:2 By the way this seems to be ~~very~~ a reply from Moscow--very important otherwise--

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HK: No, no we took it very seriously and it was very much appreciated. It was very much appreciated Anatol. No I will try to keep it in this channel.

AD: Yes, I think this is the way because there could be some additional things.

HK: Let me keep it in this channel for the time being. There

AD: Or it could go to Brezhnev himself. It is no problem.

HK: There is no sense getting him involved--I'm assuming that buildings of this magnitude you can't hide the purpose of for an indefinite period of time, so I'm assuming it is the truth.

AD: And now, Henry, when my Ministers a member of the Politburo seems to become politiking (?) not only for ~~Politburo but other views~~ foreign policy but other views.

HK: Well, you told me that earlier and I think that's a very important statement.

AD: It is important statement.

HK: Good and you will find that in Helsinki that we are moving in a constructive direction.

AD: We need you on all the points until the 30th of October.

HK: That's right. Anatol, I'll see you next Tuesday.

AD: Next Tuesday we'll eat here. Thank you very much.

HK: Good.

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TELCON (San Clemente)

Dave Kraslow/Kissinger

12:06 p.m. - 7/2/73

K: Hello.

DK: Sir, would you have any objection to my calling this young lady and telling her of our conversation.

K: No. But tell her I'm not asking for anything. I just think she should have checked it.

DK: All right. And tell Dick I will check with him - when you coming back?

K: Probably Sunday.

DK: You coming Sunday?

K: Yeh.

DK: Will the President be coming back as well?

K: I'm pretty sure.

DK: OK. Thank you, Henry.

K: Good. Right.

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K: Probably Sunday.

DK: You coming Sunday?

K: Yeh.

DK: Will the President be coming back as well?

K: I'm pretty sure.

DK: OK. Thank you, Henry.

K: Good. Right.

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TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz

July 4, 1973 10:30 a.m.

✓

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador

A: Dr. Kissinger good morning to you and a happy holiday to you.
Sorry to disturb you on the holiday.

K: That is all right.

A: I got the reaction from our Prime Minister to our conversation
yesterday on the one point that was urgent.

K: Right.

A: I am giving to you her words in reaction to the new initiative
is totally and definitely negative. The Prime Minister urges
you to do everything in your power to nip it in the bud.

K: Right.

A: The Prime Minister's decision is based on a whole set of government
of Israel decisions and arguments some of which I refer to in our
last talk and other are too well known to be repeated.

K: And can I repeat that to the President as--

A: She knows that this reaction is to you for the President.

K: Right, so this would then be her official position also if the initiative
emerges.

A: If the thing emerges which we also want--

K: No, no, I understand. I understand that what you are telling me is
that this initiative in your judgment should not emerge, but that if
it does emerge against your judgment, you would then take the same
attitude officially as you are now doing in your private communication.

A: Absolutel y. I made it clear in my communication yesterday that this
attitude should be consistent with the attitude that we take should this
thing surface in the State Department initiative.

K: Right. Now you should know it is not exactly relevant that in official
channels, our people have had--are now pressing from some Arab

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Page 2

countries for in effect for 67 borders.

A: I'm sorry--you mean American

K: Americans.

A: Are pressing for 67 borders--

K: I mean our diplomatic representatives.

A: I see. I see.

K: In this general context.

A: In the context with the Department.

K: And with us

A: and with Arabs.

K: No, no, nothing is authorized with Arabs.

A: I see. You mean internally.

K: Yes.

A: I see. May I comment on two other items that appeared in the prime Minister's communication. She also points out that if you are going to reply to this gentlemen that we talked about when just the two of us on anything of substance--

K: No, no, if I reply it will be to propose another meeting without substance.

A: Fine, because if you are reply in substance ~~he~~ would appreciate the chance to give her remarks.

K: I don't think anything substantive is needed from me right now

A: Right, right. That was my question but I just wanted to be sure--

K: Youcantell her what I would do if I do it and I won't do it until next week is to say that in light of the circumstances maybe we should meet to review the situation. And that will lead to a 4-6 week bickering,

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Page 3

A: I understand. That is the way I understood it.

K: No that you can tell her there will be no substantive move nor will there be anything along the lines of what you have seen yesterday and commented on.

A: I understand.

K: In that channel.

A: Yes, now I m coming to this point. The Prime Minister said that she is not commenting now on the other items about publication because she understands that there is no urgency to it. And that

K: That's right.

A: And that probably remarks would be forthcoming sometime in the future and we will have plenty of time to discuss it.

K: That is correct, but there is no active status now.

A: That last point, Dr. Kissinger, refers to our talking on Russian Jewry. I had a talk today with Jeb Stein (sp). I convinced him that there is no need of having the meeting down there were you are

K: Ah excellent.

A: And he has agreed to it and _____ is leaving the country I think unti the 17th. Hewould appreciate it very much if the meeting would take place some time after the 17th. If you --at your convenience

K: No, that is excellent.

A: Secondly, I told him with regard to the other meeting that he was planning for the 20th, with that guy that you talked to--

K: Yeh, I understand

A: I told him that my advice to him is that they should call him and tell him that while he agreed to meet with him in principle, it is only logical that such a meeting would take place he hears from his own government, what has happened in the summit.

K: Excellent.

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Page 4

A: And therefore such a meeting would take place before the 20th, they could keep the date, but if he would have to postpone the meeting -- but if he would not hear by that time from his own government, he would have to postpone the meeting to a later date.

HK: Good. But he will--does he know that I'm seeing that man?

A: No, no, no, no, no.

K: Because he should/refer to that.

A: No, no, no, no, I am not divulging any information which has--

K: Good, It is a good strategy because it will force them now to get me an answer by next Tuesday--

A: That is exactly what I had in mind.

K: And I will get in touch with you then after I have talked.

A: Fine, fine. now you recall, Dr. Kissinger that I'll be away the 12th (?) BUT my embassy will be able to reach me and the Minister will be able to reach at any point.

K: Right, as I said I don't expect==we won't be back until the morning of the 10th, and I don't think that matters will move with that much speed.

A: I hope not.

K: I don't see what could be happening, but I have no indication that we'll be getting any overtures.

A: I just wanted for you to know my movements so in case something develops I can be 2 hrs anyhow by plane, so there is no problem.

K: All right. I will keep you informed on the various matters so that you will know--

A: I appreciate it very much and I thank you for the long talk --

K: I thought it was useful.

A: Right. Bye.

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*

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz

July 4, 1973 10:45 a.m.

D: There was one item that I forget. If you recall yesterday when we discussed , I mentioned that it was said in the UN in a speech of Scali, I now found the quote -- it is from June 14, '73, in which Scali says the resolution to neither endorses nor precludes, let me repeat he says, neither endorses nor precludes, the arms which exist between Israel, Jordan Egypt and Syria as the final, secure and recognized boundaries.

K: Right, That is essentially the same thing.

D So I thought you should have this piece of information because some of my friends try to sell old merchandize in new packages.

K: Yeh.

D: So I think you wanted to have this information.

K: I appreciate it.

D: All right and excuse me for bothering you again.

K: Not at all, have a good trip.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

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SANITIZED COPY

TELCON (San Clemente)
President/Kissinger
July 4, 1973 - 11:00 a.m.

K: Hello.

P: Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: I want you to take the Fourth off now so . . . I just looked over the news thing, nothing new here. It's relatively quiet. The Latin Americans are having there usual - you know I think that Chilean guy may have some problems.

K: Oh, he has massive problems. He has definitely massive problems.

P: If only the Army could get a few people behind them.

K: And that coup last week - we had nothing to do with it but still it came off apparently prematurely.

P: That's right and the fact that he just set up a Cabinet without any military in it is, I think, very significant.

K: It's very significant.

P: Very significant because those military guys are very proud down there and they just may - right?

K: Yes, I think he's definitely in difficulties.

P: Well, we won't have to send the ITT down to help, will we?

K: (Laughs) That's another one of these absurdities. Because whenever the ITT came to us we turned them off. I mean we never did anything for them.

P: I never even knew they came.

K: They came once because Flanigan had set it up. You didn't know it. I didn't tell you because it required no action and I listened to them and said "Thank you very much" and that was that.

P: Frankly you know we left it to Helms and he and the Ambassador and so forth, they screwed it up.

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TELCON (San Clemente)
President/Kissinger
July 4, 1973 - 11:00 a.m.

K: Hello.

P: Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: I want you to take the Fourth off now so . . . I just looked over the news thing, nothing new here. It's relatively quiet. The Latin Americans are having there usual - you know I think that Chilean guy may have some problems.

K: Oh, he has massive problems. He has definitely massive problems.

P: If only the Army could get a few people behind them.

K: And that coup last week - we had nothing to do with it but still it came off apparently prematurely.

P: That's right and the fact that he just set up a Cabinet without any military in it is, I think, very significant.

K: It's very significant.

P: Very significant because those military guys are very proud down there and they just may - right?

K: Yes, I think he's definitely in difficulties.

P: Well, we won't have to send the ITT down to help, will we?

K: (Laughs) That's another one of these absurdities. Because whenever the ITT came to us we turned them off. I mean we never did anything for them.

P: I never even knew they came.

K: They came once because Flanigan had set it up. You didn't know it. I didn't tell you because it required no action and I listened to them and said "Thank you very much" and that was that.

P: Frankly you know we left it to Helms and he and the Ambassador and so forth, they screwed it up.

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K: Exactly. It's the Ambassador who screwed it up.

P: You remember.

K: OH yes, you remember, [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

P: That's a disaster.

K: So it didn't do any good. [REDACTED]

P: Right. Did you enjoy your visit to LA last night?

K: No, I went up, I saw the opening of Gigi. The music is very nice but the play isn't nearly as good as the movie was.

P: Well, of course, the movie was one of the great movies.

K: Exactly and so it suffers by comparison. Now the Chinese are leaking out that I'm coming and that I'm going to be discussing the Cambodian thing from which I conclude that they must have a certain amount of confidence that it's going to work because they wouldn't want to get their prestige

P: Sure they're leaking it out rather than somebody like Mansfield.

K: No, it's coming out of Peking and it says highly qualified diplomatic sources. And Bruce sent me a cable yesterday saying that Chou Kuan Hua you remember that fellow - has been saying it all over town.

P: Good. Good. Well, that's fine. They'll probably give those Senators and Congressmen an earful when they're there. You know I hate to send those babes in the woods over there, don't you?

K: Yeh, but the Chinese are not eager to embarrass us right now.

P: No, no, I know that but I'm just afraid they'll embarrass the Chinese.

K: This is a pretty good group that's going.

P: It's a good group, a good group, but I mean minor leaguers.

K: Oh no, they're not in the league with the Chinese.

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- K: Mansfield is in Paris and he's been asking for briefings which are designed to illicit that we don't need so many forces over there.
- P: In Europe?
- K: Yeh. That's going to be his next thing.
- P: We can hang tough on the MBFR.
- K: Oh yeh, absolutely.
- P: We'll have to beat him.
- K: Absolutely. I think once we can get back to fighting substantive issues we'll gain the upper hand.
- P: That's right. That's right. Well, we'd better. We've got the month of July and thank God the month of August is going to be relatively quiet. You'll be gone.
- K: I'll be gone just a week at most.
- P: But the Congress'll be gone.
- K: Right. ~~When we get back to the MBFR, we'll be gone.~~
- P: We can then do some things on our own.
- K: Exactly.
- P: Approximately when do you figure the European thing starts to come off. When do we have to put for sake of planning?
- K: I would think for the end of October.
- P: End of October. That's plenty soon enough. We've got a lot of work to do.
- K: Yeh, exactly. There's a helluva lot of work to do.
- P: Incidentally, if the Latin thing comes up we're just going to have to push that until early 1974. I just can't
- K: Well, Mr. President, I have yet to see a mission to Latin America that didn't cause more trouble than it was worth.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 888

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 00819 01 OF 02 060747Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO / 030 W

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 819

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E E D C O P Y

EXDIS:

EBAN WASHINGTON VISIT

REF: STATE 023228

1. STATE OF PLAY IN REGARD TO FORMATION OF NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL OBVIOUSLY EFFECT TO SOME EXTENT TONE AND CONTENT OF FONMIN EBAN'S PRESENTATION TO SECRETARY AND, IF OPPORTUNITY OFFERS, PRESIDENT WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. HOWEVER, EVEN IF, AS SEEMS PROBABLE BUT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, NEW GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FORMED BY THAT TIME OR IS WELL ON WAY TO FORMATION IT UNLIKELY EBAN WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENDED CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AND HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THEREFORE HE WILL COME WITH ANY EXTENDED MANDATE BEYOND THAT GIVEN IN GENERAL TERMS BY PREVIOUS CABINET. IN SPITE OF THESE LIMITATIONS, THIS CAN BE A HIGHLY USEFUL EXCHANGE. EBAN WILL PURSUE SEVERAL THEMES AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TOPICS THAT WE BELIEVE MERIT RAISING WITH HIM.

2. TOPICS FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN WILL RAISE.

(A) IN BROADEST SENSE PURPOSE OF TRIP IS, OF COURSE, TO MAKE CONTACT WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AT EARLIEST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Jul 14, 1969

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THE ISSUES FOR DECISION

- I. Would Israeli possession of nuclear weapons be sufficiently detrimental to US interests that it is worth a confrontation to prevent it? Two decisions are possible:
 - A. Leave the situation alone on grounds that we cannot stop proliferation and, anyway, the only development that could induce Israel to curb its nuclear weapons program is a peace settlement with the Arabs. Those who hold this view feel we should concentrate on achieving a political settlement and let this issue fall into place behind the settlement.
 - B. Make a major effort to keep nuclear weapons from being introduced into the Middle East on grounds that introduction would destroy any chances for a settlement, would sharply increase the chances of nuclear weapons being used in anger and would increase the risk of a US-USSR confrontation.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve judgment B.

Approve B _____ Lean toward A _____

- II. If we decide that Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is against our interest, what exactly do we want Israel to do? (There is a difference between what we want and what we ask for.) These are the possibilities:

- A. Give up its nuclear option by dismantling any nuclear devices it may have and destroying components. [We think this is unrealistic.]
- B. Freeze their nuclear weapons program where it is. [We do not know exactly what this would mean since we are not sure whether they have weapons now or not.]
- C. Not assemble completed nuclear explosive devices. [The State-Defense paper at Tab B recommends this as our in-house definition of what we want. This may be the best statement of what we would like in terms of our opposition to nuclear proliferation, of what we want on the public record, and of what we should ask for. But it may be illusive. The significant act in terms of international

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

NLN 02-28/27 DOS 12-14-04

By XaB NARA Date 9-9-05

[6 pages]

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consequences is not just the assembly of a nuclear device because that can be kept secret and have no international impact. The significant act is the public revelation of the assembly.]

- D. Not publicize the assembly of completed nuclear explosive devices. [This is what we really want to stop since it may be the only thing, if anything, that we can stop. For purposes of the record, however, we may not want to state our objective this way, not even to ourselves in any formal way.]
- E. Sign the NPT. [This seems an absolute minimum and should be included as our objective beside whichever of the objectives we seek.]

RECOMMENDATION: That we want Israeli signature of the NPT before the end of the year and ratification soon after (E above). That, in addition, it will be our unstated objective to keep Israel's possession of nuclear weapons from becoming public knowledge (D above). That it will be our stated purpose for internal working purposes to stop Israel from assembling completed nuclear explosive devices (C above).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

III. What do we ask the Israelis to do? Because of the difficulty of enforcing an Israeli agreement to do something they do not want to do and because of the delicacy of the public record on this issue, we need a formula that gets what we want but builds a more defensible record than we would have if we just asked for the minimum we would settle for. The possibilities are:

- A. Ask the Israelis to commit themselves not to become a nuclear power. [This is what we would be asking for in pressing the Israelis to sign the NPT, and we could not expect to get a bilateral commitment that did not have at least as much of an escape clause as the NPT. We would be addressing this issue in the NPT context as a minimum, but we should seek a bilateral assurance that would define more precisely what such a commitment would mean in the light of the advanced state of Israel's nuclear weapons program.]

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- B. Ask the Israelis to freeze their nuclear weapons program where it is. [While this may be generally about what we want the Israelis to do, this formulation is not practical because it is impossible to enforce and because it might make us accomplices in Israel's secret possession of nuclear weapons.]
- C. Ask the Israelis not to "possess" nuclear weapons, defining "possession" to ourselves as the "assembly of a completed nuclear explosive device." [We think this is what we have to ask for and build into our record. This leaves the Israelis to decide for themselves what constitutes "possession" without involving us in that definition. For our own purposes, "possession" means the availability of a device that could be exploded on short notice, but we do not want to get into a debate over how many hours or days short of actual assembly a nation can be without "possessing." The point is that we cannot enforce a precise understanding and therefore should mainly concern ourselves with building a record that will permit us to defend taking our distance from a nuclear Israel if ever Israel's use of those weapons threatens to involve us in nuclear confrontation.]
- D. Ask the Israelis not to publicize their possession of nuclear weapons. [This would make us accomplices in Israel's nuclear program at the same time as we are taking a public stand against proliferation. While this may be our real minimum objective, we would achieve it--and yet still avoid complicity--by pressing for Israeli agreement that it will not "possess" nuclear weapons. What it agrees not to "possess," it cannot announce, test or deploy.]

RECOMMENDATION: That we ask the Israelis to sign the NPT and agree to ratify within a reasonable period (modification of A above). In addition, that we ask the Israelis to reaffirm to us in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Mid-East and to specify that "introduction" means "possession of nuclear explosive devices" (C above).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

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- IV. What is the best tactic to follow in seeking a bilateral assurance from Israel of the kind we want? In the paper at Tab B is a course of action which represents pretty much the consensus of the Review Group. Essentially, this suggests that Richardson and Packard call in Rabin and say that, in connection with Israel's request to advance delivery of the Phantoms to August, this Administration has reviewed the record of the sale and wants to tie up loose ends--the precise meaning of Israel's commitment not to be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons--left in the discussions leading to that sale. They would then present our request for Israel's confirmation that possession of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons into the area (III above) and raise the question of Israeli signature on the NPT. The issue is whether we are prepared to imply-- and to carry out if necessary--the threat not to deliver the Phantoms if Israel does not comply with our request. These are the choices:
- A. A graduated approach--preferred by Sisco--would begin with a demarche to the Israelis making clear our interest that there be no nuclear weapons in the Mid-East but not introducing the threat of withholding the Phantoms until the Israelis had demonstrated their unresponsiveness. Depending on the degree of unresponsiveness, we would then have the option of slowing down or suspending entirely the shipment of conventional weapons, including the Phantoms. [However delicately we handle the question of withholding delivery of the aircraft, we fear this is just a prescription for indecision. There is no point to getting into a confrontation on this subject with the Israelis unless we are prepared to follow through.]
- B. A more direct approach would derive from the need--as Defense and Elliot Richardson see it--to make clear at the outset that we are serious. Those who hold this view believe that Israel would take us seriously only if it were convinced that we would halt the delivery of conventional weapons, especially aircraft. [We think it is necessary to decide now whether we are prepared to suspend delivery of conventional weapons to gain our objective, though we recognize the desirability of minimizing the atmosphere of confrontation.]

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- C. A gentle approach based on a hard decision would minimize the atmosphere of confrontation but leave little doubt that we are prepared to withhold conventional weapons to achieve our objective. This is the approach to Rabin described above under IV and in the paper at Tab B. [We think this is the best approach because it leaves to the Israelis the decision on whether to make a confrontation on the issue or to find their own way of meeting our request.]

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the course described in C above and in the attached paper.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

- V. If we are going to make this approach on nuclear weapons, what should we ask the Israelis to do with the surface-to-surface missiles they have and are manufacturing? There are three choices:
- A. Ask them to dismantle the missiles they have and halt the production line which is turning out its first missiles this summer. [We think this is an unrealistic objective because the Israelis would never agree. There is strong feeling in some quarters of our government, however, that this is essential because the rest of the world will read Israel's production of missiles as tantamount to readying a nuclear delivery capability.]
- B. Ask the Israelis to halt the production line. [The State-Defense paper recommends this course. We doubt it is achievable because Israel has invested a great deal and the missiles are just beginning to roll off the production line. Moreover, our position in defending cutting off arms deliveries on this issue is less favorable than on nuclear weapons because--even though it seems obvious--we cannot prove that missile deployment is necessarily related to a nuclear weapons program.]
- C. Ask the Israelis not to deploy the missiles they have or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile. [This is a minimum. As with the nuclear weapons, the significant act is general public awareness of the weapon, and this would surely follow

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from deployment of these missiles to launching pads. What non-deployment means is that Israel could produce the missiles and then put them in a shed instead of in the launching area.]

RECOMMENDATION: That we initially ask the Israelis not to deploy missiles and to halt production--but that we be prepared to settle for their agreement not to deploy.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

- VI. If you approve the recommendations above and calling in Rabin to make our approach, the question arises as to who should do the job. The State-Defense paper recommends that Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard do this together to emphasize the political seriousness with which we view the issue and the implication for our continued arms shipments. The joint approach is a good idea. Elliot Richardson has an excellent grasp of this issue and comes down pretty much in line with the above recommendations. However, Secretary Laird is also personally concerned. If the approach to Rabin is made later next week, Richardson, as Acting Secretary, and Laird would make an appropriate combination.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve a joint approach timed to make the Richardson-Laird combination work.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: John King's Proposal for Oil Drilling in Gulf of Suez

Bob Haldeman has asked me to talk with John King--in lieu of you--about King's proposal to sign a contract with the Israeli government to drill for oil in the El Murgan field in the Gulf of Suez. Before I do, I want to be sure that the facts of the case are fully understood so that my line is consistent with yours. As I understand the background, King discussed this proposal with you during the campaign, asking you to instruct State Department to stand aside.

The oil field in question--the Murgan field--is located in the Gulf of Suez on both sides of mid-Gulf. As you know, the Gulf of Suez runs wholly between two branches of sovereign UAR territory, the Sinai Peninsula and that part of the UAR on the African continent. In 1964, the UAR Government awarded this concession to a company owned half by Egyptian government companies and half by Pan American, an Egyptian-chartered subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana. Commercial production began in the spring of 1967, and about 200,000 barrels of oil a day are being pumped from this field today. The oil has always been piped to the African rather than to the Sinai side of the Gulf.

The Israelis in the 1967 war occupied the Sinai shore of the Gulf of Suez. In August 1968, Standard of Indiana reported that the Israelis had approached Standard, asserting their claim to all oil in the eastern half of the Gulf and forbidding Pan Am to do any more drilling there. State Department persuaded the Israelis to withdraw their approach to Standard, and then they began approaching independent companies--like King Resources--with contracts to drill for Israel in the eastern half of the Gulf. State again urged the Israelis to stop.

State Department's position rests on these points:

1. Legal. Insofar as Israeli-sponsored drilling is proposed in the El Murgan concession, it would violate a legally granted concession where another American company--Standard of Indiana--has already invested \$100 million and is operating successfully.

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SECRET NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretariat

This is a new page 2 for Tab A of
Saunders-Kissinger memo, 5/27/69, Subj:
"Request for Discussion of Israeli Oil Drilling
in Gulf of Suez." - Log # 1419

Mr. Saunders has taken care of replacing
page 2 on the copies that were in the folder
which went to Dr. Kissinger's office.

Thelma M. Toles
Thelma M. Toles

SECRET NODIS

May 29, 1969
(DATE)

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SECRET/NODIS

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2. International law. Our lawyers hold that Israel has no legal authority to grant concessions anywhere in the Gulf. By right of occupation they can exploit captured oil on the Sinai shore. But the occupation stops at the cease-fire line along the shoreline.

3. Political. If the US Government acquiesces in this Israeli effort to push its borders beyond the cease-fire line into the Gulf--especially when that move encroaches on the property of a major American company--the Egyptians will assume US support for Israel's continued occupation of the Sinai. Such support would be incongruous with our diplomatic effort to work out a Mid-East peace settlement including Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

4. Protection. Any company drilling for Israel would be subject to UAR air attack and would not have any recourse to law.

On foreign policy grounds, the case seems clear. The Israelis should have no trouble understanding why we would oppose their (a) violating the cease-fire lines and (b) encroaching on the established legal concession of an American company. While they could read into our position a more general inclination to work against them, State has openly explained the reasons for its position to avoid such misunderstanding, and Israel has not pressed its case on the merits.

I realize that domestic factors are involved, and that is why I seek your guidance. I am not the appropriate judge of the relative interests of John King and John Swearingen of Standard of Indiana, who I understand would also try to see you if he thought we were going to reverse the present position.

Recommendation: That I hear Mr. King out, explain in general terms the purpose of your current diplomatic effort and point out why such drilling would be inconsistent.

Approve _____ Other) _____

cc: Mr. Haldeman

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HHSaunders:tmt 5/29/69

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2. International law. State lawyers hold that Israel has no legal right to grant any concession in the Gulf of Suez. While rights of occupation give the Israelis right to exploit captured oil resources farther up the Gulf on the Sinai shore, our lawyers hold that Israel's rights stop at the cease-fire line. That line stands where Israeli troops stopped at the Sinai shoreline. No Israeli forces were offshore when the line was established.

3. Political. The Egyptians read Israeli efforts to drill for oil in the Gulf as clear evidence of Israel's intent to consolidate a permanent hold on the Sinai and to expand its boundaries into the Gulf. If Israel does this with US Government acquiescence, especially when it directly threatens the legitimate interests of a major American company, the Egyptians will assume US support for Israel's continued occupation of the Sinai. Such support would be incongruous at a time when you have launched an intense diplomatic effort to work out a Mid-East peace settlement including Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

4. Military. Any company drilling for Israel would be subject to UAR air attack. An American company would have some claim on our protection if it were operating legally. We would, by present position, have to hold that it was not operating legally.

Although domestic politics are not my province, I just want to be sure someone has considered the interest John Swearingen of Standard of Indiana might have. I understand he is prepared to try to see you if he feels we are about to change course.

Recommendation: That I hear Mr. King out, explain in general terms the purpose of your current diplomatic effort and point out why we believe it is undesirable for such drilling to proceed.

Approve _____

Other _____

cc: Mr. Haldeman

HHSaunders:tmt 5/27/69

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SECRET EXDIS

February 5, 1969

Israeli Oil Aspirations in the Gulf of Suez

The Six Day War ended with the Israelis in control of the Sinai shore of the Gulf of Suez and with the Egyptians on the African shore. Since that time the status of the Gulf itself and its oil have been in question.

At the present time the Egyptians are taking about 200,000 barrels a day from the Murgan field in the Gulf. Although this field falls largely on the Sinai side of the middle of the Gulf it was more convenient for the Egyptians to build their installations on the African shore. The company controlling the Murgan concessions is owned half by Egyptian government companies and half by Pan American, an Egyptian subsidiary of Standard of Indiana.

The Israelis are pumping from 35,000 to 65,000 barrels a day from a smaller field, the installations for which were on the Sinai shore. The company which had been exploiting this concession before June 1967 is owned by Egyptian government companies and the Egyptian subsidiary of an Italian company.

There are also a number of partially explored fields on both sides of mid-Gulf.

The Israelis claim that their occupation of Sinai gives them the same rights to offshore oil that they would have were Sinai part of Israel. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, they thus make a claim to all oil in the Eastern half of the Gulf. Last August they began asserting this claim by forbidding Pan American to do any more drilling in the "Israeli" part of the Gulf. In December we received a report that Israel was trying to interest American oil companies in drilling under Israeli auspices in the eastern half of the Gulf, including some areas included in the Pan American concession.

We are not sure how far the Israeli government intends to go in asserting its claim, or even the extent of support the claim has in the government. We may be seeing actions of over zealous lower ranking officials rather than decisions at the cabinet level, though we have made Foreign Minister Eban aware of the issue. So far the Israelis have made no attempt to stop pumping in areas they "claim", although they have asked that production be limited to pre-June 1967 levels.

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The oil is important to Israel, although they have not mentioned it in discussions of a Near East settlement. Israeli consumption is about the same as the upper limits of their present estimated pumping, and this represents not only a saving of as much as \$60 million a year, but also the only source of oil which does not have to come through Arab controlled waters.

We have based our legal position on the fact that occupation does not grant sovereignty to the occupying power. Israeli occupation, by our theory, stops at the Sinai shore and the UAR retains all its rights in the Gulf. We feel that the cease-fire agreement--which called for forces to stop where they were--supports that interpretation. We contend that at no time prior to the cease-fire was the Israeli navy in occupation of the gulf so that an extension of power is in effect a violation of the agreement.

Our political reasons for opposing the Israeli position are even more important than the legal ones. The investments of an American-owned company (Pan Am) are involved, and another American concession in the Gulf of Aqaba would be endangered if the same principle were applied. More important, if the US appears unwilling to defend clear American interests against Israel, the legend of Zionist control in Washington will be strengthened and our ability to deal with the Arabs even further decreased. There are also other problems, such as Egyptian retaliation for Israeli action, and the need for greater subsidies to Egypt from the oil rich Arabs if the Suez oil revenue disappears.

We vigorously protested the original Israeli attempt last summer and even persuaded them to withdraw a note they had sent Standard of Indiana. Given President Nixon's decision to take the initiative in trying to defuse the Middle East crisis, we shall need all the influence we can muster on both sides of the Arab-Israeli fence. Having the Nixon Administration tabbed in Arab eyes as supporting "another Zionist expansionist grab" would get us off on the wrong foot.

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Security: The Constant Problem

Virtually no one in Israel contests the absolute priority accorded to the question of security. Unanimity on this issue is a major feature of the Israeli political landscape, and no other topic approaches its central position in political debate. The same consensus applies with rare exceptions to actual security policy once it has been determined by the Government. While policy is in the formative stage, vigorous differences of opinion can be voiced, as exemplified by the debate that preceded the decision to go to war in June 1967. But once a final decision has been made, the ever-present awareness of security needs and the basic public confidence in the government prevail, and all sides close ranks in support of the decision. Whatever reservations remain about the wisdom of a particular course of action are expressed, if at all, as hopes and fears, not as a challenge to the government's judgment. After the Israeli raid on Beirut Airport in December 1968, for instance, only a slightly hesitant note was sounded. One journalist mused on the special role Lebanon had played until then in the Arab-Israel conflict and voiced the hope that the raid would accomplish its aim of discouraging Arab support for the fedayeen. Other public comments ranged from stern justification for the raid to "what are we to do?"--in spite of fairly commonly known reservations among "doves" in the Cabinet about the wisdom of the raid.

The constant preoccupation with security and defense is the outcome of 20 years of war or tense armistice with the surrounding countries, and long years before that when the security of Jewish settlements throughout Palestine was constantly threatened. This record also accounts for the particular form of parochialism so prevalent in Israel. Although Israeli officials and the public are intensely interested in other parts of the world, they see them through an Israeli filter: almost any event, anywhere, tends to be related to what is "good" or "bad" for Israel. It is inconceivable to most Israeli politicians and the bulk of the general public that another country could consider the subject of Israel's existence and security unemotionally as a purely political question. Israelis feel that they are under constant scrutiny by a world that at best lukewarmly supports them and is more often cruelly against them. They have done well so far, they feel, in spite of this unfriendly environment. The bravado and self-reliance on which the native-born Israelis (Sabras) pride themselves are testimony to their awareness of both the hostile world and their own success.

US Policy: Public Reactions

US policy is a sensitive subject in Israel to a degree usually reserved for matters related to security. Discussions of US policies and goals are rapidly reduced to the basic question "does the US favor Israel?" The answer they find is more positive than negative but Israeli public opinion

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and the press have a strong tendency to look for a monosyllabic reply. Since they can rarely find one, the result is widespread uncertainty about the "real" thrust of US policy. Warm praise for pro-Israeli statements by US leaders is always mingled with apprehension about "other forces" working to turn the US government against Israel. Long discourses on the community of interests between the two democracies contrast with fears of the power of oil interests that allegedly are pro-Arab. Major speeches in the US on the Middle East are promptly dissected by the Israeli press, and their relationship to Israeli goals and policies carefully measured. The picture that emerges in Israel is a confusing design, painted almost entirely in black and white and heavy with moral overtones.

Talk Smoothly, or Tell It Like It Is?

Israeli officials who deal with the US are convinced of the identity of US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. Their approach in contacts with US officials is also influenced by Israel's specific and vital policy goals--an assured supply of arms and unqualified support for Israel's position in the international arena.

Israeli spokesmen tend to view all of US foreign relations almost entirely in terms of Israel's position in the Middle East. For example, requests for military supplies are supported by citing the dangers of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, the extensive resupply by the Soviets of Arab armed forces, the US interest in maintaining an arms "balance" in the area, and the importance of a strong Israel as an outpost of democracy in the Near East. Suggestions for close cooperation in Israel's technical assistance projects in Africa, especially in Ethiopia, are accompanied by expositions of Soviet penetration in Africa and pleas to counteract this influence before it increases.

Crowning these issues, of course, is the Israeli conviction that only they know how to deal with the Arabs, that the Arab-Israeli problem can only be solved by direct dealings between Israel and the Arab states, and that a profound psychological and political transformation in the Arab world is necessary before peace can be established. Israeli officials urge the US not to interfere by such devices as great-power consultations in the process of making the Arabs face squarely the stark reality of Israel's existence and legitimacy. Here again, Israeli officials present arguments based on their view of American interests to bolster their case. They are certain that the Middle East is not on the verge of full-scale war, and that American interests will be served by letting the Israelis handle the dispute with the Arabs on their own, in accordance with their view of Israeli interests and their understanding of Arab mentality.

Elaborate arguments stressing American interests, however, do not conform readily to the style of thinking and expression most commonly found in Israel. Israelis generally have little use for rhetoric, and not

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surprisingly, they care more for their own interests than for US goals. A common remark about Abba Eban and his elegant, diplomatic prose is "at least it impresses the Americans." Generally speaking, Israeli diplomats and other officials stationed abroad incline more toward the argumentation which they hope impresses foreigners; military, intelligence, and diplomatic officers stationed in Israel rely more on the direct, hard-hitting approach to Israel's interests and desires for which the Sabras are well known.

Great Hopes, More Modest Expectations

If asked to describe the "ideal" US policy, Israeli leaders would reply: guaranteed arms supply on generous terms with no questions asked about the quantities or types of weapons requested and with no discussion of such subjects as nuclear development; no interference in Israel's efforts to deal with the Arabs as it sees fit; a hard US line to match Israel's on the subject of peace negotiations; acquiescence in Israel's concept of the shape of the settlement; and unequivocal support for Israel in the UN and other international settings. The Israelis would also like the US to recognize a unified Jerusalem as Israel's capital. US relations with Arab states, according to this "ideal" policy, would be good enough to give the US influence in Arab capitals for Israel's benefit and to permit the US to pass messages when necessary, but not so close that the US would have a stake in the continuation of specific Arab regimes (e.g., Lebanon and Jordan). The US would persuade the USSR to allow the Middle East to settle its own problems and it would commit itself to come to Israel's defense should Israel suffer a major military reverse.

Israeli expectations, of course, are far less dramatic than this "ideal." Almost no one, especially in high military circles, believes that the US would send in troops or provide air cover if Israel were caught off guard by a surprise Arab attack. Categorical statements by US officials that the US has no commitment to defend Israel, however, bring out the latent fear that the US might sit quietly by while Israel were annihilated. Those who oppose a vigorous "active defense" policy in Israel (notably Foreign Minister Eban) are made particularly uneasy with such statements.

Nor does Israel expect the US to stop examining Israel's arms requests with care in the light of American assessments of the situation in the Middle East and Israel's defense needs. Israel is very sensitive about this review process, however. Occasional newspaper articles describe the "careful calculations" of American officialdom which seem to turn the weapons procurement process into a long series of Israeli justifications of their defense requirements. This procedure is described to the newspaper-reading public in Israel as coming close to encroaching on Israel's sovereign right to judge its own defense needs. Any political conditions that might be attached to arms deals are seen in the same light.

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The Israeli officials concerned with military supply seek to make the review process as sympathetic and routine as possible and to speed up the processing of approved arms requests. They are also anxious that the US accept Israeli intelligence estimates of Arab inventories and Israeli needs and that political conditions be kept to a minimum. Similarly, Israeli officials realize that the US will continue to ask questions about Israeli nuclear and missile development but would like the US to accept at face value Israel's explanations and assurances on this score.

The Israeli leadership does not know how much US support it can anticipate for Israel's position on a Middle East settlement. US officials have assured Israel that the US will not try to "impose" a solution, that the US seeks a definitive rather than a partial solution, and that direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs will probably be needed at some point in the proceedings. But memories of US pressure on Israel to evacuate the Sinai in 1957 still rankle. The US has now undertaken four-power and two-power consultations on the Middle East and has made clear to the Israelis that it will continue to explore other approaches to agreement on the Middle East question. These independent actions, in the Israeli view, carry with them the seeds of possible political isolation from the US--a prospect which arouses deep apprehension in Israeli official and public circles. Periodic reports in the Israeli press that the US is exerting, or intends to exert, "pressure" on Israel never fail to draw voluminous official comment denying that there has been pressure, and attempting to reassure the anxious public, and the even more anxious Parliamentarians, that Israel would not in any case submit to pressures contrary to Israeli interests. The nature of the alleged "pressure" is seldom specified, but the State Department is often cited as its source, and its object is usually described as a political concession of some sort, for example, a "more conciliatory" Israeli stance towards the Arabs, or Israeli signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.

In spite of the misgivings that an "active" US Middle East policy arouses, Israeli officials are probably pleased that the US approach to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict is as close as it is to the Israeli position. They will continue, however, to try very hard to persuade the US to play a less active role. They are very anxious that the wording of US statements on the Arab-Israeli problem not conflict directly with the Israeli position even if policy differences exist (e.g., on the Jerusalem issue).

Close Association With US Democracy...

Even these more modest Israeli goals add up to a "special relationship" with the US that Israeli officials have occasionally called a "tacit alliance." In addition to Israel's specific need for support in security and foreign policy matters, many Israelis, especially some of the more militant right-wingers, see Israel as the guardian of US interests in the Middle East. Israel aspires to be a kind of special representative of

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Western democracy in an area where authoritarianism is the most common form of government, and a bridge between the developed and the developing worlds that can communicate with both.

...But Not With US Problems

Many Israelis, with little direct contact with the US, are put off by certain aspects of American life. They tend to contrast the materialism they see in the US, as viewed through the movies and disaffected American immigrants, with the unity of purpose, idealism and "pioneer ethic" exemplified by the Israel Defense Forces and the kibbutzim. On the other hand, Israelis have in recent years become increasingly aware of tensions in their own society. The problem of the "two Israels"--the predominantly European and Sabra "establishment," which controls most of the positions of power, and the Oriental Jews whose standard of living is lower and whose access to important positions is more limited--has become a national concern. Israeli observers thus have come to regard such problems as racial tensions in the US with more understanding than they otherwise might, even though they are disturbed by reports of anti-semitism in the Black Power Movement.

American Jews: Another Special Relationship

Part of the credo of the founders of Israel was that Zionism and Judaism were practically synonymous. Though the ardor of this belief is fading among the younger citizens, Israelis still tend to assume that Jewish communities in the Diaspora have a dual identity: while citizens of their own countries, they also have a special tie with Israel. This duality is reflected in the way Israelis view the mission of their representatives abroad: they serve as representatives of their government both with the host government and with the local Jewish community. They are expected, for instance, to foster support for Israel's aims and policies among local Jews as well as the government. They also seek to encourage immigration to Israel.

Israelis are constantly aware of the fact that the US is the home of the largest Jewish community in the Diaspora--and are not at all shy about discussing how this affects Israel's "special relationship" with the US. There is a certain ambivalence in attitudes of Israelis toward American Jews. They identify with American Jews, as they do with any Jewish community; Israel is eager to attract more immigrants from the US, especially well-educated young persons. Contributions from American Jews (through the Jewish National Fund, the United Jewish Appeal, and Israel Bonds) have long been an important factor in financing Israel's development. At the same time, however, Sabras and "old-timer" immigrants sometimes feel that wealthy American Jews have "bought off" their share of a country founded to give them a focus for their Jewish identity, rather than immigrate and participate personally in building the country and sharing its fate.

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On the political level, Israelis view American Jews as Americans, to be sure, but Americans with a difference. Their sympathies are assumed to favor Israel; to assume anything else would contradict Israel's sense of its own mission as a Jewish homeland. On other questions, however, their attitudes are expected to be those of "typical" Americans. The views Israelis attribute to, or wish to encourage among, American Jews, in short, are not unlike what they might envisage as the "ideal" relationship between the US and Israel.

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for

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03291 271641Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01 1031 W

034948

R 271547Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6989

SECRET TEL AVIV 3291

EXDIS:

SUBJ: ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL OF F-4 PHANTOMS

1. FROM MILITARY MESSAGES IT APPEARS FIRST FOUR PHANTOMS ARRIVE ISRAEL SEPT 5.
2. DEFENSE ATTACHE WILL BE PRESENT AT HATSOR AIR BASE TO RECEIVE AIRCRAFT FROM CREWS, DELIVER SAME TO ISRAELI AIR FORCE, AND OBTAIN RECEIPTS.
3. INDICATIONS ARE THAT GOI WILL TREAT ARRIVAL AS CLASSIFIED MATTER. HOWEVER, NUMBER OF VIPS, PROBABLY INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER, WILL BE ON HAND AND DOCUMENTARY PHOTOS WILL BE TAKEN. WE ARE TOLD ISRAELI INSIGNIA WILL BE PLACED OVER US INSIGNIA BEFORE PHOTOS MADE, AND PHOTOS WILL BE CLASSIFIED.
4. QUESTION ARISES OF PRESENCE OF CHARGE ON THIS OCCASION. PRESENCE COULD HARDLY ADD TO DISADVANTAGES WHICH WILL INEVITABLY ACCRUE IN ARAB COUNTRIES WHEN DELIVERY BECOMES KNOWN. ABSENCE, HOWEVER, COULD BE ADVERSELY REGARDED BY GOI AND MISUNDERSTOOD BY HIGH RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT IS THEREFORE EMBASSY VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO IF ASKED.
5. REQUEST DEPT'S VIEWS. GP-3.
ZURHELLEN

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Israel

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03241 221927Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, USIE 10, IO 3, CIAE 00, DODE 00,
JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20,
EUR 17, RSR 01, /111 W

007384

0 221800Z AUG 69 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6961
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TUNIS UNN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI UNN
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS UNN
AMEMBASSY RABAT UNN
USINT CAIRO
USUN NEW YORK 1524

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 3241

FONMIN HAS JUST INFORMED POLICE HAVE ARRESTED AUSTRALIAN
CHRISTIAN FOR SETTING FIRE TO AL AQSA MOSQUE. MAN HAS
APPARENTLY ADMITTED CRIME.
ZURHELLEN

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03225 221308Z

51
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO: 00, /031 W

005257

P 221055Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6954
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

SECRET TEL AVIV 3225

EXDIS

SUBJ: EAST GHOR CANAL

REF: TEL AVIV 3216

1. DURING HOUR LONG MEETING AUGUST 22 WITH HERZOG, DIRGEN OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, CHARGE HAD OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS EAST GHOR CANAL. REVIEWED WITH HERZOG ARGUMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE PREVIOUSLY WITH LOURIE. HERZOG SAID HE KNEW OF CONVERSATION WITH LOURIE BUT HAD NOT READ MEMCON YET AND WAS INTERESTED IN DIRECT PRESENTATION USG VIEWS.

2. AFTER CHARGE REVIEWED US VIEWS, HERZOG SAID WE KNEW MILITARY HAD OPPOSED LETTING CANAL BE REPAIRED ALL ALONG UNLESS THERE WAS FIRM IMPLEMENTATION BY GOI OF ASSURANCES. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NOW IF GOI ALLOWED REPAIR AND FIRING STILL CONTINUED? CHARGE VENTURED VIEW THIS WAS NOT REAL QUESTION. REAL QUESTION WAS, RATHER, WHICH WAS MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE LESS FIRING IN FUTURE AND MORE PROGRESS TOWARD MAINTENANCE OF CEASEFIRE, TO ALLOW CANAL TO BE REPAIRED WITH JORDANIANS REMAINING AWARE GOI ABILITY INTERFERE WITH IT AGAIN, OR REFUSE REPAIR AND ALLOW AREA TO RETURN TO DESERT THUS REMOVING QUESTION OF CANAL ENTIRELY FROM AREA OF GOI-GOI LEVERAGE.

3. HERZOG INDICATED MATTER WOULD BE RECEIVING FURTHER CONSIDERATION WITHIN GOI. GP-3.
ZURHELLEN

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03175 190948Z

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ACTION IO 15

INFO OCT 01, NEA 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSA 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, RSR 01, AF 12,
ARA 10, EA 10, EUR 17, /159 W

112434

P 190930Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6927
INFO USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 3175

SUBJ: LEBANESE COMPLAINT IN SC

REF: USUN 2694

1. ELIZUR, ACTING ASST DIRGEN MFA, CALLED CHARGE AUGUST 19 REGARDING DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH HE SAID "SPONSORED" BY US AND WHICH "RECALLS" ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 1949.
2. ELIZUR SAID THIS WOULD BE FIRST TIME SINCE 1967 WAR THAT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CITED AND REACTION IN ISRAEL LIKELY TO BE "VIOLENT." REFERENCE TO ARMISTICE LINES WAS "RED FLAG" TO ISRAELI PUBLIC. RESURRECTION OF THIS PREVIOUS LEGAL STRUCTURE IN UN DOCUMENT WENT BEYOND ANYTHING GOI HAD EXPECTED. HE SAID COMMENT WAS MADE ONLY FACETIOUSLY, BUT IN THIS RESPECT EVEN PAKISTANI DRAFT WAS BETTER THAN THIS ONE. HE SAID RABIN WOULD BE SEEKING TO MAKE SAME POINTS TO UNDER SECRETARY TODAY BUT WANTED ITS VIEWS REGISTERED WITH USG IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY.
3. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, ELIZUR SAID HE HAD NO WORD ON STATUS ISRAELI REPLY TO SYG LETTER ON UN OBSERVERS. GP-3.
ZURHELLEN

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PAGE 01 JERUSA 00547 210846Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00,

USIE 00, CCO 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01,

SS 20, RSR 01, ACDA 16, AID 28, OPR 02, SY 03, /148 W

127396

O P 210822Z AUG 69 ZFF=4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2463

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION NEW YORK

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FIRE AT AQSA MOSQUE

1. FIRE BROKE OUT AT AQSA MOSQUE (INSIDE TEMPLE AREA, HARAM AL SHARIF) BEFORE 0800 21 AUGUST. THICK SMOKE OBSCURED VIEW OF ROOF AND DOME AT 0900 BUT THERE NO APPARENT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND BLAZE PROBABLY UNDER CONTROL. INTERIOR DAMAGE UNKNOWN NOW. SEVEN FIRE TRUCKS AT SCENE.

2. AS OF 0915 NO RPT NO INDICATION IN STREETS OF VIOLENT REACTION AMONG MOSLEMS. ISRAELI POLICE HAD NOT TAKEN USUAL RIOT CONTROL MEASURES AND NONE APPEARED NECESSARY THEN. CIVILIAN CROWD IN HARAM AREA WATCHED FIREMEN'S EFFORTS.

3. CONGEN'S FIRST NEWS OF FIRE WAS CALL FROM CLERK OF ISLAMIC WAQF JUST AFTER 0800. HE SAID "JEWS HAVE PUT BOMB IN AQSA MOSQUE, SPREAD GASOLINE. BOMB EXPLODED AND MOSQUE HEAVILY DAMAGED."

4. COMMENT: HOWEVER FIRE STARTED, RUMOR ON LINES PARA THREE WILL DOUBTLESS SPREAD THROUGHOUT MOSLEM WORLD. CONGEN SECRETARY RESID-

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ENT VERY NEAR TEMPLE AREA HEARD NO RPT NO EXPLOSION. EXEMPT
CAMPBELL
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02731 151112Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

009045

R 150955Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6664
INFO USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECRET TEL AVIV 2731

EXDIS

SUBJ: UN OBSERVERS IN SUEZ SECTOR

REF: USUN 2375

1. AS USG AND OTHERS CONCERNED DEAL WITH IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF SAFETY OF UN OBSERVERS ON SUEZ CANAL, WE THINK IT ALSO ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION FOR ULTIMATE ISRAEL-ARAB SETTLEMENT. AS ALL KNOW, ISRAELIS HAVE HAD LITTLE IF ANY CONFIDENCE IN UN OR UN OBSERVERS AS GUARANTORS OF THIS COUNTRY'S SECURITY. FACT THAT SYG WITHDREW UNEF FROM UAR-ISRAEL LINES IN 1967 AT UNILATERAL UAR REQUEST IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS PRELUDE TO JUNE WAR AND INDICATION OF IMPOTENCE OF IDEA THAT A UN FORCE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO KEEPING PEACE CONTRARY TO WISH OF COUNTRY ON WHOSE TERRITORY IT STATIONED. THIS ISRAELI LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN UNEF OR UN OBSERVERS NOT ONLY CONTINUES BUT AFFECTS GOI ATTITUDE TOWARDS ANY PROVISIONS IN A FUTURE ISRAEL-ARAB SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD PLACE ANY RELIANCE ON A UN FORCE OR OBSERVERS.

2. IN VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF

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USSR, IDEA OF STATIONING UN FORCES ON AGREED BORDERS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES, OR AT KEY POINTS SUCH AS SHARM EL-SHEIKH, HAS BEEN ADVANCED AS MEANS OF ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS, BE THEY DEMILITARIZATION, UNDERTAKING AGAINST PERMITTING COMMANDO ACTIVITIES, ETC. WHEN QUESTION OF ABILITY OF SUCH A UNEF TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION WHEN NO LONGER DESIRED BY PARTY ON WHOSE TERRITORY IT IS STATIONED IS BROUGHT UP, USUAL RESPONSE HAS BEEN IN FORM OF MAKING WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF SUBJECT TO UNSC ORDER OR OTHERWISE REMOVING IT FROM AREA OF UNILATERAL DECISION BY STATE CONCERNED.

3. WHAT WE ARE SEEING NOW, HOWEVER, IS ABILITY OF STATE TO TREAT UN OBSERVERS OR FORCE IN SUCH A WAY THAT SYG HIMSELF OR SENDING STATES COME TO CONCLUSION THAT OBSERVERS OR FORCE MUST BE WITHDRAWN FOR OWN PROTECTION AND BECAUSE NOT BEING ACCORDED TREATMENT WHICH THEY OUGHT TO RECEIVE FROM STATES CONCERNED. THIS IS INDEED POOR ILLUSTRATION OF IMPORTANCE TO BE ACCORDED PRESENCE OF SIMILAR UN GROUP IF AND WHEN THEY ARE OBSERVING A QUOTE SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDER UNQUOTE UNDER A SETTLEMENT INSTEAD OF A CEASEFIRE LINE UNDER A UN RESOLUTION.

4. SINCE IT IS LARGELY USSR, ON BEHALF INTERESTS OF ARAB STATES, THAT IS PLUGGING FOR RELIANCE ON UNEF IN EVENT OF SETTLEMENT, WOULD IT NOT BE WELL TO POINT OUT TO SOVS THAT PRESENT SITUATION ONLY PLAYING INTO HANDS OF THOSE WHO MAINTAIN THAT SUCH UNEF WOULD BE MEANINGLESS? BEST WAY TO CONFIRM ISRAELI VIEWS IN THEIR OWN EYES AND IN EYES MUCH OF REST OF WORLD WOULD BE FOR UAR TO CONTINUE HARASSMENT OF UN OBSERVERS TO POINT WHERE THEY SUFFER CASUALTIES AND/OR HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN BY SYG OR SENDING STATES. ON OTHER HAND, BEST WAY OF SHOWING THAT UNEF WOULD BE A MEANINGFUL SUPPORT FOR EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE FOR UN OBSERVERS TO BE TREATED SCRUPULOUSLY AS REPRESENTATIVES OF WORLD COMMUNITY TRYING TO MAINTAIN CEASEFIRE UNDER UN ORDERS, AND AFFORDED ASSISTANCE RATHER THAN HARASSMENT. IF UAR COULD BE CONVINCED THAT THIS IN THEIR INTERESTS, IT WOULD NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTENANCE OF CEASEFIRE ON CANAL BUT WOULD ALSO BE CONTRIBUTION TO HOPED FOR EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

034467

R 181120Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6695
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN

SECRET TEL AVIV 2783

EXDIS

JARRING MISSION

1. DIRGEN RAFAEL, MFA, JULY 17 GAVE AMB ACCOUNT OF EBAN'S MEETING WITH JARRING IN ZURICH JULY 15-16.

2. EBAN THOUGHT IT WAS GOOD TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH JARRING AND KEEP HIM INFORMED ON SITUATION. JARRING IMPRESSED EBAN AS BEING CURIOUS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN TWO POWER TALKS AND APPEARED NOT TO HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THEM IN DETAIL. HE ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL-JORDAN RELATIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH HE SAID HE WAS HOLDING HIMSELF AVAILABLE IF PARTIES NEEDED HIM. RAFAEL SAID EBAN BRIEFED JARRING ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, BUT NOT IN DETAIL.

3. EBAN HAD TOLD JARRING ABOUT GOI ATTITUDE TOWARDS TWO POWER TALKS AND ALSTZABOUT RECENT SITUATION ON CEASEFIRE LINES, WHICH WORRIED GOI VERY MUCH. JARRING SAID THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT EXPECT A REDUCTION IN UAR MILITARY ACTIVITY, AND THAT THIS WAS SOV VIEW AS WELL AS HIS OWN, SINCE UAR WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT PRESENT SITUATION WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE AND TO IMPRESS WORLD OPINION THAT THINGS MUST BE CHANGED OR THAT SITUATION WILL DEGENERATE INTO

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VIOLENCE. THEREFORE THERE WOULD BE NO REDUCTION BY UAR OR PARTICULARLY MODERATING INFLUENCE ON PART OF SOVS. JARRING ALSO THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON CEASEFIRE SITUATION.

4. RAFAEL SAID JARRING WAS CONVINCED FOUR POWER TALKS WOULD NOT COME TO AN AGREEMENT, NOT BECAUSE JARRING HAD ANY AXE TO GRIND BUT BECAUSE THIS WAS HIS DETACHED VIEW. HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT HOW HE WOULD ACT IF AND WHEN PRESENTED WITH A FOUR POWER AGREEMENT, BECAUSE HE DOES NOT THINK THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN. HE CAN ONLY BE ACTIVATED BY SYG, BY CALL FROM PARTIES, OR ON OWN INITIATIVE, AND NOT BY FOUR POWERS AS SUCH. RAFAEL SAID JARRING WANTED TO ADVANCE IDEA OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES, WHICH HE CONSIDERS IMPORTANT. EVEN IF TWO POWERS REACH AGREEMENT, JARRING WOULD NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF COMMITTED THEREBY, SINCE HE IS BOUND ONLY BY NOVEMBER 1967 RESOLUTION.

5. RAFAEL SAID JARRING HAD TOLD EBAN HE WOULD RETURN MOSCOW AUGUST 10. HE HAD NO IDEA OF WHETHER HE WOULD BE GOING TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT ASKED IF ISRAEL THOUGHT GA WOULD DEAL ACTIVELY WITH ISRAEL-ARAB PROBLEM. EBAN EXPLAINED GA DISCUSSION WOULD BE USELESS BUT PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN MATTER WOULD ALL BE IN NEW YORK SO THERE MIGHT BE SOME ACTIVITY THERE.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

056070

R 221440Z JUL 69
 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6726
 INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET TEL AVIV 2826

EXDIS

ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. RAFAEL DIRGEN FONOFF TELEPHONED ME AGAIN THIS MORNING AND, REFERRING TO A LIST OF FURTHER FIRINGS FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY IN THE JORDAN VALLEY WHICH HE HAD INSTRUCTED BE PASSED TO EMBASSY AND WHICH IS GIVEN BELOW, REPEATED CONCERN OF GOI AT HIGHEST LEVEL AT CONTINUANCE THIS SITUATION. HE SAID THAT DESPITE JORDANIAN PLEDGES TO STOP SUCH FIRINGS FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, NOTHING IN FACT SEEMED TO BE GOING ON TO ACCOMPLISH CESSATION. GOI TAKES GRAVE VIEW AND NOTES MEASURE US INVOLVEMENT IN EFFORTS QUIET AREA.

2. I REITERATED THAT WE HAD NEVER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN POSSIBILITY ACHIEVING COMPLETE QUIET. I ADDED THAT I HAD JUST SEEN COMPLAINT TO EMBASSY AMMAN FROM JORDANIANS (AMMAN 3411) AGAINST ISRAELI FIRINGS IN SAME AREA. RAFAEL AGAIN CLAIMED ISRAELIS ONLY RETURNING FIRE WHEN FIRED UPON. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE NOT RPT NOT IMPLYING ANY PARTICULAR COURSE POSSIBLE ISRAELI FURTHER ACTION BUT REPEATED THAT SITUATION CANNOT CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT.

3. COMMENT: SINCE THREE WEEKS HAVE NOW GONE BY SINCE REPAIR OF EAST GHOR CANAL AND GOJ STATEMENTS ABOUT KEEPING CEASEFIRE LINE QUIET, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT NOW AS TO WHAT GOJ HAS BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH SO FAR AND AS TO ITS CHANCES FOR FULL SUCCESS IN REASONABLE FUTURE.

4. FOLLOWING IS LIST OF INCIDENTS DURING LAST NIGHT FURNISHED

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 02826 221617Z

EMBASSY ON RAFAEL'S INSTRUCTIONS: (ALL FIRING ORIGINATED FROM EAST BANK)

JULY 21 1920 THREE KATYUSHA SHELLS BETWEEN KINNERET AND MENAHAMIA. FIRE RETURNED.

1930 SEVERAL KATYUSHA SHELLS DIRECTED AT JEEP NEAR KIBBUTZ GESHER.

1930 THREE MORTAR SHELLS ON ISRAELI POSITION NEAR KFI R ELI Y HUD.

JULY 21 2022 FOUR KATYUSHA SHELLS ON INDUSTRIAL AREA BEIT SHEAN. ONE HOUSE HIT.

2022 TWO KATYUSHA SHELLS NEAR HAMADIYA.

2113 TWELVE KATYUSHA SHELLS VICINITY BEIT SHEAN.

2130 SEVERAL MORTAR SHELLS NORTH OF DAMIYA BRIDGE.

2330 SIX MORTAR SHELLS THREE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF MANDESA.

JULY 22 0920 VEHICLE STRUCK MINE NEAR ABDULLAH BRIDGE.

GP-3. BARBOUR

SECRET

260/10/1090

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*Department of State***TELEGRAM**

SECRET 639

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02888 280944Z

11

ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

096576

R 280908Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6757
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

SECRET TEL AVIV 2888

LIMDIS

BANGKOK FOR SISCO

SUBJ: SOVIET WARNING TO ISRAEL

1. DIRGEN MFA RAFAEL CALLED IN DCM LATE JULY 27 AND GAVE HIM COPY OF NOTE FROM FINNISH EMBASSY TEL AVIV TO FONMINISTRY TRANSMITTING NOTE "SUBMITTED BY SOVIET EMBASSY TO THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN HELSINKI."

2. SOVIET NOTE IS AS FOLLOWS, BEGIN TEXT: ON JULY THE 20TH BETWEEN 3 P.M. AND 8 P.M. THE ISRAELI ARTILLERY WHICH IS STATIONED ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AS WELL AS THE AIR FORCE HAVE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE TOWN PORT SAID ATTACKED SOVIET NAVY VESSELS WHICH WERE IN THIS AREA. THE SOVIET SHIPS WERE HIT BY SPLINTERS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THIS ATTACK AS PROVOCATIVE ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. SUCH AGGRESSIVE DEEDS INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IS CONTINUOUSLY PROCEEDING ON A VERY DANGEROUS PATH PROBABLY NOT UNDERSTANDING WHERE SUCH ADVENTUROUS DEEDS MAY LEAD. ALL THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH DEEDS IF NO ACTION IS TAKEN TO AVOID THEM IN FUTURE WILL FALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENT OF FINLAND WHICH REPRESENTS THE SOVIET INTERESTS IN ISRAEL TO TRANSMIT THIS WARNING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL. END TEXT.

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 02888 280944Z

3. FINNISH NOTE DATED JULY 27 IN TEL AVIV BUT NO DATE GIVEN FOR SOVIET NOTE. RAFAEL SAID GOI WILL SEND "MATTER OF FACT" REPLY TO SOVS WITHIN DAY OR TWO REFUTING ALLEGATION THAT "SPLINTERS" WERE RESULT OF ANY ISRAELI ACTION. WOULD TELL SOVS THERE WAS NO ISRAELI ACTION ON GROUND OR IN AIR DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET VESSELS AND IDF UNDER STRICT ORDERS NOT TO GET INVOLVED WITH ANY NON-BELLIGERENTS. THESE ORDERS OBEYED IN PAST AND WILL BE IN FUTURE. FACT THAT ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES ACTIVE IN AREA DUE TO CONSISTENT VIOLATION OF CEASE FIRE OBLIGATIONS BY EGYPT, UNDER POLICY PROCLAIMED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND IMPLEMENTED BY ITS MILITARY FORCES, WHILE ISRAEL OBSERVES CEASE FIRE STRICTLY ON BASIS RECIPROCITY.

4. FOR USG INFO, RAFAEL SAID IDF FORCES UNDER STRICT ORDERS AVOID INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES INCLUDING SOVS. ALL OPERATIONS AND PLANNING ARE DONE WITH THIS IN MIND AND ISRAELI AIR FORCE DID NOT OVERFLY PORT SAID. NEAREST IDF ACTIONS ON JULY 20 WERE AT CLOSEST TWELVE KILOMETERS FROM PORT SAID.

5. RAFAEL SAID HE WAS INFORMING USG OF THIS MATTER ON INSTRUCTIONS OF FONMIN EBAN WHO ASKED FOR USG INTERPRETATION AND ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET "WARNING." GP-3.
BARBOUR

SECRET

160/20/7090

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 00507 010910Z

5. HE ASKED ME IF I HAD ANY NOTION OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS MOTIVES WERE. I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE AND ASKED EXACTLY WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE OFFERING JORDANIANS IN EXCHANGE. HE SAID ONLY THE HOPE OF GETTING BACK PART OF THEIR TERRITORY.

6. AT ONE POINT HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW HE COULD ADVISE THE KING TO CRACKDOWN ON FEDAYEEN SINCE ISRAELIS WERE NOT OFFERING ANYTHING IN RETURN FOR THAT CONCESSION EITHER.

7. IN REPLY TO A REQUEST FOR MY IMPRESSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION I REVIEWED POINTS IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING OF JULY 24 (MEF 42).

8. HE RECALLED THAT I HAD HELPED HIM GET BACK ACROSS THE BRIDGE ONTO WEST BANK LAST TIME HE HAD GONE TO AMMAN AND BEEN HELD UP ON HIS RETURN BY ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND SAID HE WAS LETTING ME KNOW ABOUT HIS MISSION IN CASE HE HAD TO CALL ON US FOR FURTHER HELP. I TOLD HIM HARRY ODELL WAS IN CHARGE OF EMBASSY AMMAN AND EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT ODELL WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM DURING HIS VISIT.

9. HE ASKED ME IF I THOUGHT THAT HUSSEIN COULD ENGAGE IN SEPARATE PEACE TALKS. I SAID MOST PEOPLE THOUGHT THE KING COULD NOT GET VERY FAR OUT AHEAD OF NASSER. I ALSO NOTED THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS WERE MAINLY CONCERNED WITH UAR/ISRAEL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM BUT THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE THE USSR INFLUENCE IS IN CAIRO NOT AMMAN.

10. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT NUSEIBEH WAS SIMPLY ALERTING US TO FACT THAT HE WAS CARRYING SOME SORT OF MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN. I BELIEVE THE OFFER MAY HAVE BEEN MORE SPECIFIC THAN NUSEIBEH WOULD ADMIT. IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL THAT THIS EXPERIENCED AND SUBTLE DIPLOMAT WOULD AGREE TO CARRY TO THE KING A MESSAGE AS VAGUE AS THE ONE HE DESCRIBES. GP-3
CAMPBELL

NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN AND TEL AVIV BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 703

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 02 030817Z

18
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1931 W

----- 009752

R 021340Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6565
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2566

CORRECTED COPY

EXDIS

REF: STATE 107012

1. IMPORTANT QUESTION, IT SEEMS TO US, IS WHETHER AUTHOR REFTEL VIEWS IS SPEAKING ON HIS OWN OR REFLECTS GOI DECISION MAKERS' ATTITUDES. FACT SOURCE WAS EXPRESSING VIEWS SO SOON AFTER HEYKAL JUNE 27 ARTICLE AND WAS RELATING THESE VIEWS TO THAT ARTICLE SUGGEST HE MAY BE ON HIS OWN. OUR COMMENTS ON REFTEL FOLLOW.

2. SOURCE'S VIEWS BREAK DOWN INTO TWO PARTS: ANALYSIS OF SOVIET REPLY AS NEW DEPARTURE IN SOVIET POLICY, AND ACTION CONCLUSIONS SOVS-UAR AND ISRAEL SHOULD DRAW THEREFROM. RE FIRST, IN PLETHORA ISRAELI COMMENT ON OUTCOME GROMYKO'S CAIRO TALKS WE NOWHERE DISCERN GOI CONCLUSION THAT THESE TALKS MARKED DRAMATIC TURNING POINT IN SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK OF A HARDENING IN SOVIET-EGYPTIAN STANCE. RESULTS TALKS ARE SEEN AS JUST WHAT WAS TO BE EXPECTED IN TERMS OF BOTH ARAB AND SOVIET REACTIONS. STRESS HERE REMAINS ON CONTINUITY OF SOVIET POLICY.

3. WHILE WE ARE NOT IN BEST POSITION TO INTERPRET POLICY LINE SOVIETS PURSUING, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING SPECULATIVE

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OBSERVATIONS: SOVIETS HAVE BEEN DIVERSIFYING THEIR EFFORTS IN ARAB WORLD FOR YEARS; WE FIND IT DIFFICULT BELIEVE THEY WOULD PUT ALL THEIR EGGS IN NASSER'S FRAYED AND UNRELIABLE BASKET AT THIS STAGE. IT SEEMS TO US MORE LIKELY THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN DOING, BUILDING VARIED POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, STALLING US, FOMENTING US-ISRAEL FRICTION WHEREVER POSSIBLE, SEEKING TO DISPLACE US IN THE AREA WHILE STRIVING TO AVOID GENERAL HOSTILITIES.

4. AS FOR ACTION CONCLUSION THAT SOVIETS AND EGYPTIANS ARE ALLEGEDLY DRAWING FROM THE QTE NEW UNQTE SOVIET LINE, NAMELY A POLICY OF ATTRITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND THE US, WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THIS IS WHAT IT SEEMS TO US UAR, AND TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT JORDAN, HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO WITHIN THE LIMITS THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR MANY MONTHS NOW. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT ISRAELIS WHEN DESCRIBING UAR STRATEGY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING HAND IN GLOVE WITH UAR. FOR AN ISRAELI TO SPEAK OF A QTE NEW UNQTE POLICY OF ATTRITION IS LUDICROUS, AS IT IS FOR THEM TO SPEAK, AS IF IT WERE SOME-THING NOVEL, OF THE QTE IMPOSSIBILITY UNQTE OF A SEPARATE ISRAEL-JORDAN SETTLEMENT. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LARGE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT AMONG ISRAELIS THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF NASSER ALONE.

5. BY FAR MOST IMPORTANT (AND OMINOUS) PORTION OF SOURCE'S VIEWS IS THAT IN WHICH HE CONCLUDES FROM HIS PREMISES (WHICH AS POINTED OUT ARE NOT NEW IN TERMS OF PAST ISRAELI ANALYSIS) THAT ISRAEL XFAST NOW PLAY BRINKSMAN VIS-A-VIS UAR AND SOVIETS. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SOURCE'S THESIS EXPOUNDED SO POINTEDLY HERE. THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN TALK OF NEED FOR A MORE AGGRESSIVE IDF STANCE, AND SENIOR IDF OFFICERS HAVE INDICATED IN NUMBER OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH DAO THAT THEIR PATIENCE WITH UAR AND JORDAN IS WEARING THIN. THERE IS A REAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DRAIN CAUSED BY CONTINUING CASUALTIES. DAYAN HAS SPOKEN RECENTLY OF EGYPTIAN SELF-DELUSION THAT THEY ARE READY FOR ANOTHER ROUND (N.B. QTE ANOTHER ROUND UNQTE, NOT A POLICY OF ATTRITION) AND HAS NOTED PUBLICLY THAT IDF HAS SUFFERED ALMOST NO LOSSES IN ACTIONS THAT IT INITIATED. THIS LATTER REMARK SEEMS TO HERALD A SHIFT TO MORE ACTIVIST ISRAELI TACTICS. IDF ACTIONS OF LAST FEW DAYS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS.

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6. WE NOTE THAT SOURCE'S ANALYSIS IMPLIES ABRUPT CHANGE IN ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT PLACE OF BRINKSMANSHIP IN MIDEAST RCONTEXT. ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE BEING TOLD BY ISRAELIS THAT ARABS, WITH UAR IN VAN, WERE SHIPPING UP WAR SCARE TO PANIK GREAT POWERS INTO IMPOSING SOLUTION ON MIDEAST AS ONLY WAY OF PREVENTING WAR THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO US-USSR CONFRONTATION, THAT ARABS DID NOT IN FACT HAVE CAPACITY TO WAGE SUCH WAR, THAT ISRAEL COULD HOLD OUT INDEFINITELY AT THEN-PRESENT RATE OF HOSTILITIES AND CASUALTIES, AND THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS EMULATION BY US OF COOL AND CALM ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY SHOW ARABS THAT THEIR BLUSTER WOULD NOT WORK. NOW, IN SOURCE'S OPINION, TIME HAS COME FOR ISRAEL TO REVERSE THIS PROCESS, AND START TO SCARE UAR AND USSR INTO T JNKURG THAT ISRAELI MAY AT ANY TIME EMBARK ON NEW WAR. IN ONE WAY, THIS MAY BE REFLECTION OF ISRAELI FEELING THAT DETERMINATION TO GO TO WAR IF SERIOUSLY THREATENED WAS NOT MADE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO ARABS AND USSR IN PRE-JUNE 1967 AND THAT THIS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ARAB MISCALCULATION AS TO HOW FAR THEY COULD GO WITHOUT REACHING BRINK. IN FACT, OF COURSE, NOTHING THAT UAR OR OTHERS ARE DOING NOW IS COMPARABLE TO EVENTS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE 6 DAY WAR. MOREOVER, SOURCE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE CONSIDERED THAT GRAVITY WHICH US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS ATTRIBUTE TO THREAT OF WAR IN MIDEAST AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS OF THEIR OWN TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OUT OF FEAR OF WAR IS NOT NECESSARILY DEPENDENT ON WHO HAPPENS TO BE BEATING WAR DRUMS AT THE TIME. IF ISRAELIS WERE TO ACT AS SOURCE SUGGESTS AND CREATE A WAR SCARE CREDIBLE TO UAR AND USSR, IT WOULD ALSO BE CREDIBLE TO US, UK, FRANCE AND OTHERS AND THUS REINFORCE WHATEVER

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SECRET 355

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 02 021501Z

41

ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

R 021340Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6565
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

004425

69 JUL 2 PM 5:25
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2566

EXDIS

REF: STATE 107012

1. IMPORTANT QUESTION, IT SEEMS TO US, IS WHETHER AUTHOR REFTEL VIEWS IS SPEAKING ON HIS OWN OR REFLECTS GOI DECISION MAKERS' ATTITUDES. FACT SOURCE WAS EXPRESSING VIEWS SO SOON AFTER HEYKAL JUNE 27 ARTICLE AND WAS RELATING THESE VIEWS TO THAT ARTICLE SUGGEST HE MAY BE ON HIS OWN. OUR COMMENTS ON REFTEL FOLLOW.

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3. WHILE WE ARE NOT IN BEST POSITION TO INTERPRET POLICY LINE SOVIETS PURSUING, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING SPECULATIVE OBSERVATIONS: SOVIETS HAVE BEEN DIVERSIFYING THEIR EFFORTS IN ARAB WORLD FOR YEARS; WE FIND IT DIFFICULT BELIEVE THEY

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 01 OF 02 021501Z

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4. AS FOR ACTION CONCLUSION THAT SOVIETS AND EGYPTIANS ARE ALLEGEDLY DRAWING FROM THE QTE NEW UNQTE SOVIET LINE, NAMELY A POLICY OF ATTRITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL AND THE US, WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THIS IS WHAT IT SEEMS TO US UAR, AND TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT JORDAN, HAVE BEEN TRYING TO DO WITHIN THE LIMITS THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR MANY MONTHS NOW. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT ISRAELIS WHEN DESCRIBING UAR STRATEGY HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING HAND IN GLOVE WITH UAR. FOR AN ISRAELI TO SPEAK OF A QTE NEW UNQTE POLICY OF ATTRITION IS LUDICROUS, AS IT IS FOR THEM TO SPEAK, AS IF IT WERE SOME-THING NOVEL, OF THE QTE IMPOSSIBILITY UNQTE OF A SEPARATE ISRAEL-JORDAN SETTLEMENT. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LARGE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT AMONG ISRAELIS THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF NASSER ALONE.

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6. WE NOTE THAT SOURCE'S ANALYSIS IMPLIES ABRUPT CHANGE

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IN ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT PLACE OF BRINKSMANSHIP IN MIDEAST CONTEXT. ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE BEING TOLD BY ISRAELIS THAT ARABS, WITH UAR IN VAN, WERE STEPPING UP WAR SCARE TO PANIC GREAT POWERS INTO IMPOSING SOLUTION ON MIDEAST AS ONLY WAY OF PREVENTING WAR THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO US-USSR CONFRONTATION, THAT ARABS DID NOT IN FACT HAVE CAPACITY TO WAGE SUCH WAR, THAT ISRAEL COULD HOLD OUT INDEFINITELY AT THEN-PRESENT RATE OF HOSTILITIES AND CASUALTIES, AND THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS EMULATION BY US OF COOL AND CALM ATTITUDE OF ISRAEL WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY SHOW ARABS THAT THEIR BLUSTER WOULD NOT WORK. NOW, IN SOURCE'S OPINION, TIME HAS COME FOR ISRAEL TO REVERSE THIS PROCESS, AND START TO SCARE UAR AND USSR INTO THINKING THAT ISRAEL MAY AT ANY TIME EMBARK ON NEW WAR. IN ONE WAY, THIS MAY BE REFLECTION OF ISRAELI FEELING THAT DETERMINATION TO GO TO WAR IF SERIOUSLY THREATENED WAS NOT MADE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO ARABS AND USSR IN PRE-JUNE 1967 AND THAT THIS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ARAB MISCALCULATION AS TO HOW FAR THEY COULD GO WITHOUT REACHING BRINK. IN FACT, OF COURSE, NOTHING THAT UAR OR OTHERS ARE DOING NOW IS COMPARABLE TO EVENTS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE 6 DAY WAR. MOREOVER, SOURCE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE CONSIDERED THAT GRAVITY WHICH US"

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VGULYW

TYRM4FPMSXIBUTE#TO THREAT OF WAR IN MIDEAST AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS OF THEIR OWN TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OUT OF FEAR OF WAR IS NOT NECESSARILY DEPENDENT ON WHO HAPPENS TO BE BEATING WAR DRUMS AT THE TIME. IF ISRAELIS WERE TO ACT AS SOURCE SUGGESTS AND CREATE A WAR SCARE CREDIBLE TO UAR AND USSR, IT WOULD ALSO BE CREDIBLE TO US, UK, FRANCE AND OTHERS AND THUS REINFORCE WHATEVER

NOTE: # AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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NOT PASSIVELY TO ACCEPT STEADY LOSSES INFLICTED ON
IDF BY
CONTINUOUS UAR ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS. BUT SUCH TACTICS
WOULD BE BASED WE BELIEVE ON EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF WHAT
THE UAR IS DOING ON GROUND RATHER THAN KIND OF
SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS POSED BY SOURCE. IN THIS CONNECTION
GOOD SIGN OF SOVIET INTENTIONS WOULD BE PROVIDED BY

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 02566 02 OF 02 021523Z

EFFECTIVE EFFORTS ON THEIR PART TO CHECK UAR ACTIVISM ON
CANAL. IN ADDITION TO SERVING MORE VALUABLE PURPOSES SUCH
EFFORTS WOULD
ALSO DEMONSTRATE LACK OF VALIDITY TO REFTEL
SOURCE'S THEORY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 338

PAGE 01 STATE 102631

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1931 R

66642
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI:MCLISSFELT
APPROVED BY:NEA/JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON
NEA/RPDAVIES
IO: MR DEPALMA
S/S MR WALSH

013448

R 231903Z JUN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 102631

EXDIS

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL ISRAELI FONMIN GIDEON RAFAEL, ACCOMPANIED BY AMB RABIN AND MIN ARGOV, CALLED ON ASST SECYS SISCO AND DEPALMA TOGETHER JUNE 20. RABIN COMMENTED PRESIDENT'S INVITATION FOR PRIMIN MEIR VISIT HAD RECEIVED A GOOD RESPONSE IN ISRAEL. ONLY QUESTION WAS PRECISE DATES WHICH SISCO NOTED WE WERE TRYING TO WORK OUT FOR ONE OF PERIODS IN JULY SUGGESTED BY MRS. MEIR.

2° RAFAEL ASKED "WHERE DO WE STAND? WHERE IS SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN?" SISCO REPLIED DOBRYNIN IS IN MOSCOW FOR AWHILE. WE UNDERSTAND A NUMBER OF SOVIET AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN RECALLED. RABIN COMMENTED THAT DOBRYNIN'S RETURN HAD BEEN PLANED BEFOREHAND.

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TELEGRAM

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3* SISCO REFERRED TO LATEST HEIKAL ARTICLE IN AL-AHRAM WHICH SAID THAT A PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN US CONCERNING FOUR POWER AND SOVIET-US TALKS. ARTICLE SAYS THAT SOVIETS WERE TO TWIST UAR ARM, BUT NOTES THAT DURING GROMYKO VISIT TO CAIRO SOVIETS DID NOT TWIST ANY ARMS. SISCO COMMENTED IT WAS INTERESTING THAT ARTICLE ALLEGES THAT GROMYKO ASKED EGYPTIANS WHETHER SOVIETS SHOULD CONTINUE TALKS WITH US AND RESPONSE WAS YES.

4. RABIN COMMENTED HE THOUGHT IT HAPPENED OTHER WAY AROUND -- I.E., UAR ASKED SOVIETS TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH US SINCE IF THEY WERE BROKEN OFF, THIS WOULD PLAY INTO ISRAELI HANDS. HE OPINED SOVIETS DO WANT TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH US FOR TWO REASONS: TO PREVENT ANOTHER WAR AND TO ERODE US POSITION. SISCO ASKED WHETHER US-SOVIET TALKS WERE NOT AN ELEMENT OF RESTRAINT IN MIDDLE EAST. RABIN RESPONDED NO. SOVIETS WOULD FIND ANOTHER WAY TO RESTRAIN UAR IF TALKS ENDED. HE NOTED APPROVINGLY PRESIDENT NIXON'S JUNE 19 PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT ABOUT MIDDLE EAST.

5. SISCO SAID THAT OVER THE MONTHS HE HAS BEEN SAYING THAT NO SOVIET-US CONFRONTATION WAS IMMINENT OR FOR THAT MATTER ANOTHER SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THERE ALWAYS A RISK OF MISCALCULATION, HOWEVER, WHICH COULD LEAD TO WAR. WE MUST CONSIDER THAT SOVIETS ARE PURSUING A POLITICAL STRATEGY IN MIDDLE EAST, NOT PRIMARILY A MILITARY STRATEGY.

6* RAFAEL SAID THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE BETWEEN GOI AND US. RAFAEL EMPHSIZED THAT BASICALLY US AND ISRAEL SHOULD TRY TO COORDINATE THEIR ASSESSMENTS FIRST. HE EXPRESSED OPINION THAT SOVIET ARE TRYING "TO BAIL OUT THEIR CUSTOMER, THE UAR." THEY DON'T WANT TO USE FORCE BECAUSE THEY REALLY CAN'T, DUE TO ENORMOUS INTERNAL SOVIET PROBLEMS AS WELL AS PROBLEMS WITH SOVIET BLOC AND CHINA. SOVIETS ALSO MUST CONSIDER OVERALL US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THEIR OPTIONS ARE THEREFORE LIMITED.

7. RAFAEL CONTINUED THAT ON JUNE 5, 1967, SOVIETS DID NOT DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T REALLY KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. BY JUNE 6 THEY BEGAN TO TRY ALL SORTS OF DIPLOMATIC MOVES (E.G.,

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9. RAFAEL COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT WILLING TO PUT FORWARD A PEACE PLAN BEFORE ARABS AGREED TO NEGOTIATE BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE BAD NEGOTIATING TACTICS. SISCO SAID THAT OPTION OF AN INITIATIVE BY ISRAEL IS ALWAYS THERE FOR GOI TO CHOOSE, AND WE THINK ISRAEL WOULD LOSE NOTHING AND GAIN MUCH BY PUTTING FORTH ITS PEACE TERMS. ISRAEL'S LEVERAGE RESTS ON ITS STRENGTH AND FACT THAT ITS ARMY IS SITTING ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. RAFAEL SAID ISRAEL HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY ON TACTICS; FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAEL HAD RESPONDED TO US URGING

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IN JULY, 1968, THAT IT ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE THROUGH JARRING. REAL TEST WOULD COME IF ARABS WERE WILLING TO COME TO NEGOTIATING TABLE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. ISRAEL HE FELT SURE, WOULD RESPOND BY SENDING DELEGATION WITH DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE VERY PRACTICAL. THIS IS ONE OF THE FACTS OF LIFE. RAFAEL RECALLED RECENT EBAN INTERVIEW WITH ALFRED FRIENDLY WHEN FONMIN SAID IF GOI CONFRONTED BY DEFINITE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, THEN "WE'LL GET MOVING." NORMAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD BEGIN.

10. GROUP ADJOURNED AT THIS POINT TO MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY RICHARDSON (SEPTEL). GP-3. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 311615Z JUL 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6786
BT

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2941

NODIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 124641

7 6 9 6 Q

1969 JUL 31 PM 1 49

A. M. H.

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR JULY 31 TOLD PRIME MINISTER MEIR THAT US TEAM WHICH VISITED DIMONA EARLY JULY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE FULL EXAMINATION AND REQUESTED FURTHER ONE-DAY VISIT NEXT MONTH. MRS. MEIR REPLIED THIS IMPOSSIBLE, SINCE ANY DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED ROUTINE WOULD REQUIRE ACTION BY CABINET AND FORECIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF KNESSET, WHICH WAS OUT OF QUESTION IN PERIOD BEFORE ELECTIONS.

1. IN ORDER PRESENT SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL, AMBASSADOR SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR EARLY THIS WEEK. PRIME MINISTER COULD NOT ARRANGE TIME UNTIL JULY 31 AND MEETING WAS HELD THIS AFTERNOON. DCM ACCOMPANIED AMBASSADOR AND DIRGEN PM'S OFFICE YAAKOV HERZOG AND ASST DIRGEN MFA BITAN ALSO PRESENT. CONVERSATION TOOK ABOUT ONE HOUR.

2. AMB BEGAN BY READING FROM REFTEL AT LENGTH. HE NOTED ESPECIALLY THAT HE HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH VISITS FOR SOME YEARS, KNEW GOI PROBLEMS, BUT FEL THAT FACT VISITS HAD BECOME ROUTINE, PERHAPS TOO ROUTINE, AND INTERFERED WITH FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE ALSO POINTED OUT MATTER WAS ONE OF SUBSTANCE, NOT HOSPITALITY, AND TEAM HAD PLEASED WITH CORDIAL PERSONAL RECEPTION. MRS. MEIR SAID ISRAELIS HAD ALSO BEEN WELL IMPRESSED BY US TEAM.

3. IN REPLY TO AMB'S PRESENTATION, MRS. MEIR SAID SHE HAD BEEN IN ON THIS MATTER FROM BEGINNING. SHE HAD BEEN AT BEN GURION'S HOUSE FIRST TIME HE HAD TO MAKE DECISION TO AGREE TO VISIT, AND SHE KNEW HOW DIFFICULT IT HAD BEEN FOR HIM, FIRST SEVERAL VISITS HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE REST OF CABINET, UNTIL PRESS LEAK IN NEW YORK TIMES (AMB INTERJECTED THIS AND BEEN FROM ISRAELI SIDE) BROUGHT MATTER OUT AND IT HAD TO BE TAKEN UP IN CABINET AND KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MUCH TO DISCOMFITURE OF THEN PRIME MINISTER, ESHKOL. SINCE THEN CABINET AND FORAFF COMITE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN ABOUT VISITS. SHE COULD NOT SAY THAT EVERYONE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HAPPY ABOUT VISITS, BUT THAT HAD ENABLED THEM TO GO ON WAS FACT THAT GOVT ACTION WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE TAKEN TO STOP THEM, AND IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID THIS. THIS YEAR, US HAD SUGGESTED THAT VISIT BE SOMEWHAT EARLIER, IN VIEW OF COMING ELECTIONS, ETC., BUT SHE HAD SAID NO, LET IT GO ON ON SCHEDULE, SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO VARIANCE FROM ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE AND SO NO OPPORTUNITY FOR BASIC DECISION TO BE CALLED IN QUESTION.

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-2- TEL AVIV 294 , 311615Z JUL, SECTION 1 C 2, (NODIS)

4. NOW, MRS. MEIR WENT ON, THREE MONTHS BEFORE ELECTIONS, SHE WAS ASKED TO GO BEFORE CABINET AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMITE AND RAISE THIS MATTER AGAIN. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN EIGHT VISITS, SINCE 1951. US NATURALLY HAS SENT WHOM IT CHOSE, THEY HAVE LOOKED, AND NOTHING HAS BEEN FVTD. IS PROBLEM THAT THEY DID NOT SEE SOMETHING THAT WAS NOT THERE? IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO GO TO CABINET ON THIS NOW, TO CALL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMITE, ON EVE OF ELECTIONS. IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO ASK THIS.

5. AMB REPLIED HE KNEW THESE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WERE SERIOUS BUT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT GOI REALIZED HOW SERIOUSLY USG REGARDS WHOLE NUCLEAR QUESTION, NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL BUT WITH WHOLE WORLD. BECAUSE OF GRAVE DANGERS, THERE ARE THOSE IN US WHO FEEL WE MUST BE PREPARED TO BELIEVE THE WORST, IN ABSENCE OF CONTRARY INFO, NOT ONLY OF ISRAEL BUT OF ANYONE. PROBLEM BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER ISRAEL FEELS IT IMPORTANT TO DISABUSE DOUBTERS IN THIS RESPECT. AS TO PREVIOUS VISITS, WE HAD IN EACH CASE ACCEPTED GOI GROUNDRULES BUT AS RECORD WOULD SHOW HE HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED EACH TIME TO STATE THAT VISIT HAD NOT GONE AS WELL AS HAD BEEN HOPED. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOR TWO-DAY VISITS EVER SIX MONTHS; ESHKOL HAD NOT GIVEN WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE BUT HAD SAID ORALLY THAT PRESIDENT'S WISHES WERE ACCEPTABLE, AND THIS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS GOI AGREEMENT. NOW VISITS HAVE BECOME SO RUSHED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR TEAM TO MAKE REPORT WHICH WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF GOI AND USG TO ALLAY DOUBTS.

6. MRS. MEIR SAID THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT IT MADE HEGNMAD. A FEW WEEKS AGO, USG HAD ASKED HER TO COOPERATE ON QUESTION OF JORDAN, AND SHE HAD GONE ALONG. SHE HAD BEEN ANXIOUS TO GO ALONG, AND SHE DID SO. SINCE THEN, DURING JULY THERE HAD BEEN 98 SHELLING INCIDENTS FROM ACROSS JORDAN BORDER, SOME BY JORDANIAN ARMY BUT MOST BY FATAH. KING HAD PROMISED THERE WOULD BE NO SHOOTING, INCLUDING BY FATAH. NOW SYRIANS HAVE MOVED IN SIX RUSSIAN 130 MM GUNS AT SAFI (JUST SOUTH OF DEAD SEA) WITH A 27 KM RANGE. ISRAEL IS SURROUNDED ON SOUTH, EAST AND NORTH. IRAQIS AND SAUDI ARABIANS ALREADY IN JORDAN, AND NOW SYRIANS HAVE MOVED IN. SHE DID NOT KNOW WHAT IMPORTANCE TO ACCORD EASTERN COMMAND, BUT FACT WAS SYRIANS WERE NOW THERE. THEN THERE HAD BEEN NASSER'S SPEECH, AND BRESHNEV HAD SENT HIM MESSAGE SAYING USSR WOULD SUPPLY UAR WITH EVERYTHING NEEDED TO FIGHT ISRAELIS. BUT U IS WE (UNDERLINE) WHO ARE THE SUSPECTS IN US EYES. THIS MADE HER TERRIBLY SAD.

7. AMB REJOINED HE UNDERSTOOD HER POSITION BUT IN NUCLEAR EQUATION WE WERE TALKING ABOUT ANOTHER WORLD, COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FACTORS. IT WAS NOT SAME THING. POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS SUCH THAT WE CANNOT FAIL TO REGARD THEM AS SEPARATE BUSINESS. THIS DID NOT MEAN WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE SOMETHING ELSE, AND THIS IS WHY WE NEGOTIATED NPT AND HOWF OUR FRIENDS WILL SIGN IT, AS SOME HAVE. (MRS. MEIR INTERJECTED AT LEAST ISRAEL WAS IN GOOD COMPANY, BUT AMB JOZORTED NOT IN SUCH GOOD COMPANY EL THOSE WHO SIGNED.)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 211615Z JUL 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6787
BT

Control: 7699Q
Recd : July 31, 1969
2:33 p.m.

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2941

NODIS

8. PRIME MINISTER WENT ON THAT EVERYONE WITH ANY IMAGINATION COULD SEE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHETHER AS USER OR TARGET OF THEM. ISRAEL'S PROBLEM, HOWEVER, WAS HOW TO KEEP ALIVE IN FACE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, TO WHICH EVERY OUNCE OF HER ENERGY AND KNOWHOW WAS DEVOTED. SHE DID NOT SAY THAT US WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DOING ALL IT COULD TO SEE THAT THESE HORRIBLE WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE SPREAD AROUND WORLD, BUT WHY ISRAEL WAS UNDER SUSPICION WAS HARD FOR HER TO UNDERSTAND.

9. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT SAY ANY SUSPICION OF ISRAEL WAS JUSTIFIED BUT FACT WAS THAT IT EXISTED AND IT WAS IN INTERESTS US AND ISRAEL TO REMOVE IT. MRS. MEIR THEN SAID SHE DID NOT UNDERSTAND REFERENCE TO STATEMENT US DESIRED ANOTHER VISIT TO DIMONA TO TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO HER VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HAD KING HUSSEIN BEEN TOLD HE SHOULD STOP SHOOTING ACROSS BORDER BEFORE COMING TO SEE PRESIDENT? AMB REPLIED WE HAD NEVER SAID WE WHOUGHT HE COULD DO THIS COMPLETELY BUT WE WELCOMED HIS EFFORTS TO DO IT. PRIME MINISTER REJOINED IF HE CANNOT KEEP SYRIANS OUT OF HIS COUNTRY THEN HE IS NOT RULER AND THERE IS NO REASON TO ACCEPT HIS WORD ON ANYTHING. HE HAS BEEN INVADDED BY THREE ARAB COUNTRIES AND DOES NOTHING ABOUT IT. BUT HE IS THE BEST THERE IS IN JORDAN, AMB INTERJECTED. SHE DIDN'T CARE WHO WAS THERE, MRS. MEIR SAID, IF HE CAN'T KEEP OTHERS OUT. SHE HAD NOTING AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY, BUT EITHER THERE WAS SOMEONE IN CONTROL WHO COULD BE DEPENDED UPON OR THERE WAS NOTHING. JORDAN WAS NOT ISRAEL, AMB REPLIED, AND SHE WAS APPLYING ISRAELI STANDARDS TO IT. THERE WERE MANY COUNTRIES IN WORLD WEAK AND SHAKY LIKE JORDAN.

10. HERZOG THEN BROKE IN THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO SPECIFIC MESSAGES FROM KING THAT HE WOULD INSURE THAT THERE WAS NO FIRING. AMB REBUTTED WE KNEW THAT WOULD NOT WORK COMPLETELY, THAT HE COULD NOT CARRY THAT OUT. CAN'T HE KEEP SYRIANS OUT, MRS. MEIR ASKED? EITHER THEY HAVE COME IN AGAINST HIS WILL, AND HE SHOULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT, OR WITH HIS PERMISSION. NEXT HE WILL HAVE EGYPTIANS IN JORDAN. HERZOG said this was first time SYRIANS HAD MANAGED TO MOVE IN ON JORDAN, AND FIRST TIME SINCE SIX DAYS WAR THAT THEY HAD EVEN TRIED. LEBANON CAN KEEP SYRIANS OUT, MRS. MEIR CONTINUED, BUT JORDAN CAN'T. SHE COULD UNDERSTAND IT WAS MORE CONVENIENT FOR KING HUSSEIN TO KEEP AT PEACE

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2- Tel Aviv 2000 This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

WITH SYRIANS, BUT NOT AT ISRAEL'S EXPENSE. EARLY THIS YEAR, HERZOG SAID, IN ESHKOL-MUSSEIN EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES, THERE HAD BEEN CLEAR INDICATION THAT AREA AT SOUTH END DEAD SEA AND AQABA-EILAT WERE OUT OF BOUNDS. SAFI (WHERE SYRIANS GUNS ALLEGED TO BE) IS CENTRAL TO MILITARY CONTROL OF WHOLE DEAD SEA AREA. MUSSEIN HAD SHOWN HE COULD CONTROL THEM NOW. DEAD SEA INSTALLATIONS AT SDOM, PRIME MINISTER WENT ON, REPRESENTED INVESTMENT 400 MILLION ISRAELI POUNDS. (AND BIG US INVESTMENT, TOO, AMB NOTED) ONE SHOT AT ONE OF SEVERAL VITAL POINTS COULD PUT WHOLE BUSINESS OUT OF OPERATION FOR LONG, LONG TIME, YET THERE THEY ARE AT SAFI. US OUGHT TO HAVE MORE THINGS TO DO AT SUCH A TIME THAN SEARCH ISRAEL FOR ATOMIC BOMBS.

11. AMB SAID MATTER HAD TO BE LOOKED AT ON BROADER SCALE. GOI WAS MAKING PROBLEM BY BEING MYSTERIOUS. VISITS HAD BEEN SET UP FOR A PURPOSE AND HAD BECOME SO RESTRICTED THAT PURPOSE NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED.

12. DCM THEN SAID PRIME MINISTER'S FEELING THAT ISRAEL WAS OBJECT OF SOME UNIQUE SUSPICION ON PART OF USG WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. MOST FREE WORLD COUNTRIES ACTIVE IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH FIELD HAD REACTORS, FUEL OR OTHER NUCLEAR CONNECTIONS WITH US AND IN ALL SUCH INSTANCES US INSISTED ON COMPLETE AND CONTINUOUS SAFEGUARDS THAT GO FAR BEYOND ONE-DAY-ONCE-A-YEAR VISIT TO DIMONA. MRS. MEIR COUNTERED THAT DIMONA HAD NOT BEEN BOUGHT FROM US AND NOT FUELED BY US, SO US HAD NO REASON TO TALK ABOUT SAFEGUARDS ON IT. DCM REPLIED HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT APPLYING SAFEGUARDS TO DIMONA, BUT ILLUSTRATING THAT SUSPICION WAS NOT UNIQUE AGAINST ISRAEL BUT RATHER THAT THERE WAS NO ALLY OR FRIEND SO CLOSE BUT WHAT US APPLIES SAFEGUARDS WHENEVER IT DEALS WITH THEM IN NUCLEAR FIELD.

12. HERZOG SAID THAT WHEN ESHKOL FIRST WENT TO CABINET AND TOLD THEM ABOUT DIMONA VISITS, HE BASED HIS DECISION TO CARRY ON WITH VISITS ON FACT THAT COMMITMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE BY BEN GURION. MRS. MEIR SAID THAT IF MATTER WERE NOW COMING UP FOR FIRST TIME, SHE COULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER ASKING CABINET TO CONCURRENCE US VISITS TO DIMONA. SHE WAS ABLE TO CARRY ON ONLY BECAUSE ESHKOL HAD DONE IT, AND ESHKOL HAD BEEN ABLE ONLY BECAUSE HE COULD PUT IT ON BEN GURION. IF SHE HAD TO GO TO CABINET AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MATTER, THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE.

13. AMB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PRIME MINISTER'S PROBLEMS BUT FOR FINAL TIME HE WOULD SAY THAT RATHER THAN CONSIDER PROBLEMS SHE SHOULD CONSIDER

OBJECTIVE. OBJECTIVE IS TO BE ABLE TO HAVE TEAM PRODUCE AIRTIGHT REPORT THAT WILL LEAVE NO GROUND FOR DOUBT. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, DOUBTS WILL REMAIN. PRIME MINISTER MEIR REPLIED SHE WAS TERRIBLY SORRY IF THINGS HAD TO TURN OUT THAT WAY, BUT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTHINKABLE, JUST IMPOSSIBLE.

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-3- Tel Aviv 2941, Section 2 of 2, July 31, 1969

Control 7699Q

14. COMMENT: I PUSHED PRIME MINISTER AS HARD AS POSSIBLE ON THIS, ESPECIALLY ON THEME, WHICH SEEMS TO ME HEART OF MATTER, THAT PURPOSE OF VISITS IS TO ESTABLISH TO US SATISFACTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL NOT BEING PRODUCED AT DIMONA AND THAT THERE IS STRONG ISRAELI INTEREST IN SEEING TO IT THAT THIS SATISFACTION IS OBTAINED. DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH SHE ADDUCES ARE REAL, AND I IMAGINE SHE IS RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THIS PROGRAM CONTINUES ONLY BECAUSE, IN FINELY BALANCED ISRAELI CABINET, ON ONE HAS ABILITY TO GET MAJORITY DECISION TO STOP IT. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SEPARATE OUT, IN THIS MESSAGE, PARTS DEALING WITH JORDANIAN CEASEFIRE AND KING HUSSEIN, BUT THEY HAVE TO STAY IN BECAUSE DIMONA PROBLEM MUST BEEN SEEN BY US IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL SITUATION HERE. THOSE IN CABINET WHO OPPOSED MRS. MEIR ON GIVING GOJ CHANCE TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN (AND THERE CERTAINLY MUST HAVE BEEN SOME) ARE SAME ONE WHO WOULD OPPOSE RELAXATION ON DIMONA VISITS AND MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OUT OF ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS IN CABINET OR COMMITTEE. I THEREFORE RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE DONE ALL WE CAN AT THIS TIME, AND THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER DIMONA VISIT BEFORE MRS. MEIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON OR ISRAELI ELECTIONS IN LATE OCTOBER. GP-1.

BARBOUR

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FBIS 41

ISRAELI CRIMES

CAIRO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1150 GMT 21 AUG 68.

(MUHAMMAD SAHAWI COMMENTARY: "NOW ISRAEL HAS BURNED HOLY PLACES IN ARAB JERUSALEM IN FULL VIEW OF THE WHOLE WORLD")

(EXCERPTS) HARD FACTS ALONE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED REGARDING THE VERY SERIOUS REPORT WHICH AGENCIES TODAY CARRIED FROM OCCUPIED JERUSALEM-- THAT FIRE HAD BROKEN OUT IN THE HOLY AL-AKSA MOSQUE WHICH IS HELD SACRED BY MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AL-AKSA IS ALSO SACRED BY THE MUSLIMS NOT OUT OF RELIGIOUS FANATICISM, BUT OUT OF THE PROFOUND BELIEF BY MILLIONS OF MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IN THEIR RELIGIOUS CREED. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF ALCENT, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND OF WORSHIP HAS BEEN ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION.

THE QUESTION HERE IS: WHAT HAS ISRAEL DONE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE IMPERIALISM PLANTED IT IN THE MIDDLE EAST? ISRAEL IS TRAMPLING UPON ALL THESE PRINCIPLES AND IS SMOTHERING THE HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATION WITH BLOOD AND MUD. IT HAS BEEN DOING SO SINCE ZIONISM AND IMPERIALISM CREATED IT IN THE ARAB MIDDLELAND. THERE IS NO ROOM HERE TO ENUMERATE ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR ITS CRIMES ARE INNUMERABLE. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE, THEREFORE, THAT THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH ISRAEL REFUSED TO RECEIVE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, IS NOW INVESTIGATING THESE HORRIBLE CRIMES.

THE OTHER HARD FACT CONCERNING THIS GRAVE INCIDENT IS WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT ISRAEL'S PLANS TO CRUSHED ARAB JERUSALEM IN STONE. IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST FORCES CANNOT CLAIM TO BE UNWARRANTED OF SUCH PLANS. THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING ON ISRAEL TO HALT ALL VIOLENCE AIMED AT CHANGING THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM--RESOLUTIONS WHICH ISRAEL BRAZENLY AND CONTEMPTIBLY REJECTED--ARE WELL KNOWN.

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DESPITE ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THESE RESOLUTIONS AND OF ALL THE
OF RESOLUTIONS ON THE HOLY LAND PROBLEM, ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST
THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN PARTICULAR
HAS BEEN ENDORSING THE SUPPORT AND BACKING OF ALL THE VILE AND VICIOUS
IMPERIALIST FORCES. CONSEQUENTLY, THESE IMPERIALIST FORCES, FOREMOST
OF WHICH IS THE UNITED STATES, ARE CONSIDERED RESPONSIBLE IN THE
CRIME OF THE FIRE INCIDENT AT AL-AKSA MOSQUE AND IN THIS CONSTANT
AGGRESSION AGAINST HOLY PLACES IN THE HOLY CITY.

IT SUFFICES TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES--THE COUNTRY WITH THE
MOST AND STRONGEST INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL--HAS FOR YEARS A FIRE
WHILE WATCHING ISRAEL COMMIT ABOMINABLE CRIMES AND WITNESSING THE
DEMOLITION OF ARAB HOUSES, THE FORCED EVICTION OF ARAB RESIDENTS
FROM THEIR HOMES, AND THE SEIZURE OF PROPERTY WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM
OF JEWISHIZING JERUSALEM.

FINALLY, THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WILL FABRICATE STORIES AND WILL TELL
AS MANY LIES AS THEY CAN TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION, AS USUAL. BUT THE
QUESTION IS: COULD THIS CRIME HAVE BEEN COMMITTED WITHOUT PLANNING
AND PREMEDITATION BY ISRAEL? WHAT CAN THE WORLD EXPECT FROM ISRAEL
EXCEPT ABOMINABLE CRIMES, MARCHES, AND DEMONSTRATIONS?

THE AL-AKSA MOSQUE AND ALL THE WORLD'S HOLY PLACES MUST NOT
BURNED. THEY SHALL REMAIN HOLY AND SUSTAIN PEOPLE THE EXISTENCE OF
ISRAELI NATION.

21 AUG 1962 CF/303

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02378 230954Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1931 W

009489

R 230940Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6463

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2378

EXDIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 102256, TEL AVIV 2277

1. REGRET BITAN NOW STATES MRS. MEIR UNWILLING HAVE TEAM
CONSIST MORE THAN THREE PERSONS ON GROUNDS THAT TO DO SO
WOULD BE DEPARTURE FROM PAST PRACTICE TO WHICH SHE FIRMLY
DETERMINED ADHERE STRICTLY.

2. TO MY REMONSTRANCE THAT (A) THERE NO AGREEMENT AS TO NUMBER MEMBERS OF TEAMS WHICH PREVIOUSLY VISITED DIMONA AND (B) THAT RESTRICTION THIS CASE IRRITATING, BITAN REITERATED THAT PRIMIN INSISTS.

3. IN CIRCUMSTANCES PLEASE ADVISE WHICH INDIVIDUAL WILL BE OMITTED.

4. ITINERARY SET FORTH REFTEL SATISFACTORY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 940

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02277 161252Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

095394

R 161131Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6400

SECRET TEL AVIV 2277

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 097540

1. HAVE INFORMED BITAN TEAM WILL CONSIST FOUR INDIVIDUALS TO WHICH HE MADE NO REPEAT NO OBJECTION.
2. CONFIRM THAT PROCEDURES OF PREVIOUS YEARS VIZ NO CONTACT ISRAELI EMBASSY WASHINGTON, VISAS TO BE PROVIDED UPON ARRIVAL, AND GOI HANDLING ACCOMMODATIONS, ETC. SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. VISIT TO DIMONA WILL CONSIST OF ONE DAY (JULY 12) BUT GOI AGREEABLE TO TEAM ARRIVING IN ADVANCE EITHER JULY 9 OR 10 IF THEY WISH TO DO SO.

GP-3. BARBOUR

SECRET

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Department of State

Israel
TELEGRAM

SECRET 771

PAGE 01 TEL AV 02142 050752Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

R 050750Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6333

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2142

EXDIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 089717

I SPOKE TO BITAN JUNE 3 RE DIMONA VISIT AND HE PROMISED FURTHER INFO RE DATE WILL BE FORTHCOMING TOMORROW, JUNE 6. ONLY PROBLEM IS AVAILABILITY PROFESSOR DE SHALITT, WHO IS TO ACT AS HOST AS CUSTOMARY, BUT IS PRESENTLY IN THE US AND BITAN HAD TO ASCERTAIN DATE HIS RETURN.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 9351

PAGE 01 STATE 102256

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1931 R

66646
DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI STERNER
APPROVED BY NEA DAVIES
NEA/IAI ATHERTON
INR/RNA AUSTIN
SCI ZOOK INFO
AEC SOMMER
S/S PARKER

000689

R 210033Z JN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET STATE 102256

EXDIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 2277

1. TEAM WILL ARRIVE LOD 1540 10 JULY TWA 804. DEPARTS
ISRAEL 0850 JULY 13 TWA 841 ARRIVING ROME 1300.

2. PASSPORT INFORMATION FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.
GP-3. ROGERS.

SECRET

TELEGRAM

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 STATE 105618

2. WE HOPE GOI WILL REFLECT ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE WE INTEND TO REOPEN QUESTION OF PERIODICITY AND CONDUCT OF VISITS PRIOR NEXT VISIT.

GP-3 ROGERS

SECRET

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0604/02/138

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PM 8:50

O 311615Z JUL 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6786
BT

7 6 9 6 Q

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2941

1969 JUL 31 PM 1 49

NODIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 124641

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR JULY 31 TOLD PRIME MINISTER MEIR THAT US TEAM WHICH VISITED DIMONA EARLY JULY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE FULL EXAMINATION AND REQUESTED FURTHER ONE-DAY VISIT NEXT MONTH. MRS. MEIR REPLIED THIS IMPOSSIBLE, SINCE ANY DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED ROUTINE WOULD REQUIRE ACTION BY CABINET AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF KNESSET, WHICH WAS OUT OF QUESTION IN PERIOD BEFORE ELECTIONS.

1. IN ORDER PRESENT SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL, AMBASSADOR SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR EARLY THIS WEEK. PRIME MINISTER COULD NOT ARRANGE TIME UNTIL JULY 31 AND MEETING WAS HELD THIS AFTERNOON. DCM ACCOMPANIED AMBASSADOR AND DIRGEN PM'S OFFICE YAAKOV HERZOG AND ASST DIRGEN MFA BITAN ALSO PRESENT. CONVERSATION TOOK ABOUT ONE HOUR.

2. AMB BEGAN BY READING FROM REFTEL AT LENGTH. HE NOTED ESPECIALLY THAT HE HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH VISITS FOR SOME YEARS, KNEW GOI PROBLEMS, BUT FEL THAT FACT VISITS HAD BECOME ROUTINE, PERHAPS TOO ROUTINE, AND INTERFERED WITH FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE ALSO POINTED OUT MATTER WAS ONE OF SUBSTANCE, NOT HOSPITALITY, AND TEAM HAD PLEASED WITH CORDIAL PERSONAL RECEPTION. MRS. MEIR SAID ISRAELIS HAD ALSO BEEN WELL IMPRESSED BY US TEAM.

3. IN REPLY TO AMB'S PRESENTATION, MRS. MEIR SAID SHE HAD BEEN IN ON THIS MATTER FROM BEGINNING. SHE HAD BEEN AT BEN GURION'S HOUSE FIRST TIME HE HAD TO MAKE DECISION TO AGREE TO VISIT, AND SHE KNEW HOW DIFFICULT IT HAD BEEN FOR HIM, FIRST SEVERAL VISITS HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE REST OF CABINET, UNTIL PRESS LEAK IN NEW YORK TIMES (AMB INTERJECTED THIS AND BEEN FROM ISRAELI SIDE) BROUGHT MATTER OUT AND IT HAD TO BE TAKEN UP IN CABINET AND KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, MUCH TO DISCOMFITURE OF THEN PRIME MINISTER, ESHKOL. SINCE THEN CABINET AND FORAFF COMITE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN ABOUT VISITS. SHE COULD NOT SAY THAT EVERYONE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY HAPPY ABOUT VISITS, BUT WHAT HAD ENABLED THEM TO GO ON WAS FACT THAT GOVT ACTION WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE TAKEN TO STOP THEM, AND IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID THIS. THIS YEAR, US HAD SUGGESTED THAT VISIT BE SOMEWHAT EARLIER, IN VIEW OF COMING ELECTIONS, ETC., BUT SHE HAD SAID NO, LET IT GO ON ON SCHEDULE, SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO VARIANCE FROM ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE AND SO NO OPPORTUNITY FOR BASIC DECISION TO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 211615Z JUL 69 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6787
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 2941

Control: 7699Q
 Recd : July 31, 1969
 2:33 p.m.

NODIS

8. PRIME MINISTER WENT ON THAT EVERYONE WITH ANY IMAGINATION COULD SEE HORROR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHETHER AS USER OR TARGET OF THEM. ISRAEL'S PROBLEM, HTWEVER, WAS HOW TO KEEP ALIVE IN FACE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, TO WHICH EVERY OUNCE OF HER ENERGY AND KNOWHOW WAS DEVOTED. SHE DID NOT SAY THAT US WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DOING ALL IT COULD TO SEE THAT THESE HORRIBLE WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE SPREAD AROUND WORLD, BUT WHY ISRAEL WAS UNDER SUSPICION WAS HARD FOR HER TO UNDERSTAND.

9. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT SAY ANY SUSPICION OF ISRAEL WAS JUSTIFIED BUT FACT WAS THAT IT EXISTED AND IT WAS IN INTERESTS US AND ISRAEL TO REMOVE IT. MRS. MEIR THEN SAID SHE DID NOT UNDERSTAND REFERENCE TO STATEMENT US DESIRED ANOTHER VISIT TO DIMONA TO TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO HER VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HAD KING HUSSEIN BEEN TOLD HE SHOULD STOP SHOOTING ACROSS BORDER BEFORE COMING TO SEE PRESIDENT? AMB REPLIED WE HAD NEVER SAID WE WHOUGHT HE COULD DO THIS COMPLETELY BUT WE WELCOMED HIS EFFORTS TO DO IT. PRIME MINISTER REJOINED IF HE CANNOT KEEP SYRIANS OUT OF HIS COUNTRY THEN HE IS NOT RULER AND THERE IS NO REASON TO ACCEPT HIS WORD ON ANYTHING. HE HAS BEEN INVADED BY THREE ARAB COUNTRIES AND DOES NOTHING ABOUT IT. BUT HE IS THE BEST THERE IS IN JORDAN, AMB INTERJECTED. SHE DIDN'T CARE WHO WAS THERE, MRS. MEIR SAID, IF HE CAN'T KEEP OTHERS OUT. SHE HAD NOTING AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY, BUT EITHER THERE WAS SOMEONE IN CONTROL WHO COULD BE DEPENDED UPON OR THERE WAS NOTHING. JORDAN WAS NOT ISRAEL, AMB REPLIED, AND SHE WAS APPLYING ISRAELI STANDARDS TO IT. THERE WERE MANY COUNTRIES IN WORLD WEAK AND SHAKY LIKE JORDAN.

10. HERZOG THEN BROKE IN THAT THERE HAD BEEN TWO SPECIFIC MESSAGES FROM KING THAT HE WOULD INSURE THAT THERE WAS NO FIRING. AMB REBUTTED WE KNEW THAT WOULD NOT WORK COMPLETELY, THAT HE COULD NOT CARRY THAT OUT. CAN'T HE KEEP SYRIANS OUT, MRS. MEIR ASKED? EITHER THEY HAVE COME IN AGAINST HIS WILL, AND HE SHOULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT, OR WITH HIS PERMISSION. NEXT HE WILL HAVE EGYPTIANS IN JORDAN. HERZOG said this was first TIME SYRIANS HAD MANAGED TO MOVE IN ON JORDAN, AND FIRST TIME SINCE SIX DAYS WAR THAT THEY HAD EVEN TRIED. LEBANON CAN KEEP SYRIANS OUT, MRS. MEIR CONTINUED, BUT JORDAN CAN'T. SHE COULD UNDERSTAND IT WAS MORE CONVENIENT FOR KING HUSSEIN TO KEEP AT PEACE

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-2- Tel Aviv 2941, Section 2 of 2, July 31, 1969 Control 7699Q

WITH SYRIANS, BUT NOT AT ISRAEL'S EXPENSE. EARLY THIS YEAR, HERZOG SAID, IN ESHKOL-HUSSEIN EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES, THERE HAD BEEN CLEAR INDICATION THAT AREA AT SOUTH END DEAD SEA AND AQABA-EILAT WERE OUT OF BOUNDS. SAFI (WHERE SYRIANS GUNS ALLEGED TO BE) IS CENTRAL TO MILITARY CONTROL OF WHOLE DEAD SEA AREA. HUSSEIN HAD SHOWN HE COULD CONTROL THEM NOW. DEAD SEA INSTALLATIONS AT SDOM, PRIME MINISTER WENT ON, REPRESENTED INVESTMENT 400 MILLION ISRAELI POUNDS. (AND BIG US INVESTMENT, TOO, AMB NOTED) ONE SHOT AT ONE OF SEVERAL VITAL POINTS COULD PUT WHOLE BUSINESS OUT OF OPERATION FOR LONG, LONG TIME, YET THERE THEY ARE AT SAFI. US OUGHT TO HAVE MORE THINGS TO DO AT SUCH A TIME THAN SEARCH ISRAEL FOR ATOMIC BOMBS.

11. AMB SAID MATTER HAD TO BE LOOKED AT ON BROADER SCALE. GOI WAS MAKING PROBLEM BY BEING MYSTERIOUS. VISITS HAD BEEN SET UP FOR A PURPOSE AND HAD BECOME SO RESTRICTED THAT PURPOSE NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED.

12. DCM THEN SAID PRIME MINISTER'S FEELING THAT ISRAEL WAS OBJECT OF SOME UNIQUE SUSPICION ON PART OF USG WAS NOT JUSTIFIED. MOST FREE WORLD COUNTRIES ACTIVE IN NUCLEAR RESEARCH FIELD HAD REACTORS, FUEL OR OTHER NUCLEAR CONNECTIONS WITH US AND IN ALL SUCH INSTANCES US INSISTED ON COMPLETE AND CONTINUOUS SAFEGUARDS THAT GO FAR BEYOND ONE-DAY-ONCE-A-YEAR VISIT TO DIMONA. MRS. MEIR COUNTERED THAT DIMONA HAD NOT BEEN BOUGHT FROM US AND NOT FUELED BY US, SO US HAD NO REASON TO TALK ABOUT SAFEGUARDS ON IT. DCM REPLIED HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT APPLYING SAFEGUARDS TO DIMONA, BUT ILLUSTRATING THAT SUSPICION WAS NOT UNIQUE AGAINST ISRAEL BUT RATHER THAT THERE WAS NO ALLY OR FRIEND SO CLOSE BUT WHAT US APPLIES SAFEGUARDS WHENEVER IT DEALS WITH THEM IN NUCLEAR FIELD.

12. HERZOG SAID THAT WHEN ESHKOL FIRST WENT TO CABINET AND TOLD THEM ABOUT DIMONA VISITS, HE BASED HIS DECISION TO CARRY ON WITH VISITS ON FACT THAT COMMITMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE BY BEN GURION. MRS. MEIR SAID THAT IF MATTER WERE NOW COMING UP FOR FIRST TIME, SHE COULD NOT EVEN CONSIDER ASKING CABINET TO CONCURRENCE US VISITS TO DIMONA. SHE WAS ABLE TO CARRY ON ONLY BECAUSE ESHKOL HAD DONE IT, AND ESHKOL HAD BEEN ABLE ONLY BECAUSE HE COULD PUT IT ON BEN GURION. IF SHE HAD TO GO TO CABINET AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON MATTER, THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE.

13. AMB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PRIME MINISTER'S PROBLEMS BUT FOR FINAL TIME HE WOULD SAY THAT RATHER THAN CONSIDER PROBLEMS SHE SHOULD CONSIDER OBJECTIVE. OBJECTIVE IS TO BE ABLE TO HAVE TEAM PRODUCE AIRTIGHT REPORT THAT WILL LEAVE NO GROUND FOR DOUBT. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, DOUBTS WILL REMAIN. PRIME MINISTER MEIR REPLIED SHE WAS TERRIBLY SORRY IF THINGS HAD TO TURN OUT THAT WAY, BUT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY UNTHINKABLE, JUST IMPOSSIBLE.

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~~SECRET~~

-3- Tel Aviv 2941, Section 2 of 2, July 31, 1969

Control 7699Q

14. COMMENT: I PUSHED PRIME MINISTER AS HARD AS POSSIBLE ON THIS, ESPECIALLY ON THEME, WHICH SEEMS TO ME HEART OF MATTER, THAT PURPOSE OF VISITS IS TO ESTABLISH TO US SATISFACTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL NOT BEING PRODUCED AT DIMONA AND THAT THERE IS STRONG ISRAELI INTEREST IN SEEING TO IT THAT THIS SATISFACTION IS OBTAINED. DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH SHE ADDUCES ARE REAL, AND I IMAGINE SHE IS RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THIS PROGRAM CONTINUES ONLY BECAUSE, IN FINELY BALANCED ISRAELI CABINET, ON ONE HAS ABILITY TO GET MAJORITY DECISION TO STOP IT. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO SEPARATE OUT, IN THIS MESSAGE, PARTS DEALING WITH JORDANIAN CEASEFIRE AND KING HUSSEIN, BUT THEY HAVE TO STAY IN BECAUSE DIMONA PROBLEM MUST BEEN SEEN BY US IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL SITUATION HERE. THOSE IN CABINET WHO OPPOSED MRS. MEIR ON GIVING GOJ CHANCE TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN (AND THERE CERTAINLY MUST HAVE BEEN SOME) ARE SAME ONE WHO WOULD OPPOSE RELAXATION ON DIMONA VISITS AND MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OUT OF ANY DISCUSSION OF THIS IN CABINET OR COMMITTEE. I THEREFORE RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE DONE ALL WE CAN AT THIS TIME, AND THAT THERE IS NO REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER DIMONA VISIT BEFORE MRS. MEIR'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON OR ISRAELI ELECTIONS IN LATE OCTOBER. GP-1.

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-2- TEL AVIV 2941, 311615Z JUL, SECTION 1 OF 2, (NODIS)

4. NOW, MRS. MEIR WENT ON, THREE MONTHS BEFORE ELECTIONS, SHE WAS ASKED TO GO BEFORE CABINET AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMITE AND RAISE THIS MATTER AGAIN. THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN EIGHT VISITS, SINCE 1961. US NATURALLY HAS SENT WHOM IT CHOSE, THEY HAVE LOOKED, AND NOTHING HAS BEEN FVTD. IS PROBLEM THAT THEY DID NOT SEE SOMETHING THAT WAS NOT THERE? IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO GO TO CABINET ON THIS NOW, TO CALL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMITE, ON EVE OF ELECTIONS. IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO ASK THIS.

5. AMB REPLIED HE KNEW THESE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WERE SERIOUS BUT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT GOI REALIZED HOW SERIOUSLY USG REGARDS WHOLE NUCLEAR QUESTION, NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL BUT WITH WHOLE WORLD. BECAUSE OF GRAVE DANGERS, THERE ARE THOSE IN US WHO FEEL WE MUST BE PREPARED TO BELIEVE THE WORST, IN ABSENCE OF CONTRARY INFO, NOT ONLY OF ISRAEL BUT OF ANYONE. PROBLEM BOILS DOWN TO WHETHER ISRAEL FEELS IT IMPORTANT TO DISABUSE DOUBTERS IN THIS RESPECT. AS TO PREVIOUS VISITS, WE HAD IN EACH CASE ACCEPTED GOI GROUNDRULES BUT AS RECORD WOULD SHOW HE HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED EACH TIME TO STATE THAT VISIT HAD NOT GONE AS WELL AS HAD BEEN HOPED. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL HAD BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY FOR TWO-DAY VISITS EVER SIX MONTHS; ESHKOL HAD NOT GIVEN WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE BUT HAD SAID ORALLY THAT PRESIDENT'S WISHES WERE ACCEPTABLE, AND THIS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS GOI AGREEMENT. NOW VISITS HAVE BECOME SO RUSHED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR TEAM TO MAKE REPORT WHICH WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF GOI AND USG TO ALLAY DOUBTS.

6. MRS. MEIR SAID THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT IT MADE HEGNMAD. A FEW WEEKS AGO, USG HAD ASKED HER TO COOPERATE ON QUESTION OF JORDAN, AND SHE HAD GONE ALONG. SHE HAD BEEN ANXIOUS TO GO ALONG, AND SHE DID SO. SINCE THEN, DURING JULY THERE HAD BEEN 98 SHELLING INCIDENTS FROM ACROSS JORDAN BORDER, SOME BY JORDANIAN ARMY BUT MOST BY FATAH. KING HAD PROMISED THERE WOULD BE NO SHOOTING, INCLUDING BY FATAH. NOW SYRIANS HAVE MOVED IN SIX RUSSIAN 130 MM GUNS AT SAFI (JUST SOUTH OF DEAD SEA) WITH A 27 KM RANGE. ISRAEL IS SURROUNDED ON SOUTH, EAST AND NORTH. IRAQIS AND SAUDI ARABIANS ALREADY IN JORDAN, AND NOW SYRIANS HAVE MOVED IN. SHE DID NOT KNOW WHAT IMPORTANCE TO ACCORD EASTERN COMMAND, BUT FACT WAS SYRIANS WERE NOW THERE. THEN THERE HAD BEEN NASSER'S SPEECH, AND BRESHNEV HAD SENT HIM MESSAGE SAYING USSR WOULD SUPPLY UAR WITH EVERYTHING NEEDED TO FIGHT ISRAELIS. BUT U IS WE (UNDERLINE) WHO ARE THE SUSPECTS IN US EYES. THIS MADE HER TERRIBLY SAD.

7. AMB REJOINED HE UNDERSTOOD HER POSITION BUT IN NUCLEAR EQUATION WE WERE TALKING ABOUT ANOTHER WORLD, COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FACTORS. IT WAS NOT SAME THING. POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS SUCH THAT WE CANNOT FAIL TO REGARD THEM AS SEPARATE BUSINESS. THIS DID NOT MEAN WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE SOMETHING ELSE, AND THIS IS WHY WE NEGOTIATED NPT AND HOPED OUR FRIENDS WILL SIGN IT, AS SOME HAVE. (MRS. MEIR INTERJECTED AT LEAST ISRAEL WAS IN GOOD COMPANY, BUT AMB JDZORTED NOT IN SUCH GOOD COMPANY EL THOSE WHO SIGNED.)

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Department of State

7
TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 020929Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6797
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2964

CN: 3 9 8Q
AUGUST 2, 1969
6:03 A.M.

NODIS

REF: TEL AVIV 2941

ASST DIRGEN MFA BITAN HAS INFORMED AMB ON AUTHORITY PRIME MINISTER MEIR THAT STATEMENT SHE MADE TO AMB (REFTEL PARA 10) TO EFFECT THAT ARTILLERY AT SAFI NEAR SOUTH END OF DEAD SEA WAS SYRIAN WAS INCORRECT. SYRIANS HAVE NOT RPT NOT MOVED THIS FAR SOUTH AND THEIR FORCES' SOUTHERNMOST POINT IS PRESENTLY NEAR DAMIYA BRIDGE. THE GUNS ARE THERE AT SAFI THREATENING ISRAELI DEAD SEA WORKS AT SDOM, BITAN SAID, BUT THEY ARE JORDANIAN. GP-1.

BARBOUR

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

11

R 081510Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6848
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 3055

Control 1880Q
Recd 8 August 1969
12:49 p.m.

NODIS

SUBJ: DIMONA VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 2941

2. ASST DIRGSO MFA BITAN AUG 6 ASKED TO SEE AMB AND TOLD HIM PRIMIN MEIR HAD ASKED FOR REPORT FROM DIMONA ON RECENT VISIT OF AMERICANS AND HAD DIRECTED BITAN TO INFORM AMB ON CONTENTS THERE-OF.

2. BITAN READ FROM REPORT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

THERE ARE SOME SURPRISING DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN REPORTS RECEIVED BY PM ON VISIT THAT TOOK PLACE ON JULY 12 AND DESCRIPTION OF COURSE OF VISIT AS PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR AT THEIR MEETING ON JULY 31.

VISIT WAS CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PROGRAM DRAWN UP IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS OF AND IN AGREEMENT WITH VISITORS, OF WHOM WERE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH CENTER FROM PREVIOUS VISITS. THIS INCLUDED TIMING OF VISIT TO WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY.

THIS PROGRAM INCLUDED THREE RECENTLY ADDED FACILITIES, POINTED OUT BY HOSTS - LIBRARY AND COMPUTER BUILDING, PHYSICS LABORATORY AND AIR-RAID SHELTERS.

GUESTS DECIDED TO DISPENSE WITH VISITS TO SOME OF FACILITIES THEY HAD SEEN ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS - WORKSHOPS, STORES AND GENERAL SERVICES. THEY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THEY WOULD FINISH EARLY IN AFTERNOON. (ALTHOUGH IN FACT THEY STAYED UNTIL APPROX 2000 HOURS).

PACE OF VISIT WAS SET BY VISITORS. IN NO CASE WAS TIME SPENT IN ANY FACILITY CURTAILED BY HOSTS. GUESTS WERE REPEATEDLY ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR REQUESTS. IN NO CASE WAS A REQUEST REFUSED.

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SECRET

-2- Tel Aviv 3055, August 8, 1969

Control 1880Q

IT WAS PERFECTLY NATURAL FOR VISITORS TO DEVOTE SOME TIME TO DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS, SINCE CENTER IS A NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER. TIME DEVOTED TO THESE TALKS WAS ALSO DETERMINED BY VISITORS.

IN SHORT, VISITORS HAD AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY TO SEE ALL FACILITIES THEY HAD EXPRESSED DESIRE TO SEE, TO RECEIVE ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS AND TO DISCUSS PROJECTS.

AT END OF VISIT, GUESTS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION WITH WHAT THEY HAD SEEN AND HEARD.

3. IT IS NO DOUBT ONLY NATURAL THAT ISRAELIS WILL ATTEMPT PUT BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON FACTS OF RECENT VISIT. AMB DID NOT ARGUE POINTS WITH BITAN, BUT REITERATED OUR INFORMATION WAS DIFFERENT.

4. SINCE PRIMIN'S REFUSAL OF FURTHER VISIT AT THIS TIME WAS BASED ESSENTIALLY ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN ADEQUACY OF FIRST VISIT, DO NOT THINK IT PROFITABLE TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED ARGUMENT LATTER POINT, WHICH IN ANY CASE ONLY PARTICIPANTS VISIT QUALIFIED TO DO. GP-3.

BARBOUR

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Department of State
SECRET

W/K
TELEGRAM

R 301120Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6537
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 2500

7 2 0 2 Q

1969 JUNE 30 AM 8 01

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

REF: STATE 107432

1. THANKS REFTEL.

2. I HAD OCCASION AT RECEPTION HOSTED BY PRIMIN MEIR LAST EVENING FOR LARGE GROUP OVERSEAS VISITORS ET AL IN JERUSALEM TO SPEAK BRIEFLY AND SEPARATELY WITH (1) MRS. MEIR, (2) RAFAEL, (3) YAACOV HERZOG, (4) AVIAD YAFEH (PRIMIN'S POLITICAL SECRETARY).

A. WITH MRS. MEIR: I TOOK OCCASION TO WELCOME DECISION PERMIT REPAIR GHOR CANAL COMMENTING TO EFFECT SHE QUOTE USUALLY MADE CORRECT DECISIONS UNQUOTE. SHE SMILINGLY REPLIED QUOTE WILL PUT THAT IN WRITING UNQUOTE.

B. WITH RAFAEL: I ALSO SAID WELCOMED DECISION AND THANKED HIM FOR HIS PART THEREIN. I ADDED THAT WE HAD STRESSED TO JORDANIANS EXTENT TO WHICH WE HAD INVOLVED USG IN EFFORT QUIET SITUATION AND HOPE THAT JORDANIAN EFFORTS WOULD BE SERIOUS AND EFFECTIVE. I NOTED WE NOT OF COURSE IN POSITION GUARANTEE RESULTS BUT URGED ISRAELI PATIENCE. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH IT NO LONGER AN ISSUE, I MADE POINT THAT ISRAELI REQUEST FOR MEETING BETWEEN COMMANDERS IS, IN MY VIEW, IN CURRENT SITUATION FOR THE BIRDS. WHILE THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME PURPOSE IN THE PROPOSAL WHEN ORIGINALLY MADE BEFORE SIX DAY WAR THE SITUATION NOW IS SUCH THAT I CANNOT ENVISAGE MEETING BETWEEN LOCAL COMMANDERS SERVING ANY PURPOSE. RAFAEL APPEARED TO CONCUR COMMENTING THAT QUOTE HE (UNIDENTIFIED) UNQUOTE WHO WAS NOW ADVOCATING SUCH MEETINGS HAD PREVIOUSLY OPPOSED THEM, WHILE RAFAEL'S POSITION IN TWO INSTANCES HAD CHANGED CONTRARY-WISE. RAFAEL WENT ON TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT US WILL BE ABLE BE HELPFUL TO GOI IN UPCOMING SC JERUSALEM DEBATE, REITERATING GOI WISH THAT WE MAINTAIN PAST POSITION ON INSEPARABILITY OF JERUSALEM FROM FINAL PEACE SOLUTION.

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SECRET

-2- TEL AVIV 2500 (NODIS)

C. HERZOG'S COMMENTS FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON OBSERVATION THAT FRIENDLY COMPLIMENTARY CLOSURES WITH WHICH THE KING CONCLUDES MESSAGES TO ISRAELI PRIMIN REGARDLESS OF CONTEXT AND EXISTING SITUATION BETWEEN COUNTRIES ARE AT LEAST MYSTIFYING. HE ASSUMED EXPLANATION LIES IN ARAB MYSTIQUE BUT WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE WEIGHT SHOULD BE ATTACHED THERETO HE UNABLE DETERMINE.

D. YAFEH'S FIRST COMMENT WAS TO INQUIRE HOW LONG WE THOUGHT PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WOULD HOLD. I DECLINED SPECULATE BUT REITERATED VIEW THAT IN ANY CASE ISRAELI DECISION WELCOME AND BOUND HAVE SOME SALUTARY EFFECT WHICH STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION. I ALSO NOTED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAD MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO TALK AT ANY LENGTH WITH MRS. MEIR SINCE SHE WAS IN THE RECEIVING LINE AS HOSTESS AND I ASKED THAT HE MAKE CLEAR TO HER JR APPRECIATION FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S DECISION. FURTHER I ADDED HE SHOULD ALSO INFORM HER THAT WE HAD TOLD JORDANIWJZU THAT US INTERCESSION THIS INSTANCE ENGAGED US TO DO WHAT WE COULD TO INSURE JORDANIANS TAKE STRICT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO QUIET AREA AND THAT WE WILL HOPE THEY DO SO. WHILE WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT GUARANTEE JORDANIAN ACTION WE ALSO HOPE THAT AT SAME TIME ISRAELIS WILL EXERCISE REASONABLE RESTRAINT. TA AGREED TO PASS ON MY COMMENTS EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

SECRET

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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THE JOINT STAFF

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*SAV-DEAS
MIL AID-VP*

10 JUNE 1970
0430 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Reported Killing of Assistant US Army
Attache, Major Robert Perry

1. Major Robert Perry, Assistant US Army Attache, Amman, Jordan, has been reported to have been killed on 10 June. The American Embassy, Amman, Jordan received the report from the British Army Military Attache. The killing reportedly took place in Major Perry's residence as a result of Fedayeen activity nearby.

2. The Defense Attache, Amman, has arranged for a Jordanian Army escort to remove the Perry family (wife, 12 year-old son, and 3-week old baby) from their residence.

3. The American Embassy, Amman, has also reported that Foreign Service Officer Robert Pelletreau is missing.

James G. Shanahan
JAMES G. SHANAHAN
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director
for Operations, NMCC

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------|------------------------|
| WHSR | J-31 |
| SECSTATE | J-32 |
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| CJCS (5) | ADDO |
| Acting CJCS (5) | CCOC |
| DJS (3) | DIA REP |
| CSA | CIA REP |
| CNO | NSA REP |
| CSAF | PA REP |
| CMC | STATE REP |
| J-5 | EUR/MEAFSA DIV |
| J-30 (7) | EUR/MEAFSA DESK (NMCC) |

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 2 | report | The Situation in Jordan | 6/10/70 | B |
| 4 | memo | HAK to the President | 6/10/70 | B |
| 5 | report | The Situation in Jordan No. 2 | 6/10/70 | B |
| 7 | report | The Situation in Jordan No. 1 | 6/9/70 | B |
| 9 | telegram | Amemb Amman to SecState | 6/11/70 | B |
| 11 | telegram | USINT Cairo to SecState | 6/10/70 | B |
| FILE GROUP TITLE | | | BOX NUMBER | |
| NSC | | | 619 | |

FOLDER TITLE

(1)

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

June 11, 1970

OPERATIONS CENTER

JORDAN TASK FORCE

Jordan Sitrep No. 3 - 0500

The Situation

The security situation remains essentially unchanged from Sitrep No. 2. The one message from Embassy Amman commenting on the situation received during this period said the fedayeen and the Jordanian Government were jointly trying to "promote idea agreement is final and lasting ...". The Embassy reported a substantial measure of ceasefire as of 2000 hours local June 10 (1400 hours EST), though sporadic firing could still be heard. Wire service reports on the situation through the night have been contradictory. The hostages in two downtown Amman hotels remain under fedayeen control and are apparently still okay. King Hussein broadcast to the nation at 2300 hours local last night (1700 hours EST), characterizing the fedayeen as the enemy and their acts as sedition, and appealing for unity and restraint.

Interventions

The International Committee of the Red Cross has instructed its representative in Amman to intervene with the fedayeen on behalf of the hostages. President Masser of the United Arab Republic and Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi jointly cabled appeals from Cairo to King Hussein and to Yasir Arafat for a ceasefire. Hussein has reportedly replied that the situation "is improving very rapidly."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

June 10, 1970

OPERATIONS CENTER

JORDAN TASK FORCE

Jordan Sitrep No. 2 - 1600

Security Situation in Amman

Embassy Amman reported that as of 1640 local Amman time heavy firing had again broken out in Amman and that the Embassy building was hit by stray bullets. Heavy weapons fire was heard in the city outskirts. The Embassy speculates that the renewed firing may be a showdown between the Army and various fedayeen groups. As of 2000 Amman time the Embassy in a telecon with the Task Force reported a lull during which Army and fedayeen personnel were going around the city in sound trucks announcing final ceasefire agreement and calling on people to return to work tomorrow.

Hostages

Thirty American, British and German hostages are still being held by fedayeen in the Jordan Intercontinental Hotel and the PMLP fedayeen group has now also occupied the Philadelphia Hotel located in downtown Amman. In return for the release of the hostages, the PFLP is demanding that the GOJ dismiss five senior Army officers, including CINC Sharif Nasir (the King's uncle) and cease its fire on fedayeen-controlled refugee camps. If these demands are not met, the PFLP group threatens to kill the hostages in the Intercontinental and to blow up the Philadelphia Hotel. The Embassy has been in touch with the Palace and was told that the GOJ is aware of this situation and is taking appropriate action.

Evacuation Possibility

We have advised Embassy Amman by telecon to take advantage of any lull in the fighting to evacuate non-essential employees and all dependents. We are also considering other possible contingency plans to be put into effect if movement to the Amman airport remains dangerous.

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Embassy Beirut says it can charter three MEA aircraft which could lift out 450 people. Amman estimates that a maximum of 425, but probably considerably fewer, people may have to be evacuated. Athens has been designated as safehaven.

Death of Assistant Defense Attache

Major Robert P. Perry, Assistant Army Attache, was killed on the morning of June 10 when fedayeen at close range fired automatic weapons through the front door of his home. Major Perry's family has been removed to the comparative safety of the home of the Defense Attache. Major Perry's body has been recovered and identified and arrangements are being made to notify his next of kin in the United States. Major Perry was an excellent Arabist and a highly respected and dedicated officer. His tragic death is a distinct loss to the USG.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 10, 1970

OPERATIONS CENTER

JORDAN TASK FORCE

Jordan Sitrep No. 1 - 0830

The security situation in Jordan remains critical following several days of major disorders between government forces and fedayeen bands in Amman and nearby Zarqa. A definite confrontation between the King and the fedayeen may well be in the offing as the King has moved front-line troops to the capital.

Charge' Odell has requested and has been given discretionary authority to evacuate American personnel in the wake of the killing of Assistant Military Attache Perry and the as yet unexplained disappearance of Second Secretary Pelletreau. In the meantime, the maverick extremist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) continues to hold 14 Americans (including several well-known correspondents and a DOD team which was negotiating our latest military sales agreement), 14 British and 4 Germans hostage in Amman's major hotel and threatens to kill them if the GOJ does not desist from its attacks on the fedayeen.

At 10:15 Amman time (4:15 Washington time) the Government of Jordan informed the Embassy that it is in the process of arranging the release of the hostages but indicated that the general negotiations with the fedayeen were "touch and go". Top Iraqi Government officials are also ~~reportedly~~ participating in the negotiations. Radio Amman has broadcast three times that an agreement with the PLO-Fatah head, Arafat, has been reached and listed various provisions including: a cease-fire to go into effect 1200 Amman time (6:00 Washington time); release of all prisoners; and joint Jordan army and fedayeen patrols to enforce the cease-fire. The PFLP, however, has evidently

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declared that it will not abide by this agreement and it is not clear whether this agreement is being generally observed. We have established a task force in the Operations Center headed by Ambassador Harrison Symmes which will keep you informed by periodic sitreps.

ADDENDUM

The French Consul has reported that he spoke with the hostages this morning, that the Fedayeen are now limiting their demands to release of PFLP prisoners held by the Government, and that FSO Pelletreau is in the hotel, unharmed, but unable to leave.

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CHARGE OF U.S. INTRIGUE IN JORDAN

CAIRO MENA IN ARABIC 0750 GMT 10 JUN 70 M

(TEXT) CAIRO--AL-JUMHURIYAH UNCOVERS, FROM SEVERAL DOCUMENTS IT PUBLISHES TODAY, THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PLOT AGAINST FEDAYEEN ACTION IN JORDAN. THE PAPER DISCLOSES THE ROLE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN AMMAN IN THIS PLOT AND ALSO THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THAT EMBASSY, THE ISRAELIS, AND THE ENEMIES OF THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION.

IN THIS REGARD, THE PAPER POINTS TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN. THE PAPER SAYS THAT ON 4 APRIL, THE AMBASSADOR WENT TO THE SHAWR AS-YAFI AREA, WHERE HE AND A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION CROSSED THE RIVER AND MET WITH A NUMBER OF ISRAELIS WHO WERE ACCOMPANIED BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN OCCUPIED JERUSALEM. THE TWO SIDES MET WITH CERTAIN ELEMENTS AND AGREED TO SHADOW FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION.

AL7JUMHURIYAH SAYS THAT THE DOCUMENTS IN ITS POSSESSION SHOW THAT THE ENEMIES OF THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION ARE RECRUITING RETIRED OFFICERS FROM A CERTAIN BEDOUIN TRIBE TO SET UP ORGANIZATIONS HOSTILE TO FEDAYEEN ACTION. THESE HOSTILE ELEMENTS ARE ALSO DISTRIBUTING ARMS IN THE VILLAGES AND INSTIGATING TRIBAL LEADERS AGAINST FEDAYEEN ACTION.

THE PAPER SAYS THAT THE DOCUMENTS SHOW THAT A GANG CALLING ITSELF "PEACE SQUADS" (FIRAQ AS-SALAM) ARE CARRYING OUT SABOTAGE ACTS IN NORTHERN JORDAN TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE RESISTANCE AND THE MASSES. THESE SQUADS ALSO PLAN TO KIDNAP CERTAIN RESISTANCE MEN. ELEMENTS OF THESE SQUADS, THE PAPER ADDS, WENT TO (BURAYMUN) VILLAGE IN JARASH PROVINCE SOME 5 KILOMETERS FROM GHAZZAH CAMP DRESSED AS FEDAYEEN, KIDNAPED A GIRL AND THEN ABANDONED HER.

AL7JUMHURIYAH THEN RELATES WHAT HAPPENED A FEW HOURS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE RECENT BLOODY INCIDENTS IN JORDAN. THE PAPER SAYS THAT THE (PRESUMABLY JORDANIAN--ED) DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY SENT OUT A MEMO TO ALL POLICE STATIONS ASKING THEM TO IMMEDIATELY FURNISH HIM WITH ALL DETAILS CONCERNING THE FEDAYEEN BASES, THE NUMBER OF MEN IN EACH BASE, AND THE KIND OF WEAPONS IN THEIR POSSESSION. THE PAPER SAYS THAT AT THE SAME TIME AN ARMORED FORCE CONSISTING OF 50 TROOPS LEFT (PRESUMABLY AMMAN--ED) FOR AZ-ZARQA. THE PAPER SAYS THAT IT WAS THIS FORCE THAT STARTED THE CLASHES WITH THE FEDAYEEN.

AL-JUMHURIYAH CONTINUES THAT FEDAYEEN COMMANDERS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK U.S. COL (JOHN AGERY) HELD CONTACTS TO

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ARAFAT STATEMENT

DAMASCUS MENA IN ARABIC TO MENA CAIRO 0800 GMT 10 JUN 70 M

(TEXT) BEIRUT--PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASIR ARAFAT HAS STATED THAT THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WILL NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES DEVIATE FROM ITS BASIC AIM--THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE AND THE OVERTHROW OF THE USURPER ISRAELI STATE.

ARAFAT, IN A STATEMENT PUBLISHED TODAY IN THE LEBANESE PAPER AL7KIFAH, CONTINUES: THE IDEA OF STAGING A MILITARY COUP OR PROVOKING AN ARMED CLASH TO OVERTHROW KING HUSAYN IS NOT ONLY OUT OF THE QUESTION IN THE CALCULATIONS OF THE ARMED PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, BUT IS ALSO CONSIDERED A TRAP WHICH THE MOVEMENT MUST BY ALL MEANS AVOID.

ARAFAT ASSERTS: LET US FROM THE BEGINNING PINPOINT WHAT THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT DESIRES OF JORDAN. IS IT WILLING OR IS IT IN ITS INTEREST TO ASSUME POWER? THE ANSWER IS NO. ALL WE SEEK IS LEGAL RECOGNITION OF OUR PRESENCE AND THE FACILITATION OF OUR LIBERATION MISSION. SUCH RECOGNITION WILL NOT, CERTAINLY, BE ACCORDED VOLUNTARILY, BUT THROUGH AN IMPOSITION OF A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND DICTATES OF THE PHASE.

ARAFAT SAYS: THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO IMPOSE ITS LOGIC, PROVE ITS ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND GROW IN THE FACE OF ALL OBSTACLES AND ATTEMPTS TO LIQUIDATE IT.

HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE RESISTANCE WILL NEVER RELINQUISH JRDAN AS A BASE FOR ACTION, SUPPORT, AND PROTECTION. HE ADDED: SO LONG AS THE AUTHORITY IN AMMAN REMAINS COMMITTED--DESPITE ALL DIFFERENCES--TO PROVIDING THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WITH A BASE IN JORDAN, THEN WE WILL FIND OURSELVES COMPELLED TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO THIS AUTHORITY, WITHOUT NECESSARILY CALLING FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXISTING OFFICIALS.

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FBIS 13 (SUB FOR 12)

DETAILS OF JORDANIAN AGREEMENT

AMMAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 0408 GMT 10 JUN 70 M

(TEXT) EARLY THIS MORNING, AN IMPORTANT MEETING WAS HELD AT THE ROYAL PALACE IN AL-HUMMAR. KING HUSAYN PRESIDED ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE, AND THE PREMIER, THE DEPUTY PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS ATTENDED. HBROTHER "ABU AMMAR," THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE AND CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), PRESIDED ON THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT SIDE, AND A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE TWO COMMITTEES ATTENDED. THE MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER STAFF LT GEN HAMMAD SHIHAB, IRAQI MINISTER OF CULTURE AND GUIDANCE MINISTER SALAH UMAR AL-ALI, SALAH AD7DIN FORCES COMMANDER STAFF MAJ GEN ABDALLAH AS-SAYYID AHMAD, AND ASSISTANT IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF BRIG GEN HASAN MUSTAFA AN-NAQIB.

THE REGRETTABLE INCIDENTS IN JORDAN OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS WERE EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED. AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRANKNESS AND UNDERSTANDING PREVAILED DURING THIS IMPORTANT MEETING.

AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION, COMPLETE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED REGARDING THE FOLLOWING:

- 1--COMPLETE ABIDANCE BY THE CEASE-FIRE.
- 2--JOINT DILIGENT AND SINCERE WORK TO RESTORE LIFE TO NORMALCY AND TO SECURE CALM.
- 3--THE RETURN OF ALL REGULAR AND FEDAYEEN FORCES TO THEIR BASES AND CENTERS.
- 4--JOINT (JORDANIAN ARMY-FEDAYEEN--ED) PATROLS TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND TO SECURE CALM AND ORDER.
- 5--JOINT (JORDANIAN ARMY-FEDAYEEN--ED) DETACHMENTS TO ONCE AGAIN EXERCISE THEIR FORMER DUTIES.
- 6--RELEASE OF THOSE DETAINED BY BOTH SIDES AS RESULT OF RECENT INCIDENTS.
- 7--FORMATION OF A JOINT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE TO ASCERTAIN WHO CAUSED THE INCIDENTS. THIS COMMITTEE WILL SUBMIT THE RESULTS OF ITS INVESTIGATIONS TO THE KING WHO WILL THEN TAKE STRICT MEASURES AGAINST THEM.

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8--SINCERE WORK TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONAL UNITY OF THE PEOPLE AND TO CONSOLIDATE TIES OF BROTHERHOOD AND AFFECTION AMONG THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR SACRED DUTY IN THE LIBERATION BATTLE.

9--SETTING UP A JOINT COMMITTEE TO PREVENT ANY DISTURBANCE OF CALM OR THE CREATION OF DIFFICULTIES.

10--COOPERATION TO EXPOSE THE ELEMENTS WHICH ARE TRYING TO FOMENT SEDITION AND TO SOW INTRIGUE AMONG THE COMRADES IN-ARMS.

11--BROADCASTING THIS STATEMENT.

THE KING HAS ORDERED COMPENSATION TO BE PAID TO ALL THOSE WHO SUSTAINED LOSSES IN LIFE OR PROPERTY DURING THE RECENT INCIDENTS.

THE PEOPLE--SONS OF THE ONE HOMELAND, THE SOLDIERS, THE FEDAYEEN, AND THE STRUGGLERS: DURING THIS GRAVE CRUCIAL STAGE IN WHICH OUR ARAB NATION IS FACING THE FIERCEST ATTACKS AND CHALLENGES, WE APPEAL TO YOU TO STAND IN ONE RANK IN A SOLID FRONT AGAINST THE USURPING ENEMY AND FOR LIBERATION OF THE USURPED HOMELAND.

10 JUN 0643Z DD/GG

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NNNN

NOR201 EPE020

0437 :MIDEAST - - FIGHTING SCHEDULED):

670 - - FOUR TAKES)

AMMAN, JORDAN, JUNE 10 (REUTERS) - - KING HUSSEIN AND PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA LEADER YASSER ARAFAT TODAY AGREED ON A 10-POINT PLAN TO END THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS YET BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN MONARCH AND ARAB COMMANDOS, RADIO AMMAN ANNOUNCED.

THE BROADCAST SAID THE PLAN CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND THE RETURN OF GOVERNMENT AND GUERRILLA FORCES TO THEIR BASE CAMPS AFTER A DAY AND NIGHT OF BITTER FIGHTING IN AMMAN THAT REPORTEDLY COST THE LIVES OF AT LEAST 50 MEN.

HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT, CHIEF OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (P.L.O.) REACHED ACCORD AT AN EMERGENCY MEETING IN THE ROYAL PALACE EARLY THIS MORNING, THE RADIO SAID.

EARLIER, REPORTS FROM BEIRUT HAD SAID FIRING CONTINUED LATE INTO THE NIGHT IN THE JORDANIAN CAPITAL AFTER DAY-LONG CLASHES BETWEEN HUSSEIN'S TROOPS AND PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS.

ONE GUERRILLA GROUP ESTIMATED THE CLASHES COST 50 LIVES.
MORE AV TR/DDJS.

6

NNNN

NOR202 EPE221

0440 :1ST ADD AMMAN MIDEAST - - FIGHTING :

X X X LIVES.

AFTER A PREMATURE CEASEFIRE ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE NOON YESTERDAY THE P.L.O. LAST NIGHT OFFERED A SECOND CEASEFIRE.

BUT OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT SAID THE SETTLEMENT TERMS OFFERED BY A P.L.O. SPOKESMAN AT A CAIRO NEWS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT WOULD BE TOO TOUGH FOR THE KING TO ACCEPT.

THE SPOKESMAN DENIED REPORTS - - WHICH ORIGINALLY CAME FROM COMMANDO SOURCES IN BEIRUT - THAT GUERRILLAS HAD FIRED ON THE KING'S CAR YESTERDAY MORNING.

THIS MORNING'S REPORT WAS THE FIRST WORD FROM AMMAN SINCE AFTER TOTAL CENSORSHIP WAS ORDERED BY THE GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO REFERENCE IN EARLY BROADCASTS TO THE ORIGINS OF THE FIGHTING.

TRAVELERS REACHING BEIRUT FROM AMMAN LAST NIGHT SAID THE JORDANIAN CAPITAL WAS LIVING IN FEAR, WITH COMMANDOS CONTROLLING THE CITY CENTER AND GOVERNMENT TROOPS RINGING THE OUTSKIRTS.

THE MAIN FIGHTING YESTERDAY CENTERED ON REFUGEE CAMPS WHERE GUERRILLA GROUPS HAVE THEIR HEADQUARTERS AND MILITARY AND POLICE POSTS IN THE FRINGES OF THE CITY.

ONE GUERRILLA SPOKESMAN IN BEIRUT SAID COMMANDOS HAD SEIZED THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. OTHER REPORTS FROM AMMAN SAID FIRE HAD BEEN STARTED AT THE U.S. EMBASSY AND THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT BUILDING.

MORE AV MA/DDJS.

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FBIS 28 (SUB FOR 27)

MORE ON FEDAYEEN HOSTAGES

JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 1101 GMT 10 JUN 70 M

(TEXT) THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) IS HOLDING 32 FOREIGN NATIONALS HOSTAGE IN AMMAN AND THREATENS NOT TO BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE THEIR SAFETY UNLESS THE JORDANIAN ARMY STOPS ITS ATTACKS ON TERRORIST BASES.

ONE OF THE PRISONERS IS AP CORRESPONDENT (DENNIS NIEL), WHOM THE MEMBERS OF THE PFLP HAVE ALLOWED TO REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF HIS FELLOWS VIA THE U.S. EMBASSY. (NIEL) REPORTS THAT THE HOSTAGES ARE 14 AMERICANS, 14 BRITISH SUBJECTS, AND THREE GERMANS, MOST OF THEM JOURNALISTS, AND ONE LEBANESE, THE SON OF EX 7PRESIDENT CAMILLE SHAMUN.

ALL WERE CAPTURED LAST NIGHT AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL IN AMMAN, WHICH FELL INTO PFLP HANDS. ACCORDING TO THE CORRESPONDENT, HOTEL GUESTS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE, BUT BECAUSE OF THE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN THE TOWN THEY COULD NOT DO SO. THEY ARE THEREFORE ALL CROWDED INTO THE HOTEL CELLAR, WHICH SERVES AS A SHELTER AGAINST THE SHOOTING, AND MEMBERS OF THE PFLP ARE DIGGING IN, IN HOTEL ROOMS AND BALCONIES.

10 JUN 1151Z MJC/RG

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ACTION NEA-15

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CCO-00 AID-28 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NIC-01
NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 OPR-02 P-03 PER-02 RSC-01 PRS-01
SCA-01 CSE-00 S-20 SY-03 IO-13 AF-12 EUR-20 SR-01
ORM-03 RSR-01 /166 W
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O 111103Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 672
AMEMBASSY AMMWU

UNCLAS BEIRUT 4639

JOURNALISTS REPORT PFLP BEIRUT HAS JUST ANNOUNCED
THAT HEAVY FIGHTING THROUGHOUT AMMAN RESUMED
1000 LOCAL.
PORTER

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ACTION NEA-15

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PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 SCS-04 SCA-01 AID-28 OPR-02 SY-03
E-15 DOT-12 O-03 RSR-01 /171 W

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O 111046Z JUN 70 ZFF 6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 202
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
CINCSRIKE
AMCONSUL DHAKRA
DIA
EUCOM
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL STUTTGART

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2565

SUBJ SITUATION IN AMMAN () FACILITIES

1.EMBOFF IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TODAY, JUNE 11, WITH CAPTAIN JOHN WATERMAN, AMERICAN CITIZEN, PILOT WITH ROYAL JORDANIAN AIRLINES, INFORMED US THAT AT THIS TIME (1050Z) THE LOCAL AIRPORT IS CROWDED WITH FOREIGN NATIONAL ATTEMPTING LEAVE JORDAN. RESERVATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED ARE NOT BEING HONORED; IN FACT TICKETS FOR OUTGOING FLIGHTS SEEM TO BE GOING TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. CAPTAIN WATERMAN STATED THAT HE DOUBTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AMERICANS

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02565 111134Z

TO OBTAIN TICKETS UNLESS THEY WERE WILLING TO ENTER INTO THE
BARGAINING. WE INFORMING GERMANS OF FOREGOING.
ODELL

NOTE: () OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DIA

SECRET STATE 090735

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 090735

SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF US PERSONNEL

REF: AMMAN 2562; SECSTATE 90494, 89694

1. DEPT CONCURS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR NO FULL-SCALE EVACUATION AT THIS TIME AND APPROVES DETAILS OUTLINED PARA TWO AMMAN 2562. BASED ON EXPERIENCE 1967 EVACUATION, HOWEVER WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND EVACUATION DEPENDENTS BE MADE MANDATORY RATHER THAN ON VOLUNTARY BASIS.
2. SITUATION OBTAINING AMMAN AIRPORT ON SALE OF TICKETS (AMMAN 2565) IS DISTURBING AND OBVIOUSLY WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE SUPERVISION LOADING OF AIRCRAFT. THIS SITUATION SHOULD BE REVIEWED WITH MEA BEIRUT WHEN CHARTER ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE TO INSURE NO DIFFICULTIES OCCUR DURING LOADING OPERATIONS AMMAN AIRPORT. PERHAPS YOU MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE AT AMMAN AIRPORT FOR SECURITY PROTECTION TO INSURE ORDERLY EVACUATION OF AMCITS.
3. WE NOTE YOU HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ZAID RIFAI (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER GOJ OFFICIALS) IN ORDER TO COORDINATE EVACUATION AND ALSO TO AVOID AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ANY RESULTANT ADVERSE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. WE GATHER THAT OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS (ESPECIALLY GERMAN) ARE "OUT IN FRONT" HAVE ALREADY COMMENCED ACTUAL EVACUATION MOVEMENT AT THE AIRPORT AND THAT YOU ARE IN AS CLOSE CONTACT AS POSSIBLE WITH BRITISH, FRENCH AND OTHER EMBASSIES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR PLANS. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE STRESS TO KEY JORDANIAN OFFICIALS OUR CONTINUING OBJECTIVE OF SUPPORTING REGIME WHILE MAKING LOW KEY EFFORT TO REDUCE PRESENCE OF NON-ESSENTIAL AMERICANS.
4. RE AMMAN 2556, WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFICS ON WHICH EMBOFF THREATENED AS WELL AS ON WHICH AMMAN SUBURB CONTINUES HAVE ACCESS TO AIRPORT.

GP-3.
ROGERS

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT

01 EUR-20 IO-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSC-10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 E-15 DOT
12 O-03 OPR-02 OC-06
SY-03 SUY-04 SCA-01 PER-02 AID-28 RSR-01 /179 W

123042

O 111000Z JUN 80 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 196
AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
CINCSRIKE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
DIA
EUCOM
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2556

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN AMMAN MORNING JUNE 11

1. SITUATION APPEARS TO BE COOLING DOWN SOMEWHAT IN CITY OF
AMMAN MORNING JUNE 11.

FEW SHOOTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN GOVT FORCES AND FEDAYEEN
HAVE BEEN REPORTED. ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR PUBLIC SECURITY,
GOVT HAS MADE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE CIVIL SERVANTS TO RETURN TO
WORK TODAY BUT ONLY WITH RELATIVELY SMALL SUCCESS.

2. AMMAN IS STILL BROKEN UP INTO ENCLAVES, IN WHICH SOME OF
FEDAYEEN HAVE TOTAL CONTROL; ANND FEDAYEEN ROADBLOCKS ARE STILL

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02556 111046Z

SOME GROCERY AND SIMILAR SHOPS ARE OPEN; AND INHABITANTS ARE TRYING TO STOCK UP. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE AND VEHICLES ARE MOVING ABOUT.

3. NO RPT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN RELEASE OF PFLP HOSTAGES AT TWO AMMAN HOTELS (AND PERHAPS A THIRD). ICRC REP MAKING EFFORTS THROUGH FATAH CONTACTS, AS IS GERMAN EMBASSY. FATAH EFFORTS, IF ANY, TO PERSUADE HABBASH TO MORE RELAXED STANCE CLEARLY HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE.

4. CIVIL AIRPORT STILL UNDER GOVT CONTROL AND ACCESS THERETO FROM ONE SUBURB OF CITY APPEARS FREE OF FEDAYEEN INTERFERENCE.

5. AMMAN RADIO IS REGULARLY BROADCASTING KING HUSSEIN'S JUNE 10 STATEMENT INTER

LIA URGING THE PEOPLE "NOT TO ALLOW THE ENEMY AN OPPORTUNITY TO DESTROY WHAT WE HAVE BUILT." HE APPEALS TO BROTHERS TO STOP KILLING BROTHERS.

6. FEDAYEEN LOOTING, STEALING OF VEHICLES, AND MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PRIVATE AND GOVT PROPERTY HAVE CONTINUED,

ND
WITH GENERAL LESSENING OF CONTROL FROM ANY QUARTER, FEDAYEEN OR GOVT, WE MUST EXPECT THAT SECURITY OF INDIVIDUAL FOREIGNERS AND THEIR PROPERTY WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE. ONE EMBOFF HAS BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK BY NEIGHBORS WHO ALTHOUGH NOT FEDAYEEN ARE FEDAYEEN SUPPORTERS. HOME OF CAPTAIN POTTS BROKEN INTO, WITH MUCH WANTON DESTRUCTION. HIS HOME NEXT TO HOME OF MOTHER OF GENERAL ZAID BIN SHAKIR; AND WHERE SISTER OF ZAID BIN SHAKIR WAS REPORTEDLY KILLED BY FEDAYEEN ON JUNE 9.

7. WITH REFERENCE STATE 90494 JUST RECEIVED, LBE ARE ADDRESSING OURSELVES URGENTLY TO QUESTION OF POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICANS AND WILL SEND SEPTTEL THIS SUBJECT SOONEST. NOTE: GERMAN EMBASSY JUST CALLED 1200 LOCAL (1000Z). REQUESTED EMBASSY BONN INFORM FRG FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THEY ARE IN TERMINAL PHASE EVACUATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AT EMBASSY HAVE BEEN SEALED.

ODELL

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04631 110828Z

22

ACTION OPR-02

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 CCO-00 SY-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 OC-06 PER-02 O-03
AID-28 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 PRS-01
SS-20 E-15 /150 W

----- 122223

O P 110742Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 668
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USEUCOM
CINCSRIKE
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4631

REF: STATE 089694

1. WE HAVE BEEN TOUCH WITH MEA GENERAL MANAGER ASAD NASR
WHO IS PREPARED TO PUT PLANE INTO AMMAN ON TWO HOURS'
NOTICE. HAS CAPACITY AVAILABLE HANDLE ALL EVACUEES GIVEN DEPT.
BY AMMAN.

2. HE POINTED OUT, AS OBVIOUS, SECURITY CONDITIONS AT AMMAN
AIRPORT BUT ASSUMED, HE TOLD US, THAT EMBASSY AMMAN EQUALLY
AWARE.
PORTER

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16 10
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00
PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 RSR-01 OPR-02 O-03 OC-06 /114 W
----- 122987

O 110950Z JUN 70 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 195
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
RUQMBEXAMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2817
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
CINCSTRIKE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
EUCOM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUDTCRXAMEMBASSY LONDON 1430
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2555

SUBJ ALLEGED VOA RADIO BROADCAST

0. WE INFORMED BY ARAB FRIEND THAT VOA ARABIC BROADCAST
EVENING JUNE 10 REPORTED THAT "A FEW AMERICANS" WERE LEAVING
AMMAN. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE MONITOR ALL BROADCASTS.
ASSUME THAT DEPARTMENT, USIA, AND VOA WILL TAKE EXCEPTIONAL
PRECAUTIONS IN ANY PUBLIC REFERENCE TO AMERICANS
LEAVING JORDAN. WE URGE NO RPT NO STATEMENTS
AT ALL. WE CAN NOT RPT NOT TAKE ANY RISKS THIS SUBJECT,
SINCE IT COULD INVITE FURTHER FEDAYEEN OR FEDAYEEN-SYMPATHIZER EFFORTS
TO TAKE AMERICANS AS HOSTAGES.
ODELL

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02552 110820Z

18
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 E-15 DOT-12 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10

P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 OPR-02 RSR-01 /119 W
----- 122205

O P 110750Z JUN 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 193
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
CINCSRIKE
DIA
EUCOM
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2552

SUBJ ALIA FLIGHT SCHEDULE

1. ALIA PILOT INFORMS US FOLLOWING ALIA FLIGHTS OPERATING:

- (A) 1000 TO KUWAIT
- (B) 1130 TO FRANKFURT
- (C) 1500 TO CAIRO
- (D) 1830 TO BEIRUT
- (E) 2000 TO TEHRAN

2. FOR BEIRUT: PLEASE TRANSMIT TIMES AND NUMBERS OF ANY
FLIGHTS MEA INTENDS TO SCHEDULE TO AMMAN JUNE 11.

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PAGE 01 STATE 090494

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ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
CCO-00 AID-28 O-03 SY-03 OPR-02 PER-02 PM-05 NSC-10
SS-20 RSC-01 INR-07 OC-06 SCS-04 SCA-01 H-02 L-04

/134 R

66641

DRAFTED BY: NEA/JTF: HARRISON M. SYMMES
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ ARN: TALCOTT SEELYE
NEA/ RDAVIES
OPR: INLG: HANDERSON
NEA/ EX/ LRHUNT

----- 120383

P R 110044Z JUN-70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USEUCOM
INFO USINT CAIRO
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 090494

REF: AMMAN 2540: STATE 089694
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICANS
1. IN ORDER TO INSURE FULL UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING POSSIBLE
EVACUATION, DEPT REITERATES YOU HAVE AUTHORITY ORDER EVACUATION
ANY NON- ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES AS WELL AS ALL DEPENDENTS AS SOON
AS LOCAL SECURITY CONDITIONS PERMIT

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PAGE 02 STATE 090494

WM SUBJECT YOUR VIEWS WE INCLINED BELIEVE ANY IMPROVEMENTS
IN LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION LIKELY BE ONLY TEMPORARY AND WE
THEREFORE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY UTILIZE ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT BECOME
AVAILABLE TO EVACUATE NONA ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES AS WELL AS DEPENDENTS.
ROGERS

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SAUNDERS
HENDER

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ORIGIN OPR-02

INFO OCT-01 NEA-13 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 NSC-10
PM-05 O-03 SY-03 PER-02 AID-28 SCS-04 SCA-01 /104 R

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117991

O R 101835Z JUN 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089881

1. CURRENT NUMBER POTENTIAL EVACUEES FROM JORDAN AS
RECEIVED TODAY FROM AMMAN:

| | |
|---|-----|
| A. OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS | 125 |
| B. OFFICIAL PERSONNEL | 92 |
| C. WIVES AND CHILDREN OF JORDANIAN
NATIONALS | 120 |
| D. OTHER AMERICANS (MISSIONARIES,
FOUNDATIONS, ETC.) | 90 |

2. FEW OF CATEGORIES C AND D WOULD OPT TO LEAVE.
ROGERS

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ACTION OPR-02

INFO OCT EUR-20 NEA-13 CCO-00 O-03 AID-28 PER-02 SCS-04

SCA-01 SY-03 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 RSC-01 OC-06 PM-05 NSC-10 SS-20 AGR-20 PRS-01

RSR-01 /148 W

115337

Z O 101305Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
SECSTATE WASHDC 0651
USEUCOM
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
CINCSRIKE
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4584

REF: STATE 89694

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLANS

1. IN EVENT AMMAN EVACUATION, CIVIL AIR ATTACHE CERTAIN EMBASSY CAN CHARTER FROM MEA ONE CARAVELLE (60 PASSENGERS), ONE COMET (80 PASSENGERS) AND ONE CV990 (110 PASSENGERS) AND HAVE PLANES READY TO FLY ON FIVE HOURS NOTICE. WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED MATTER WITH MEA.

2. EMBASSY BEIRUT, OF COURSE, HAPPY TO OFFER FACILITIES AS SAFEHAVEN. HOWEVER, UNDER PRESENT UNCERTAIN POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES WE SUGGEST THAT ONLY THOSE FAMILIES BE EVACUATED BEIRUT WHO HAVE COMPELLING REASONS COME HERE AS INTERIM STOP. MAJORITY SHOULD

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115337

Z O 101305Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
SECSTATE WASHDC 0651
USEUCOM
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
CINCSTRIKE
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4584

REF: STATE 89694

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04584 101251Z

PROCEED DIRECTLY TO ATHENS SUBJECT ATHENS CONCURRENCE. CONSEQUENTLY WE WOULD APPRECIATE AMMAN SENDING US SOONEST ESTIMATED NUMBER POTENTIAL EVACUEES BOTH FROM BEIRUT AND ATHENS.

PORTER

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ACTION NEA-15

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SCS-04 AID-20 CCO-00 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04
NIC-01 NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 OPR-02 P-03 PER-02 RSC-01
PRS-01 SCA-01 SS-20 SY-03 RSR-01 /141 W

117533

O 101540Z JUN 70 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 185
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CIARO
CINCSIRIKE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
DIA
EUCOM
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2543

SUBJ SITUATION IN AMMAN AT 1700 LOCAL (1500Z)

REF AMMAN 2524

1. AT APPROXIMATELY 1640 LOCAL (1440Z), HEAVY FIRING AGAIN BROKE OUT VARIOUS PARTS AMMAN. EMBASSY HIT BY FEW STRAY BULLETS. HEAVY CALIBRE WEAPONS OCCASIONALLY CAN BE HEARD FROM OUTSKIRTS CITY. IMPLICATION THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS THAT POSSIBLE SHOWDOWN PREDICTED BY ZAID RIFAI MAY RPT MAY BE UNDER WAY. AT 1700 LOCAL (1500Z), EMBASSY AGAIN CAME UNDER APPARENT SNIPER FIRE.

2.FSO PELLETREAU MEANWHILE HAS INFORMED US VIA FRENCH CONSUL, WHO REGULARLY VISITS AL-URDON HOTEL, THAT PFLP NOW

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RPT NOW DEMANDING THAT FIVE ARMY OFFICERS, INCLUDING CINC SHARIF NASIR, THIRD DIVISION COMMANDER ZAYD BIN SHAKIR, AND PRINCE ALI BIN NAYIF, BE DISMISSED FROM THEIR POSITIONS BEFORE HOSTAGES ARE RELEASED. BOTH JESSE LEWIS AND BILL TUOHY CONFIRM FOREGOING. CAUTION: JESSE LEWIS IN PARTICULAR DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO BE CITED FOR SOURCE OF ANY INFORMATION. GP3
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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00

PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-20 SCS-04 SCA-01 O-03 OPR-02 OC-06 SY-03

AID-28 E-15 COM-03 RSR-01 /160 W

116650

O 101510Z JUN 70 ZFF6

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 184

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

MEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

CINCSTRIKE

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

DIA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USEUCOM

CSAF WASHDC

DA DCSLOG

DOD ISA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2541

SUBJ PFLP HOSTAGES

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS BEING HELD IN THE AL-URDAN HOTEL. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FSO ROBERT PELLETREAU VIA NRENCH CONSUL.

(1) REVEREND DOUGLAS SIDEN, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

(2) ELEANOR SIDEN, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

(3) FRED THIEBERGER, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. DOD/ISA/M&AS

(4) WARREN PAUL, READING, PENNSYLVANIA, ASSIGNED USAECOM, PHILA.

(5) ROBERT PLUMMER, SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA. DA DCSLOG

(6) EARL BOZEMAN, SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA, USAFHQ MIL ASSISTANCE

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SALES OFFICE

- (7) HARRY PERO, JOLIET, ILLINOIS, USAAPSA
- (8) FRANK HOLT, JOLIET ILLINOIS, USAAPSA
- (9) HARVEY ROLLINS (BELIEVED ATTACHED USAECOM FIELD OFFICE
HEIDELBERG GERMANY) (
- (10) JESSE LEWIS (SINCE DEPARTED) (SEE SEPTTEL)
- (11) WILLIAM TUOHY (SINCE DEPARTED) (SEE SEPTTEL)
- (12) WILSONCQLL, NBC
- (13) MR. AND MRS. JAMES S. TAYLOR
- (14) PATRICIA RADFORD, WASHINGTON D.C.
- (15) DR. SHRUM, AMEMBASSY ATHENS
- (16) ROBERT H. PELLETREAU, AMEMBASSY AMMAN
- (17) BOB KEESEE, PHOENIX, ARIZONA (PILOT)
- (18) PETER STARKEN
- (19) DAVID LEWIS LONG, BEIRUT

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NOTE: AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION OPR-02

INFO OCT

01 EUR-20 NEA-13 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00

O-03 AID-28 SY-03 PER-02 PM-05 NSC-10 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 OC-06 SCS-04 SCA-01 PRS-01

RSR-01 /128 W

116568

O 101445Z JUN 70 ZFF 6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 182
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
CINCSTRIKE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
EUCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2539

SUBJ CONTINGENCY EVACUATION PLANS

REF BEIRUT 4584; STATE 89694; ATHENS 2953

1. EMBASSY APPRECIATES DEPARTMENT'S DESIGNATION BEIRUT AS INITIAL SAFEHAVEN POINT AND BEIRUT'S AND ATHENS' CONCURRENCE ACCOMMODATE POTENTIAL EVACUEES.

2. IN VIEW UNCERTAIN POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES BEIRUT AND ATHENS, CROWDED AND TIGHT HOTEL SITUATION (CHARGE FAMILIAR WITH CONDITIONS ATHENS IN 1967 EV

CUATION) REQUEST DEPT DESIGNATE MUNICH OR FRANKFORT AS INITIAL SAFEHAVEN POINT WITH THEIR WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY FACILITIES.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02539 101530Z

2. TELEPHONE SERVICE AMMAN ERRATIC AND INOPERATIVE MOST SECTIONS. REQUEST BEIRUT BE PREPARED ARRANGE AIRLINE CHARTER UPON TELEGRAPHIC ADVICE FROM EMBASSY.

3. IT IS BECOMING MOST DIFFICULT COMMUNICATE WITH FAMILIES AS RESULT TELEPHONE FAILURES, FEDAYEEN ROADBLOCKS AND GUNFIRE. WE ESTIMATE 125 OFFICIAL DEPENDENTS WOULD BE INVOLVED POTENTIAL EVACUATION.
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Prot Con Paper

TOP SECRET

Air Strikes Against Syrian Forces in Jordan

I. Timing of Decision

Given the seriousness of a decision to intervene, there will be an argument for waiting to see whether outside intervention is necessary. Against that natural tendency to hold off must be weighed the advantages of early decision.

A. An early decision could have these advantages:

- The earlier the Syrians are turned back, the less likely are the Fedayeen to consolidate their position in northern Jordan and the more likely is the King to strengthen his position.
- An early threat to the Syrians could encourage them to decide to treat this as an in-and-out incursion, saving face in a way that they could not if they established a foothold in Jordan.
- An early decision even if not immediately executed could be communicated to the Israelis and perhaps forestall a move on their part.
- An early decision, if in favor of U.S. intervention, would permit the implied threat that could be made by flying aerial reconnaissance from the Sixth Fleet.

B. Holding a decision would have these advantages:

- The best possible outcome would be for Hussein to stave off the Syrians on his own. Although his forces are taking losses, a premature move from outside would deprive him of the advantages of proving his ability to defend Jordan.
- A premature move could cut short the time in which our approach to the USSR might have some effect.

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

II. Are there actions yet to be tried before armed outside intervention?

If a Syrian armored force appears to be moving south into northern Jordan, there will be a limited amount of time for any but decisive military moves. However, it is necessary to canvass all alternatives.

- A. Israeli show of force. It is possible that a massing of some Israeli forces on the Golan Heights or the appearance of Israeli air action toward the Syrian rear might cause the Syrians to pause.
- B. U. S. tactical air reconnaissance over the battle area could serve as a warning of impending U. S. air attack. This would require overflight of Israel.
- C. UN Security Council. Although this is unlikely to prove a decisive deterrent to the Syrians, the Jordanians may well feel compelled to call the Council into session.

III. Whether to encourage or try to prevent Israeli air intervention?

The basic question is whether the U. S. should move quickly to deter Israeli air intervention. The question of whether or not there should be any intervention at all may be academic unless the situation in Jordan quiets quickly because Israel may be tempted to move if the Syrians seem on their way to gaining a foothold in northern Jordan.

A. The arguments that U. S. intervention is preferable to Israeli are:

-- There is a general argument that perhaps the time has come in the broader Mid-East context to show a capacity for decisive U. S. action. If we stand back, we may well find that we have lost much of whatever U. S. capacity to influence events that may remain. The Soviets and others may already doubt that the U. S. in its present mood will not undertake action that could bring it face to face with the USSR.

-- In the context of our peace initiative, it could be argued that the Arabs in the end do respect force. U. S. demon-

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a useful effect in reasserting U.S. determination (within the limits of its power) to see a responsible settlement.

- If either of the above arguments has merit, it can be argued that air strikes in Jordan may be the best means available for such a demonstration. They could be reasonably effective since Syrian armored units will present a well-defined target while at the same time setting limits to U.S. involvement. Congressional support might be more likely.
- One school of thought holds that the Soviets would probably conclude that they had little choice but to let the U.S. get away with a limited intervention as long as Israeli forces were not involved. If the Israelis became involved, the Soviets are likely to be swept up in a broad Arab reaction.
- For the U.S. to stand back would be read as a sign that the U.S. had finally written Hussein off. Failure to come to his aid would be the last in a long series of blows to his confidence in us. In this vein, it would also be a blow to the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia and other moderate countries which have in a general way depended on U.S. power.
- The U.S. would be maintaining an independent policy in the Middle East. Israeli involvement has the dimension of renewing general hostilities, although even Israeli air strikes could be limited. The U.S. could make a better case for a limited operation. This could be presented to the Arab world as a U.S. move to pre-empt further Israeli forward movement and to limit spread of hostilities.
- U.S. action would preserve U.S. control and set limits. Israeli air action could be a first step to ground intervention, and the U.S. would have little ability to prevent such escalation.
- In relation to either of the last two points, the breakdown of the cease-fire seems more likely if Israel intervenes than if the U.S. does.
- U.S. intervention, even on a "quick-strike" basis would be a rallying point in the Arab world for those who charge that Hussein is a "Western lackey." But in this context

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T O P S E C R E T STATE 154440

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: RETURN OF AIRBORNE BRIGADE FROM GRAFENWOHR TO
HOME STATION

REF: (A) BONN 10843, (B) JCS 201724Z LIMDIS IVY TREE 1472

IN RESPONSE REF A, EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO INFORM TOP LEVEL
GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON IMMEDIATE, CLOSE-HOLD BASIS OF OPERA-
TION OUTLINED REF B. YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT DECISION TO
PLACE THESE UNITS IN ADVANCE STATE OF READINESS IN ANTICIPA-
TION OF NECESSITY POSSIBLE EVACUATION US AND THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONALS FROM JORDAN. ROGERS

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EXDIS

(TR-AT AS RUOKK)

REF: AMMAN 4988

1. IN CONNECTION WITH THE KING'S MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM THAT: WE HAVE PASSED HIS MESSAGE TO THE UK AND THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED ITS SUBSTANCE WITH THE ISRAELIS.
2. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE KING THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE INFORM US CONTINUOUSLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND SO THAT WE WILL BE AS COMPLETELY UP TO DATE AS POSSIBLE AT ALL TIMES.
3. FYI. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PM'S PARTY, THROUGH RABIN, AND GOI IS UNDERTAKING EARLY MORNING RECONNAISSANCE OF IRBID AREA. CURRENT ASSESSMENT, AS CONVEYED TO US BY RABIN AT 11 P.M. WASHINGTON TIME, WAS THAT GOI FELT SITUATION IN IRBID AREA IS SERIOUS. ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN NO RPT NO DECISIONS TO HELP EITHER BY AIR OR LAND, BUT CONSIDERING THIS POSSIBILITY AND WILL MAKE DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF WHAT THEIR RECONNAISSANCE SHOWS. END FYI. ROGERS
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فِي الْمَدِينَةِ لِيُتَظَاهَرَكُمْ فَجُورَ الْفَاسِقِينَ

4. CONSIDERED TO FOUL UP THE MATTER UP REASONED TO
THE SO UNDERSTANDING AND ACTIVE REVEAL IN FRONT OF
SOMEONE OF THE MATTER. HE AN INTERESTING STEP WAS CONSIDERED
THAT ALTHOUGH HE INSTRUCTED TO SEND A LETTER TO
THE SO UNDERSTANDING OF THE MATTER. INTERVIEWED AND THE
REASONING THE MATTER UNDER TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE
REASON OF SO. DE-PAINTER, COULD NOT TO CALL IN THE
SITUATION DOES NOT IMPROVE AS IS THE CASE TO CALL SO.
OF THE MATTER HOWEVER, HE WILL CONSIDER DE-PAINTER ON THIS
MATTER AND REVEAL REASONING THAT HE REVEALS

FOR CIVIL

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ON 10-13-13

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1. WE ARE REQUESTING ACTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL

IN LIGHT OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN 4070. IN

CONNECTION WITH THE FACT THAT THE DISCUSSION WITH THE

QUESTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. WE NOTE YOU ARE BEING VERY CAREFUL IN THE

PROCESSES THAT YOU HAVE TO DO. I AM REFERRING TO

PAGE 2 IN 00010 4070. PLEASE BEAR IN MIND HOWEVER

THAT OUR OWN POSSIBLE INTERVENTION ON OTHER

INTERVENTION REMAINS OPEN, AND THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO

KEEP UNITED STATES ACTIVE REVIEW IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING

SITUATION. WE OBVIOUSLY DO NOT WISH YOU TO ENCOURAGE

ANY TO ACT FOR OUR INTERVENTION, BUT WE WOULD

BE GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WORK IS CONTINUING

SHOULD WHICH WE FEEL THE IMPACT OF YOUR PAGE 1

TO GIVE. HOWEVER

THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IT IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. THE INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO YOU IN CONFIDENCE AND IS NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU KEEP THIS INFORMATION IN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

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/s/

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 10 DECEMBER 1969
 10 AMERICAN INDIAN PLANT
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 AMERICAN AMMAN
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U.S. AIR FORCE 154417

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1. Additional significant events transpired the following day, 1011 ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SOVIET CHARGES VORONTSOV AT 1:00 P.M. Following this, September 20, on current situation in Dornaga and the Government of the U.S. notes that the Soviet Government expressed concern over the sharp deterioration of the situation in Dornaga. On the second day of 21. VORONTSOV on September 15.

There is no doubt that the United States is a free country and that the people of the United States are entitled to the same rights and freedoms as the people of any other free country.

It is the policy of the United States to support the people of the United States in their struggle for freedom and independence. The United States will continue to support the people of the United States in their struggle for freedom and independence.

The United States will continue to support the people of the United States in their struggle for freedom and independence. The United States will continue to support the people of the United States in their struggle for freedom and independence.

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There is no doubt that the United States is a free country and that the people of the United States are entitled to the same rights and freedoms as the people of any other free country.

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of the 1940s and 1950s. The Soviet Union had a strong
and powerful economy. It was the only country in the world
that was not a democracy. It was the only country in the world
that was not a democracy. It was the only country in the world
that was not a democracy.

Do not allow FBI and other public statements published on the
media information and calling for withdrawal of the person.

On four the same date as was to keep in Holland and call for
no meeting. For a no meeting to be accepted in the document - 1-2
conclusion that the following: (1) situation by the ground was
in such that an unconditional ceasefire would be favorable to the

2. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE ABOVE HOLDING

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APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J SISCO

NEA: MR DAVIES

S/S: MR RTCURRAN (SUBS)

NEA/UAR: MR STERNER

S/S-O: BA FLATIN

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NOFORN

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 18 MEETING WITH ARAB CHIEFS OF
MISSION

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WHITE HOUSE
S. H. ROSEN

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FOLLOWING NORFORN/UNCLEARED SUMMARY FYI ONLY

SUMMARY: ON SEPTEMBER 18 SECRETARY MET WITH ALL ARAB CHIEFS OF MISSION IN WASHINGTON AT THEIR REQUEST TO DISCUSS STATE OF US PEACE INITIATIVE AND QUESTION OF FURTHER US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL. ARAB REPS EXPRESSED HOPE US PREPARED CONTINUE WITH PEACE INITIATIVE AND WOULD AVOID FURTHER ARMS SUPPLY AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AT THIS TIME. SECRETARY EXPRESSED PERPLEXITY AT REASONS FOR OCCURENCE OF UAR/SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF STANDSTILL. HE EMPHASIZED HOW THIS COMPLICATED OUR DESIRE FOR ARMS RESTRAINT AND OUR MAKING ANY NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE ASSERTED WE WILL NOT ABANDON SEARCH FOR PEACE. UAR REP AGREED TRANSMIT QUERY WHETHER CAIRO WILLING HAVE IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS EXAMINE EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS ON WEST BANK OF CANAL. END SUMMARY.

1. ON SEPTEMBER 18 SECRETARY RECEIVED ALL ARAB CHIEFS OF MISSION AT THEIR REQUEST TO DISCUSS US PEACE INITIATIVE AND ARMS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL. PRESENT WERE REPRESENTATIVES FROM KUWAIT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, UAR, LIBYA, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, SUDAN AND ALGERIA. ONLY ARAB REPS TO SPEAK WERE GHOSSEIN (KUWAIT), SHARAF (JORDAN) AND GHORBAL (UAR). SECRETARY OPENED BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AT HIS MEETING WITH THE SAME GROUP LAST WEEK ON HIJACKING (STATE 147024). HE PLEASED WITH SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND WITH FACT THAT OVER 375 HOSTAGES HAD NOW BEEN RELEASED.

2. GROUP SPOKESMAN, AL-GHOSSEIN, (KUWAIT) SAID THEY HAD COME TO EXPRESS CONCERN RE NEWS REPORTS THAT USG WAS PLANNING SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH FURTHER ARMS AT THIS STAGE. MANY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE IN NEAR EAST HAD FELT US PEACE INITIATIVE WAS GOOD FIRST STEP IN THOUSAND MILE JOURNEY AND WERE VERY CONCERNED THAT USG MIGHT CHOOSE THIS MOMENT TO UNDERMINE OWN PROPOSALS BY SUPPLYING ARMS TO ISRAEL. NOTING GRAVITY OF JORDAN SITUATION, AL-GHOSSEIN PREDICTED SITUATION THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST WILL DETERIORATE IF FURTHER ARMS SUPPLIED AT THIS STAGE.

3. JORDAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF ASSERTED ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS BASICALLY WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH USG. THEY ALARMED OVER NEWS PROSPECTIVE LARGE SCALE ARMS DELIVERY FOR ISRAEL WHILE IT REMAINED IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY. SHARAF SAID ARMS

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SUPPLY WILL HARM THE POSITIVE POSITION TOWARD PEACE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY JORDAN AND SOME OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

4. UAR REPRESENTATIVE GHORBAL SAID UAR WANTED CLOSER RELATIONS WITH US AND PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE AND HONOR. AS HE HAD EARLIER TOLD SISCO, GENERAL ATTITUDE IN CAIRO IN PERIOD SURROUNDING ESTABLISHMENT CEASEFIRE WAS THAT "FINALLY US MIDDLE EAST POLICY CONTAINS POSITIVE ELEMENTS". UAR WANTS PERMANENT CEASEFIRE BASED ON IMPLEMENTATION NOVEMBER 22 UNSC RESOLUTION. CAIRO NOW SENSES SOMETHING MAY BE HAPPENING TO "ROGERS INITIATIVE" AND ASKS IF ISRAEL IS ONCE MORE SUCCEEDING IN GETTING UNITED STATES TO FEED ITS MILITARY APPETITE. GHORBAL SAID HE COULD ASSURE US THAT CAIRO MAINTAINS ITS POSITION AND WANTS THE USG TO DO LIKEWISE.

5. SECRETARY OBSERVED IT NOT PRODUCTIVE TO ENTER INTO DEBATE IN THIS FORUM. ADDRESSING GHORBAL, SAID HE PLEASED TO HEAR CAIRO STILL INTERESTED IN US PEACE INITIATIVE AND INTENDS ABIDE BY CEASEFIRE. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT EVERYTHING WE HAD DONE HAS HAD PRESIDENT'S FULL APPROVAL. NOTING GHORBAL'S STATED PERPLEXITY OVER PRESENT STATE OF PLAY, SECRETARY SAID HE SHARED THIS PERPLEXITY. WE DO NOT WANT OUR INITIATIVE TO FAIL.

6. WHILE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WERE CONTINUING TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE, SECRETARY COMMENTED, THIS WAS NOT CASE WITH "STANDSTILL" PART OF AGREEMENT. OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH CAIRO AND MOSCOW HAD BEEN CLEAR ON THE POINT THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SEEK TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSITION DURING 90-DAY PERIOD. WE HAD THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THERE WOULD BE VIOLATIONS, PARTICULARLY SINCE EVERYONE KNEW THERE WOULD BE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. WE AVOIDED COMMENT AND FORMING JUDGMENTS FOR MANY DAYS THINKING PERHAPS THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISINTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT'S LANGUAGE OR MISINTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS. HE AND SISCO HAD PERSONALLY, HOWEVER, EXAMINED ALL DATA AT LENGTH AND CONCLUDED THAT SINCE CEASEFIRE UAR HAS STARTED BUILDING NEW MISSILE SITES, COMPLETED OTHERS, AND MOVED MANY MISSILES TOWARD CANAL. HAD HE ANY DOUBTS, HE WOULD NOT SAY THIS, SECRETARY CONCLUDED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WAY WOULD BE FOUND TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THIS PROBLEM. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS KIND OF ACTIVITY HAD GONE ON. LANGUAGE OF STANDSTILL/CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT WAS SO CLEAR AND EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS SO CONCLUSIVE THAT WE MUST ASSUME DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO MAKE THESE VIOLATIONS. WE WAITED; WE SPOKE IN LOW KEY WITHOUT POLEMICS. IT WAS NONSENSE TO STATE THAT WE

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HAD ADOPTED OUR STAND IN ORDER TO DESTROY OUR OWN INITIATIVE.

7. WE FULLY INTENDED, SECRETARY SAID, TO ACT WITH GREAT RESTRAINT ON ISRAELI REQUESTS AND HAVE SO ACTED. ON OTHER HAND, HAVING ASSURED ISRAEL IT WOULD NOT BE PLACED AT A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE BY AGREEING TO CEASE FIRE, IT NOW VERY DIFFICULT FOR US WHEN ISRAEL POINTS OUT MILITARY DISADVANTAGE UNDER WHICH IT HAS BEEN PLACED. IF US CANNOT GET PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THEN ONLY INCREASED STRIFE AND KILLING IS IN PROSPECT. OBJECT OF US POLICY IS SENSIBLE AND JUST SOLUTION. WE ARE CONVINCED VIOLATIONS OCCURRED. WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS VIOLATED CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BUT ISRAEL'S VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN TO SAME DEGREE AS THOSE COMMITTED IN REGARD MISSILE SITES. WE ARE DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH MOSCOW AND WANT TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH CAIRO.

8. THOUSSEIN SAID IF ISRAEL REALLY PLANS TO WITHDRAW THEN MOVEMENT OF DEFENSIVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES OR INCREASE IN NUMBERS ON WEST BANK OF CANAL NOT INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO PEACE. ALL SHOULD FOCUS ON PEACE. FAVORABLE US RESPONSE TO ISRAELI ARMS REQUEST COULD BE "POINT OF NO RETURN". GHOSSEIN ASKED SECRETARY ABOUT RESULTS MEIR'S VISIT, SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS AGREED ABOUT ARMS.

9. SECRETARY RESPONDED IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO MAKE SUCH COMMENTS BUT HE WISHED OBSERVE THAT FOR MONTHS US HAD TALKED WITHOUT AVAIL TO SOVIETS ABOUT ARMS LIMITATIONS AS PREFERABLE COURSE FOR ALL IN NEAR EAST. GIVEN SOVIET NEGATIVE REPLY, ARMS LIMITATIONS NOT MADE PART OF CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. SECONDLY, FOR ALL OUR HOPES, PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE POSSIBLE ONLY IF CONFIDENCE DEVELOPS THAT PARTIES WILL KEEP THEIR WORD AND LIVE UP TO THEIR AGREEMENTS. LANGUAGE OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS VERY SIMPLE AND CLEAR. WHAT SHOCKS US IS THAT VERY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING HAS NOT BEEN OBSERVED.

WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT FUTURE UNDERSTANDINGS? HOW DO WE ANSWER ISRAEL WHEN IT ASKS HOW IT CAN CONSIDER AGREEMENT WHICH NO ONE ELSE IS WILLING TO LIVE UP TO? PROBLEM WAS PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY. US IS ANXIOUS TO START AGAIN, BUT IF AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE, WHY BOTHER TALKING. HE DID NOT WISH TO ARGUE POINT BUT IN ISRAEL'S CASE, SITUATION REDUCED ITSELF TO "WE WERE ASSURED WE WOULD BE PLACED UNDER NO DISADVANTAGE YET HAVE BEEN."

10. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT SECRETARY HAD ADDRESSED

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HIMSELF TO BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND UAR. ("AND SOVIETS", SECRETARY INTERJECTED.) NOTING THAT ARAB REPRESENTATIVES WERE CONVINCED OF US SINCERITY IN ITS JUDGMENT OF VIOLATIONS, SHARAF SAID THEY WERE EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT UAR HAD NO BAD INTENT AND HAD ACTED WITHIN ITS RIGHTS. HOWEVER, ARAB DIPLOMATS WERE NOT TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION. THEIR CONCERN WAS POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ARMS SUPPLY AND MASSIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. THIS UNRELATED TO TECHNICAL PROBLEM OF VIOLATIONS.

11. ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SHARAF SAID, STEM FROM "OCCUPYING TERRITORIES AND HOLDING ONE MILLION ARABS "AT BAYONET POINT." ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS OCCUPATION DOES. IF THIS SITUATION CONTINUES, IT WILL BE VERY HARD TO CONVINCE ARAB PEOPLES THAT US SEEKING TO MAINTAIN A BALANCED POLICY. THE ARABS RESPECT NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S "NEW, BALANCED" MIDDLE EAST POLICY. US POLICY MUST NOT SUPPORT ISRAEL'S "SO-CALLED SECURITY" BY INSURING THAT COUNTRIES SURROUNDING IT ARE "EITHER WEAK, ANARCHIC OR SUBJEGATED." RUMORS OF IMMINENT LARGE SCALE US SUPPORT IN CONNECTION MRS. MEIR'S VISIT IS STIMULATING ARAB FEAR US WILL ACT TO SUPPORT PRESENT ISRAELI OCCUPATION POLICY. ARABS ARE AWARE NEITHER SIDE TO CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IS BLAMELESS.

12. SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO REPEAT HIMSELF BUT ASSURED GROUP USG HAS TRIED FOLLOW A BALANCED POLICY. HE UNDERSTOOD JUSTICE OF ARAB REPRESENTATIVES' POINT OF VIEW; WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVE; WE HAD HAD DIFFICULTY IN BRINGING ISRAEL ALONG AND WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR POLICY. WE STILL FEEL SITUATION DEMANDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SINCE ALTERNATIVES ARE MORE KILLING, HIJACKINGS AND MORE SPEECHMAKING. FACT IS THAT VIOLATIONS TO DATE HAVE MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAD MADE ISRAEL COME ALONG WITH US.

13. GHORBAL SAID THAT FOMMIN RIAD HAD EXPLAINED TO BERGUS SEPTEMBER 4 WHAT UAR DID AND DID NOT DO. IT DID NOT INTRODUCE NEW MISSILES. THERE WERE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION, SUCH AS HAD CHARACTERIZED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. (SECRETARY INTERJECTED "NOT IN THIS KIND OF LANGUAGE.") CAIRO, GHORBAL CONTINUED, WAS READY TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS AT ANY TIME WITH US BUT WAS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY. SECRETARY REITERATED THAT LANGUAGE OF AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE TO MISINTERPRET. IN CLOSING, HE ASKED GHORBAL WHETHER UAR WILLING TO HAVE IMPARTIAL

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OBSERVERS EXAMINE OUR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY EVIDENCE OF THE VIOLATIONS. GHORBAL SAID HE WOULD REFERE THIS TO CAIRO. SECRETARY THANKED THE GROUP FOR THEIR PRESENTATION AND ASSURED THEM THAT WASHINGTON WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO PUT HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN. ROGERS

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EXOTS

SUBJ: PM MEIR DISCUSSION OF HOSTAGES SEPT. 18

FOLLOWING EXCERPTED FROM MEMCON SECRETARY-MRS. MEIR
MEETING MORNING SEPT. 18. IT IS UNCLEAR, NOFORN AND
RYI ONLY, SUBJECT TO REVISION ON REVIEW.

1. TURNING TO HOSTAGE PROBLEM, SECRETARY SAID WE WERE
TRYING TO KEEP OUR BRITISH, SWISS AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES
TOGETHER. WE DID NOT KNOW WHY THEY WERE SO FRENETIC AT
TIMES. SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE AND OTHER DEPT. OFFICERS
HAS BEEN RECIPIENTS OF MIDDLE-OF-NIGHT CALLS FROM CONERNED
DIPLOMATS. MRS. MEIR SAID US POSITION HAD BEEN VERY GOOD,
THAT HE HAD HELD OUT BEAUTIFULLY. ISRAELI HAD BEEN ASKED WHAT
ITS CONTRIBUTION WAS. SHE SAID OTHERS SEEMED READY TO CON-
TRIBUTE PEOPLE WHO HAD TRIED TO KILL ISRAELIS. MRS. MEIR
DESCRIBED CRIMES AGAINST ISRAELIS COMMITTED BY FEDAYEEN
IN BRITISH, GERMAN AND SWISS HANDS. SHE SAID SWISS WERE
GOOD IN THIS AFFAIR BUT GERMANS AND BRITISH WERE AWFUL.

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2. SISCO SAID PREVIOUS NIGHT THERE HAD BEEN MEETING IN BERN AND BRITISH HAD PUT FORWARD DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PARTIAL DEALS. OUR CONCERN IS GREATER THAT OTHERS MAY EVENTUALLY WANT TO GO OWN WAY. BRITISH WOULD HAVE FIVE COUNTRIES INCLUDING ISRAELI SAY STRONGLY IT WAS QUESTION OF TOTAL DEAL AND THAT WE AS A GROUP WOULD CONSIDER WHAT PFL PUT FORWARD PROVIDED IT WAS A TOTAL DEAL. ISRAELIS WERE FAMILAR WITH FEDAYEEN POSITION THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD HAND OVER TWO ALGERIANS AND MIXED BUNCH INCLUDING LEBANESE AND AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO RELEASE IMPRISONED FEDAYEEN BEFORE FEDAYEEN WOULD GIVE LIST THOSE THEY WANTED. THIS WAS PIG IN A POKE. BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WOULD LAY DOWN POSITION REGARDING TOTAL EXCHANGE. SISCO SAID HE HOPED MRS. MEIR WOULD LOOK AT THIS PROPOSAL. OUR CONCERN WAS THAT IF WE COULD NOT PROCEED ON UNIFIED BASIS THERE WOULD BE TENDENCY TOWARD SEPARATE DEALS.

3. SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED STATE OUR POSITION IN DETAIL. FIRST, THERE WOULD BE NO DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN UNLESS ALL HOSTAGES WERE GIVEN OVER. SECOND, WE DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF DEMAND ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE EXCHANGE OF ITS PASSENGERS AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. THIRD, WE WERE URGING THAT ISRAEL DO NOTHING UNDER PRESSURE.

4. MRS. MEIR SAID BRITISH COULD NOT SEND OUT THE GIRL (LELIA KHALED) WITHOUT ISRAELI CONSENT. ISRAEL HAD TREATY OF EXTRADITION. IT WAS QUESTION WHETHER WHEN HIJACKED, EL AL PLANE WAS LEGALLY IN BRITISH TERRITORY OR ISRAELI TERRITORY. SISCO COMMENTED BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WOULD HELP AVOID BUSINESS OF ISRAEL COMMITTING ITSELF TO PRINCIPLE OF EXCHANGE.

5. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE DID NOT LIKE MAKE PROMISES ISRAELI DID NOT INTEND TO KEEP. ISRAEL WOULD NOT RELEASE THESE PEOPLE. THEY ARE IN JAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE MURDERERS WHO HAD BLOWN UP CAFETERIA AND DONE OTHER THINGS. ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE TOLD LATER BY WORLD OPINION THAT IT HAD AGREED TO FREE THESE PEOPLE. SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS. NOW WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID SPLIT IN FIVE. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE BRITISH BUT SHE WAS SURE THAT THE GERMANS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO A SEPARATE EXCHANGE FOR THEIR PEOPLE.

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WHICH LEFT JEWS STILL AS HOSTAGES. THIS WOULD BE TOO MUCH AND THEY WOULD NOT DO IT.

6. SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAELIS HAD ANY INFORMATION ON WHERE HOSTAGES WERE. RABIN SAID GOI DID NOT. MRS. MEIR COMMENTED THAT SHE THOUGHT ISRAEL AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF THE TEN LEBANESE. POLITICAL SECRETARY DINITZ SAID GOI HAD ANNOUNCED THE TWO ALGERIANS WOULD NOT BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK. THERE WAS UNCERTAINTY AMONG ISRAELIS IN ROOM THAT GOI ACTUALLY HAD SAID IT READY TO GIVE UP TEN LEBANESE. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL NOT SAY ANYTHING REGARDING LEBANESE UNTIL IT WAS SURE OF GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN. SECRETARY AGAIN EMPHASIZED GETTING TOGETHER ON SOME LANGUAGE TO KEEP BRITISH AND GERMANS CALM.

GP-3. ROGERS

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Z 261855Z SEP 70 ZFF-4

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8395

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

UNCLAS CAIRO 2214

MOHAMED RIAD JUST INFORMED ME KING HUSSEIN ARRIVING CAIRO
EARLY MORNING 27TH.

BERGUS

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FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8394

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLAS CAIRO 2213

MOHAMED RIAH OF FONOFF HAS JUST CALLED ME TO CONFIRM THAT
REMAINING HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO UAR EMBASSY
AMMAN. GUAR IS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS DELIVER HOSTAGES TO ICRC
SOONEST. MOHAMED SAID SOURCE THIS INFORMATION IS QTE HIGHEST UAR
AUTHORITY. UNOTE HE THINKS ALL RPT ALL REMAINING HOSTAGES NOW
IN UAR HANDS
BUT HE NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE.
BERGUS

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CAIRO

$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{1}{n} = 0$

$$P_{\text{max}} = 1 \quad \text{with } P_{\text{min}} = 0 \quad \text{and } P_{\text{min}} = 1 \quad \text{and } P_{\text{min}} = 0$$

42

NOTED 5-25-12

1470 UC1-21 1471-22 1472-23 1473-24 1474-25 1475-26 1476-27 1477-28

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$$t^2=0.0 \quad 100=0.1 \quad 1.02=0.1 \quad 20=0.0 \quad 1.01=0.1 \quad 1.02=0.1$$

تاریخ: ۱۳۹۵/۰۵/۰۵

مجلس الشورى

المادة 10: لا يجوز للمحكمة أن تصدر حكمًا بغير ما تقدمت به النيابة العامة، ولا أن ترفض ما تقدمت به النيابة العامة، إلا في الحالات التي يحددها القانون.

and a second, smaller, cluster.

[illegible]

REPRODUCED FROM THE 2002 BUREAU OF STATISTICS FOLLOW-UP

2000

1. KING MODELING HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED IN THE CASE OF
OF HIGH DEFENDING. IN NOV. 1965 FULFILLING ASPECT OF A
- DO NOT KNOW KING STAFF DISCONTINUATION ON AIRCRAFT OPERATION.

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2. The FBI advised that the FBI is investigating the above-named person's residence and is not sure if the FBI is in the area.

— *Journal of the American Medical Association*

SECRET

SECRET

2. HEYAL SAID GEN SADE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH KING HUSSEIN ON
THIS SUBJECT SINCE THIS MORNING. EGYPTIANS ALSO IN TOUCH WITH
SIRIANS. HEYAL THINKS SIRIANS MAKING GRANDPLANES PLAY OF
LIMITED MILITARY VALUE. HE DROPS USE NOT WPI BUT TO EXAGGERATE.
I HEYAL CALLED BACK AT 2:00 LOCAL TO STATE HE HAD CONTACTED
PRESIDENT NABBER. HE AFFIRMED GOV AFFIRMED AND FOREIGN
INTERVIEW IN JORDAN INCLUDING USE INTERVIEW. I SAID
I WANT THAT AND THAT IS WHY I HAD INFORMED EGYPTIANS OF
SYRIAN INTERVIEW.

ACT CALING 2:15

2 E O N 7 1 CALING 2:15

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- 4 -

Israeli intervention could have an even worse effect. It could - especially if it expanded to ground action -- give anti-government forces a rallying point.

B. The arguments that Israeli intervention is preferable are:

- The Israelis are operationally in a much better position to mount such an operation. They have the reconnaissance capability and, by being on the ground, they have much greater logistical capability. They also have the freedom to bomb the Fedayeen. If the U.S. did so, that would do great damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world.
- The Israelis have a clear-cut national interest which, while the Arabs will not like it, they will understand.
- Air strikes seem likely to be indecisive in a contest of this kind. They might disrupt a tank column, but if the Syrians pour in manpower to reinforce Fedayeen units, air strikes are not likely to present clear targets decisively defeated from the air.
- If the U.S. intervened and then found that its air attacks were indecisive, pressure would then mount to make good via ground intervention. The U.S. would then be on the way to another land war, probably more difficult to sustain than that in Southeast Asia.
- Following up the previous point, if the U.S. intervened in the air and then backed off, it would look as if Israel had to bail the U.S. out if Israel moved. This would be a damaging sign of U.S. weakness.
- U.S. air intervention could be the first step to further involvement. Given Congressional views and the difficulty of supporting a sustained ground operation, it would be better not to take the first step.
- Another way of putting these points is that this is a Middle Eastern war which outsiders cannot settle. It is likely to go on for some time. The U.S. has carefully avoid involvement of combat forces to date. It is of paramount importance to avoid any provocation to further Soviet

MR NLN 01-26 / 1
EXEMPT
p. 1
of 1 pp.
as amended
per E.O. 12958 sec. 3.3 (b) (1) (c)
Mr. 25 Aug. 2004

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MR NLN 01-26/3 **EXEMPT** p. 1 - 2 of 2 pp.

per E.O. 12958^{as amended} secs. 1.4 (c) (d) and
3.3 (b) (1) (6)

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECRETARY WASHDC FLASH 170

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

SECRET L LONDON 7040

LEADS

1. FCU (RIFP) HAS JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM UK AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN WHICH KING JUSSEIN ASKED BE PASSED TO US, AND AS NOTED BELOW, TO ISRAELIS:

QUOTE

"AT 0000Z, 24 IRAQI TANKS WERE MOVING WESTWARD ALONG JERASH ROAD STILL WITHIN IRAQI AREA. THE IRAQIS HAVE SINCE ASSURED THE KING THAT THIS MOVE IS MERELY TO SECURE OWN FLANK BUT THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS WATCHING CAREFULLY SINCE A CONFINEMENT OF THE MOVE WOULD INTERFERE THE WHOLE JORDANIAN POSITION IN THE CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIANS. JORDANIAN HUNTERS ARE MAKING AIR STRIKES ON SYRIAN POSITIONS. JORDANIANS HAVE LOST SOME 20 TANKS AND SOME CREWS. KING HUSSEIN IS SELLING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT 0000Z AND ASKED THAT THIS MESSAGE BE PASSED TO THE US AND ISRAEL".

END QUOTE

2. FCU EMPHASIZED THAT UK IS NOT KPT NOT PASSING THIS MESSAGE TO ISRAELIS SINCE THEY BELIEVE THE US IS IN BEST POSITION TO DISCUSS WITH ISRAELIS. FCU SUGGESTED US PROBABLY WILL WISH TO TREAT THIS INFORMATION ON THE SAME BASIS AS INFORMATION GARDWHILL GAVE KISSINGER SEP 1. 20.
AMWENDERS

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VV EHA117
*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUEHCR 52720 2642047
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 212045Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 211950Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 168
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 7633

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

REF: STATE 154543 (AMMAN 4933)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KING'S LETTER AS FURNISHED BY FCO:

QUOTE

MOST URGENT.

FROM HIS MAJESTY THE KING

TO: THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM,
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

FURTHER TO MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF YESTERDAY I WISH
TO INFORM YOU THAT SYRIAN INVADING FORCES HAVE RESUMED THE
OFFENSIVE AGAINST JORDAN THIS AFTERNOON. THEIR FORCES HAVE
CAPTURED THE ENTIRE CITY OF IRBID AND TENS OF SURROUNDING
VILLAGES. THEY HAVE ARRESTED LARGE NUMBERS OF GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND SENT THEM TO SYRIA. THE SITUATION IS BECOMING
CRITICAL. I REQUEST YOU AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL TO DO ALL YOU CAN IN AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE
THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT HALT THIS INVASION AND WITHDRAW SYRIAN
FORCES FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY.

UNQUOTE

ANNENBERG

BT

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NW 01-26/4 per ltr. 13 Dec. 04
By SP Date 20 APR 07
[p. 1 of 1]

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VV EHA105

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ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 211641Z SEP 70

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

O 211511Z SEP 70

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 139

BT

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 7588

NODIS

SUB: UKG POSITION ON SITUATION IN JORDAN

1. WHITELAW, LEADER OF HOUSE OF COMMONS, HAS GIVEN US INFORMALLY BRITISH GOVERNMENT POSITION AS REFLECTED AT MEETING THIS MORNING WITH PRIMIN HEATH. WHITELAW MUST BE FULLY PROTECTED.

2. IT IS BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STRONG VIEW THAT MATTER OF SYRIAN INVASION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO SC. ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SC ACTION MIGHT NOT BE EFFECTIVE, PRIMIN AND HIS COLLEAGUES CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT THIS SHOULD BE TRID IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR TO PUBLIC OPINION THE FULL DIMENSIONS OF THE SITUATION AND THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS IN RELATION THERETO.

3. IF RECOURSE TO SC IS UNSUCCESSFUL AND IF SITUATION IN JORDAN CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TAKEN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES WITHOUT IT APPEARING THAT SUCH ACTION WAS INSTIGATED OR ENCOURED BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS.

4. IF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ACT AND USG DECIDES US MILITARY ACTION IS NECESSARY, BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE FACILITIES, IF REQUESTED, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD CAUSE THEM DIFFICULTIES. THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION BEYOND PROVISION OF FACILITIES.

5. IN THE VIEW OF BRITISH MINISTERS THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION BY US OR OTHER WESTERN POWERS IS VERY DOUBTFUL. THEY CONSIDER THAT WESTERN POWER INTERVENTION WOULD COMPLETELY ALIENATE ALL ARAB NATIONS WITH FURTHER SIMPLICATION THAT ANY SUBSEQUENT CHANCES OF PROMOTING NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT WOULD BE GREATLY LESSEMED. THEY ALSO DOUBT WHETHER LONGER TERM POTENTIALITIES OF HUSSEIN'S LEADERSHIP IS REALLY WORTH SUCH FAR-REACHING MOVE AS WESTERN POWER INTERVENTION WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH IT MIGHT ENTAIL.

6. POSITION ALONG THESE LINES HAS BEEN SENT TO SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME.

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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211641Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
O 211511Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 139
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 7588

NODIS

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6. POSITION ALONG THESE LINES HAS BEEN SENT TO SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NUN 01-26/5 per 14r. 13 Dec 04

By Date 26 APR 07

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- 5 -

involvement; neither of us has an interest in confronting the other directly in a war neither of us can finish. Whatever the disadvantages of Israeli involvement, they are outweighed by the importance of keeping this a cool conflict if we can.

- A quick U.S. move before full Congressional consultation could create a "Vietnam syndrome" on the Mid-East and tie the President's hands in the future. It is important for the future Presidential strategy to establish a basis for Presidential Congressional cooperation.
- Israeli action reduces the possibility of Soviet reaction and preserves future U.S. flexibility. Instead of being directly involved, the U.S. can contribute to the operation by sustaining Israeli operations.
- Any U.S. intervention will provoke a sharp reaction from the Arab radicals. This could cause harm to the hostages in Amman; turn the PFLP to a round of attacks and kidnappings against U.S. personnel and installations throughout the Arab world; provoke retaliation against U.S. oil properties, especially in Iraq. If the Israelis move, the U.S. will share some of the blame but probably it would not be as immediately directed at the U.S.
- Despite a predictably strong Arab reaction to Israeli attacks, these would be understood in terms of known Israeli interests. U.S. attacks -- especially if Fedayeen became the targets -- would be seen principally as attacks against the Arab cause, i.e. on Israel's behalf.

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LONDON

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PAGE 01 LONDON 07572 210510Z

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ACTION 35-45

INFO OCT-01 550-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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O 210400Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 126
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET LONDON 7572

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4933

FCO HAS SHOWN US CABLE FROM UK EMBASSY AMMAN REPORTING ON KING'S LETTER TO FOUR POWERS. LETTER REPORTED CROSSING OF FRONTIER BY SYRIAN ARMED DIVISION OF SEVERAL COLUMNS. IT STATED THAT JORDANIAN CABINET HAVE AUTHORIZED KING TO REQUEST ALL AID NECESSARY TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF JORDAN. KING THEREFORE REQUESTS UK TO EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IMMEDIATELY. THE JORDANIAN PERREP AT UN HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST THE CONVENING OF AN URGENT SO MEETING. LETTER THEN SAID, ACCORDING UK CABLE, THAT ANY ACTION CONDEMNING THE SYRIAN ATTACK AND ORDERING THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. CONCLUDED THAT KING WILL BE IN TOUCH AGAIN "TO DISCUSS OR REQUEST OTHER MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ASSISTANCE"

UK CABLE REPORTED THAT IDENTICAL NOTE GIVEN AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS BUT NOT AS YET DELIVER TO FRENCH.
AMMAN 4933.

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TO RU3NAAA/USCINCPAC

INFO RUEDAAA/CINCSARPAC

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RUORRKO/AMEMB AMMAN

RUORRBE/AMEMB BEIRUT

RUFRAD/AMEMB VIENNA

RUFRHO/AMEMB ROME

RUORRAT/AMEMB ATHENS

RUFRHOL/AMEMB BOON

RUOTCR/AMEMB LONDON

RUESMDG/AMEMB MADRID

RUFRHGV/US MISSION GENEVA SWITZERLAND

RUENHC/STATE DEPT WASH DC

RUOEUA/MAC

RUEDADWW/WHITE HOUSE

BT

SECRET 0074

DJCS SENDS

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 3725 SECRET

SUBJ: US MILITARY HOSPITAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN

1. (S) THIS CONFIRMS VCOM L3EN VOST, DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF, AND CAPTAIN HOFFORD, USN, ZCOM, 261553Z SEP 70.

2. (S) HOSPITAL AT LAKENHEATH, ENGLAND TO BE LOADED, ICRC SYMBOLS PAINTED AND READY TO DEPART BY EVENING 27 SEPTEMBER FOR ARRIVAL IN AMMAN AT FIRST LIGHT ON 14 SEPTEMBER 70.

3. (S) HOSPITAL AT KIPZINGEN TO BE LOADED AND READY TO DEPART BY EVENING 23 SEPTEMBER 70 FOR ARRIVAL IN AMMAN AT FIRST LIGHT ON 19 SEPTEMBER 70.

4. (S) HOSPITAL WILL NOT DEPART UNTIL DIRECTED.

5. (S) ALL ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH ICRC ON MARKINGS, UNIFORMS, VEHICLES, ETC. WILL BE IMPLEMENTED, AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED.

6. (S) REQUEST YOU ADVISE WHEN AIRCRAFT ARE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT.

IP-3

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FM COMSIXTHFLT

TO RUQKSPB/CTF SIX ZERO

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RUTPSH/CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO

INFO RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR

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BT

TOP SECRET

1. WHEN AND IF WE ARE COMMITTED TO SUPPORT JORDANIAN FORCES FOLLOWING OUR DETAILED PREPARATORY PLANNING DISCUSSIONS OF YESTERDAY, I NOTE AGAIN HOW CLOSE SOME OF THE REPORTED SYRIAN ARMOR IS TO THE SYRIAN BORDER.

2. THIS PROMISES TO MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GUARANTEE WE AVOID PENETRATION OF SYRIAN AIR SPACE PARTICULARLY IF WE GET JUMPED BY SYRIAN FIGHTERS.

3. MY GUIDANCE REMAINS FIRM. OUR FIGHTERS ARE TO PROTECT OUR STRIKE AIRCRAFT. WE WILL NOT HOWEVER, ENGAGE IN HOT PURSUIT INTO SYRIA.

4. ON THE OTHER HAND, LETS BE SURE WE DO NOT LEAD ANY SYRIAN STRIKE AIRCRAFT BACK TO THE CVA'S. KIDD

GP-3

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MR NLN 01-26 / 6 p. 1 of 1 pp.

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3.3(b)(1)(6)

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per E.O. 12958, as amended secs 1.4 (c) (d)
3.3 (b) (1) (G)

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NAME OF RESEARCHER (Type or print, above)

Robert T. Kaminsky

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3.3 (b) (1) (3) (6)

SANITIZED

3.3(b)(1)(3)(6)

WERE OUTNUMBERED AND OUTGUNNED WERE SAID TO BE DOING BADLY ALTHOUGH JORDANIAN AIR FORCE HUNTERS HAD SET SOME SYRIAN TANKS ON FIRE. ACCOUNTS FROM JORDANIAN SOURCES GIVE A SIMILAR IMPRESSION. THEY SAY THAT THE REMNANTS OF THE JORDANIAN BRIGADE OPPOSING THE

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NW 01-2169
By: [Signature] Date: 18 Apr 07
[P. 1 of 2]
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3. APART FROM THE FOREGOING, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION WHICH GIVES EVIDENCE OF A MAJOR SYRIAN INCURSION INTO JORDAN OR OF FUTURE SYRIAN INTENTIONS. IT IS SURPRISING THAT SUCH AN APPARENTLY LARGE SCALE OPERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT WITH SO [REDACTED] OR ANY OTHER INDICATION.

SANITIZED

4. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN ARE UNDER PLA COLOURS, WE ARE CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PLA HAVE NOTHING LIKE THE NUMBER OF TANKS WHICH BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS REPORT ARE ENGAGED. WE ASSUME, THEREFORE, THAT THEY ARE IN FACT SYRIAN ARMY TANKS AND PRESUMABLY CREWS.

3.3(b)(1)(c)

3.3(b)(1)(c)

SANITIZED

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS IS PERHAPS NOT ONLY A FURTHER CONCENTRATION OF IRAQI FORCES BUT ALSO A PRUDENT MOVE TO EXTRACT IRAQI TROOPS FROM SYRIAN SOIL AT A TIME WHEN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST BE VERY UNCERTAIN. APART FROM THIS WE HAVE NO INDICATION OF IRAQI REACTIONS TO THE SYRIAN MOVE. NOR DO WE HAVE ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY, BUT ONE REPORT SAYS THAT THE TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF AMMAN ARE BEING DEPLOYED INTO DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN CASE IRAQI FORCES WERE TO MOVE AGAINST THE CITY.

3.3(b)(1)(c)

SANITIZED

6. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT [REDACTED] MOVES APART FROM THE [REDACTED] MENTIONED ABOVE. HOWEVER, IF THE SYRIAN INCURSION CONTINUES, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH [REDACTED]

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05259 270305Z

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ACTION MEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-23 IC-13 CCQ-00 CTAR-00 DODE-00 DOT-12

F-15 M-02 IN2-03 L-04 NSAF-00 NSC-10 NSOE-00 O-03

OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-03 USSS-00 SY-03

SCS-04 SCA-01 SSC-00 PPT-02 UPV-01 RSR-01 /143 W

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Z 270315Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1615
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 05259

SUBJ: HOSTAGES

1. HOSTAGES WERE HELD IN SOLID HOUSE ABOUT 100 METERS
FROM ASHRAFIA HOSPITAL IN TWO ROOMS. REPORTEDLY HAD
ADEQUATE FOOD BUT SOME SHORTAGE WATER.

2. FREDEYEN RELEASED THEM AFTER FIRST SENDING TWO
CAPTAIN KOPFIS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO HOSPITAL TO MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS. VEHICLES SENT TO REMUNIZONS POINT. AT
THIS POINT JAA OPENED FIRE. FREDEYEN LEFT. CROUSE WENT TO
HOSPITAL. THREE 1000 TOOK OVER. CROUSE SPENT NIGHT AT
HOSPITAL AND WERE CHECKED OVER BY 1000. ALL FOUR CAPTIVES
WENT THROUGH RED CROSS. IT IS FROM CROUSE OF CAPTIVES THAT
WE HAVE NAMES. RED CROSS TOOK TO AIRPORT THIS AM AND LOADED
CROUSE ABOARD WAITING 1000 PLANE.

3. TWO 1000 HAD 1000S INTO 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05259 270903Z

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ACTION MEA-15

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E-15 U-02 INT-03 L-04 NSAF-00 NSC-10 NSOE-03 O-03

OC-06 PK-05 PRG-01 RGC-01 SS-20 USCIB-02 USSS-00 SY-03

SCS-04 SCA-01 SSO-00 PPT-02 HPW-01 RSR-01 /143 W
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Z 270915Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1615
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 05259

SUBJ: HOSTAGES

1. HOSTAGES WERE HELD IN SOLID HOUSE ABOUT 100 METERS
FROM ASRAFIA HOSPITAL IN TWO ROOMS. REPORTEDLY HAD
ADEQUATE FOOD BUT SOME SHORTAGE WATER.

2. FREYER WELFARD THEN AFTER FIRST REMOVALING THE
CAPTAIN HOLBY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO HOSPITAL TO MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS. VEHICLES CAME TO RENDEZVOUS POINT. AT
THIS MOMENT JAA OPENED FIRE. FREYER LEFT. GROUP WENT TO
HOSPITAL. THERE LONG FIGHT OVER. GROUP SPENT TIME AT
HOSPITAL AND WERE CHECKED OVER BY JORD. ALL SEEN PATIENTS
MOVE THROUGH RED CROSS. IT IS FROM COPIES OF CABLES THAT
WE HAVE HEARD. RED CROSS TOOK TO AIRPORT THIS AM AND LOADED
GROUP ABOARD WAITING JORD PLANE.

3. ONE JORDANIAN OFFICER DID NOT COME BACK TO THE

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PAGE 22 AMMAN 05259 270905Z

TIME. HE MISSED THEM AT HOSPITAL, SPENT SOME TIME GETTING NAMES FOR US, AND ARRIVED AT AIRPORT JUST AFTER TAKEOFF. THIS ALL ABOVE INFO IS SECOND-HAND.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE NEXT LANDING WILL BE. HOPE ADDRESSEES WILL BE ALERT TO POSSIBLE LANDING AND WILL SEEK ANY INFO POSSIBLE ON MISSING HOSTAGES.

5. WE HAVE JUST ASKED BEIRUT BY RADIO TO SEND OFFICER TO AIRPORT IMMEDIATELY.

BROWN

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05233 261949Z

1970 SEP 26 20 05

85
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CCO-00 SSQ-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-03 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-33
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 SCS-04 SCA-01 UPW-01 RSR-01 /110 W

076637

O P 261920Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1591
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 1924
USINT CAIRO
USNATO 61
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCEUR

S E C R E T AMMAN 5233

SUBJECT: HOSTAGES

PASS MCCLOSKEY

1. I TOLD RIFAI THAT I THOUGHT IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT US
PRESS AT INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, AMMAN, BE GIVEN SOONEST
ACCESS POSSIBLE TO HOSTAGES WHEN THEY RELEASED. I SAID
IT ESSENTIAL THAT GOJ UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE KEEPING US

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05233 261949Z

PRESS IN PICTURE AND THAT IT BE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY SEE
HIGH GOJ OFFICIALS AS WELL AS HOSTAGES, NOTING SOUR
PRESS ELSEWHERE.

2. HE AGREED. GP-3.
BROWN

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05230 261942Z

53

1970 SEP 26 19 55

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 SSO-00 SCS-04 SCA-01 VO-04 PPT-02
CCO-00 CIAE-00 DOT-12 E-15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 NSCE-00 O-03 OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20
USIE-00 USSS-00 SY-03 RSR-01 / 151 W
----- 076603

Z 261900Z SEP 70

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1500

INFO/AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BERN

AMEMBASSY BONN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USUN NEW YORK

USINT CAIRO

USMISSION NATO

CINCSRIKE

DIA

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSNAVEUR

CINCUSAREUR

CINCEUR

SECRET AMMAN 5230

SUBJ: HOSTAGES

1. RIFAI INFORMED THIS INSTANT THAT JAA HAS GONE TO PICK
UP 32 HOSTAGES. HE WILL GIVE US FURTHER INFO SOONEST.

GP-3. BROWN

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05224 261819Z

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 EUR-20 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 AID-28 IGA-02 HEW-08 UPW-01 SR-01
ORM-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 RSR-01 / 152 W

076271

Z 0 261715Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1584
USMISSION GENEVA
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 1922
JCS
CINCSRIKE
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CONARC
DIA
MAC
TAC
TAC-AFFTK
CINCUSAREUR
CINCEUR

SECRET AMMAN 5224

SUBJ: FIG HILL

REF: STATE 158996

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TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

- Since our peace initiative was launched in June, the Palestinian guerrillas and those Arab Governments, including Syria, opposed to a settlement with Israel have sought to destroy our initiative.
- The situation came to a head in Jordan when King Hussein, who along with Nasser had accepted the US initiative, sought to assert control over the fedayeen "state within a state" in Jordan.
- By September 19 the King was slowly gaining the upper hand. Iraq, although it has a large number of troops in Jordan and is pro-fedayeen, has remained passive; the UAR has avoided choosing sides; and the Soviets have limited themselves to exhortations for an end to the civil strife and against outside intervention.
- Beginning late September 19 a new situation has been created by a massive invasion of Jordan from Syria (300 tanks plus artillery and infantry). The invading forces have established themselves in northern Jordan where the fedayeen have been strong.
- At stake is the regime of King Hussein, a moderate Arab leader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can to make peace with Israel. If he falls, the prospects are for radicalization and possible partition of Jordan among elements hostile to Israel and the United States. If Hussein falls,

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2

there will remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settlement in the foreseeable future.

-- On September 20 we urged the Soviets to prevail upon the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan, warning that if they did not there was danger that the conflict would be broadened. and affirming our own decision to avoid this. The Soviets have been totally unresponsive.

-- In these circumstances we have been consulting with other governments, including the British, the French and the Israelis.

-- We have been informed that Israel has decided to move militarily against the Syrian forces in northern Jordan in view of the threat which would be posed to its security by a radical regime and a large Syrian military force on its eastern border.

-- We view sympathetically this Israeli position to defend its national interests. We will be helpful in quietly providing Israel materiel assistance, while seeking minimal public association with this Israeli action in order to protect to the extent possible our interests in the Arab world.

-- We see our principal responsibility as keeping the Soviets from intervening. We are informing the Soviets that we have no plans or our own to intervene, and are warning them against intervening. We are making clear that the problem results

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from Syrian aggression and that the solution lies in Syrian withdrawal from Jordan. We will of course also support withdrawal of Israeli troops once the military ^{operation} ~~occupation~~ is completed should the Israelis feel that they must go in on the ground as well as in the air.

-- As for possible actions we might take, we are making contingency plans should it become necessary to evacuate US nationals from Jordan. If, contrary to our expectations, the situation should require a larger direct US role, we will consult the Congress in advance.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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STATE ~~INDEX~~ 155203

EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

REF: STATE 155166

Following is text of questions and answers delivered to
Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21:

QUOTE:

Q. Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in
this matter?

A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement
in principle to the operation under discussion. If
decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they
should be on the basis of those conversations and the
fact that our common interests would be served.

Q. Will the King agree to request our assistance and to
undertake to institute methods of communication and

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/XXXXXXXX/ALatherton/hlk

DRAFTING DATE

9/21/70

TEL. EXT.

29588

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA:JUSisco/

CLEARANCE:

The Secretary

S/S-O SPolly

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2-

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coordination between us?

A. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With respect to ground operations, the only indication we have of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli QUOTE ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan. UNQUOTE. We are seeking clarification on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.

Q. How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

A. On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan.

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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for file*

SECRET/NODIS

August 1, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Yigal Allon

We are forwarding suggested talking points for the President's use with Israeli Foreign Minister Allon in case the President meets with the Minister.

Samuel R. Springsteen
George S. Springsteen *acting*
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Talking Points

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEETING WITH YIGAL ALLON

The Oval Office

From: Henry A. Kissinger

JK

I. PURPOSE

To emphasize the importance we attach to the consultations we are holding with Arab and Israeli foreign ministers over the next few weeks, to reiterate our general support for Israel, and to stress the need for steady progress in the negotiations.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN

A. Background: You will recall that, during your trip to the Middle East, it was agreed that Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and Syrian representatives should come to Washington for a series of consultations designed to develop a clearer picture of what direction peace negotiations should take over the next several months. Allon, who is Foreign Minister and remains under Rabin the Deputy Prime Minister as he was under Mrs. Meir, is a moderate on Arab-Israeli issues and is known for the "Allon Plan" which he worked out in 1967-68 for a settlement between Jordan and Israel under which Israel would annex a narrow strip in the Jordan River valley and return the bulk of the West Bank to Jordan. The plan has never been adopted officially by the Israeli Government, but he has talked along these lines here.

Allon has shown two main interests in his talks with me: (1) He has repeated the strong

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- 2 -

pitch you heard in Jerusalem for substantial long-term military and economic assistance to Israel. Secretary Schlesinger and I have simply promised to review Israel's military needs sympathetically. Secretary Simon is doing the same on the economic side. (2) On the question of peace negotiations, Allon started with a view that all further negotiations should be deferred until late in the year. I have told him we have no fixed position but that, in my view, Israel and the US will lose control of the diplomatic situation and pressures such as re-imposition of the oil embargo will begin to mount if there are no serious negotiations this fall. Allon has agreed to discuss a more flexible strategy for negotiations. Our discussions gave me a sense of what might be possible from the Israeli viewpoint in further Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel negotiations, and I will now get Rifai's and Fahmy's views.

The point for you to emphasize is that: It is crucial for us to maintain control of the situation by developing a strategy for giving the Arabs hope of some progress.

- B. Participants: Foreign Minister Allon and Ambassador Dinitz. Dr. Kissinger.
- C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. Arms Assistance: As you know, I feel that Israel's strength is an essential factor in the Middle East peacemaking process. We will consider your arms requests in that spirit. As you know from Secretary Schlesinger, there have been problems with fulfilling some of your conventional weapons requests because of our low production rates and our limited available stocks. On some of the sophisticated items which Israel has requested, we have questions connected with the protection of

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- 3 -

our advanced military technology. The main point is that these be dealt with as problems we want to address together and that they not be made issues between us.

2. Economic Assistance: Again, on economic assistance we will be helpful, and I can assure you that this Administration will do what is necessary to be as responsive as possible. In regard to Israel's request for \$1.5 billion annually in financial assistance to cover arms purchases and for another one-half billion in economic assistance, we will have to move carefully. These are very substantial amounts at a time when I have directed sharp limitation of spending to curb inflation here in the U.S.
3. Peace Efforts: Concerning the next steps in seeking a political accommodation in the Middle East, we have no pre-conceived ideas. We want in this next month to hear out the parties, and that is why I encouraged Secretary Kissinger to invite you as the first Middle Eastern representative to come to Washington in this series of discussions. We hope later in August to have a clearer picture on such questions as to whether the next move should be between Israel and Egypt or Israel and Jordan and how to relate any such move to the Geneva Conference. Our objective is a steady ongoing political process that will aid Arab moderates to stay on a moderate course. We want to help Israel achieve peaceful conditions, and we believe that the modest increase so far of U.S. influence in the Arab world will contribute toward this end. Following our consultations with the Arab foreign ministers here, it may be desirable for us to get together again in early September.

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Drafted:NEA:HHSaunders:kha
8/1/74: x22686

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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| | DAVIS | ST EX SEC | | C | EYES-ONLY EXDIS |
| | | | | <i>(S)</i> | CODEWORD |
| | | | | TS | SENSITIVE |
| SUBJECT: <i>Contingency Talks for possible Pres mtg w/ Yigal Allon Former of Israel</i> | | | | | |

| DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT | INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION | | | REC
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| | | ACTION | INFO | | |
| | ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | | | | |
| | STAFF SECRETARY | | | | |
| | FAR EAST | | | | |
| | SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | | |
| | MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA | | <i>X</i> | | |
| | EUROPE / CANADA | | | | |
| | LATIN AMERICA | | | | |
| | UNITED NATIONS | | | | |
| ECONOMIC | | | | | |
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| | <i>8/01</i> | | <i>Scraft</i> | <i>X</i> | <i>HAK to sign Pres for talks (8/03)</i> | |
| | <i>8/02</i> | | | <i>C</i> | <i>DBE per McFarlane</i> | |
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| | CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: | M/F D <i>1974</i> BY | |
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*Approved by the Secretary
8/1/74 according to
phone call. Retyped
on White House
stationary by NSC.*

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Yigal Allon

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George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Talking Points

Drafted: NEA: HHSaunders: kha
8/1/74: x22686
Concurrence: S

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- 3 -

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|-------------------|---|---------------------------------------|-------------|
| 9 | letter | Meir to the President
NLN 02-04/1
Declassified 01-08-2003
[4 pp (1 copy)] | 3/8/70 | B |
| 15 | notes | re: Cease Fire
Declassified 07-19-2000 | n.d. | B |
| 16 | memo
w/attach. | HAK to the President [18 pages scanned] [2 pp]
NLN 02-04/2 and NLN 02-04/2A
sanitized sec. 3.4(b)(1)(6) per ltrs 07-05-2002
and 01-08-03 | 3/18/70 | B |
| 20 | memo | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 04-22/10
duplicate of document 16 sanitized as above | | |
| 34 | transcript | telcon between HAK and Rabin
NLN 02-04/3 Sanitized. sec. 3.4(b)(1) ltr 01-08-03
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 04-22/11 | [1 pp] 3/17/70 | B |
| 59 | letter | duplicate of document 9
Declassified | per sec 3.3 (b)(1)(6) ltr 16 Jul 2008 | |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Country Files- Middle East

BOX NUMBER

612

FOLDER TITLE

(3) Israeli Aid (Duplicate of HAK Notebook)

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In your talk with Rabin and also in your further talk with Mrs. Meir if you have it I think it is important that you lay it on the line with regard to Israel's interest going far beyond the present conflict.

Israel is relying on the peace at any price Democrats. Mansfield, Fulbright, Symington et al, and on some Republicans like Goodell and Scott to come through for them in the event we come to a crunch, not just in aid but in case Israel is threatened directly by Soviet power.

What they must realize is that these people are very weak reeds. They will give Israel a lot of lip service but they are peace at any price people. When the chips are down they will cut and run, not only as they are presently cutting and running in Vietnam but also when any conflict in the Mideast stares them straight in the face.

On the other hand, their real friends (to their great surprise) are people like Goldwater, Buckley, RN et al who are considered to be hawks on Vietnam but who in the broader aspects are basically not cut and run people whether it is in Vietnam, the Mideast, Korea or any place else in the world. They may be concerned, for example, that Buckley wrote a column indicating displeasure that the Jewish community demonstrated against Pompidou and didn't demonstrate against Kosygin. This, however, is the most fundamental point of all. They must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is pro freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion. We will oppose a cut and run policy either in Vietnam or Cuba or the Mideast or

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NATO or any place else in the world. This is the kind of friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when the going gets very tough in the next five years.

It is time for Israel (and I don't think it will do any good to suggest this the American Jewish community) to face up to the fact that their only reliable friends are the hawks in this country -- those that are hawks in the best sense when it comes to Soviet expansionism any place in the world, not just Soviet expansionism in the Mideast.

They think, for example, that in the event some move is made in the Mideast that what really counts is to have Lindsay, Goodell or Scott to come out for more arms to Israel. Lindsay, Goodell and Scott can deliver only their own votes despite the fact that Manny Celler got 200 names on a Congressional petition which was presented to me (incidentally, a very stupid move on their part since it was so unnecessary and so obvious a move.)

What they must understand is that people like Goodell, Scott and Lindsay have no character and that when the crunch comes they will cave. What they must also realize is that people like RN, Buckley, Goldwater et al will stand up for them when the crunch comes basically because we admire them for their character and their strength and because we see in Israel the only state in that part of the world which will not become an abject tool of Soviet policy the moment the Soviet begins to flex its missiles.

What all this adds up to is that Mrs. Meir, Rabin et al must trust RN completely. He does not want to see Israel go down the drain and makes an absolute commitment that he will see to it that Israel always has "an edge." On the other hand, he must carry with him not just the Jewish constituency in New York and Pennsylvania and California and possibly Illinois which voted 95 percent against him, but he must carry with him the 60 percent of the American people who are in what is called the silent majority and who must be depended upon in the event that we have to take a strong stand against Soviet expansionism in the Mideast. Only when the Israeli leaders realize this fact are they going to have any kind of security which will be reliable.

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- 3 -

This is tough talk for them to hear because they read the Jewish press, the New York Times, the Washington Post and also listen to the media and get the impression that because they have so much clout with some of those people that they will get their way. They must realize that that group has lost its credibility with the American people and that they are not going to get their way with a majority of Americans when the chips are really down.

In this connection, they must realize that one of their best friends also is Agnew. Agnew will stand up and be counted in the event there is a Soviet expansionist move in the Mideast. On the other hand, he will not stand just as I will not stand for a double standard. We are going to stand up in Vietnam and in NATO and in the Mideast, but it is a question of all or none. This is it cold turkey and it is time that our friends in Israel understood this.

We are going to be in power for at least the next three years and this is going to be the policy of this country. Unless they understand it and act as if they understood it beginning now they are down the tubes.

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SundinPRESS BRIEFING PAPER

March 23, 1970

STATEMENT ON ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REQUESTS

My statement will deal with the Israeli requests both for military and economic assistance from the United States. The decisions I am announcing today are based on our present appraisal of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Last year, the Government of Israel asked the United States to sell it 25 additional Phantoms and 100 more Skyhawks. The Israeli request has been carefully and sympathetically considered in the light of the military situation in the area and of our policy of doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

In our judgment, Israel's air capacity is sufficient to meet its needs for the time being. Consequently, the President has decided to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for additional aircraft. In doing so, he has instructed

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This document has been review pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

- 2 -

that close watch be kept on the military balance in the area. The United States will be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it. To this end the United States will remain in close consultation with those concerned.

In this connection, we have evidence that the USSR has been taking recent steps to strengthen the air defense of the UAR by introduction of SA-3 missiles and additional Soviet personnel. As the President indicated on Saturday, the situation bears and will receive close and careful scrutiny by us as well as continuous review and evaluation.

On the economic side, the United States will respond affirmatively to certain of Israel's short-term financial requests while studying further its longer-range needs. There will be an expanded PL-480 program for purchase of surplus food, principally wheat and feed grains, under favorable credit arrangements. We will also extend credits to help cover the balance due on past military contracts.

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PRESS BRIEFING PAPER

March 23, 1970

STATEMENT ON ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC REQUESTS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



March 23, 1970

SECRET/NODIS

FOR: Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

FROM: Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. *TL*
Executive Secretary

The attached telegram from Tel Aviv sets forth the Israeli response to our decision on aircraft and economic aid for Israel. In view of its sensitivity I would be grateful if you would limit its distribution in the White House to as few as possible.

Attachment:

Tel Aviv 1502

AK
Towed down.

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NNNN

NOR454 EPB 786

1322 :JETS-EBAN ' ' ' ' ' :

JERUSALEM MARCH 23 (REUTERS) -- ISRAEL TODAY EXPRESSED
"ITS DISAPPOINTMENT AND CONCERN" AT PRESIDENT NIXONS
DECISION NOT TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL PLANES FOR THE TIME BEING.
MORE. (AV) CPM/LAD

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

March 12, 1970

[Below is the text of a hand-written letter from Prime Minister Meir. It was handed to Dr. Kissinger by Ambassador Rabin at a meeting at 10:30 a.m., March 12, 1970. Also present at that meeting were Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel, and Harold M. Saunders.]

Jerusalem
March 8, 1970

His Excellency Richard M. Nixon,
The President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,

Please forgive me for taking a double liberty: one of writing to you at all, and two, of writing in this personal way.

I am sure that you will understand that I would never allow myself to do this if I did not sense a great emergency.

When I left Washington, I felt, as very seldom before, that I was fortunate to have accomplished something of great importance for my country and people. This I tried to put in one meaningful sentence: "We have a friend in the White House."

This I told my Government and my people. I wonder if you, President of the greatest Power in the world, can realize what a "friend in the White House" means to a small beleaguered people.

When your several statements concerning the Middle East and Israel came over our radio, people would stop me in the

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

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By SP/2 NARA, Date 5-6-03

[4 pages]

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PAGE 2

street and say, "You were right. We have a friend."

They did not ask me questions. They believed me.

There is no need for me to go into details about our situation. Our neighbours will not even consent to a cease-fire. There is constant shooting and casualties. Men fall and sometimes also planes with them. We in Government count our planes almost daily. The facts are: Forty Mirages, plus Skyhawks and Phantoms, which are arriving four per month, plus about one hundred old French planes.

It is true that our pilots are very good, but they can be good only when they have planes.

Lately some rumours have reached me that your decision may be negative or at best postponed.

I absolutely refuse to believe it.

In the light of the threats and the vicious propaganda of the Russians, of the hatred of our neighbours, of the audacity and murderous attacks of the terrorists, of the blowing up of planes, (I attended the funeral of twenty Israelis and other Jews, victims of the Swissair plane, who were buried in Jerusalem), to envisage such a blow to my people is more than I have the courage to believe.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PAGE 3

If, God forbid, this were true, then we would feel really forsaken. Our enemies, including the Russians, would, for the first time, really believe that we are at their mercy.

Mr. President, I know it can be said that at any rate the planes would not arrive now. But the uncertainty on our part of what would happen after all the Phantoms will have arrived, and the encouragement to the Arabs that we have been abandoned by our best friend while their supplies pour in, spells not only a security danger but a psychological shock for our people. The effect of this shock cannot be overestimated.

Of course, we will not commit suicide, but will our people be the same brave, courageous but also rational human beings as they are now?

Will any leader have the right to ask for their trust and confidence in the path that we have followed?

We remember too acutely our fate during the Second World War. Our memories are still with us of the days before June 5th, 1967.

Mr. President, we were alone!

Again, I say to myself and to you, I do not believe it.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

PAGE 4

I doubt whether this is how one writes to a
President of the United States, but I am writing to our
"friend in the White House."

Again, I ask your forgiveness.

Sincerely yours,

Golda Meir

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

HHSaunders:rn:3/12/70

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March 17, 1970

AIDE MEMOIRE

Reaffirming the discussion of September 26, 1969 with Prime Minister Golda Meir, I hereby confirm that the United States Government will continue its commitment to the military security of Israel by the provision of hardware required to maintain the military balance in the Middle East. We would construe any significant introduction of Soviet or other arms into the Middle East as endangering the military balance. In these circumstances my Government would provide a substantial majority of the military assistance requested by your Government. At the same time, I want to reaffirm our intention to pursue a policy of seeking a negotiated settlement of the situation in the Middle East. As I stated on September 26, 1969, we expect the Government of Israel to adopt an understanding attitude with respect to our efforts. ~~(Finally, I would like to request that the Government of Israel terminate for a period of 60 days its air and other attacks against the UAR providing a complete cease-fire is observed by the other side and recognizing that there would be no official statements to this effect by either side. Any relative disadvantage suffered by Israel as a result of these restraints -- for example, through the unimpeded building up of SAM sites -- will be taken into account in replacement decisions for 1971.~~

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*McChesnut that's will be signed
And if the replacement
of birds in addition, if the introduction of new equipment
changes the balance*

SUGGESTED U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT

Last year, the Government of Israel asked the United States to sell it additional ^{MILITARY} aircraft. The Israeli request has been carefully and sympathetically considered in the light of the military situation in the area and of our policy of doing everything possible to achieve peace in the Middle East in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

[The conclusion has been reached that the military balance in the Middle East is such that a decision is not required at this time.] In our judgment, Israel's air capacity is sufficient to meet its defensive needs ^{at the} for the time being. Consequently, the President has decided to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for ^{25 Harbans + 100 Skyhawks} additional aircraft. ^{Honorable} In doing so, he has instructed that close watch be kept on the balance and that the United States be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement ^{to replace losses while} aircraft promptly if the situation requires it. To this end, the United States will remain in close consultation with those most concerned. Meanwhile, ^{AFFIRMATIVE} The United States will respond positively to certain of Israel's financial requests.

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*limit itself to replacing losses while
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-2-

decision in
This ~~step~~ is taken with the strong conviction that ultimate
peace and no belief in restraint
security for all concerned lies in ~~restraint~~. It is taken in the
belief that the current trend of events must be reversed if the
situation is to be stabilized and if progress toward peace is to begin.

The United States alone cannot achieve that result. This
Government, therefore, calls upon the Soviet Union to exercise
similar restraint. In making this proposal, it must be understood
that we have no intention of jeopardizing the legitimate security
interests of our friends in the region. It goes without saying that
if any country takes steps which might upset the current balance
or if in our judgment political developments warrant, the President
will not hesitate to reconsider this matter.

We believe that our restraint will afford fresh opportunities
for all concerned--in and outside the area--to replace the drift
towards violence with positive steps towards peace. To this end,
the United States will make renewed efforts in diplomatic channels
to:

-- encourage both sides to adhere scrupulously to
the UN ceasefire resolutions;

-- call upon the parties to the conflict to re-appraise
positions which have become roadblocks to peace;

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-3-

-- urge all concerned to support proposals which would help Ambassador Jarring launch a process of negotiation among the parties under his auspices; and

-- engage the other major suppliers to the Middle

East in early arms limitation talks.

These are serious initiatives addressed to a serious situation in the area. We urge all concerned to examine them with care and with the sense of urgency which the present situation demands of all responsible governments.

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SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3-

INDICATE:

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ACTION:

Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20. We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel's security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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This morning's Cabinet Meeting - March 18, 1970

The President said, Bill, why don't you give us a rundown on this Israeli arms situation. I would like for the Cabinet members to know the general direction in which we are going.

(Secretary Rogers essentially reviewed the decision on Middle East arms.)

President: The point is that this anxiety the Jewish people are showing is more than anxiety. That's really an understatement. They are almost pathological about this thing. They want a direct commitment by the U. S. for planes regardless of what the Soviet Union might do. There are three points here I would like to make and that you all should understand. We are already providing the Israelis a very very large economic package, much larger in fact than we are providing most countries, taking size and other factors into consideration. The second point, we are committed to maintain the balance (pause). Yet they still want an outright commitment from us in addition to the fact that we are committed to maintain the balance. The third point: If the Soviet Union does escalate we will come to the Israelis' assistance.

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Rogers: As all of you know, the Israelis are militarily superior to any of the Arab nations -- militarily superior by far. In fact, if a major war broke out in that part of the world there is little doubt that the Israelis would win even though they would be opposing all of the Arab nations at once. The Arabs simply cannot catch up. At least not for a good many years; and when I say "catch up" I mean the Arabs simply cannot train their people to adequately fly and maneuver the planes and handle the equipment. You don't learn to handle complicated or sophisticated equipment overnight. The sort of pitiful part of this is that the Arabs know this -- they recognize it and admit it. Now, that being the case, if we were to go ahead and give the Israelis more equipment -- the additional things they want -- when they are already superior militarily...well, you can see how the Arabs would view that. We would be asking for an arms race of major proportions, and the Soviet Union has already made great inroads into the Arab nations. Further, we would probably see the defection of some of our very good friends, for example the Tunisians and the Moroccans. (Most of the rest of what he said revolved around the above points. He mentioned Kuwait. Did not take more than 4-1/2 minutes for his statement. Ended up with statement, "of course, this is why this anxiety among the Jewish people.

Following ~~this~~ the President's statement George Shultz, Secy of Labor, said - it may be of interest to the other Cabinet members to know what I tell my Jewish friends. I tell them to read Secy Rogers' recent statement on this. That statement was very well written, very well balanced and is very thoughtful and if most Jewish people will read that it will answer most of their questions as to our course of action in the Middle East.

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A. Cease Fire.

- 1) Israel consents to an 'undeclared' cease-fire'.
- 2) By 'undeclared cease-fire' shall be meant that Israel will respect a cease-fire as long as the other side shall not open fire across the cease-fire line nor cross it.
- 3) From the day to be determined as the beginning of the 'undeclared cease-fire' and for 3-⁴5 days Israel shall not apply its air~~s~~ power except in order to silence artillery fire if when and wherever it may be opened across the cease-fire line. *Same shall apply to enemy air action.*
- 4) This period of 'grace' shall come into effect from the day that shall be determined as the beginning of the 'undeclared cease-fire'.
- 5) In the event of a breach of the 'undeclared cease-fire' after this period of 'grace' Israel shall be free to apply its air power and armed forces and the situation shall be considered to have been reverted to the ^{pre}'undeclared cease-fire' state.
- 6) In the event that the 'undeclared cease-fire' shall be honoured by the other side Israel shall still reserve the right to reevaluate~~the~~ the above arrangements at the expiration of a period of 60 days from beginning of the 'undeclared cease-fire' and in the light of possible developments in the area.

B. Criteria for determining need to meet Israel's request for planes.

The U.S. shall meet Israel requests should any of the following developments take place:

- 1) The supply by the Soviet Union of 40-50 additional planes to any one or

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

As you will recall, the NSSM-40 Committee charged me with informing you when first indications appeared of the introduction of new Soviet weapons to Egypt with particular reference to [REDACTED]. This is the first such report.

SANITIZED



Attachment - 1

Copy No. 1.

16 March 1970
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN 02-04/2A per 3.4(h)(1)(6) 7/5/02

by [signature] NARA, Date 5-7-03
[6 pages]

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVEConversation between the President and Israeli Ambassador Rabin
on March 18, 1970

I brought Ambassador Rabin to the President's Office at the Executive Office Building after handing him the letter reaffirming our commitment to supply Israel with equipment if the balance of power were in danger. The letter was drafted at the request of the President, in order to calm the Israelis and to prevent any violent outburst of military action. The President said he wanted to see Rabin to tell him one thing - that the line of communication to the President was via me. He knew that the Israelis had legitimate concerns about their security and that they had some doubts on whether we would not nitpick them to death, if they felt their security was in danger. He therefore wanted to tell Rabin to let Kissinger know if the balance of power was in danger. We have great difficulty looking at the problem massively but if you put it to us in an informal way, we will find our own way to solve the problem. Quite apart from helping Israel which means a lot to us, we don't want the power balance to change. Within our bureaucracy, there are many who don't agree. They think our real interests in the Middle East lie with the Arabs but those others don't have my power. I am aware of the introduction of Soviet SA-3s and I hope you knock them out. You can't let them build up.

Rabin said I know I am speaking to the most powerful man of the most powerful country in the world. I must tell you that the

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TOP SECRET/S ISITIVEConversation between the President and Israeli Ambassador Rabin
on March 18, 1970 (contd)

2

public announcement which you will make produces great concern. It will give great encouragement to the Arabs because they believe Israel has been left alone to defend itself by its oldest friend. It will give great encouragement to the Soviets because it shows them that they are free to do what they want and it will lead them into greater intransigence towards the Arabs. It will have great consequence for the other states in the Middle East, going as far as the Persian Gulf who will draw the conclusion that you have been forced off your course by the Soviets. We Israelis have no one to turn to except to you the President of the United States. We believe in freedom and human dignity and we will defend ourselves but we are ^{only} 2.5 million. We ^{now} would like to knock out the SAMs but we know that if we knock the SAM sites we will face the Soviet Union alone. I am in no position to disbelieve the President of the United States but our survival is at stake and I am deeply worried.

The President replied, when you see that a need exists, convey it to us. What this means is what my letter says.

Rabin said the need exists now. What is the balance of power in the world today? Egypt has 160 supersonic planes. Syria has 100 supersonic planes. We have less than 90. We are brave but we can't

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TOP SECRET, SENSITIVE

Conversation between the President and Israeli
Ambassador Rabin on March 18, 1970

3

be superhuman. We will do what I can but the Arabs don't need more arms. And as soon as they get greater competence, we will be in mortal danger.

The President when you are in danger, let Kissinger know.

We will get it done.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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Tab A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In your talk with Rabin and also in your further talk with Mrs. Meir if you have it I think it is important that you lay it on the line with regard to Israel's interest going far beyond the present conflict.

Israel is relying on the peace at any price Democrats. Mansfield, Fulbright, Symington et al, and on some Republicans like Goodell and Scott to come through for them in the event we come to a crunch, not just in aid but in case Israel is threatened directly by Soviet power.

What they must realize is that these people are very weak reeds. They will give Israel a lot of lip service but they are peace at any price people. When the chips are down they will cut and run, not only as they are presently cutting and running in Vietnam but also when any conflict in the Mideast stares them straight in the face.

On the other hand, their real friends (to their great surprise) are people like Goldwater, Buckley, RN et al who are *considered to be hawks on Vietnam but who in the broader aspects* are basically not cut and run people whether it is in Vietnam, the Mideast, Korea or any place else in the world. They may be concerned, for example, that Buckley wrote a column indicating displeasure that the Jewish community demonstrated against Pompidou and didn't demonstrate against Kosygin. This, however, is the most fundamental point of all. They must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is pro freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion. We will oppose a cut and run policy either in Vietnam or Cuba or the Mideast or

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- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

NATO or any place else in the world. This is the kind of friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when the going gets very tough in the next five years.

It is time for Israel (and I don't think it will do any good to suggest this the American Jewish community) to face up to the fact that their only reliable friends are the hawks in this country -- those that are hawks in the best sense when it comes to Soviet expansionism any place in the world, not just Soviet expansionism in the Mideast.

They think, for example, that in the event some move is made in the Mideast that what really counts is to have Lindsay, Goodell or Scott to come out for more arms to Israel. Lindsay, Goodell and Scott can deliver only their own votes despite the fact that Manny Celler got 200 names on a Congressional petition which was presented to me (incidentally, a very stupid move on their part since it was so unnecessary and so obvious a move.)

What they must understand is that people like Goodell, Scott and Lindsay have no character and that when the crunch comes they will cave. What they must also realize is that people like RN, Buckley, Goldwater et al will stand up for them when the crunch comes basically because we admire them for their character and their strength and because we see in Israel the only state in that part of the world which will not become an abject tool of Soviet policy the moment the Soviet begins to flex its missiles.

What all this adds up to is that Mrs. Meir, Rabin et al must trust RN completely. He does not want to see Israel go down the drain and makes an absolute commitment that he will see to it that Israel always has "an edge." On the other hand, he must carry with him not just the Jewish constituency in New York and Pennsylvania and California and possibly Illinois which voted 95 percent against him, but he must carry with him the 60 percent of the American people who are in what is called the silent majority and who must be depended upon in the event that we have to take a strong stand against Soviet expansionism in the Mideast. Only when the Israeli leaders realize this fact are they going to have any kind of security which will be reliable.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 10, 1970

Place: East Wing, White House

Participants: Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. Lawrence E. Lynn

I met Dobrynin in the Military Aide's Office at the White House at 3:00 p.m. The meeting had come about because during our last conversation Dobrynin had indicated some doubt about the relationship between the Safeguard components for area defense and the Safeguard components of point defense, and I told him that I would give him a briefing explaining the difference.

I took Larry Lynn of my staff along. We talked briefly about the problem of area defense and of point defense, the various types of missiles that were necessary for both, and why the area defense we were planning was not a threat to the Soviet Union. It was clear, however, that Dobrynin was not interested in that. He asked a few perfunctory questions which, incidentally, showed that he had studied the subject very carefully. He then said that he wanted to talk to me alone.

He made the following points:

1. SALT. Dobrynin said he had been asked by the Soviet Government to make three points with respect to SALT:

a. The Soviet Government agrees with our proposition that he and I might have an exchange of views both before and during the SALT talks with a view to coming to a conclusion between us on some of the principal outstanding issues.

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

2

b. The Soviet Government wanted the President to know that the Soviets were approaching the Vienna discussions very seriously and would try to find an area of agreement.

c. The Soviets were prepared to discuss either comprehensive or separate agreement. They believed that a comprehensive agreement would be better because it would lead also to a solution of other political problems. But they were prepared to make separate agreements, provided it was understood that the limited agreements would not preclude coming eventually to a comprehensive agreement.

Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had some doubts about the seriousness with which we approached the negotiations and that it had some genuine worries whether we really meant to have a negotiation. I told him that we were extremely serious about the negotiations and that we were hoping to come to an agreement. I said that they should know the President well enough by now to realize that our approach was always concrete and detailed and that the way to find out whether we were serious would be for them to engage in serious discussions. I was sure they would not be disappointed.

Dobrynin then turned the conversation to the Middle East.

II. Middle East. Dobrynin said he had been asked by the Soviet Government to give me an answer to some representations I had made to him on February 10. These representations were as follows:

a. It had come to my attention that one of the junior officers of the Soviet Embassy had complained to one of our journalists that we did not take the Kosygin letter sufficiently seriously.

b. We are assuming that serious communications will be made directly by Dobrynin to me and therefore we will not comment officially.

c. We want Dobrynin to know that the Kosygin letter received the highest level attention. Given the fact that the

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

3

Soviet side had distributed it in regular channels in London and Paris, we had no choice but to deal with it in a similar fashion here.

d. The President is prepared to have bilateral discussions on the Middle East in the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel with a view to finding a solution fair to everybody.

e. We want the Soviet leaders to know that the introduction of Soviet combat personnel in the Middle East would be viewed with the gravest concern. We are choosing this method of communication because we do not want to make any formal demarche. At the same time, we want to make sure that the Soviet leaders are under no misapprehension about the possibility of grave consequences.

Dobrynin said in reply to these propositions the Soviet Government wanted to make the following comments in strictest confidence:

"Under instructions from Moscow I would like in confidence to express some considerations in connection with the aggravation of the military situation in the Middle East.

"Guided by special responsibility of our countries for the maintenance of peace A. N. Kosygin has already drawn the attention of President Nixon to the dangerous escalation of Israel of military actions against the UAR and other Arab countries and called upon the U. S. Government to use its influence so that Israel stop its armed attacks, dangerous for the cause of peace. The head of the Soviet Government stated at the same time that on its part the Soviet Union would show good will and determination to act in the interests of peace in the Middle East.

"It has been noted in Moscow that the American side, persistently putting forward the proposal on the cessation of fire on both sides, gives as its reasons the need to create a favorable situation for the search of political settlement.

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4

At the same time the United States ignores the fact that Israel not only occupied by means of aggression substantial Arab territories for the liberation of which the Arab peoples are now fighting but continues barbaric air raids against areas deep in the UAR and other Arab countries.

"We would like to draw the attention of the American side to the need for a realistic approach towards this question with due regard to the political situation in the Arab countries caused by the people's indignation at the Israeli aggression. In order to have the escalation of military operations in the Middle East discontinued it is necessary first of all that Israel take practical steps in this direction. We have reason to count that if the Israelis stop their bombings of the UAR, the UAR on its part will display restraint in its actions, without, of course, any official statements to that effect.

"I would like to ask you, Mr. Kissinger, to bring the context of this conversation to the attention of President Nixon. I would like to receive a reply to this communication."

Dobrynin asked me what I thought of these propositions. I said it was very interesting; I would take it up with the President and let him know.

Dobrynin then said that he had to tell me in confidence that he had been instructed to call on Secretary Rogers and would offer the continuation of bilateral discussions. I said I had wondered when they would get tired of the quadripartite meetings. Dobrynin smiled and said, "We'll let the quadripartite meetings go on, but we prefer to talk in the bilateral forum." He said that, as he remembered it, there were two outstanding issues: one having to do with the state of peace, and the second having to do with the obligations of the two sides. He could tell me in strictest confidence that the hang-up on the first point would be met by the Soviet formulation.

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Up to now, the Soviets had only offered a cessation of the state of war; they were now ready to talk about establishing a state of peace. As for the obligations of the two sides, the Soviet Union also was prepared to make a concession. Until now the Soviet Union had insisted that control of irregular forces would not be possible or would be solved automatically. They were now ready to offer a formulation which would make it the responsibility of the Arab governments.

He said there were a number of other issues with which he did not wish to bother me. For example, he said the Soviet Union wanted the UAR to have full sovereignty over the Sinai, but also that it recognized that Sharm al Sheikh and surrounding territories would be put under a UN force which could be removed only by the unanimous vote of the Security Council's permanent members. In other words, we could have a veto over the international presence in Sharm al Sheikh.

He asked me what I thought our reaction to these proposals would be. I said I would have to study them but he could be sure that if there were a positive possibility of making progress, we would be very receptive. I would be in touch with him next week about it. Dobrynin asked whether he could come to me if he reached some impasse with Sisco or the Secretary. I said I was always willing to see him.

Dobrynin then pointed out that it would be possible to arrange some formula for direct negotiations as long as we did not use the "Rhodes Formula." And, of course, both sides would have to join the document.

(All these things seem to me major steps forward.)

III. Vietnam. At the end of the conversation, Dobrynin asked how the trip to Paris had gone. I said that it had been all right. I asked him what he had heard about it. He said the Vietnamese had told him that no real progress had been made and that I had had nothing new to say. He asked me whether I had been encouraged. I said I have been in this position too long to be either encouraged or discouraged. Dobrynin said, "Well, if there was any more than what they have told us, it would be the first time that they haven't told us the truth." I said I wouldn't want to shake his confidence in his allies.

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Comments:

Dobrynin made a number of significant concessions:

- (1) He offered a ceasefire along the Suez Canal, thus enabling us to show the Israelis that we have achieved something for them with our policy on the Kosygin letter.
- (2) In the negotiations on Egypt our policy of relative firmness has paid off on all contested issues. The Soviet Union has made a first move and, while it may not be enough, at least it showed that holding firm and offering no concessions was the right course.

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March 12, 1970

[Below is the text of a hand-written letter from Prime Minister Meir. It was handed to Dr. Kissinger by Ambassador Rabin at a meeting at 10:30 a.m., March 12, 1970. Also present at that meeting were Shlomo Argov, Minister, Embassy of Israel, and Harold M. Saunders.]

Jerusalem
March 8, 1970

His Excellency Richard M. Nixon,
The President of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,

Please forgive me for taking a double liberty: one of writing to you at all, and two, of writing in this personal way.

I am sure that you will understand that I would never allow myself to do this if I did not sense a great emergency.

When I left Washington, I felt, as very seldom before, that I was fortunate to have accomplished something of great importance for my country and people. This I tried to put in one meaningful sentence: "We have a friend in the White House."

This I told my Government and my people. I wonder if you, President of the greatest Power in the world, can realize what a "friend in the White House" means to a small beleaguered people.

When your several statements concerning the Middle East and Israel came over our radio, people would stop me in the

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UN 02-04/1 Dostler, 1-8-03

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 5-6-02
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PAGE 2

street and say, "You were right. We have a friend."

They did not ask me questions. They believed me.

There is no need for me to go into details about our situation. Our neighbours will not even consent to a cease-fire. There is constant shooting and casualties. Men fall and sometimes also planes with them. We in Government count our planes almost daily. The facts are: Forty Mirages, plus Skyhawks and Phantoms, which are arriving four per month, plus about one hundred old French planes.

It is true that our pilots are very good, but they can be good only when they have planes.

Lately some rumours have reached me that your decision may be negative or at best postponed.

I absolutely refuse to believe it.

In the light of the threats and the vicious propaganda of the Russians, of the hatred of our neighbours, of the audacity and murderous attacks of the terrorists, of the blowing up of planes, (I attended the funeral of twenty Israelis and other Jews, victims of the Swissair plane, who were buried in Jerusalem), to envisage such a blow to my people is more than I have the courage to believe.

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

PAGE 3

If, God forbid, this were true, then we would feel really forsaken. Our enemies, including the Russians, would, for the first time, really believe that we are at their mercy.

Mr. President, I know it can be said that at any rate the planes would not arrive now. But the uncertainty on our part of what would happen after all the Phantoms will have arrived, and the encouragement to the Arabs that we have been abandoned by our best friend while their supplies pour in, spells not only a security danger but a psychological shock for our people. The effect of this shock cannot be overestimated.

Of course, we will not commit suicide, but will our people be the same brave, courageous but also rational human beings as they are now?

Will any leader have the right to ask for their trust and confidence in the path that we have followed?

We remember too acutely our fate during the Second World War. Our memories are still with us of the days before June 5th, 1967.

Mr. President, we were alone!

Again, I say to myself and to you, I do not believe it.

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~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

PAGE 4

I doubt whether this is how one writes to a
President of the United States, but I am writing to our
"friend in the White House."

Again, I ask your forgiveness.

Sincerely yours,

Golda Meir

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

HHSaunders:rn:3/12/70

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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This morning's Cabinet Meeting - March 18, 1970

The President said, Bill, why don't you give us a rundown on this Israeli arms situation. I would like for the Cabinet members to know the general direction in which we are going.

Rogers: As all of you know, the Israelis are militarily superior to any of the Arab nations -- militarily superior by far. In fact, if a major war broke out in that part of the world there is little doubt that the Israelis would win even though they would be opposing all of the Arab nations at once. The Arabs simply cannot catch up. At least not for a good many years; and when I say "catch up" I mean the Arabs simply cannot train their people to adequately fly and maneuver the planes and handle the equipment. You don't learn to handle complicated or sophisticated equipment overnight. The sort of pitiful part of this is that the Arabs know this -- they recognize it and admit it. Now, that being the case, if we were to go ahead and give the Israelis more equipment -- the additional things they want -- when they are already superior militarily...well, you can see how the Arabs would view that. We would be asking for an arms race of major proportions, and the Soviet Union has already made great inroads into the Arab nations. Further, we would probably see the defection of some of our very good friends, for example, the Tunisians and the Moroccans. (Most of the rest of what he said revolved around the above points. He mentioned Kuwait. Did not take more than 4-1/2 minutes for his statement. Ended up with statement, "Of course, this is why this anxiety among the Jewish people.")

President: The point is that this anxiety the Jewish people are showing is more than anxiety. That's really an understatement. They are almost pathological about this thing. They want a direct commitment by the U. S. for planes regardless of what the Soviet Union might do. There are three points here I would like to make and that you all should understand. We are already providing the Israelis a very very large economic package, much larger in fact than we are providing most countries, taking size and other factors into consideration. The second point, we are committed to maintain the balance (pause). Yet they still want an outright commitment from us in addition to the fact that we are committed to maintain the balance. The third point: If the Soviet Union does escalate we will come to the Israelis' assistance.

Following the President's statement, George Shultz, Secretary of Labor, said, "It may be of interest to the other Cabinet members to know what I tell my Jewish friends. I tell them to read Secretary Rogers' recent

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- 2 -

statement on this. That statement was very well written, very well balanced and is very thoughtful and if most Jewish people will read that it will answer most of their questions as to our course of action in the Middle East."

TOP SECRET

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RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|---|--------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Memorandum | HAK to the President with attachments
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/12
NLN 06-66/1
NLN 07-03/1 | 6pp
ca. 7/1969 | B |
| 2 | Report | TAB A – Summary of the Situation and Issues
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4A
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/13
NLN 06-66/2
NLN 07-03/2 | 18pp
07/19/1969 | B |
| 3 | Report | TAB B – Scenario for Discussions with Israelis...
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4B
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/14
NLN 06-66/3
NLN 07-03/3 | 4pp
07/19/1969 | B |
| 4 | Report | TAB C – The Issues for Decision
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4C
Duplicate Requests: NLN 06-66/4
NLN 07-05/4 | 7pp
07/19/1969 | B |
| 5 | Letter | TAB D – Yitzhak Rabin to Paul Warnke
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4D
Duplicate Request: NLN 07-03/5 | 2pp
11/22/1968 | B |
| 6 | Letter | TAB D – Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4E
Duplicate Request: NLN 07-03/6 | 2pp
11/27/1968 | B |

COLLECTION TITLE

NSC Country Files – Middle East

BOX NUMBER

612

FOLDER TITLE

4. Israel – Israeli Nuclear Program

PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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NUMBER | DOCUMENT
TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| 7 | MemCon | TAB D – Negotiations with Israel (4 th Session) 4pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4F
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/15
NLN 07-03/7 | 11/12/1968 | B |
| 8 | MemCon | TAB D – Negotiations with Government of Israel 1pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4G
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/16
NLN 07-03/8 | 11/26/1968 | B |
| 9 | Memorandum | TAB D – Negotiations with Israel 3pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4H
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/17
NLN 07-03/9 | 11/29/1968 | B |
| 10 | Memorandum
w /
attachment | TAB E – Davies to Kissinger 30pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4I
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/18
NLN 06-66/5
NLN 07-03/10 | 05/29/1969 | B |
| 11 | Memorandum | HAK to the President 7pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4J
Duplicate Requests: NLN 06-66/6
NLN 07-03/11 | 10/08/1969 | B |
| 12 | Memorandum
w /
attachment | Haig to Lake for HAK 12pp
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4K
Duplicate Requests: NLN 06-66/7
NLN 07-03/12 | 08/02/1969 | B |
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4. Israel – Israeli Nuclear Program

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| 13 | Memorandum
w /
attachment | Haig to HAK
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4L
Duplicate Requests: NLN 06-66/8
NLN 07-03/13 | 8pp
08/04/1969 | B |
| 14 | Memorandum | HAK to the President
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4M
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/19
NLN 06-66/9
NLN 07-03/14 | 3pp
07/04/1969 | B |
| 15 | Memorandum | Richardson to the President
Mandatory Review Request: NLN 02-04/4N
Duplicate Requests: NLN 04-22/20
NLN 07-03/15 | 1pp
08/28/1969 | B |

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NSC Country Files -- Middle East

BOX NUMBER

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FOLDER TITLE

4. Israel -- Israeli Nuclear Program

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-4-

INDICATE:

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ACTION:

Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?

A. We would be prepared to take the position publicly, including in the Security Council, that such action by Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel's security. While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the Security Council on any particular resolution in the absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution, we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned Israel for this act of self-defense.

Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

A. The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--|------------|-------------|
| 1
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | HAK to the President with attachments (6 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6/4/07 | c. 7/1969 | B |
| 2
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab A - Summary of the Situation and Issues (18 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 A <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6/4/07 | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 3
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab B - Scenario for Discussions with Israelis... (4 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 B <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 4
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab C - The Issues for Decision (7 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 C <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 5
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Yitzhak Rabin to Paul Warnke (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 D <i>Exempt per 3.4(b)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 2-27-03 | 11/22/1968 | B |
| 6
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 E <i>Declassified in full OSD 11-20-02 letter</i> | 11/27/1968 | B |
| 7
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (Fourth session) (4 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 F <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 11-20-02</i> | 11/12/1968 | B |
| 8
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Government of Israel (1 page)
NLNS 02-04/4 G <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 11-20-02</i> | 11/26/1968 | B |
| 9
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (3 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 H <i>Declassified in full per EO 12958 OSD letter 10-20-02</i> | 11/29/1968 | B |
| 10
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo w/att. | Tab E - Davies to Kissinger (30 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 I <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6)</i>
EO 12958 per letter 6-4-07 | 05/29/1969 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

612

FOLDER TITLE (4)

Israel - Israeli Nuclear Program

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial and confidential information,
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--|-----------------------|-------------|
| 11 | memo | HAK to the President (7 pages) | 10/08/1969 | B |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/45 <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | | |
| 12 | memo w/att. | Haig to Lake for HAK (4 pages) | 08/02/1969 | B |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/42 <i>Sanitized per 3.4 (b)(1)(6) EOI 2958 per letter 2-27-03</i> | | |
| 13 | memo w/att. | Haig to HAK (8 pages) | 08/04/1969 | B |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/42 <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6) EOI 2958 per letter 6-4-07</i> | | |
| 13A | memo | to HAK (5 pages) | | |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/41 <i>Sanitized per 3.4(b)(1)(6) letter 6-4-07</i> | | |
| 14 | memo | HAK to the President (5 pages) | 07/04/1969 | B |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/41 <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | | |
| 15 | memo | Richardson to the President (1 page) | 08/28/1969 | B |
| MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | REQUEST | NLNS 02-04/41 <i>Declassified 6-4-07</i> | | |
| 13B | memo | Richardson, Robin, et al
NLN 02-04/4L2 (6) pp (copy)
Sanitized per ser. 3.4(b)(1)(6) | 7/29/69
Mr. 6/4/07 | |

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

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Israel - Israeli Nuclear Program

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A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential

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| 2
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NLNS 02-04/4 A | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 3
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab B - Scenario for Discussions with Israelis...(4 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 B | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 4
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | report | Tab C - The Issues for Decision (7 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 C | 07/19/1969 | B |
| 5
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Yitzhak Rabin to Paul Warnke (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 D | 11/22/1968 | B |
| 6
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | letter | Tab D - Paul Warnke to Yitzhak Rabin (2 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 E | 11/27/1968 | B |
| 7
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (Fourth session)(4pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 F | 11/12/1968 | B |
| 8
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memcon | Tab D - Negotiations with Government of Israel (1 page)
NLNS 02-04/4 G | 11/26/1968 | B |
| 9
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | Tab D - Negotiations with Israel (3 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 H | 11/29/1968 | B |
| 10
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo w/att. | Tab E -Davies to Kissinger (30 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4 I | 05/29/1969 | B |

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National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

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Israel - Israeli Nuclear Program

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| 12
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo w/att. | Haig to Lake for HAK (12 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4K | 08/02/1969 | B |
| 13
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo w/att. | Haig to HAK (8 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4L | 08/04/1969 | B |
| 14
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | HAK to the President (3 pages)
NLNS 02-04/4M | 07/04/1969 | B |
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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | memo | Richardson to the President (1 page)
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FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

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FOLDER TITLE

Israel - Israeli Nuclear Program

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

You will recall that you created a special group -- because of the sensitivity of the issue -- to consider the status of the Israeli nuclear program and our possible responses to it. We have met twice at the top level (Packard, Richardson, Helms, Wheeler, Kissinger) to consider analyses drawn up by a small working group under us.

The paper at Tab A is my summary of the situation as our group sees it after reviewing the intelligence and of our discussion of the issues which that situation raises. This is long, but I believe you will want to read through it because this is a complex problem.

THE SITUATION

[REDACTED] We judge that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Near East would increase the dangers in an already dangerous situation and therefore not be in our interest.

Israel has 12 surface-to-surface missiles delivered from France. It has set up a production line and plans by the end of 1970 to have a total force of 24-30, ten of which are programmed for nuclear warheads.

When the Israelis signed the contract buying the Phantom aircraft last November, they committed themselves "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East." But it was plain from the discussion that they interpreted that to mean they could possess nuclear weapons as long as they did not test, deploy, or make them public. In signing the contract, we wrote Rabin saying that we believe mere "possession" constitutes "introduction" and that Israel's introduction of nuclear weapons by our definition would be cause for us to cancel the contract.

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Delivery of the Phantoms is scheduled to begin in September. But some of the aircraft will be ready at the factory in August, and the Israelis have asked to begin taking delivery then.

WHAT WE WANT

There was general agreement in our group that we must recognize one important distinction to begin with:

1. Israel's secret possession of nuclear weapons would increase the potential danger in the Middle East, and we do not desire complicity in it.
2. In this case, public knowledge is almost as dangerous as possession itself. This is what might spark a Soviet nuclear guarantee for the Arabs, tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs and increase the danger of our involvement. Indeed, the Soviets might have an incentive not to know.

What this means is that, while we might ideally like to halt actual Israeli possession, what we really want at a minimum may be just to keep Israeli possession from becoming an established international fact.

In our discussions, the following positions were taken:

1. Everyone agreed that, as a minimum, we want Israel to sign the NPT. This is not because signing will make any difference in Israel's actual nuclear program because Israel could produce warheads clandestinely. Israel's signature would, however, give us a publicly feasible issue to raise with the Israeli government -- a way of opening the discussion. It would also publicly commit Israel not to acquire nuclear weapons.
2. Everyone agreed that, in addition, we should try to get from Israel a bilateral understanding on Israel's nuclear intentions because the NPT is not precise enough and because the Phantom aircraft are potential nuclear weapons carriers.
3. Opinion was divided on the nature of the assurances we should seek and on the tactics of seeking them:

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-- The JCS felt that if Israel's program becomes known, we should be in a position to say we did everything in our power to prevent Israel from going nuclear. JCS felt that we should try to stop Israel's missile production and use the Phantoms as leverage.

-- Defense felt that we could live with the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons provided they were not deployed. Defense agreed that we should try to stop missile production and that we should use the Phantoms as leverage to get the assurances we want.

-- State believed that we should try to keep Israel from going any further with its nuclear weapons program -- it may be so close to completion that Israel would be willing -- and make a record for ourselves of having tried. State has joined in suggesting asking the Israelis to halt production of the missiles. State would not threaten to withhold the Phantoms in the first approach to the Israelis but would be prepared to imply that threat if they were unresponsive to our first approach.

At the end of our discussions, State, Defense, and JCS agreed to describe a course of action which represented as nearly as possible the consensus of our group. Despite the different shades of opinion expressed in our discussions, the State, Defense and JCS members have concurred in the paper at Tab B which proposes asking the Israelis to:

1. Sign the NPT at an early date (by the end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.
2. Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices. [For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear device.]
3. Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile. [NOTE: I do not believe we can ask Israel not to produce missiles. Israel is sovereign in this decision, and I do not see how we can ask it not to produce a weapon just because we do not see it as an effective weapon without nuclear warheads. We might persuade them not to deploy what they

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This paper recommends approaching the Israelis in two steps:

1. First step. Richardson and Packard call in Rabin and say that, in connection with Israel's request to advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we want to tie up loose ends left by the exchange of letters surrounding that contract (i.e., the difference over what would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons). They would stress the importance of Israel's signature of the NPT and ask for Israel's confirmation that "possession" of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute "introduction". They would also say that Israel's development and deployment of missiles -- a nuclear weapons delivery system -- would cast doubt on its nuclear assurances. They would not in this first meeting explicitly link delivery of the Phantoms with Israel's response.
2. Second step. If Rabin tried to stonewall, Richardson and Packard would state exactly what we want and make clear that Israeli unresponsiveness would raise a question about our ability to continue meeting Israel's arms request.

THE DILEMMA WE FACE

Our problem is that Israel will not take us seriously on the nuclear issue unless they believe we are prepared to withhold something they very much need -- the Phantoms or, even more, their whole military supply relationship with us.

On the other hand, if we withhold the Phantoms and they make this fact public in the United States, enormous political pressure will be mounted on us. We will be in an indefensible position if we cannot state why we are withholding the planes. Yet if we explain our position publicly, we will be the ones to make Israel's possession of nuclear weapons public with all the international consequences this entails.

THE OPTIONS

In the end, we have these broad options:

1. Initiate discussion now and try to reach an understanding before delivery of the Phantoms becomes an active issue in September.

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2. Initiate discussion of the nuclear issue in September when Mrs. Meir comes, letting delivery of the Phantoms begin.
3. Initiate discussion of the issue in September and not let delivery begin until we have a satisfactory response to our request for assurances.
4. Not raise the issue.

I recommend the first. I would propose that:

1. Richardson and Packard call in Rabin and go through the first step as outlined in their paper -- express our desire to tie up loose ends on Israel's nuclear assurances to us but not explicitly link delivery of the Phantoms to their reply.
2. If Rabin's reaction is negative, I call Rabin in and stress your concern that they sign the NPT, confirm that they will not "introduce" (defined as "possess") nuclear weapons, and agree not to deploy their missiles.
3. We then take stock before committing ourselves on withholding the Ph antoms.

The rationale for this approach is that:

1. It raises the question with the Israelis before delivery of the Phantoms becomes an active issue. We shall have to find an excuse for not delivering in August, but the scheduled delivery would begin in September. By raising the question now, we at least have a chance to keep the Phantom delivery from becoming an issue.
2. By relating our discussion to the contract, it implies -- without committing us -- that we are questioning the Phantom delivery and thereby encourage the Israelis to take us seriously.

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3. It maintains your control over the point at which we do or do not introduce the threat of withholding the Phantoms.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____

I recommend that you read through the papers that follow before you decide, because this is a complex issue. They are written to help you work your way in more detail through the pros and cons of the major issues (Tab A), to enable you to see how the consensus of the group would play itself out in a course of action (Tab B), and to present to you systematically the principal issues for decision (Tab C). The two remaining papers are background: at Tab D, the exchange of letters consummating the Phantom sale for your reference; at Tab E, the basic working group papers that our group started from.

Attachments

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July 19, 1969

Tab A

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AND ISSUES

This paper is designed (1) to summarize the situation that we now face and (2) to brief the issues which two discussions in the Ad Hoc Review Group have raised. A paper on the operational decisions required is at a following tab.

I. Summary: Elements in the Present Situation

1. Our general intelligence judgment is that:

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Rec 3.3 (6) (1) (16)

--Israel has 12 surface-to-surface missiles delivered from France. Israel has set up a production line and plans by the end of 1970 to have a total force of 24-30, ten of which are programmed for nuclear warheads. The first domestically produced missile is expected to be completed this summer. Preparation of launch facilities is under way.

--There is circumstantial evidence that some fissionable material available for Israel's weapons development was illegally obtained from the United States by about 1965.

2. The intelligence community agrees on the general judgment above. The issue dividing it is the more specific question of whether Israel has already produced completed nuclear weapons.

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Although views in State differ, the institutional position emphasizes that concrete proof is lacking and that Israel is concerned enough about its relations with us -- and aware enough of our opposition to nuclear proliferation -- to think twice about putting nuclear weapons openly in its arsenal.

3. This difference of assessment raises the choice between recording a judgment that Israel may have nuclear weapons and recording only a general judgment as to Israel's capability.

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a. The advantage of recording only the general judgment is that it permits us the freedom of acting as if we believe Israel is still short of assembling a weapon and of leaving to Israel the choice of whether to hide what it has or dismantle it. It also retains our freedom to press Israel to sign the NPT and prevent the USSR from reacting.

b. The disadvantage of not recording the more precise estimate is that only this underscores the immediacy of the problem if we are called on in the Congress, for instance, to justify our position.

4. In signing the contract for sale of the Phantom F-4 aircraft last December, Israel, in a letter, committed itself not to be "the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." The US stated in reply that circumstances requiring cancellation of the agreement would exist in the event of "action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth...."

5. We and Israel differ on what "introducing" nuclear weapons means. Ambassador Rabin believes only testing and making public the fact of possession constitute "introduction." We stated in the exchange of letters confirming the Phantom sale that we consider "physical possession and control of nuclear arms" to constitute "introduction."

6. Before negotiation of the sale, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk told Foreign Minister Eban we felt strongly about Israel's signature on the NPT and stated that political discussions on this issue would precede negotiation. Later, after strong pressure from the Israeli government and approaches from American Jewish leaders, the President instructed Secretary Clifford to sell the planes without conditions. Since the Israelis had already given us the commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in connection with the 1966 sale of the Skyhawk A-4 aircraft, Secretary Clifford permitted its repetition in the 1968 sale. What was new in the 1968 talks was the inconclusive attempt to define the word "introduction."

7. No one in Congress is yet officially aware of the exchange of letters on Israel's promise not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or our reply. Nevertheless, the Administration might have to defend someday the delivery of a nuclear weapons carrier despite our intelligence and the exchange of letters at the time of the sale.

8. Delivery of the Phantoms is scheduled to begin in September, 1969. The planes are almost ready, and the Israelis have asked to begin taking delivery in August.

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9. We do not know exactly how much the Soviets know about Israel's nuclear development. However, the Director of Central Intelligence believes that, while Moscow may not have quite as much detail as we do, the Soviets must be aware of the general state of Israel's nuclear weapons and missile development, though they may not want it publicly known.

10. We do not know exactly how much the Arabs know, but they are aware that Israel's capability in the nuclear field is well-advanced. Both Soviets and Arabs have been surprisingly quiet about this subject.

II. A Central Issue

A. As our response to the above situation is considered, the basic question to keep in mind is: Exactly what development do we most want to prevent? There are two aspects to the question:

1. Israel's secret possession of nuclear weapons would increase the danger in the Near East and, ideally, should be prevented.
2. But the significant international act is public acknowledgement that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. This might spark Soviet nuclear guarantees to the Arabs, tighten the Soviet hold on the Arabs and increase the danger of US-Soviet nuclear confrontation.

III. The Major Issues

BASIC U.S. INTEREST

A. How detrimental to US interests would Israeli possession of nuclear weapons be?

1. Danger of US-Soviet confrontation.
 - a. Israeli possession of nuclear weapons could substantially increase the danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East.

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--If the Israelis are known to have nuclear weapons the Russians might feel obliged either before or during a crisis to indicate that they would retaliate if the Israelis use nuclear weapons. We might feel obliged to indicate that we would respond to Soviet use of nuclear weapons.

--The Israelis, who are one of the few peoples whose survival is genuinely threatened, are probably more likely than almost any other country to actually use their nuclear weapons.

--Because of these dangers, both we and the Russians might find it harder to stay aloof from conflicts in the Middle East.

- b. On the other hand, it can be argued that we and the Russians managed in June, 1967 to agree to remain aloof from the conflict and we might do so again, albeit with some greater difficulty, even if the Israelis are known to have nuclear weapons.

2. Effect on chances for an Arab-Israeli political settlement.

- a. If Israeli possession of nuclear weapons became known, it would sharply reduce the chances for any peace settlement in the near future.

--At the least, diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement would be delayed until the Arabs and the Soviets assessed this development.

--Negotiations would be put off for the foreseeable future. The Arabs believe they cannot negotiate from a position of conventional military inferiority, much less nuclear inferiority.

--Moscow would probably be in a position of resisting Arab pressures for nuclear weapons or nuclear guarantees and would find it more difficult to press the Arabs for diplomatic concessions.

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- b. While accepting these judgments, some would argue that it will also harm chances for a political settlement if we tackle this issue head-on. They would argue that we can persuade the Israelis to give up their nuclear option only in the context of peace and that trying to deny Israel that option will only make the Israelis less willing to make the concessions on territory that will be necessary in a settlement.

3. Charge of US complicity.

- a. If Israel's possession of nuclear weapons became known, the US would be highly vulnerable to charges of complicity in helping Israel become a nuclear power:

--Regardless of what we say, the Arabs will assume that we could have stopped Israel.

--The Administration would have delivered to Israel a nuclear weapons delivery system (Phantoms) [REDACTED] despite a contract stating that it would be cancelled if Israel violated its pledge not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

- b. On the other hand, there is the danger that we will become accomplices by talking to the Israelis, pressing them and failing to get what we want. Then we might look as if we acquiesced, especially if we talked and then went ahead and delivered the Phantoms -- a nuclear weapons carrier -- anyway. Even if we get what we want and the Israelis violate their pledge, we might look like accomplices. There could be an argument for acting in pretended ignorance, [REDACTED]

4. Effects on nuclear proliferation.

- a. World-wide knowledge that the Israelis had nuclear weapons would almost certainly wreck the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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--The Arab states would refuse to ratify the treaty.

--Other powers who might be prepared to sign and ratify the treaty if only the five great powers have nuclear weapons might find it more difficult to accept non-nuclear status if a small power such as Israel is known to have nuclear weapons.

b. Others would argue that adherence by other potential nuclear powers such as the FRG and Japan would be little affected by Israeli behavior.

5. Conclusions: Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons would: Impose a substantial cost on US relations with Arabs and Soviets. Setback NPT efforts. Substantially increase the probability that someone will use nuclear weapons in anger. Increase the risk of Soviet-US confrontation. Make a political settlement all but impossible.

WHAT SHOULD WE WANT?

- B. Can we prevent Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons?
Or to put it more precisely since Israel may already have some nuclear weapons: Could we persuade Israel to freeze its nuclear program where it is?
 1. We assume that it is impossible to deprive Israel of option to put together an operational nuclear capability.
 - a. Regardless of what we think of the military or deterrent value of nuclear weapons in Israel's hands, Israelis feel that in conventional war numbers will eventually tell and that over the long term this makes nuclear weapons necessary.

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- b. The Israeli program is very near fruition, and-- given strong Israeli feeling that Israel's very survival is at stake--it would seem all but impossible politically for an Israeli Prime Minister to give up completely an advantage deemed vital and achieved at considerable cost.
 - c. We have no way of forcing Israel to destroy any nuclear devices or components it may now have-- much less the design data or the technical knowledge in people's minds.
2. If it is impossible to persuade Israel to give up its nuclear option completely, could we persuade Israel to stop its nuclear program where it is?
- a. On the face of it, this seems a difficult but not unattainable objective. It would satisfy Israel's principal aim of being able to put together an operational nuclear capability on short notice-- while avoiding a harsh collision with the US, possible nuclear threats from the USSR and a fatal blow to near-term chances for peace with the Arabs. It could even be consistent with signing the NPT, which has its own escape clause.
 - b. The argument against setting this as our sole aim is that this by itself is not a practical objective:

--Its attainment is unverifiable. We might conceivably persuade Israel to agree to freeze its nuclear program, but it is unrealistic to think that such an agreement would mean that Israel had actually stopped. We would have no way of assuring compliance. Inspection would not work because we could never cover all conceivable Israeli hiding places. This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us-- and may even have stolen from us.

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--It is not in our interest to verify failure to attain it. We do not want to prove to the world that Israel has nuclear weapons, and we would put ourselves in an even more difficult situation than we are in now if we proved it to ourselves.

--It is unreal. Israel may already have nuclear weapons. We may very well want to keep Israel's nuclear program from going further, but that by itself would be small gain if Israel agreed and then made public weapons it may already have.

--We may be better off not talking to the Israelis about where their program stands. We may be in a much better position telling them that we do not want them to possess nuclear weapons and then letting them figure out how to meet our request.

--Putting this in the record as our objective leaves us vulnerable to the charge of complicity in Israel's nuclear program.

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3. Conclusions: Talking about preventing Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons may be a reasonable way to state our purpose to the Israelis or for the record, because keeping nuclear weapons out of the Near East would be safer. Neither of these formulations is precise enough for describing to ourselves what we really want. We cannot prevent acquisition of weapons that may already be there, and it is impossible by inspection to learn what is there.
- 
- We do not simply want to ask for a freeze because that makes accomplices of us. Therefore, for the sake of our own understanding at least we may want to try describing our objective another way. They might be willing to freeze their program about where it is today, but it is impractical for us to state our objective this way.

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C. If there are too many pitfalls in saying to ourselves that we want to stop the Israeli nuclear program where it is, could we state our objective as trying to persuade Israel not to announce its possession of nuclear weapons?

1. It can be argued that the real impact of Israel's nuclear weapons, if any, would be felt only when [REDACTED]

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- a. As long as Israel keeps them secret, both the Arabs and the Soviets can act as if they did not exist. The moment Israel's program becomes an established international fact, the Arab governments will have to cope with another major demonstration of Israeli superiority, and the Soviets will have to cope with substantial Arab pressures for a guarantee against nuclear attack.
- b. Many Israelis would also argue that the first purpose of having nuclear weapons is achieved only when the Arabs know they exist. As Ambassador Rabin said to Assistant Secretary Warnke last fall: No one who has nuclear weapons expects to use them; their first purpose is as a deterrent. And there is no deterrent unless the enemy is aware of it.

2. It can also be argued that Israelis might be persuaded to promise us not to announce their possession of nuclear weapons:

- a. In fact, by Israeli definition they have already made this promise. When Warnke asked Rabin what would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons into the Middle East, Rabin replied that "introduction" would not occur until a weapon had been tested and its existence become publicly known. With that definition in the record, the Israeli government reaffirmed in writing its commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Mid-East.

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- b. Israel's conventional superiority will be sufficient to meet any Arab attack in the foreseeable future.
- 3. The arguments against stating this as our objective-- at least to the Israelis--are that:
 - a. It would establish an indefensible record for us. We would accept complicity in Israel's possession of nuclear weapons by saying in effect: We know what Israel has, but we will close our eyes to it-- and deliver the Phantoms--provided the Israelis promise not to announce what they have. That would not make an easy record to defend before the world against a background of our professed desire to limit nuclear proliferation.
 - b. It puts the Israelis in a position--with our acquiescence--to let the world know indirectly but unmistakably what it has without violating any pledge to us.
- 4. Conclusions:
 - a. Saying that we want to keep Israel's possession of nuclear weapons from becoming an established international fact may come very close to describing what we really want in this case. Our interest is in preventing Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. But since we cannot--and may not want to try to-- control the state of Israel's nuclear program and since Israel may already have nuclear weapons, the one objective we might achieve is to persuade them to keep what they have secret. This would meet our objective because the international implications of an Israeli program are not triggered until it becomes public knowledge.

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- b. While this may be a reasonable description of our real objective to ourselves, it makes an indefensible public record. It leaves us highly vulnerable to the charge of acquiescing in the proliferation of nuclear weapons--and even of abetting it by delivering the Phantom, a nuclear weapons carrier.
- c. Even though keeping Israeli weapons secret may be a fair statement of what we most want, we should not lose sight of the fact that it would also be desirable to stop the Israeli nuclear program where it is, or even roll it back a little. Even though that alone may not be a practical objective, keeping it in our sights does help us keep in mind that our public purpose is preventing proliferation.
- d. We may, therefore, want to differentiate between our private understanding of what we want and what we ask the Israelis for:

--We may want to consider saying to ourselves that our aim is to keep Israel's possession of nuclear weapons from becoming public knowledge and to do what we can to stop further development.

-- But in talking to the Israelis and for the record-- as well as because it is not in our interest for them to have nuclear weapons--we may want to state our position as opposing Israel's "possession" of nuclear weapons, leaving it to the Israelis to figure out how to comply. If they committed themselves not to "possess" nuclear weapons, they would at the same time be promising not to test, deploy or announce.

COURSE OF ACTION

- D. If we decide that Israel's known possession of nuclear weapons would be highly detrimental to our interests and that we might persuade the Israelis to say they do not "possess" such weapons, what is the best tactic to follow?

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1. Should we raise the issue and seek specific Israeli assurances or content ourselves with a general statement of our opposition to proliferation?

a. The arguments for raising the issue directly are:

--This is the only approach that stands any chance of persuading the Israelis to take our interests seriously. Their practice is to read silence as consent.

--If it becomes known that Israel has nuclear weapons, it will be to our advantage to have built a record of attempting to prevent introduction of nuclear weapons into the Mid-East.

b. The arguments against raising the issue in a specific way are:

--While this is debatable, it can be argued that the Israelis are unlikely in the near future to detonate a nuclear device or to publicly announce that they have a nuclear capability. Thus, the distinction between where they themselves will stop and where we might try to get them to stop is too small to risk a confrontation.

--We cannot hold a detailed dialogue with the Israelis and sustain our position publicly without risking making Israel's nuclear capability public knowledge. That could bring on the crisis and the sharp Soviet reaction we are trying to avoid.

--The only hope of getting the Israelis to agree with us to maintain secrecy and sign the NPT is to get an Arab-Israeli political settlement. We should save our leverage with them for this issue.

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2. If we raise the issue, should we hold up delivery of the Phantoms (and even shipment of other conventional weapons) until we get what we want?

a. Con.

--It is important to the US for Israel to be able to defend itself. Halting delivery of the Skyhawks and suspending plans for delivery of the Phantoms would leave Israel with a highly disadvantageous ratio in supersonic aircraft vis-a-vis the UAR next year. While Israel could probably still hold its own on the Suez Canal, its vulnerability would increase.

--A conventional arms embargo might make Israel's recourse to nuclear weapons more--not less--likely.

--The American body politic would generate intolerable political trouble for the Administration--damaging Congressional attacks on Administration programs. Yet, we could not defend our position without making the nuclear issue public.

--If Israel's going nuclear may force us to dissociate ourselves from Israel eventually, we want to set it up to defend itself first so we will not later face the excruciating choice of going to its aid if it gets in trouble.

b. Pro.

--If we believe stopping the Israelis is important enough, this is the only prospect serious enough to have a chance of success.

--They may not want a confrontation with us on this issue. If we make a reasonable request that gives them some flexibility of interpretation and not make a direct threat they might agree to our limited requests and we might not have to carry through our threat. If they are at a good stopping place, they might be able to agree to freeze their program and

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keep it secret with little cost. The only loss to them would be giving up holding the threat of potential nuclear weapons over the Arabs.

--If Israel openly became a nuclear power, we would have little choice anyway but to take our distance. Once Israel's possession of nuclear weapons was known, it would be difficult for Israel to confront us publicly on the nuclear proliferation issue. Our position could be presented as acting in the US interest without jeopardizing Israel's security in the near term as long as we were willing to deliver conventional weapons to a non-nuclear Israel.

- c. Conclusion: There is a serious issue whether we should make this threat now and risk undercutting whatever chance we may have via our diplomatic effort to achieve a peace settlement. The dilemma on that front is that if we don't stop Israel's nuclear development, that will jeopardize the peace effort and increase the danger to us besides.

The real dilemma is how to get Israel to take us seriously without making the nuclear issue public and bringing on a crisis. The only way out of this dilemma seems to be to make the firmest but gentlest approach possible on the assumption that Israel does not want a showdown with us on this issue. There seems little question, however, that we shall make no dent on the Israelis unless we put something they very much want into the balance--at least by implication.

3. Should we try for Israeli assurance that it will stop its strategic missile as well as its nuclear weapons program?

- a. Con.

--Getting the Israelis to abandon their surface-to-surface missile program seems impossible. Their

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~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~
SENSITIVE

- 15 -

assembly line is turning the missiles out now.

--We are on very weak ground provoking a show-down over another sovereign nation's decision to deploy a delivery system that it believes makes sense.

--Nuclear weapons and not missiles are our main objective. We should not overload the circuit.

b. Pro.

The main military justification for these missiles is the nuclear warhead (though the Israelis have also talked of chemical warheads).

--Therefore the deployment of the missiles may provoke the same reaction as the actual deployment of the warheads. Everyone will assume they have nuclear warheads whether they do or not.

--It is a lot easier for us to police Israeli assurances if the missiles are not deployed. We can see missile deployment, and it can be an indicator for us. If missiles are on the launching pads, it is difficult for us to determine whether they have nuclear warheads or not.

- c. Conclusion: Our main objective is to keep secret Israeli nuclear weapons. But because the public impact of missile deployment might be almost the same as nuclear weapons deployment, we might start by trying to persuade the Israelis not to deploy SSM's. We probably cannot persuade them to stop the production line.

RELATION TO THE PEACE EFFORT

4. Might anything be done to have this effort complement rather than undercut our efforts to achieve a political settlement?

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~~TOP SECRET/NODJS~~
SENSITIVE

- 16 -

a. Con.

--The Israelis already doubt our support, as a result of our talks with the Russians on the terms of a settlement. Threatening them on the nuclear issue now would confirm their worst fears.

--If we threatened to cut off Israel's conventional arms supply, it would harden its demand for expanded borders. It would want the added security of strategic borders if it lost what it considers to be the security of advanced weapons.

--Carrying out our threat to cut military supply would make the nuclear issue public and it would be harder for the Arabs to make the concessions necessary for a settlement.

--It is better to play out the present diplomatic effort first and then tackle the nuclear problem.

--Any US effort to encourage the Israelis to get something from the USSR in return for their signature on the NPT would, in effect, involve us in nuclear blackmail.

b. Pro.

--If we don't settle the nuclear problem soon, it could itself wreck the diplomatic effort to achieve a settlement. In fact, the Israelis could well use it at some point to sabotage the peace talks if they did not like the way the talks were going.

--If we want to press the Israelis on the terms of peace, we would be in a more defensible position applying pressure ostensibly for the sake of non-proliferation. If we come to a showdown on either issue--withdrawal or non-proliferation--the main leverage will not be jet aircraft but the total US-Israeli relationship. If we were going to have

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INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/ENDIS (Treaties NODIS)

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-5-

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

Syrian forces in Jordan.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this matter would be made at the highest levels.

Q. Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions are clear and should not be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

END

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

[ROGERS]

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 22, 1970

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Meeting on Jordan

The Situation

1. This morning's reports indicate that the military situation for the moment seems to have stabilized. The Jordanians have turned back a southern Syrian thrust and inflicted losses.
2. Following last night's meeting, our replies to the Israeli questions were given to the Israeli minister here. [Text at Tab A.] In two related further moves:
 - We asked the Israelis for their view of an attack on the Syrian rear from the Golan Heights.
 - We asked Ambassador Brown for direct clarification of King Hussein's personal view on an Israeli ground attack in Jordan as contrasted to an attack in Syria. We have no reply yet.
3. The Soviet Charge yesterday delivered a note to Assistant Secretary Sisco replying to the U.S. request Sunday that the USSR press the Syrians to pull back from Jordan. It is non-polemical, urges prevention of Israeli attack and asks about concentration of U.S. Forces. [Text at Tab B.]
4. There are some straws in the wind this morning that suggest discussing the possibility that the Jordan problem may be resolved in an Arab context. The Israeli military believe Syria will have serious logistical difficulty within 3-4 days. The Arab summit could -- although we should not count on it -- produce a face-saving compromise under which the Syrians would withdraw.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Public and Diplomatic Posture in the Event of Israeli Intervention

1. Congressional Briefings - We have drafted talking points for briefings which include background on the situation and notes (1) that we are informing the Soviets that we have no plans to intervene and warning them not to do so, (2) that we are doing contingency planning for evacuation, and (3) that, if contrary to our expectations, the situation should require a larger direct role we will consult Congress in advance. (Tab C)
2. Public Statements - We have drafted a public statement which reviews the background of the situation and notes (1) that Syria's invasion of Jordan is understandably considered by Israel as a threat to Israel's security and (2) that we have no intention of embarking on other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting unless powers outside the area become involved. (Tab D)
3. United Nations - We are drafting a contingency statement supporting a veto of any motion condemning Israel. This supports our agreement with Israel.
4. Diplomatic Scenario - Messages for our approaches to the USSR, Middle East Nations and our NATO allies have been drafted for this contingency.

Military Readiness

1. Navy - Two Carrier Task Groups (Saratoga and Independence with Cruiser Springfield, 14 destroyers, and 140 aircraft remain off the coast of Lebanon.

An amphibious task force with 1,200 Marines is ready and in position 35 hours off the coast.

A third Carrier Task Group (JOHN F. KENNEDY with two guided missile frigates) will enter the Mediterranean early Friday morning, September 25.

A second amphibious task force (GUAM, additional ships, 17 helos, and a reinforced battalion of 2,814 Marines) has split into fast and slow groups. Will enter Mediterranean on September 27 and 30.

Five Navy P-3 ASW-patrol aircraft are now at Rota.

Two additional attack submarines will enter Mediterranean on September 25 and September 29.

Two additional destroyers will depart the US tomorrow for the Mediterranean

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TOP SECRET

- 3 -

2. Army

One Airborne battalion and one Infantry battalion ready in Europe. Another airborne battalion will be ready at noon today. Transit and load time is 4 hours for first rifle company, 8 hours for the rest. Total force is 1,600 troops. Initial company and battalion air drop; other battalions airland.

82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg has the initial ready force of one airborne company rigged for drop on 6-hour alert. One battalion also is ready on 6-hour alert; an additional battalion will be on same alert by 2:00 p.m. today. Remainder of division on 84-hour alert.

3. Air Force

18 F-4s and 4 C-130s are at Incirlik, Turkey. (Turkey has not authorized us to use the base to launch these aircraft in strikes over Jordan.)

3. Medical Assistance Units

Two hospital units (one in the UK and one in Germany) are loaded and ready to move in one hour. First elements can arrive Amman in 10-11 hours, closing entire unit in 18 hours.

The situation in Amman is such that a medical effort (under the umbrella of the ICRC) may become the most urgent action as soon as the security situation will permit entry of the medical units.

The foregoing military measures will put us in a position to conduct evacuation or intervention operations. They also have a deterrent effect on Soviet intervention.

Military Equipment Packages for Israel and Jordan

-- A package is ready to replace materiel expended by Jordan. Transport plans are complete.

-- Packages of equipment for Israel, in the event of an Israeli move, to (1) replace that expended in the attack and (2) improve defensive posture in the Suez area will be completed today.

Actions to Deter or Counter Soviet Intervention

In addition to the military measures already taken, scenarios of additional military and diplomatic steps to deter or, if necessary, counter Soviet intervention are being refined by the WSAG.

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RID

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

Note Verbale

After discussion in the cabinet, following is a summing up that the Ambassador of Israel has been instructed to convey:

1. Your answers in your oral paper of September 21, 1970 have been brought to the information of the Government of Israel and the Government considers them to be authoritative answers to our questions which we interpret as a formal U.S. approach. We are ready to operate against the Syrians in Jordan. Our intention is to act by air, but if the situation should require, we shall also operate on the ground.
2. Our intention is to succeed and therefore in the event our air action shall not lead to Syrian withdrawal, we shall operate also on the ground.
3. In either case our action shall be directed against the Syrians in Jordan. We are not ready to act against Syria in order to cause withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. We oppose this course of action on both military and political grounds.
4. We consider it essential to arrange a meeting with the King's representative for coordination purposes. Such meeting must take place prior to action, and as soon as possible.
5. We require additional clarification of your oral paper as follows:

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

- 2 -

a) With regard to the containment of Soviet intervention as it appears in your answer to our question 3, we want you to approve to us our interpretation of your position as follows:

"With reference to the answer to question three, we wish to observe that we understand the term "Soviet intervention" as covering Soviet military action and measures undertaken on any of the fronts, including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Furthermore, we understand that the U.S. decision to prevent Soviet intervention would not be restricted to the time of operations undertaken by us with reference to the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that Soviet reaction may be ^a delayed reaction."

b) With regard to equipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in the Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We shall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items of equipment and shall expect to get better treatment than we have been getting these past months.

6. It is our intention to send a message to the King through you after we have had your answer.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9:20AM

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

September 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*
SUBJECT: A Late Development in Jordan



We have a preliminary report on this morning's briefing by the Israeli Defense Ministry which, if confirmed, signifies a major change in the situation in northern Jordan. Our source says the Israelis now believe that one of the Syrian armored brigades has withdrawn from Jordan into Syria and that others are in the process of doing so. The Israelis believe the Syrian tank units are being replaced by Palestinian infantry. They think the Iraqis who moved out of Mafraq yesterday may have moved up toward Ramtha, although this still seems doubtful.

It is too soon to confirm this information, but it should be taken into account at this morning's meeting. On the one hand, this would -- if true -- seem to be an improvement in the military situation. On the other hand, it would leave a strengthened guerrilla force in place and Hussein's long-range problem would have become more difficult. In the new situation, outside intervention would be harder to justify.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN 01-19/33 page 2-7-03 letter

By XMB NARA, Date 5-11-04

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02533 101143Z

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ACTION NEA-15

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 177

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AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

DIA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

R/USINT CAIRO 676

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2533

SUBJECT: PFLP HOSTAGES

1. BILL TUOHY OF LA TIMES AND JESSE LEWIS OF WASHINGTON POST, HOSTAGES AT AL-URDON HOTEL, SUCCESSFULLY SLIPPED AWAY FROM HOTEL THIS MORNING. PLEASE INFORM THEIR RESPECTIVE EMPLOYERS BUT EXPLAIN IT NECESSARY THAT NO RPT NO PUBLICITY BE GIVEN TO THIS FACT. BOTH MEN ARE TRYING TO GET TO BEIRUT TODAY, IF POSSIBLE, BY JORDAN AIR LINES. FLIGHT REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED TO DEPART AMMAN AROUND 1800 HOURS (1600Z). IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT NOT BE MET. GP-3.
ODELL

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02981 101127Z

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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SSCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8774
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2981

EXDIS

JORDAN SITUATION

1. IN RESPONSE DCM REQUEST, GAZIT GAVE FOLLOWING RUNDOWN
ON GOI VIEWS ON JORDAN SITUATION AS OF NOON LOCAL TIME:

A. HELOU HAS CABLED HUSSEIN CONGRATULATIONS ON ESCAPING
ATTACK YESTERDAY MORNING. SO HAS VICE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ.
NASSER HAS SENT RATHER WARM CABLE, THANKING ALLAH FOR
SAVING HUSSEIN. QADAFI TRIED TO PHONE HUSSEIN BUT
COULD NOT GET THROUGH. NOTHING HEARD FROM SYRIA.

B. UAR RADIO HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET ON SUBJECT OF JORDAN
FIGHTING. NOT SO PALESTINIAN RADIO CAIRO, HOWEVER, WHICH
HAS BEEN INCITING TO VIOLENCE AGAINST HUSSEIN REGIME.

C. IRAQ WAS APPARENTLY ONLY ARAB GOVERNMENT TO TAKE POLITICAL
INITIATIVE, AND HAS INTERVENED TO TRY TO ARRANGE CEASEFIRE.
SYRIA HAS ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CEASEFIRE BUT ON TERMS
MORE FAVORABLE TO FEDAYEEN THAN PREVIOUS SITUATION.

D. ON WHOLE, FROM PROPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW THERE IS NO RPT
NO INDICATION OF ASSAULT ON HUSSEIN REGIME FROM OTHER ARAB
COUNTRIES. ONE REPORT IS THAT AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
WILL BE SET UP ON JORDAN TO SIFT AFFAIR AND REPORT TO HUSSEIN;
THIS WOULD BE A GESTURE TOWARDS HUSSEIN'S PRESTIGE. ON OTHER
HAND, GAZIT SAID, ONE ISRAELI ANALYST FEELS THAT
IF HUSSEIN DOES NOT TAKE DECISIVE ACTION AGAINST
FEDAYEEN AT THIS TIME, INCLUDING KILLING A LARGE NUMBER

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 02981 101127Z

17
ACTION SS-45

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TO SSCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8774
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 2981

EXDIS

JORDAN SITUATION

1. IN RESPONSE DCM REQUEST, GAZIT GAVE FOLLOWING RUNDOWN ON GOI VIEWS ON JORDAN SITUATION AS OF NOON LOCAL TIME:

A. HELOU HAS CABLED HUSSEIN CONGRATULATIONS ON ESCAPING ATTACK YESTERDAY MORNING. SO HAS VICE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ. NASSER HAS SENT RATHER WARM CABLE, THANKING ALLAH FOR SAVING HUSSEIN. QADAFI TRIED TO PHONE HUSSEIN BUT COULD NOT GET THROUGH. NOTHING HEARD FROM SYRIA.

B. UAR RADIO HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET ON SUBJECT OF JORDAN FIGHTING. NOT SO PALESTINIAN RADIO CAIRO, HOWEVER, WHICH HAS BEEN INCITING TO VIOLENCE AGAINST HUSSEIN REGIME.

C. IRAQ WAS APPARENTLY ONLY ARAB GOVERNMENT TO TAKE POLITICAL INITIATIVE, AND HAS INTERVENED TO TRY TO ARRANGE CEASEFIRE. SYRIA HAS ALSO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CEASEFIRE BUT ON TERMS MORE FAVORABLE TO FEDAYEEN THAN PREVIOUS SITUATION.

D. ON WHOLE, FROM PROPAGANDA POINT OF VIEW THERE IS NO RPT NO INDICATION OF ASSAULT ON HUSSEIN REGIME FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. ONE REPORT IS THAT AN INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE WILL BE SET UP ON JORDAN TO SIFT AFFAIR AND REPORT TO HUSSEIN; THIS WOULD BE A GESTURE TOWARDS HUSSEIN'S PRESTIGE. ON OTHER HAND, GAZIT SAID, ONE ISRAELI ANALYST FEELS THAT IF HUSSEIN DOES NOT TAKE DECISIVE ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN AT THIS TIME, INCLUDING KILLING A LARGE NUMBER

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 02981 101127Z

("HUNDREDSIF NOT THOUSANDS OF THEM") THEN FEDAYEEN WILL BE OUT TO GET HIM NEXT TIME. ANALYSIST FEELS THAT AS LONG AS HUSSEIN BEHAVES AS GOOD ARAB PATRIOT, WHICH HE IS, AND DOES NOT INDULGE IN BLOODBATH, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT HIS OWN HONORABLE INTENTIONS WILL BE HIS UNDOING AND THAT FEDAYEEN WILL GET HIS HEAD IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. WE REPORT THIS VIEW FOR WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IT MAY BE WORTH.

2. WE ARE KEEPING GOI INFORMED ON FACTUAL SITUATION AS WE RECEIVE INFO. THEY ARE PRESSING US FOR USG ESTIMATE OF SITUATION AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. GP-3.
BARBOUR

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SECRET 1970

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PAGE 01 STATE 089710

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APPROVED BY:S/S-O :GMALONE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089710

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION DIA, SECSTATE INFO BEIRUT, BONN, CAIRO, DHAKHRAN, CINCSRIKE, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, LONDON, AND TEL AVIV ON 10 JUNE FROM USDAO AMMAN. QUOTE:

AMMAN USDAO 234

SUBJ: FIRE FIGHT VICINITY MAJOR PERRY HOME

1. BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICERS AT UK AIRA HOME CAN OBSERVE FIRE FIGHT VICINITY PERRY HOUSE. AMBULANCE NOW APPROACHING HOUSE TO EXTRICATE FAMILY. BRITS REPORT FIRE FIGHT APPARENTLY STARTED WHEN PFLP ATTACKED PASC HEADQUARTERS NEARBY PERRY HOME. HOME BECAME FOCAL POINT IN AND AROUND FIRE FIGHT.

2. CHIEF OF STAFF JORDAN ARAB ARMY IS SENDING ARMY RELIEF TO PERRY HOME. DATT IS LEAVING EMBASSY SHORTLY WITH ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF JAA TO AREA.

UNQUOTE. ROGERS

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02530 1010 Z

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17
ACTION NEA-15

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 175
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
CINCSTRIKE
DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2530

SUBJ DEATH OF MAJOR ROBERT PERRY, ASST. ARMY ATTACHE

REF AMMAN 2520; AMMAN USDAO 233, 234

1. JAA HAS CONFIRMED PERRY'S DEATH. HIS BODY IS IN PALESTINE HOSPITAL, AMMAN.
 2. MRS. PERRY, SON JOHN AND DAUGHTER JESSICA WERE EVACUATED FROM HOME BY FEDAYEEN AND ARE NOW IN MUASHIR HOSPITAL, AMMAN, PHYSICALLY UNHARMED.
 3. BEIRUT PLEASE INFORM SON REYNOLDS PERRY, STUDENT AT ACS.
- GP3
ODELL

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NIXON PRES

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04574 100934Z

18
ACTION NEA-15

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17 JUN 1978 09 55Z

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
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RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 SY-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 RSR-01

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4574

1. PER AMMAN'S 2515, WE ARE NOTIFYING FOUR PEOPLE (MRS. JESSE LEWIS, ROY ESSOYAN OF AP, ABDALLAH SCHLIEFFER OF NBC, AND ACTING HEAD OF UPI) THAT LEWIS, TUOHY, NEELD, HALL AND LOUGHRAM ARE SAFE AT INTERCONTINENTAL BUT CANNOT COMMUNICATE OR TRAVEL BECAUSE PHONES ARE OUT AND ROADS ARE CUT.

2. WE HAVE NOT REVEALED HOSTAGE ANGLE HERE.

3. IF AND WHEN WASHINGTON RELEASES POOL STORY (AMMAN 2516), REQUEST NOTIFICATION SO WE CAN PASS STORY TO CORRESPONDENTS' BEIRUT OFFICES AS IT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED HERE.

4. REQUEST NOTIFICATION BY AMMAN IF GOJ PERMITS DISTRIBUTION OF POOL STORY TO BE FILED LOCALLY.
PORTER

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5-10

15 JUL 1977

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PAGE 01 STATE 089694

19
ORIGIN OPR-02

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01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
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APPROVED BY:NEA:ROGER DAVIES
USIA:IOA:SE:MR. MUELLER (SUBS)
AID:NESA:MR. RICHARDSON (SUBS)
NEA:EX:MR. HUNT (SUBS)
DOD:JCS:J3
NEA:ARN:TWSEELYE
COL. STEWART (SUBS)
O:A:MR. MEYER (SUBS)
S/S-O:GMALONE

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DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 089694

REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO ORDER EVACUATION

REF: AMMAN 2521

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PAGE 02 STATE 089694

1. YOU AUTHORIZED ORDER EVACUATION AT YOUR DISCRETION.
2. FOR AMMAN: IF EVACUATION NECESSARY CHARGE COSTS FOR
USG PERSONNEW AND DEPENDENTS AS FOLLOWS: A. STATE-
APPROPRIATIONS 1900522; ALLOTMENT OK-2036-20; T.O.
0-440. B. AID - IN ACCORDANCE WITH MANUAL ORDER 709.1.
C. USIS - APPROPRIATION 6700100; ALLOTMENT O C - 3006;
T.O. 803163, DATED JUNE 9, 1970. D. DOD - SEE JTR, VOL. ONE,
CHAPTER THREE.
3. BELIEVE WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO USE NON-US AIRLINE FOR
EVACUATION. YOU AUTHORIZED ARRANGE FOREIGN AIRLINE CHARTER
PER I-EE 214.22.
4. BEIRUT DESIGNATED SAFEHAVEN FOR INITIAL MOVEMENT.
5. FOR BEIRUT. PLEASE BE PREPARED TO ARRANGE FOREIGN
AIRLINE CHARTER, IF REQUESTED BY AMMAN.
6. FOR ATHENS, IF BEIRUT NOT, REPEAT NOT SUITABLE, WE PLAN
DESIGNATE ATHENS SAFEHAVEN UNLESS YOU DISAGREE.
ROGERS

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CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
NSA

107 JUN 10 00 24Z

CONFIDENTIAL

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18
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
AID-28 CCO-00 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NIC-01
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SCA-01 SS-20 SY-03 SCS-04 RSR-01 /121 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 171

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2521

REF: AMMAN 2520

REQUEST FOR DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO ORDER EVACUATION

1) SITUATION HERE MAY BE GETTING OUT OF HAND. REFTEL REPORTS
SLAYING BY FEDAYEEN OF ARMY ATTACHED MAJOY ROBERT PERRY AND
WE ARE CONCERNED OVER FACT FSO FOBERT PELLETREAU IS MISSING FOR
OVER TWO HOURS.

2) AS PRACTICAL MATTER IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO ATTEMPT
MOVE AMERICANS TO AIRPORT UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, BU
NEVERTHELESS REQUEST STANDBY AUTHORI Y TO ORDER EVACUATION.

3) DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALERT ALL APPROPRIATE ADDRESSES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 170
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
DIA
CINCSTRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2520

SUBJ: REPORTED KILLING OF ASST ARMY ATTACHE MAJOR ROBERT PERRY

1. AT 0915 LOCAL TIME BRITISH ARMY MILITARY ATTACHE TELEPHONED CHARGE TO SAY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM MRS. PERRY THAT HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN SHOT AND KILLED BY FEDAYEEN.

2. BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE FURTHER REPORTED THAT HE WAS AT TIME OF HIS CALL AT HOME OF BRITISH AIR ATTACHE NEAR PERRY HOUSE AND HE WAS UNABLE TO MOVE BECAUSE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE STATED THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY SPOKEN WITH JAA CHIEF OF STAFF AND ASKED HIS INTERVENTION.
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ACTION NEA-15

INFO WAOCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 UU
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C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2518

SUBJ: SITUATION IN AMMAN 0800 LOCAL (0600Z) JUNE 10

1.

AMMAN THIS MORNING APPEARS SUPERFICIALLY CALM, ASIDE FROM FACT HABASH RPT HABASH'S POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION PALESTINE REMAINS IN CHARGE OF AL-URDON HOTEL (SEPTELS). RELATIVELY LITTLE GUNFIRE WAS HEARD THROUGHOUT CITY DURING NIGHT. RADIO AMMAN HAS BEEN BROADCASTING ELEVEN POINT ANNOUNCEMENT RE CEASE-FIRE, REACHED IN PART BECAUSE OF INTERVENTION OF YASIR ARAFAT.

2. SITUATION HAS BRIEFLY RELAXED TO POINT WHERE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BRING TO EMBASSY ADDITIONAL EMBASSY PERSONNEL WITHOUT HINDRANCE.

FEDAYEEN SMILINGLY BOWED TO PRETTY EMBASSY SECRETARY AS SHE DROVE BY ENROUTE EMBASSY.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02518 100754Z

3. AIR PORT IS SO FAR CLOSED ACCORDING RELIABLE INFORMANTS.

4. WE STILL DO NOT RPT NOT YET HAVE AUTHORITATIVE WORD FROM GOVERNMENT RE NATURE OF CEASE-FIRE OR STATUS OF SITUATION ACCORDING THEIR UNDERSTAFING.

5. ADDITIONAL USG PERSONNEL BELIEVED TO BE AT AL-URDON HOTEL, AND POSSIBLY HOSTAGES, WPILUDE COLONEL BOZMAN, MR. HOLT, MR. ROLLINS, MR. PLUMMER, MR. THIEBURGER.

6. TRAVELLERS FROM DAMASCUS REPORT FEDAYEEN ROADBLOCKS CONTROL PARTS PRINCPQAL NORTH-SOUTH HIGHWAY FROM JERASH TO NORTHERN OUTSKIRTS AMMAN NEAR SUWEILAH.

7. AS FAR AS WE ARE ABLE ASCERTAIN AT THIS MOMENT, ALL AMERICANS IN JORDAN ARE SAFE ALTHOUGH OF COURSE SOME ARE STILL HOSTAGES AT AL-URDON HOTEL. ALL AMERICANS ORDERED TO STAY AT HOME.

8. AT 0830 LOCAL (0630Z), RELIABLE EYEWITNESSES REPORT THAT HEAVY FIGHTING HAS AGAIN BROKEN OUT IN NORTHERNSECTION CITY, PARTICULARLY JABAL HUSSEIN, SCENE OF MUCH OF YESTERDAY'S HEAVY FIGHTING.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2516

SUBJECT: POOLED STORY FROM HOSTAGES

FOLLOWING IS POOLED AP, WASHPOST, LA TIMES, UPI STORY
DICTATED BY NEELD, REFERRED TO IN SEPTEL.

"AMMAN JORDAN JUNE 10 AP

A BAND OF FANATICAL ARAB GUERRILLAS TODAY HELD 32 FOREIGN HOSTAGES,
FOURTEEN OF THEM AMERICAN, IN A LUXURY HOTEL THEY HAD TURNED INTO AN
ARMED CAMP.

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE MARXIST POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
PALESTINE WARNED THEY COULD NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF
THE
HOSTAGES IF THE JORDANIAN ARMY CONTINUED ITS ATTACKS ON

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PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS.

HE IDENTIFIED THE HOSTAGES AS FOURTEEN AMERICAN, FOURTEEN BRITISH, THREE WEST GERMANS AND THE SON OF A FORMER LEBANESE PRESIDENT, DANNY CHAMOUN. ALL WERE GUESTS AT THE HOTEL. THE INCLUDED SEVERAL NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDANTS.

GUESTS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES WERE TOLD THEY WERE FREE TO LEAVE LAST NIGHT BUT IN THE BLACKOUT EMBATTLED JORDANIAN CAPITAL THERE WAS NO WHERE FOR THEM TO GO.

IN A DRAMATIC NEWS CONFERENCE IN THE HOTEL'S CANDLELIT SNACKBAR LAST NIGHT THE GUERRILLA SPOKESMAN CLAIMED JORDANIAN TROOPS HAD BOMBARDED ~~RAHGOLEEBAMPSUSITH DANK DENSHE~~. REFUGEE CAMPS CAUSING MANY DEATHS.

THE GUERRILLAS, TOTING SUBMACHINE GUNS AND WEARING HAND GRENADES AT THEIR BELTS INVADDED THE UNGUARDED JORDAN INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. THEY TOOK UP FIRING POSITIONS ON BEDROOM BALCONIES AND STOOD GUARD AT EVERY EXIT.

THE HOTEL HAD EARLIER COME UNDER FIRE DURING HOURS OF BLOODY STREET FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GUERRILLAS AND JORDANIAN TROOPS.

MOST HOSTAGES AND GUESTS SPENT THE NIGHT HUDDLED IN THE HOTEL BASEMENT. AMMAN HAS BEEN WITHOUT POWER FOR NEARLY 24 HOURS AND GUESTS GROPED THEIR WAY ALONG HOTEL CORRIDORS BY CANDLELIGHT.

WITHIN THE HOTEL HOSTAGES WERE FREE TO DO AS THEY PLEASED AND NONE WAS ILL TREATED. THEY HELPED THEMSELVES TO ICE CREAM FROM THE THE HOTEL

FREEZER AND WERE SERVED A MEAL OF HAMBURGERS AND MASH IN THE BASEMENT.

ALL TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD HAVE BEEN CUT AND NO PLANES ARE FLYING FROM AMMAN."
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C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2515

SUBJECT: HOSTAGES IN HOTEL

REF: STATE 89474

1. HOSTAGES IN HOTEL FINALLY WERE GIVEN PERMISSION BY FEDAYEEN CAPTORS TO TELEPHONE EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO WASH POST JESSE LEWIS, CAPTORS ARE NOT RPT NOT HAWATMI GROUP BUT, RATHER, GEORGE HABBASH'S POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION PALESTINE (PFLP). ALTHOUGH CEASE-FIRE ALLEGEDLY HAS BEEN ARRANGED, PFLP STILL ARE CAUTIOUS. ALL PEOPLE AT HOTEL BEING TREATED COURTEOUSLY BY PFLP. ALL ARE COMFORTABLE. AMERICANS INCLUDE: JESSE LEWIS, WASH POST; BILL TOUHY (LA TIMES); DENNIS NEEDL (AP); WILSON HALL (NBC); GERRY LOUGHRAM (UPI); PETER STURKEN; JAMES TAYLOR AND WIFE, CONSULTANT; PATRICIA REDFORD OF WASH D.C.; REV. AND MRS. DOUGLAS SIDEN OF SAN FRANCISCO; DAVID LONG, INSURANCE REP FROM BEIRUT; DR. SCHRUM OF AMEMBASSY ATHENS; AND

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THREE OR FOUR OTHER USG PERSONNEL WITH OFFICIAL PASSPORTS.

2. AS THIS MESSAGE BEING TYPED, REPORTERS ARE DICTATING OVER PHONE POOLED STORY WHICH THEY HOPE CAN BE CIRCULATED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AGENCIES. IN ANY EVENT, DEPT AND BEIRUT PLEASE INFORM RESPECTIVE EMPLOYERS.

3. TRUST DEPT AND OTHER ADDRESSEES WILL APPRECIATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATIONS HERE IN AMMAN. TRAVEL IN NIGHTTIME HOURS HAS BEEN NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE. TELEPHONES ARE NOT OPERATING. GOVERNMENT LEADERS ARE PHYSICALLY INACCESSIBLE. EVEN AFTER REACHING THEM BY TELEPHONE THEY APPEAR OVERWHELMED WITH THEIR PROBLEMS. WE HAVE BEEN TRYING, SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO ENLIST HELP OF RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE AND AUTHORITIES IN RED CRESENT SOCIETY.

4. WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED (0555Z) THAT, WHATEVER MAY BE STATUS OF TRUCE, FEDAYEEN APPEAR TO BE IN CONTROL OF IMMEDIATE ACCESS ROADS TO AMMN AIRPORT.
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2519

SUBJECT: PFLP HOSTAGES

1. DENNIS NEEDL (AP), HOSTAGE AT HOTEL, JUST TELEPHONED
FOLLOWING, SELF-EXPLANATORY STATEMENT.

"WE ARE READY TO HOLD OUT UNTIL DEATH IF
NECESSARY," SAID A SPOKESMAN FOR POPULAR FRONT IN THE HOTEL.
"WE ARE READY TO DESTROY THE HOTEL AND ALL OUR HOSTAGES IF
OUR DEMANDS ARE NOT MET," HE WARNED. "FOR THE REVOLUTION,
WE ARE ALWAYS SERIOUS." HE SAID THE PFLP REJECTED AN ELEVEN
POINT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVT AND YASIR 'ARAFAT, LEADER
OF THE FATAH GUERRILLAS. "THE PFLP," HE SAID, LOINSISTED ON THE
REMOVAL OF ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF SHARIF NASIR, THE KING'S
UNCLE, AND FIVE OTHER TOP ARMY OFFICERS WHO THEY CLAIMED
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT VIOLENCE. END QUOTE.

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2. WE ASKED NEELD WHETHER THESE DEMANDS HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO GOVT. PFLP SPOKESMAN TOLD NEELD HE WOULD STAND ON THIS STATEMENT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT NO RPT NO JORDAN ARMY NEGOTIATORS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO COME TO HOTEL. IN EARLIER CONVERSATION. JESSE LEWIS TOLD US THAT HE HAD SEEN SENIOR JORDAN ARMY COMMANDERS IN HOTEL IN EARLY MORNING HOURS CARRING ON AMICABLE TALKS WITH PFLP LEADERS IN HOTEL.

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CINCSTRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2511

SUBJECT: DPFLP HOSTAGES

REF: AMMAN 2510

1. FURTHER FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT 322 HOSTAGES MENTIONED REFTTEL ARE STILL IN HOTEL AL-URDAN UNDER CONTROL OF DEMOCRATIC POPULAR FRONT. THEY APPARENTLY HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN TAKEN FROM HOTEL. ACCORDING TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR, DPFLP THREAT TO TAKE THEIR LIVES IF REFUGEE CAMPS ARE SHELLED HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN STATED IN SO MANY WORDS, BUT THE THREAT IS CERTAINLY PRESENT IN THE CONCEPT OF HOSTAGES.

2. GERMAN EMBASSY RECOMMENDING THAT BONN ISSUE STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT. DPFLP ARE NOT RPT NOT YET MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEIR AMBASSADOR IS IN TOUCH WITH JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT.
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

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|-----------------|---------------|--|---------|-------------|
| 3 | cable | DIRNSA to White House
Exempted per sec. 1.4(c)(1) & 3.3(b)(1)(6) E.O. 12958
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
NLN 01-26/1 1pp | 9/26/70 | B |
| 4 | cable | DIRNSA to White House
Exempted per sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6) E.O. 12958
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
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| 5 | cable | DIRNSA to CIA
Exempted per sec. 1.4(c)(1) & 3.3(b)(1)(6) E.O. 12958
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST
NLN 01-26/3 2pp. | 9/25/70 | B |
| 6 | cable | DIRNSA to White House
Exempted per sec. 1.4(c)(1) & 3.3(b)(1)(6) E.O. 12958 | 9/23/70 | B |
| 7 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/23/70 | B |
| 8 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/23/70 | B |
| 9 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/22/70 | B |
| 10 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/22/70 | B |
| 11 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/22/70 | B |
| 12 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 13 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 14 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/21/70 | B |
| 15 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/21/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files, Country Files Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

Jordan Crisis

[p. 1 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
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| 17 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 18 | cable | Nicosia to DIRNSA | 9/21/70 | B |
| 19 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/21/70 | B |
| 20 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 21 | cable | DIRNSA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 22 | telegram | Amemb London to Sec State | 9/20/70 | B |
| 24 | telegram | Sec State to White House NLN 01-26/4
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST 1 pp
Declassified per ltr. 13 Dec. 04 E012958 | 9/21/70 | B |
| 25 | telegram | Sec State to White House NLN 01-26/5
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST 1 pp
Declassified per ltr. 13 Dec 04 E012958 | 9/21/70 | B |
| 28 | report | Intelligence Information Cable | 9/23/70 | B |
| 29 | cable | CIA to White House NLN 01-26/6 1 pp.
per sec 1.4(c)(d) + 3.3(b)(1)(6) ltr 30 Aug 04 E012958 | 9/21/70 | B |
| 30 | cable | CIA to White House NLN 01-26/7 2 pp.
per sec 1.4(c)(d) + 3.3(b)(1)(6) ltr. 30 Aug. 04 E012958 | 9/21/70 | B |
| 31 | cable | Director, FBI to White House, et. al. | 9/21/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files, Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

619

FOLDER TITLE

(2) Jordan Crisis

[2 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

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| 32 | cable | CIA to White House | 9/21/70 | B |
| 34 | cable | CIA to White House | 9/21/70 | B |
| 36 | cable | CIA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 37 | cable | CIA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 38 | cable | CIA to White House | 9/20/70 | B |
| 39 | report | Middle East Current Intelligence Group ^{2 pp.}
NLN 01-26/8 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | 9/20/70 | B |
| 41 | cable | CIA to White House ^{per Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(3)(6) tr. 25 Aug 04 E012958} | 9/23/70 | B |
| 42 | telegram | Sec State to White House | 9/22/70 | B |
| 44 | telegram | Sec State to White House ^{NLN 01-26/9 2 pp.}
Declassified per ltr. 13 Dec 04 E012958 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | 9/21/70 | B |
| 45 | telegram | Sec State to White House ^{NLN 01-26/10}
Declassified per ltr. 13 Dec 04 E012958 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST | 9/21/70 | B |
| 48 | cable | Tel Aviv to DIA | 9/23/70 | B |
| 51 | cable | Tel Aviv to DIA | 9/22/70 | B |
| 55 | cable | Tel Aviv to DIA | 9/21/70 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files Country Files, Middle East

BOX NUMBER

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FOLDER TITLE

(2) Jordan Crisis

[p. 3 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
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SECRET STATE 155203

EXDIS (TREAT AS MODIS)

REF: STATE 155166

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS DELIVERED TO
ISRAELI MINISTER ARBOV AT 12:30 EDT SEPTEMBER 21:

QUOTE:

Q. WILL THE U.S. AGREE TO APPROACH ISRAEL FORMALLY IN
THIS MATTER?

A. WE HAVE INDICATED IN OUR CONVERSATIONS OUR AGREEMENT
IN PRINCIPLE TO THE OPERATION UNDER DISCUSSION. IF
DECISIONS ARE TAKEN TO CONDUCT SUCH AN OPERATION, THEY
SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF THOSE CONVERSATIONS AND THE
FACT THAT OUR COMMON INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED.

Q. WILL THE KING AGREE TO REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE AND TO
UNDERTAKE TO INSTITUTE METHODS OF COMMUNICATION AND
COORDINATION BETWEEN US?

A. WE DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. ISRAEL IS
AWARE OF THE INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER ALLON AND THE KING WHICH WE CONVEYED. WITH
RESPECT TO GROUND OPERATIONS, THE ONLY INDICATION WE HAVE
OF THE JORDAN ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION WAS A STATEMENT BY
ZAID RIFAI TO OUR AMBASSADOR THAT ISRAELI QUOTE GROUND
OPERATIONS ARE FINE IN THE AREA AS LONG AS THEY ARE NOT
HERE IN JORDAN. UNQUOTE. WE ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION
ON THIS QUESTION FROM THE KING. ISRAELI AIR STRIKES HAVE
BEEN REQUESTED OR APPROVED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY THE KING.

Q. HOW WILL THE U.S. ACT TO PREVENT SOVIET PARTICIPATION
OR INVOLVEMENT?

A. ON SEPTEMBER 20 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CALLED UPON THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS IN DAMASCUS
TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDAN.
SECRETARY ROGERS MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS
EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 20. WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO
MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S

TO PERMIT CONDITIONS UNDER DISCUSS
THE U.S. MAY TAKE TO
DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND
AT THE TIME. WE HAVE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR THESE
EVENTUALITIES.

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Q. IS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. WILL SIDE WITH US IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA INCLUDING THE USE OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SYRIAN INVASION OF JORDAN NOT ONLY VIOLATES JORDAN'S INTEGRITY BUT ALSO THREATENS ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THEREFORE ENTITLES ISRAEL TO TAKE ACTIONS IN HER DEFENSE?

A. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE THE POSITION PUBLICLY, INCLUDING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT SUCH ACTION BY ISRAEL REPRESENTED LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE SINCE THE SYRIAN INVASION OF JORDAN THREATENED ISRAEL'S SECURITY. WHILE WE CANNOT STATE PRECISELY HOW WE WOULD VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANY PARTICULAR RESOLUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF PRECISE KNOWLEDGE OF TERMS OF THAT RESOLUTION, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO VETO A RESOLUTION WHICH CONDEMNED ISRAEL FOR THIS ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE.

Q. IS IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL SHALL NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES?

A. THE U.S. SHALL NOT HOLD ISRAEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES RESULTING FROM ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES IN JORDAN.

Q. IS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO ABOVE QUESTIONS SHALL BE MADE ON HIGHEST LEVELS AND NOT LOWER THAN SECRETARY OF STATE?

A. WE AGREE THAT MAJOR U.S. POLICY STATEMENTS ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE MADE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS.

Q. ANSWERS TO ABOVE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A SECRET MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ORAL ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS ARE CLEAR AND SHOULD NOT BE IN THE FORM OF A SECRET MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. ROGERS
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1. UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON HAS JUST INFORMED US AS FOLLOWS:

A. UK EMBASSY AMMAN BELIEVES GOJ WOULD NOT RPT NOT
COOPERATE IN EXPL. VIA ALLIED BRIDGE.

B. BRITISH PLANNING IS NOW FOCUSING ON WORST ASSUMPTION
THAT AMMAN AIRPORT AND ACCESS ROADS WOULD NOT BE
AVAILABLE. (MAY FEEL, AS WE DO, THAT AIR LIFT FROM
AMMAN AIRPORT HIGHLY DESIRABLE IF POSSIBLE.)

C. THEREFORE, UK NOW FOCUSING ON ROAD CONVOY TO AQABA
SIMILAR TO PARA 25 REFUEL CO.

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D. THERE ARE NO UK MERCHANT VESSELS CLOSE ENOUGH TO GULF OF AQABA TO BE OF ASSISTANCE.

E. UK HAS ASKED ISRAELIS NOT TO INTERFERE IF EVACUATION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED FROM AQABA.

F. ALSO HAVE ASKED ISRAELIS IF THEY WOULD PERMIT EVACUEES TO CROSS OVER TO EILAT AND PERMIT AIRLIFT OUT, PROBABLY TO CYPRUS OR BAHRAIN.

G. BRITISH DO NOT THINK ANY MOVEMENT FROM AQABA COULD BEGIN BEFORE WEDNESDAY MORNING YOUR TIME. WE CONCERN IF THAT ROUTE IS CHOSEN.

2. AS YOU AWARE, IF AMMAN AIRPORT USABLE, THERE IS SUFFICIENT AIRLIFT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO TAKE CARE OF YOUR NEEDS IF LOCAL GROUND SECURITY PROBLEMS CAN BE HANDLED. MEA CHARTERS, WHICH BEIRUT CAN ARRANGE, WOULD SEEM TO BE BEST IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, PROVIDED OVERFLIGHT SYRIA-JORDAN BORDER FEASIBLE.

3. WE WILL WAIT UNTIL YOUR NEXT ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION BEFORE PROCEEDING TO CONCERT ON DETAILS INCLUDING TIMING OF BROADCASTS ON VOA, BBC AND HBS (REFTEL B).

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EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

1. AS YOU HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY INFORMED THE ISRAELIS HAVE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION THE QUESTION OF AIR AND GROUND ACTION IN JORDAN (REPEAT IN JORDAN). WE HAVE INFORMED THEM, AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO YOU, THAT THE US AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO AN ISRAELI OPERATION BY AIR AND LAND IN JORDAN, SUBJECT TO CONTINUING REVIEW OF THIS MATTER IN LIGHT OF THE EVOLVING SITUATION. ISRAELIS HAVE NOT TAKEN ANY DECISION AND ARE AWAITING REPLY TO SEVEN QUESTIONS PUT TO US REPORTED SEPTEL. ONE QUESTION IS AS FOLLOWS: WILL THE KING AGREE TO REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE AND UNDERTAKE TO INSTITUTE METHODS OF COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN US?

2. WE ARE RESPONDING TO ISRAELIS WE DO NOT KNOW GOJ VIEWS ON THIS POINT, HAVING AS ONLY GUIDE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN ALLON AND HUSSEIN AND RIFAI'S STATEMENT TO YOU THAT GROUND OPERATIONS ARE FINE IN THE AREA AS LONG AS THEY ARE NOT HERE IN JORDAN.

PLEASE ASCERTAIN KING'S VIEWS ON QUESTION POSED BY GOI.
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S E C R E T STATE 155169

EXDIS

SUBJ: SOVIET REPLY TO US DEMARCHE ON SYRIA

REF: DEPTTEL 154421 AND 154417

1. SOVIET CHARGE* VORONTSOV CALLED ON ASST. SECY. SISCO SEPTEMBER 21 TO PRESENT SOVIET REPLY TO US REQUEST THAT SOVIET UNION

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PRESS SYRIANS TO PULL BACK FROM JORDAN (REFTELS). FOLLOWING IS:
INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF SOVIET REPLY.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NOTES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE CONCERN IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHARP AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND THAT IT (THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES) ALSO CONSIDERS UNACCEPTABLE INTERVENTION IN THE EVENTS IN JORDAN BY OTHER STATES - BOTH THOSE BELONGING AND NOT BELONGING TO THIS REGION.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE GUIDED BY SUCH A LINE ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THAT WHICH CONCERNS THE PREVENTION OF POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS BY ISRAEL TO USE THE GIVEN SITUATION.

ON ITS SIDE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO TAKE STEPS DIRECTED TOWARD FACILITATING THE STOPPING OF FRATRICIDAL CLASHES IN JORDAN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ADHERES TO THE SAME LINE IN ITS CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT BUT HAVE A QUESTION AS TO WHAT AIMS ARE SOUGHT BY THE INCREASED CONCENTRATION OF THE FORCES OF THE SIXTH FLEET OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND ALSO OTHER MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THAT REGION.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM ONCE AGAIN THAT ANY INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE INTO THE EVENTS OCCURRING IN JORDAN COULD EVEN FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.
END TEXT.

3. SISCO ASKED VORONTSOV WHETHER WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS STATEMENT TO MEAN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS TAKING STEPS TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDAN. VORONTSOV SAID HE DID NOT HAVE INFORMATION REGARDING THE EXACT NATURE OF THE CONTACTS TAKING PLACE BUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS USING ALL ITS INFLUENCE IN CONTACTS WITH SYRIA. THE USSR WAS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH BOTH SYRIA AND JORDAN.

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4. VORONTSOV ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN HAD REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE. SISCO REPLIED THE COULD NOT GET INTO DETAILS OF ANY DISCUSSION WITH GOU.

5. VORONTSOV THEN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET. SISCO SAID VORONTSOV COULD REPORT WE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THIS QUESTION. SISCO CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE SOONER WE SAW PRACTICAL RESULTS COMING OUT OF DAMASCUS, THE SOONER THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD BE DEFUSED. ROGERS:

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EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

FOLLOWING ARE SEVEN QUESTIONS WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED
US TO ANSWER IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER
TO UNDERTAKE AIR AND GROUND ACTIONS IN JORDAN:

QTE 1. WILL THE U.S. AGREE TO APPROACH ISRAEL
FORMALLY IN THIS MATTER?

2. WILL THE KING AGREE TO REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE AND
TO UNDERTAKE TO INSTITUTE METHODS OF COMMUNICATION AND
COORDINATION BETWEEN US?

3. HOW WILL THE U.S. ACT TO PREVENT SOVIET PARTICIPATION
OR INVOLVEMENT?

4. IS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. WILL SIDE WITH US IN THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ARENA INCLUDING THE USE OF THE VETO
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SYRIAN
INVASION OF JORDAN NOT ONLY VIOLATES JORDAN'S INTEGRITY BUT
ALSO THREATENS ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND THEREFORE ENTITLES
ISRAEL TO TAKE ACTIONS IN HER DEFENSE.

5. IS IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL SHALL NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES?

6. IS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON ALL
MATTERS PERTAINING TO ABOVE QUESTIONS SHALL BE MADE ON
HIGHEST LEVELS AND NOT LOWER THAN SECRETARY OF STATE?

7. ANSWERS TO ABOVE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE IN THE FORM
OF A SECRET MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. UNQTE
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EXDIS

TREAT AS NODIS

1. SISCO CONVEYED FOLLOWING TO RABIN AT NOON SEPT 21:

A. USG AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO ISRAELI AIR/LAND OPERATION AGAINST SYRIANS IN JORDAN, SUBJECT TO FINAL REVIEW THIS EVENING IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING SITUATION;

B. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY AMMAN TO PASS TO KING HUSSEIN MESSAGE FROM ACTING PRIME MINISTER ALLON SUGGESTING MEETING;

C. WE HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR BROWN TO SEEK KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS RE AIR/LAND ACTION BY ISRAEL. IF KING DISAGREES, WE MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT;

DGM IF ISRAELI OPERATION IS UNDERTAKEN, OUR VIEW OF SUCH OPERATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) IT MUST SUCCEED; (2) WE PREFER IT BE LIMITED TO AIR STRIKE

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2. RABIN SAID NO GOI DECISION TAKEN BUT HE COULD GIVE US FOLLOWING ISRAELI ESTIMATE:

A. TO ELIMINATE SYRIANS IN JORDAN WOULD REQUIRE MASSIVE OPERATION AGAINST TANKS, ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY; IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED SYRIANS WOULD NOT FIGHT;

B. ISRAEL DOES NOT KNOW WHAT REACTION WOULD BE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES -- E.G., IRAQ. ACCORDING ISRAELI INFORMATION THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RECENT IRAQI MOVEMENTS (E.G., AZRAK) THOUGH PURPOSE NOT CLEAR;

C. ISRAEL DOES NOT KNOW WHAT REACTION WOULD BE ALONG SUEZ CANAL.

D. ISRAEL CANNOT PREDICT WHAT SOVIETS MIGHT DO POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY.

3. SUMMING UP, RABIN SAID ISRAEL MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT ACTION BY IT MIGHT BRING UNPLEASANT DEVELOPMENTS. MESSAGE SISCO HAD CONVEYED TO HIM SUGGESTED USG WOULD BE "ONLOOKER", PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE OF PAST 2 OR 3 MONTHS WHEN US HAD MEASURED CAREFULLY EVERY MILITARY ITEM SUPPLIED TO ISRAEL. SISCO DEMURRED, SAYING ALL OF THIS IS IN CONTEXT OF ASSURANCES CONVEYED TO RABIN PREVIOUS EVENING; WE VIEW THIS AS MOST SERIOUS STEP IN TERMS OF OUR OWN AS WELL AS ISRAELI INTERESTS. GP-3. ROGERS
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JORDAN: Current Situation



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Ed/Jim

I closed this file out. Copy of
memo from HAK to Laird, A. Johnson,
& Helms dispatched 9/16 is attached.

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- 2 -

I would suggest something like the following for Ron Ziegler: "We deeply regret the loss of life in the crash landing of the Libyan airliner in the Sinai. We have no direct knowledge of the facts of this incident, and we are not aware of any adequate explanation. We are naturally very deeply concerned over an event like this and express our condolences to the families of those who were reported killed."

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Issues and Talking Points

Prime Minister KIM Chong Pil

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister or Minister Kim

Courtesy Points:

President Park was elected under the new Constitution on December 23, and inaugurated on December 27. Your message of congratulations has been transmitted to him. You should:

- extend personal greetings to President Park and say that you look forward to a continuation of the close relationship between the two nations.

Issues You Should Raise:

1. Our appreciation for ROK role in Viet-Nam. - The ROK agreed to our request that they loan F-5 aircraft and certain of their regimental equipment to the Republic of Viet-Nam. In the past they have agreed to delay departure of their forces serving in Viet-Nam when requested by you, even though the Seoul government has been under some pressure, internally and externally, to withdraw rapidly. You should:

- note ROK decision to defer withdrawal of their forces from Viet-Nam for a month or two during the present impasse in negotiations.
- express your appreciation for the vital role these forces have played in the defense of Viet-Nam, and specifically for Korea's recent agreement to the loan of planes and equipment.

2. Talks between South and North Korea. - The July Fourth communique on the understanding between leaders in Seoul and Pyongyang, is an important step toward resolving the Korean problem. They have agreed on peaceful unification, established a "hot line", agreed to stop slandering each other, and to end propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. Among proposals for cooperative programs now being talked about are joint exploitation of fishery resources and development of tourism in the peninsula. You should:

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GDS

- say we have been extremely pleased to see the progress made in talks between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. While we realize there are many bridges to cross, we believe these talks are an important contribution to reduction of tensions not only in the Korean peninsula but throughout Asia.
- emphasize that the Republic of Korea will continue to have our firm support as it pursues these discussions.

Issues He May Raise:

1. Negotiations with North Make Firm U.S. Support More Essential - Kim will probably summarize developments in North-South contacts and stress the importance of firm U.S. support as a means of strengthening the Republic of Korea hand in negotiations. He will emphasize that this includes continuation of the U.S. troop presence and prompt accomplishment of the program to modernize Republic of Korea forces. You should:

- reiterate that we are very much aware of the importance for the negotiations of our firm support for the Republic of Korea. In this regard we attach great significance to the U.S. security commitment.
- state that we intend to do all we possibly can to carry out the modernization program for the Korean military.
- assure the Prime Minister that we will consult with his government as further troop reductions become necessary.

2. Constitutional Changes - On October 17 President Park began a series of sweeping changes to the ROK governmental structure. Subsequently, in a referendum held under martial law, the Constitution was revised to provide for indirect election of the President to an unlimited number of consecutive six-year terms. Amidst circumstances of curtailed civil liberties, and a highly controlled press and political opposition, Park was reelected on December 23. This move toward authoritarian rule and perpetuation of Park in power has been justified in terms of the South-North talks and a need to adapt democratic institutions to Korean culture. Park's government is making an extensive effort to try to demonstrate to the

Korean public that the United States supports these moves. The Prime Minister will seek to utilize his visit to the U.S. and his discussion with you for this purpose. If Kim raises this matter with you, you should:

- state that the relations between Americans and the Korean people have been such that the United States is deeply interested in the welfare as well as the security of Korea.
- say that our Ambassador in Seoul has kept us informed of the recent changes in the Republic of Korea, and that we will continue to follow these developments closely.

Attachment:

Biographic Information.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

PHILIPPINES

Issues and Talking Points

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo
(Pronounced: ROM-yoo-loh)

Addressed as: Mr. Secretary and General Romulo

Courtesy Points

- shock and concern upon learning of the attempt on Mrs. Marcos' life and our relief that she is recovering so well.

Issues You Should Raise:

- None

Issues He may Raise:

1. Assassination Plots - Philippine authorities, apparently under Marcos' personal direction, are investigating what purports to be a highly complex plot or series of plots to assassinate President Marcos. The Philippine Government is holding an American named August McCormick Lehman, Jr. on suspicion of having been hired, presumably by some leading Filipino figure to assassinate President Marcos. We have offered such assistance as we legally and appropriately can in the investigation of several other Americans who are alleged to have some involvement or connection with these plots. It is conceivable that the publicity being given to these plots is intended to provide further justification for Marcos' declaration of martial law or to discredit and deactivate leading conservative political opponents. If Secretary Romulo should tell you of these plots or ask for US assistance in questioning American citizens, you should:

- express deep concern over the existence of such plots.
- reiterate as appropriate our willingness to render such assistance as we can in the investigation.

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2. US-Philippine Trade and Investment Agreement - The existing "Laurel-Langley" trade and investment agreement expires on July 4, 1974. Marcos would like to start negotiations early in 1973 for a successor agreement. The Philippines would like to get US agreement to extend special non-reciprocal bilateral tariff preferences for the Philippines and to continue the guaranteed floor under the Philippine sugar quota provided by the expiring Laurel-Langley Agreement. We have said that the continuation of such special preferential concessions would be incompatible with US foreign trade policy. Unless and until it seems that the Filipinos are willing to incorporate adequate national treatment provisions and to settle for something less than bilateral tariff preferences and a guaranteed sugar quota, it would be very risky to encourage the idea that negotiations should be undertaken in the near future. If Secretary Romulo raises these issues, you should:

- say that, as we indicated during the course of the joint Philippine-American panel discussions in 1967 and 68, the US would be willing to talk about the possibility of negotiating an FCN or an AER treaty.*
- remind Secretary Romulo that the aspect of such a treaty which would be of most interest to us would be the areas of national treatment which it might provide.
- remind Secretary Romulo that a continuation after 1974 of bilateral tariff preferences would be inconsistent with US foreign trade policies and that sugar quotas are regulated by the US Sugar Act. (In 1972 Philippine quota entitlements under the Sugar Act amounted to over 1.4 million tons, substantially exceeding the 952,000 ton floor guaranteed in the Laurel-Langley Agreement.)

3. Extradition Treaty - The Philippines has proposed the negotiation of an extradition treaty. Embassy Manila, on instructions from the Department, has responded that the US is prepared to enter into informal discussions with a view to ascertaining the expectations and the intentions of both countries regarding the possible nature and scope of an extradition treaty. Depending on the results of these discussions, formal negotiations between duly authorized negotiating teams might begin sometime during the second quarter of 1973. If General Romulo should press for our views regarding the possibility of negotiating an extradition treaty, you should:

- say that you understand that preparations are being made for a preliminary round of informal discussions between Philippine and American study groups in Manila.

* Friendship Commerce and Navigation
Amity and Economic Relations

4. Possible Visit to the US by President Marcos - As long ago as July 1972 President Marcos raised with Ambassador Byroade the idea that he might propose a State visit to the US in February or March 1973. If General Romulo should raise the subject of a possible US State visit for President Marcos, you should:

-- seek to avoid encouraging the idea.

5. Mrs. Marcos Attendance at President Nixon's Inauguration Ceremonies - We were advised by the Philippine Consul General in New York on January 2 that Mrs. Marcos is planning to visit the US to attend President Nixon's inauguration ceremonies. If General Romulo should refer to Mrs. Marcos' proposed visit, you should:

-- advise him that it seems impossible for you to schedule a meeting with Mrs. Marcos on January 19th, as requested by the Philippine Consul General. We are in the process of trying to find out whether suitable arrangements can be made for a medical checkup for her at Walter Reed on the 18th. We will keep in touch with the Philippine Embassy regarding Mrs. Marcos' plans.

6. Land Reform - Success in his land reform program is regarded by President Marcos as the key requirement for continued public acceptance of his martial law rule and for sustained public support for him as President under the existing Constitution and ultimately as Prime Minister under the proposed new Constitution. If Secretary Romulo raises the subject of land reform, you should as appropriate:

-- say that we are sympathetic to the land reform program, that we have been much impressed by the sound, realistic approach the Philippine Government is taking in the development of the program, and that we have been impressed by President Marcos' own evident determination to see the program succeed.

-- say in response to any request from Secretary Romulo for US help with the program that we will be looking for ways in which the US within its capabilities can appropriately provide assistance to the program; but Secretary Romulo will realize that this can, at best, be only supportive of the major effort being undertaken by the Philippines itself.

Attachment: Biographic Information.

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 7D ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Issues and Talking Points

Vice President Yen, Chia-Kan
(Pronounced: YEN Ja-gan)

Addressed as: Mr. Vice President or Your Excellency

Courtesy Points

- Inquire about President Chiang Kai-shek's health, and express your wishes for his speedy recovery from his present indisposition.

Issues You Should Raise

U.S. Defense Commitment. Assurances of continuing US adherence to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty are vital to both foreign and domestic confidence in Taiwan's future security. You should:

- assure him that our policy is to live up to our defense commitment, as well as to maintain close political, economic, and cultural ties. (You may also want to say that if he wishes, he may make this assurance public when he returns to Taiwan.)

Taiwan's Economic Progress. Notwithstanding severe international political setbacks, the Taiwan economy has continued to surge forward (GNP up 11% in 1972; foreign trade up 48%). You should:

- commend the ROC government for Taiwan's remarkable economic progress, and for the steps it has taken to continue economic ties with countries that have broken diplomatic relations.
- note that new US investments on Taiwan (e.g. Ford Motor Co.) demonstrate continued confidence in Taiwan's economic potential.
- express the hope that US-Taiwan trade will continue to grow, and in particular that opportunities will be found for further expansion of US exports.

Issues He May Raise

ROC's International Status. The number of nations

SECRET
GDS

recognizing the ROC has fallen to 39; those recognizing the PRC has grown to 85. Since its ouster from the UN, the ROC has been reduced to minimal participation in international organizations. If Vice President Yen asks for assistance to shore up the ROC's international position, you should:

- note that while we supported PRC entry into the UN, we made a maximum effort to prevent expulsion of the ROC.
- remind him that we worked hard to hold a place for the ROC in other international organizations; recently, and successfully, in the case of the international financial institutions.
- point out that the close diplomatic relations we have with the ROC is clear to all, but that we cannot tell others what is in their own interest in this respect.
- say that in appropriate situations we encourage other countries, which have decided to break diplomatic relations, to maintain economic and cultural ties with the ROC.

US Military Presence. In the Shanghai Communique we stated our intention to reduce forces on Taiwan as tensions in the area permit. Actually, because of Southeast Asian requirements, our forces on Taiwan have increased. Vice President Yen may seek assurances that US force levels will not be reduced substantially after a Viet-Nam settlement. If he raises this issue, you should:

- point out that our policy is to reduce forces on Taiwan as tensions in the area permit, and that the ROC must be prepared for appropriate reductions.
- note that we have continued to assist the ROC in meeting priority defense needs, most recently in our willingness to proceed with a co-assembly/co-production program of F-5Es.
- express appreciation for the ROC's prompt cooperation in the recent transfer of its own F-5As to South Viet-Nam.

Attachment:
Biographic Information.

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 2, 1973

FOR: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: STEPHEN BULL 

RE: Presidential Meeting with Foreign VIPs
Attending Truman Memorial Service

The President reviewed your memorandum relating to the foreign VIPs planning to attend the Truman memorial service and made decisions on the two points contained within the memorandum as follows:

1. The President, in accordance with your recommendation, will meet briefly with President Shazar, Prime Minister Kim and Prime Minister Lynch, at 3:00, 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. respectively on Friday, January 5th. These meetings are primarily courtesy calls and should last for 15 minutes. In addition to these three Heads of Government, the President will meet with Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo at 4:30. This meeting is for "personal reasons", since Romulo is a long-time associate of the President. This meeting with Foreign Secretary Romulo is the only case where he will meet with an individual below the rank of Chief of State or Head of Government on Friday.
2. The President will not be hosting a buffet or any other function for representatives attending the Truman memorial service. That event should be held at the State Department in accordance with the plan they have already developed, and the decision as to whether the Vice President or the Secretary of State should host it should be made at the State Department.

Could you please set up the four meetings (President Shazar - 3:00 p.m., Prime Minister Kim - 3:30 p.m., Prime Minister Lynch - 4:00 p.m., Foreign Secretary Romulo - 4:30 p.m.), having the appropriate briefing papers prepared, and make an appropriate recommendation as to whether there should be Press photos. Could you please confirm the appointments, and the details, with Nell Yates of the Appointments Office.

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman; R. Kennedy; D. Parker; Gen. B. Scowcroft; G. Warren

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: *Talkies for Pres mtyg w/le Pres slogan / Pres Kins / PM Lynch & Philippi Sec of State Affairs Honolulu*
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APPT'S: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8235

SECRET

ACTION

January 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Robert Hormats
Hal Saunders

SUBJECT: EC Trade Agreement with Spain and Israel

After reviewing our December 1 memorandum on this subject (at Tab B), you asked for an explanation of what our recommendations imply operationally.

Operationally you should get in touch with Flanigan either directly or by sending him the memorandum at Tab A, making the following points:

1. You agree with Flanigan that we must tell the EC, the Spanish, and the Israelis that we will not stand by and accept preferential trade arrangements damaging to our legitimate economic interests and will ask for appropriate compensation. Therefore, you agree with Flanigan's proposed decision memorandum and negotiating instructions (attached to his draft memorandum to the President at Tab C).
2. You feel, however, that the EC, Spain, and Israel might regard the proposed \$750 million compensation claim by our negotiators as so extreme as to jeopardize the credibility of our negotiating position.
3. You agree with Flanigan that at the outset of GATT Article XXIII consultations Bill Eberle and an appropriate official from State, probably Casey, should call on the EC, Spain, and Israel to explain our objectives.
4. Finally, and most important, you should recommend to Flanigan that we not present our views to the EC, Spain, and Israel until the President has made the basic policy decisions on how we want to handle the US-European political, security, and economic relationships and our relations with Israel. Point out that we are soon to consider our European relations at a Senior Review Group meeting resulting from the response to NSSM 164.

SECRET GDS3, 12/31/80

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

8670

December 22, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

RICHARD T. KENNEDY

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT:

Israeli Assistance, FY-74

A decision is required on Supporting Assistance for Israel in the fiscal 1974 budget. The table below compares fiscal 1972, 1973, and 1974 levels of all USG aid for Israel.

| | Fiscal Years (\$ million) | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | <u>72 Act.</u> | <u>73 Request</u> | <u>73 CRA*</u> | <u>74 Proj.</u> |
| FMS | 300 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Supporting Assistance | 50 | 50 | 50 | 0-25-50 |
| PL-480 | 55 | 50 | 50 | 58 |
| Housing Guarantees | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Soviet Emigres | 0 | 0 | 50 | 0 |
| Am. Schools & Hosp. | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| Ex-Im Credits | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| Prototype Desalter | 0 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| | 490 | 490 | 538 | 446-471-496 |

*Continuing Resolution Authority

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

The issues are (1) the amount of Supporting Assistance to show in the FY-74 budget: \$0, 25, or 50 million and (2) how to convey this decision to the Israelis.

There's a budget problem in each FY 73 and FY 74. OMB is considering the following possible courses:

--In FY 73, they have considered impounding the \$50 million for Soviet emigres (which Congress provided even though we did not request it). They have recognized that we really cannot do this without opening the USG to a charge of bad faith. So that is not an active issue now except as it leads to the next point.

--In FY 74, OMB proposes eliminating Supporting Assistance for Israel altogether. They would explain to the Israelis that we had released the \$50 million for Soviet emigres in FY 73 only after much thought and say that we did so with the thought that, if released, it could be considered to serve the same purpose as FY 74 SA would have.

The first issue, therefore, is whether we should show \$0 for SA in FY 74 as OMB proposes. Your staff is wary of this approach. Not requesting enough SA funds to provide for Israel--especially if dealt with in the budget process alone--could destroy much of the confidence the President has so carefully cultivated. Moreover, even if we wanted to try to reduce the SA level to zero in consultation with the Israelis, it would deprive the President of a necessary fallback in dealing with the delicate Middle East situation.

Everyone agrees that economically the Israelis do not need Supporting Assistance. Their foreign reserves have been rising, funded in part by US Supporting Assistance. But we feel that it is unwise to move to zero as quickly as OMB proposes. We suggest \$25 million. If we insist on this, OMB may accept it but propose impounding all or part of the FY-73 Soviet Emigre funds. As noted above, we believe the Emigres money should not be impounded. OMB's arguments are that putting any SA in the budget makes it easier for Congress to raise the figure thus eroding SA for Southeast Asia and that this purely grant aid is costliest to us.

The second issue is how to deal with the Israelis on any reduction in the overall assistance level. We are very much concerned that if the cut just shows up in the budget (a) the Israelis will react negatively to our taking this step without consulting with them and (b) will go to the Congress and try to have it restored. We propose, therefore, that someone like George Shultz sit down with an appropriate Israeli, explain the President's serious

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

need to trim his budget and offer to discuss with the Israelis ways of cutting their aid level with the least possible damage to them. This would involve talking with them about which of the several kinds of aid is most useful to them and where we might partly compensate for cuts in the aid level by adjustments in such areas as FMS interest rates or debt repayment schedules. This would not only serve the President's budgetary needs but enhance the atmosphere of consultation in common purpose.

Even though the decision on what figure to show in the budget must be made now, there is time for the consultation described above because individual country programs do not become public until the AID Congressional Presentation Document is submitted in March.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize us to cite as your position \$25 million of Supporting Assistance for Israel in FY-74 with no impounding of FY-73 Soviet Emigres funds.

Approve AK Disapprove _____

2. That you authorize us to arrange with George Shultz for the consultations with the Israelis.

Approve AK Disapprove _____

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: *Supporting Resistance for Israel in the 8774*
Budget

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

47

CONFIDENTIAL

VERY URGENT ACTION

January 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM:

Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with Irish Prime Minister

A talker for the President's meeting with Irish Prime Minister Lynch (scheduled for 3:00 p.m., January 5) is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY A. Denis Clift
EXEMPT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1978

THE WHITE HOUSE

47

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIALACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Irish Prime Minister Lynch
Friday, January 5, 1973
3:00 p.m. (fifteen minutes)
The Oval Office

I. PURPOSE

Prime Minister Lynch is in Washington to attend the Memorial Service for President Truman. In keeping with earlier announced plans, the Prime Minister will remain in the United States on an unofficial visit through January 10 primarily to promote U.S. investment in Ireland. This meeting will provide the opportunity for a brief review of issues of mutual interest to the United States and Ireland.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

- A. Background. In mid-December, the Irish Government announced that Prime Minister Lynch planned to visit the United States during the period January 5-11 to promote U.S. investment in Ireland. While unannounced, it was also indicated by the Prime Minister's office that he hoped to dampen private U.S. support for the IRA and to settle US-Irish civil air landing rights problems.

Recent months have been a very active and relatively successful period for the Lynch Government. As you know, Ireland has just entered the Common Market. With regard to the Ulster crisis, Lynch has taken courageous action to combat IRA activities in the Republic. On December 1, he pushed through a bill, against heavy opposition, making it easier for Ireland to convict IRA leaders, and his government has arrested and convicted top IRA leader Sean Mac Stiofain.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1978

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 025

PAGE 01 SEL AV 07411 01 OF 02 110833Z

12

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 10-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-08 H-02 INR-09

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7411

SUBJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SUMMARY: FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS MINDEF DAYAN HAS BEEN CHALLENGING RULING LABOR PARTY TO REVISE ITS POLICY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. DAYAN HAS BEEN CONTENDING THAT IN ABSENCE OF SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT, CONTRACTUAL PEACE WITH JORDAN IS NOT FEASIBLE. BY NOW IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT WHAT DAYAN MEANS IS THAT THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AREA IS NOT YET CONDUCTIVE FOR THE KIND OF PEACE TREATY HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE. DAYAN HAS BEEN ASSERTING THAT WHAT ISRAEL MUST GUARANTEE IN A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN IS NOT SO MUCH "SECURITY" IN TERRITORIAL TERMS, BUT A CLOSE MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP OF INTERDEPENDENCE UNDER WHICH THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION, INTER ALIA, ABOUT RIGHT OF ISRAELIS TO LIVE, PRAY AND WORK IN WEST BANK, REGARDLESS WHAT FLAG WOULD BE FLYING OVER THE AREA. DAYAN ARGUES THAT THE WAY TO GO ABOUT THIS IS THROUGH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF WEST BANK (AND ALSO OF GAZA STRIP) WITH ISRAEL, THEREBY RAISING ARAB STANDARD OF LIVING TO ONE OF EQUALITY WITH ISRAELI CITIZENS AND MODERNIZING ARAB WAY OF LIFE AND THINKING. AT SAME TIME HE WOULD HAVE ISRAEL DEVELOP

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 07411 01 OF 02 110833Z

FURTHER PRACTICAL AND INFORMAL ACCOMMODATIONS WITH JORDAN TO GIVE ARAB RESIDENTS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND CULTURAL OUTLET. DAYAN HAS BEEN PRESSING VIEW THAT ANY STEP HAVING EFFECT OF ISOLATING TERRITORIES FROM ISRAEL, SUCH AS CUTTING BACK OR ENTIRELY ELIMINATING ACCESS TO ISRAELI EMPLOYMENT MARKET FOR WORKERS FROM TERRITORIES, WILL ONLY IMPEDE COEXISTENCE PROCESS REQUIRED TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH JORDAN. MRS MEIR HAS NOW CALLED HALT TO FORMAL PARTY DISCUSSION ON TERRITORIES BUT INTEREST GENERATED LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME TO COME, EVEN THOUGH DAYAN VIEWS ARE LARGELY REJECTED BY MAJORITY OF HIS PARTY, WHO FEAR THAT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IMPLIES POLITICAL INTEGRATION. END SUMMARY.

1. PRIME MINISTER MEIR NOVEMBER 8 CALLED HALT TO LABOR PARTY DEBATE OVER ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHICH HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE OVER PAST FEW WEEKS AND HAD BEEN INITIATED BY DAYAN ON JULY 29 (TELAVIV 1967). BUT DAYAN, BY FINALLY MAKING CLEARER HIS THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT OVER PAST FEW WEEKS, HAS SO STIMULATED INTEREST WITHIN BOTH PARTY AND PUBLIC AT LARGE IN TAKING NEW LOOK AT ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH ARABS UNDER ITS CONTROL, THAT WE SUSPECT PARTY'S DEBATE WILL HAVE REVERBERATIONS FOR SOME TIME TO COME, MOREOVER, QUESTION OF LABOR PARTY POSITION ON TERRITORIES WILL COME UP AGAIN IN MID-1973 WHEN PARTY REVIEWS ITS PLATFORM IN PREPARATION FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS, AND DAYAN HAS PREPARED HIS GROUND FOR RENEWED CAMPAIGN FOR GOI CHANGE IN DIRECTION.

2. DEBATE HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT FORMALLY IN SESSIONS OF HIGHEST PARTY ORGANS AND AT AN INFORMAL LEVEL THROUGH EXTENSIVE USE OF MEDIA. IN PAST FEW MONTHS, DAYAN HAS FAITHFULLY ATTENDED ALL PARTY SESSIONS AND HAS DIRECTLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO DEBATE THROUGH (FOR DAYAN) UNUSUAL NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS AND SPEECHES. THROUGH MOST POLITICAL ANALYSTS IN ISRAEL DO NOT DOUBT SINCERITY OF DAYAN'S VIEWS ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PEACE WITH JORDAN, THEY TEND TO INTERPRET HIS CURRENT INITIATIVE AS PRE-ELECTION MANEUVERING WITHIN LABOR PARTY, AND SOME SEE IT AS PART OF STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO MRS MEIR'S POSITION. THOSE WHO GO EVEN FURTHER AND ASSERT DAYAN IS INSINCERE POINT TO THE IMPRACTICALITY OF HIS COEXISTENCE VISION AND BY HIS STEADY REFUSAL TO ADDRESS HIMSELF TO THE ISSUE OF JORDAN'S ISRAELI BOUNDARY QUESTION. THERE IS SOME CONCERN THAT DAYAN'S CURRENT CAMPAIGN IS LITTLE MORE THAN A GAMBIT FOR CREATING DE

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 07411 01 OF 02 110833Z

FACTO ANNEXATION OF WEST BANK, AND SOME OF THEM CLAIM DAYAN IS GRANDSTANDING TO INCREASE HIS POPULARITY AMONG THE BROAD CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN KNESSET WHICH ADVOCATE IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL ANNEXATION OF WEST BANK.

3. THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, IS PERSUASIVE. A NUMBER OF ISRAELI POLITICIANS MAKE A CONVINCING CASE THAT MRS MEIR WILL CONTINUE IN OFFICE AFTER ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR FALL 1973 AT LEAST FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WHILE THERE IS SUFFICIENT DOUBT ON THIS POINT TO JUSTIFY SOME CONTINGENCY MANEUVERING WITHIN LABOR PARTY, IT IS UNLIKELY DAYAN WOULD FULLY COMMIT HIMSELF TO SUCCESSION BATTLE UNTIL MRS MEIR'S PLANS ARE FIRM. ALSO DAYAN PROBABLY HAS FEW ILLUSIONS AS TO HIS CHANCES TO SUCCEED HER, GIVEN PARTY MACHINERY WHICH IS STACKED AGAINST HIM. TO SORROW OF HIS RAFI FACTION COLLEAGUES, DAYAN HAS NEVER SHOWN ANY TASTE FOR SUSTAINED POLITICAL IN-FIGHTING TO STRENGTHEN HIS FACTION'S OR HIS OWN STANDING IN PARTY (EVEN THOUGH HE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD LIKE TO BE PRIME). THUS, EMBASSY DISAGREES WITH POLITICAL ANALYSTS WHO CONTEND DAYAN'S CURRENT CAMPAIGN IS SOLELY POLITICAL MANEUVER AND CONCLUDES DAYAN IS ENGAGED IN SERIOUS EFFORT TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN LABOR PARTY, AND THUS GOI, POLICY, CHANGES WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED WOULD GIVE HIM NEW CHALLENGES AND GREATER AUTHORITY IN DEVELOPMENT OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

4. DAYAN LIKE MANY OTHERS IN GOI APPEARS CONVINCED THAT NEGOTIATED PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN SHOULD NOT COME BEFORE BREAKTHROUGH IN IMPASSE WITH EGYPT. DAYAN HAS MADE IT CLEAR OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS THAT HE BELIEVES EGYPT HOLD KEY TO PEACE IN AREA. WITH EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT IN POCKET, PRIMARY THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY WOULD BE RESOLVED, ISRAEL WOULD NO LONGER FACE THREAT OF COORDINATED ARAB ATTACK ON ALL FRONTS, AND COULD AFFORD MORE COMPROMISING ATTITUDE IN TERMS OF SECURITY WHEN NEGOTIATING COMPLEXITIES OF SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN. JORDANIANS ALSO COULD TAKE MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE ON QUESTIONS OF FUTURE DIRECT RELATIONSHIPS, DAYAN HAS POINTED OUT.

5. DAYAN SEEMS CONVINCED THAT HUSSEIN, EVEN WITH BEST OF INTENTIONS, COULD NOT AGREE TO DEGREE OF DE FACTO ISRAELI CONTROLS OVER WEST BANK HE COULD CONCEIVE ISRAEL WOULD GIVE TO JORDAN. DAYAN ADVOCATES THAT ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW MORE OF JORDAN THAN SECURITY. HE HAS SAID A NUMBER OF YEARS PUBLICLY

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REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT PEACE WITH JORDAN MUST GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ISRAELIS IN WEST BANK TO INCLUDE RIGHT TO LIVE IN AREA AND CERTAINLY RIGHT TO WORSHIP THERE. CURRENTLY HE HAS BEEN STRESSING VALUE FOR SAKE OF ARAB-ISRAELI COEXISTENCE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF INHABITANTS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INSIDE PREWAR ISRAEL. THIS ALSO IS NOT NEW THEME FOR DAYAN: IN APRIL 1968 NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW HE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT SOME DAY IF INDIVIDUAL WEST BANKERS, FOR PRIVATE, NON-POLITICAL REASONS, SHOULD WISH TO SETTLE INSIDE PREWAR ISRAEL, THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO. DAYAN SAYS, HOWEVER, THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HOW CONTINUED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND WEST BANK CAN BE ASSURED IF ISRAEL REACHES SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN NOW, UNDER WHICH CONTROL OF LARGE PART OF WEST BANK WOULD REVERT TO JORDAN. EVEN IF, ACCORDING TO DAYAN THESIS, AMMAN DID AGREE ON CONTINUED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AMMAN WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURES FROM OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND MIGHT GO BACK ON ITS WORD. DAYAN PHILOSOPHY IS THAT CURRENT PROCESS OF ARAB-ISRAELI FAMILIARIZATION AND COOPERATION NEED TO BE ALLOWED TO GO ON FOR SOME TIME IN ORDER THAT BOTH ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE FACED WITH DOMESTIC POPULAR OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPT TO REIMPOSE STULTIFYING ISOLATION OF PRE-1967 SITUATION.

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-08 H-02 INR-09

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7411

SUBJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

6. ALTHOUGH CONTRACTUAL PEACE WITH JORDAN NOT DESIRABLE OR FEASIBLE IN DAYAN'S VIEW AT THIS TIME, HE DOES CERTAINLY NOT ADVOCATE THAT CURRENT LEVEL OF RELATIONS WITH EITHER WEST BANK OR JORDAN CAN OR SHOULD REMAIN STATIC. DAYAN CLAIMS THAT ISRAEL CAN MATERIALLY CHANGE ENVIRONMENT IN AREA TO ONE MORE PROPITIOUS FOR FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN BY ACTIVELY DEMONSTRATING TO WEST BANKERS AND THROUGH THEM TO JORDANIANS PLAUSIBILITY AND MATERIAL AND SOCIAL ADVANTAGES OF LIVING TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL. DAYAN SAYS THAT CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE, BUT HE HAS BEEN STRESSING IDEAS ISRAEL HAS NOW REACHED A PLATEAU IN ITS RELATIONS WITH WEST BANKERS AND CANNOT CONTINUE TO PROGRESS UNLESS GOI ADOPTS A DYNAMIC POLICY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL-WELFARE INTEGRATION OF TERRITORIES' POPULATION (MEANING GOI INVESTMENTS). GIVEN THESE INVESTMENTS, DAYAN CLAIMS ISRAEL CAN, IN SPAN OF A FEW YEARS, PROVIDE POPULATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH SERVICES, WAGES, AND STANDARD OF LIVING NOW ENJOYED BY ISRAELI CITIZENS.

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WITH ALL THAT HE CONTENDS WOULD AUTOMATICALLY FLOW FROM SUCH GRASS ROOTS TRANSITION, INCLUDING POLITICAL NATURING OF POPULATION AND EMERGENCE OF MODER AND "RATIONAL" LEADERSHIP.

7. AT SAME TIME DAYAN HOPE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS OR DE FACTO UNDERSTANDINGS WITH JORDAN TO PROVIDE EVEN GREATER NORMALIZATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND TO GUARANTEE RESIDENTS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, NOT ONLY FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL ACCESS TO ARAB WORLD, BUT ALSO A LEGITIMATE NON-ISRAELI OUTLET FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION. IN END, DAYAN APPARENTLY FEELS THAT MATERIAL EQUALITY WITH ISRAELIS AND POLITICAL OUTLET THROUGH JORDAN WILL ENGENDER ENVIRONMENT OF COOPERATION SO STRONG THAT MANY OF THE DIFFERENCES WHICH NOW SEEM INSURMOUNTABLE IN CONCLUDING CONTRACTUAL PEACE WITH JORDAN WILL HAVE DISAPPEARED.

8. DAYAN HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY UNCLEAR ABOUT WHAT THIS ULTIMATE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN WOULD LOOK LIKE. EMBASSY SUSPECTS THAT THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO CONCLUDE THAT DAYAN THEREBY IS CONCEALING SOMETHING AND REALLY WANTS ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER WEST BANK HAVE MISREAD HIM. ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME PROPOSED BY TRANSPORT MINISTER AND DAYAN SUPPORTER PERES IS FEDERAL STRUCTURE DIVIDING ADMINISTRATION BUT NOT LAND, EVIDENTLY MEANING AN ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONDOMINIUM OVER WEST BANK. CONCEIVABLY THIS REFLECTS DAYAN'S OWN THINKING, BUT WE ARE MORE INCLINED TO VIEW THAT ANY ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY ISRAELI SECURITY, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, AND CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS FOR ISRAELIS IN WEST BANK ARE GUARANTEED WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO DAYAN. HE TAKES POSITION THAT THE ONLY GUARANTEE TODAY IS DIRECT ISRAELI CONTROL OF TERRITORIES, BUT HE APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT, WITHIN CONTEXT OF THE DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT HE HOPES TO CREATE, REQUIREMENT FOR ISRAELI CONTROL MAY DISAPPEAR OR TAKE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FORM MORE ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN.

9. IN REFUSING TO SPECULATE ON WHAT EVENTUAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN MIGHT LOOK LIKE, DAYAN GOES ON TO SAY THAT THIS IS BOTH FRUITLESS AND HARMFUL EXERCISE AT THIS POINT IN TIME AND THAT OTHER ISRAELIS SHOULD ALSO REFRAIN FROM IT. PREJUDGING TERMS OF ULTIMATE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT TODAY BY DRAWING MAPS OR BY ISOLATING POPULATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES FROM ISRAELI ECONOMY AND SOCIETY CAN, ACCORDING TO DAYAN'S THESIS, ONLY IMPEDE PROCESS OF "LIVING TOGETHER" WHICH HE CLAIMS IS NECESSARY FOR

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REAL PEACE, AND THUS WILL DELAY ADVENT OF PEACE. DAYAN THUS DISAGREES WITH THOSE IN GOI (PARTICULARLY SAPIR AND ALLON) WHO FEAR THAT ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF TERRITORIES WITH ISRAEL IMPLIES POLITICAL INTEGRATION, AND WHO DO NOT WANT TO RISK ALTERING CHARACTER OF JEWISH STATE EITHER BY LARGE INFLUX OF ARAB CITIZENS THROUGH ANNEXATION OF MOST OF WEST BANK UNDER A STEELEMENT OR BY ALLOWING MANY THOUSANDS OF WORKERS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO CONTINUE EMPLOYMENT IN ISRAEL INDEFINITELY AND THUS BECOME A NECESSITY WHICH COULD INVOLVE NEED TO GRANT THEM PERMANENT STATUS OF SOME KIND INSIDE ISRAEL.

10. DAYAN IS RECOGNIZED AS KEY VOICE ON SECURITY MATTERS IN CABINET, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER HAS BEEN LEFT TO RULE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MORE OR LESS AS HE SEES FIT, AND HAS SOLD HIS POLICY FOR TERRITORIES IN PAST LARGELY ON THE BASIS THAT LIGHT BUT FIRM HAND REDUCES THREAT FROM ARAB POPULATION TO ISRAEL'S INTERNAL SECURITY. IN LATEST SESSION OF OFFICIAL DEBATE IN LABOR PARTY SECRETARIAT OVER ISRAEL'S FUTURE POLICY IN TERRITORIES, DAYAN SUPPORTER PERES JUSTIFIED DAYAN'S CALL FOR PARTY TO ADAPT HIS CONCEPT RE TERRITORIES ON INTERNAL SECURITY GROUNDS. HOWEVER, DAYAN'S PROPOSED POLICY IS MUCH MORE FAR-REACHING IN ITS IMPLICATIONS AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, POLICY ACTUALLY IMPINGES DIRECTLY ON BASIS ISRAELI APPROACH TOWARD PEACE AND FUTURE CHARACTER OF STATE OF ISRAEL, AND IN THESE MATTERS DAYAN DEFINITELY DOES NOT PLAY PIVOTAL ROLE.

11. IN MOVING NOVEMBER 8 TO CUT OFF DAYAN-INSPIRED DEBATE ON TERRITORIES, MRS MEIR MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT DANGERS OF BREACH IN PARTY OVER ISSUE AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY THAT DAYAN'S VIEWS COULD GATHER A FOLLOWING. SHE DECLARED THAT DEBATE IN LABOR PARTY ON TERRITORIES POLICY SHOULD BE TERMINATED, ONCE NOVEMBER 9 SESSION AND A FINAL SESSION AT WHICH DAYAN WOULD MAKE CONCLUDING REMARKS HAVE BEEN HELD. SHE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT POLITICAL DECISION WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN WHEN THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF PEACE WILL ALSO DETERMINE QUESTION OF FUTURE ECONOMIC RELATIONS -- IMPLYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE MEANWHILE IN STATUS QUO AND THAT SHE THUS DID NOT AGREE WITH DAYAN. SHE HASTENED TO ADD THAT PERHAPS ISRAEL HAD NOT DONE ENOUGH SOCIALLY FOR TERRITORIES AND THAT SHE WAS PREPARED TO SEE GREATER GOI EFFORT TO DEVELOP EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN TERRITORIES BY ENCOURAGING LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS, POSSIBLY WITH ISRAELI PARTNERS BUT NOT UNDER EXCLUSIVE ISRAELI.

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OWNERSHIP. THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONCESSION TO DAYAN VIEWPOINT. SHE INSISTED GOI HAS NOT DRAWN ANY FUTURE MAPS AND DISMISSED QUESTION IMPLYING THAT LOCATIONS OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN TERRITORIES DEFINED A DE FACTO MAP. GIVEN OPPOSITION OF MRS MEIR AND OTHERS IN LABOR PARTY, WE DOUBT THAT HE WILL SUCCEED IN BRINGING ABOUT MAJOR CHANGES IN PARTY POLICY, BUT BY REMAINING A THORN IN PARTY'S SIDE, HE MAY MAKE SOME LIMITED PRACTICAL GAINS IN WHAT HE IS ABLE TO CARRY OUT IN DAY-TO-DAY ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES.

GDS.
BARBOUR

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Handwritten
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✓

Handed to HRC by
Robin
Oct. 6, 1972.

The text was written down from memory by an immigrant who saw the document immediately after the local OVIR office in Kiev advised prospective emigrants about the requirement of the payments for diplomas. It is reasonable to assume that there are some inaccuracies in the precise wording. However, the immigrant maintains that he did remember accurately the substance of the document.

Decision

of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 573
August 3, 1972.

1. To approve the instructions worked out by the Ministry of Finance and by the Ministry of Higher Education on reimbursement for expenditures of education in higher educational institutions by persons leaving for permanent residence in capitalist countries.
2. To permit the agencies of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in exceptional cases to waive partly or fully the payment of reimbursement for the expenditures for education in higher educational institutions. .

Decree

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to approve the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on reimbursement for expenditures for education in higher educational institutions by persons who leave for permanent residence in capitalist countries.

Podgorny
Georgadze



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1972

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Negotiations with Israel

Consultations will be held with Israel the week of November 6, to consider the Israeli request for additional airline landing rights at Chicago and/or one or more other United States points. At present the Israeli airline, El Al, is authorized to serve New York only.

Israel has long desired additional United States points and last year requested negotiations with that goal in mind. Since the economic balance under the existing Air Transport Agreement continues to be heavily weighted in favor of El Al (TWA is the only U.S. airline serving Israel), and since granting rights at Chicago would give us great difficulties with other countries also seeking Chicago (Belgium, Spain, Japan, Iran), we attempted to convince the Israelis that it would not be productive to enter into such negotiations. However, Israel has now insisted that consultations be held, and we have agreed to hold them as we are required to do under the provisions of the bilateral Agreement.

In addition to pressing for expanded landing rights in the United States, we expect Israel to raise its desire to add Bucharest as an intermediate point on its route to the United States. (We have taken the position that Israel cannot unilaterally add such an intermediate point under the terms of the Agreement, while Israel claims it can. We offered in May our agreement to the addition of Bucharest if Israel would agree with us on a moratorium to that section of the Agreement covering such route additions. We have received no reply from Israel to this offer.)

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It is difficult at this point to see what Israel can offer us to counterbalance the concession of the additional rights it is seeking. The consultations may, however, turn up new data and new ideas and, in any case, will serve as an expression of our good will and readiness to discuss frankly problems of mutual interest.

R. Miller for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE CASE FOR UPDATING AIR SERVICE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL

1. In 1950 when the presently effective Air Transport Agreement was concluded between the United States and Israel, New York was practically the only U.S. departure and arrival point for flights to and from Europe and the Middle East. Since that time virtually all of the transatlantic airlines have been given additional traffic points in the U.S. An important exception, however, is Israel.
2. Although Israel has had a much greater justification for expanded rights due to the fact that it has successfully devoted its energies to the promotion of third and fourth freedom traffic between the two countries, its request in 1968 was rejected even though certain European fifth freedom carriers had previously been awarded additional traffic rights in the U.S.
3. For its part Israel granted unlimited rights to the U.S. airline to fly from any and all points in the U.S. to Israel. Moreover, Israel has not attempted to limit the nature of the TWA operation beyond Israel (a practice which has been followed by some other countries) notwithstanding the fact that the TWA service today is much different than that contemplated in 1950.
4. There seems to have been little recognition that the instability in the Arab World today makes Tel Aviv a much more important stop on the TWA route to the Far East.
5. TWA has concentrated on traffic between the U.S. and Europe and between Europe and Israel while Israel has been developing the market between the two countries. Notwithstanding this difference

in emphasis TWA has been showing significant gains in direct traffic in recent years as its service has been improved.

6. While TWA has been increasing its percentage of the market, the El Al proportion has been on the down swing due to the relative decline of New York, which is now only one of many U.S. transatlantic gateways.

7. The European airlines such as KLM and SAS have gained access to multiple U.S. gateways while Israel continues to be restricted to the single point, New York, which completely ignores the shifting in the U.S. market and changes in technology.

8. Today TWA offers direct service to Israel from six U.S. cities with good TWA connections from many others.

9. When the U.S.-Israel Air Transport Agreement was concluded in 1950, transatlantic travel involved about 300,000 passenger crossings per year. Today transatlantic traffic between the U.S. and Europe and Israel is close to 10,000,000. Yet Israel is required to continue to operate in conformance with an outdated 1950 route description.

10. Israel has been a particularly attractive destination for U.S. tour groups. These tours are widely promoted not only by TWA and El Al, the airlines providing direct service between the two countries, but also and most effectively by such European airlines as BOAC, British Caledonian, Olympic, KLM and Swissair. In fact most such tours make only a transit stop in the home country of the airline or spend at most 3-4 days there or at other European points while the large bulk of the time is devoted to touring Israel. Their advantage over El Al is that they are able to offer

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direct one airline service from inland and West Coast gateways without the inconvenience and delays involved in a New York transfer.

11. In order to maintain its position in the market, El Al must be released from what has become a very restrictive and unfair Agreement so that it can enjoy a fair and equal opportunity to compete for traffic, particularly against the European airlines which are now claiming a disproportionate share of the U.S.-Israel business.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: *Civil Aviation negotiations w/ Israel*REFERENCE: S/S *7217450* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
November 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*

SUBJECT: Israeli Desalting Project

Secretary Morton's office called General Haig Thursday and told him that the Israelis and the Interior Department are in basic agreement now on the desalting matter. (File attached at Tab A.)

I spoke with Minister Idan today and confirmed that this is true. I told him that you would be glad to hear it, and that they should stay in touch with us on the matter if any further problems should arise.

Interior seems to have committed itself more firmly to the big 11 million-gallon-per-day project, in exchange for Israeli acquiescence in a San Diego project to test some of the components.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
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United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

Peter Rodman
See me
RD

November 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT:

Proposed Desalting Program

Following our telephone conversation yesterday, I have prepared an update of the status of our discussion with the Israelis regarding the above subject.

Pursuant to earlier arrangements, Israeli representatives and members of the Office of Saline Water have been conducting discussions this week on their proposal to develop an 11 MGD desalting plant in Israel on a 50% cost-sharing basis with the United States.

There has for sometime been certain disagreement between our technical people and the Israelis as to the technical feasibility of the Israeli proposal.

During discussion on November 1st, OSW outlined a basic proposal which represents essentially the "middle course" recommendation in the Secretary's October 18 memorandum to Dr. Kissinger, with some refinements. This proposal provides:

First, for a 50% U. S. share in the construction of the 1 MGD desalting plant already under construction in Israel.

Second, for a 50% share in a testing facility at our existing OSW testing site in San Diego, California, to evaluate components of what would be the 11 MGD plant.

Third, for a 50% share of the design and construction of the 11 MGD plant in Israel.

The total cost of the proposal would be approximately \$30 million, \$15 million of which would be the U. S. share.

The technical staff of OSW indicates that an 11 MGD plant would not be merely 11 times larger than the 1 MGD plant now under construction, but would embody some different construction design. Consequently, some testing of the different component designs is essential before proceeding with actual construction of the plant. Further, we believe it would be preferable to have the architectural and engineering work of this component module testing facility and the 11 MGD plant accomplished by an American A & E firm. Construction of both of these facilities could be done by the Israeli construction firm.


The best estimate of our technical people is that this procedure would extend the time frame for completion of the 11 MGD plant by only one year over the present Israeli schedule.

During the November 1 afternoon meeting the chief Israeli government representative indicated this plan was basically acceptable to them, providing the remaining details could be worked out to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

As mentioned previously, this is essentially the same course of action which the Secretary earlier recommended and, in light of the advice and recommendations of our technical people, the additional one-year delay over the previous time schedule seems to be entirely proper.

Attached is a copy of the Secretary's October 18 memorandum for your reference.

We will keep you advised of any further developments.


Robert J. Hitt
Executive Assistant to the Secretary

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO: Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House

Subject: Proposed Israeli Desalting Program

On October 12, 1972 I met with the Ambassador of Israel regarding Israeli plans for the desalination of seawater in Israel; and their request for a U.S. commitment of \$10 million in support of this program. Attached is a copy of the Israeli proposal left at the close of the meeting.

The Ambassador summarized the chronology of discussions between the Governments of the United States and Israel since 1964 relative to Israeli requests for U.S. assistance. Also attached is a more detailed chronology prepared by the Department of the Interior setting forth the history of these discussions.

Ambassador Rabin stated that the Government of Israel felt the discussions had continued too long at the technical level and now a policy decision from the U.S. was needed on the program.

In presenting the program, the Ambassador identified three major components: (1) A 1 million gallon per day (MGD) plant currently under construction, entirely financed by Israel, which will become operational the latter part of the calendar year 1973. (He expressed desire of U.S. assistance on this, but played this down in favor of the request associated with component 2.) (2) An 11 MGD plant which will be located at Ashdod on the Mediterranean on land held by Israel before the 1967 war; (3) Ultimately a 200 MGD facility.

The request currently being conveyed to the U.S. Government was for \$10 million as one half of the cost of constructing the 11 MGD facility with which Israel would like to proceed immediately so that it might be operational in 1977.

The Ambassador pointed to the \$20 million authorized and appropriated by the Congress for such a desalting facility on December 30, 1969. (Public Law 91-175). A copy of the relevant sections of that law are also attached. He was concerned that these funds might not be available later and that the work of Israeli scientists and technicians had reached the point where they were confident that their proposed technology was workable. He did not deny that there were some risks of proceeding now but felt that Israel was prepared to take those risks as indeed it had to do in almost every phase of its nation-building effort.

The following pros and cons are set forth relative to the proposal by Israel.

CON

1. From a purely technical point of view there is not enough knowledge now on the basis of which the feasibility of the Israeli proposal can be established.

a. Israeli plans to use aluminum piping in a distillation plant, while conceptually feasible, and reducing the cost of the water produced, has not been satisfactorily demonstrated and there are high risks associated with the use of such aluminum tubing.

b. A minimum of one year of continuous testing of the proposed 1 MGD plant will be required to prove the proposed technology to be utilized in the 11 MGD prototype plant for which U.S. funds are requested.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

URGENT ACTION

AK has sent October 17, 1973
120

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: DONALD J. STUKEL *etc*
SUBJECT: Financing Arms for Israel

The DOD proposal (Tab A) prepared as a result of WSAG direction provides:

- \$2.2 billion for grant military assistance for Israel
- \$200 million for grant military assistance for Cambodia
- \$500 million for additional military assistance to other countries

The primary question is whether additional assistance to Israel should be grant or credit.

If the assistance is grant, we will be under tremendous pressure to provide the full \$2.2 billion even if the conflict were to terminate shortly. The \$2.2 billion level assumes a long war in which we provide everything on the Israeli list of requests, which go beyond one for one replacement. A Congressional request of \$2.2 billion for Israel would signal a massive rebuilding of the Israeli military forces well beyond the current crisis.

From our point of view, it is preferable to provide Israel with credits. If financing is the only concern, legislation already exists ("Jackson Amendment") to permit extension of credit to Israel.

Since the outbreak of the war, about \$600 million of supplies and equipment have been delivered or are in the pipeline to Israel. Part of this has been funded under unused credits and the remainder by signing "dependable undertakings" (no payment for 120 days). Israel owes the U.S. about \$1.7 billion on cash and credit purchases (20-30 year repayment periods) made prior to the war. At the present they still have \$300 million in FY 74

FMS credits plus a limited amount of FMS credits from previous years. Their financial picture was very good before the war. If it becomes necessary, debt forgiveness or rescheduling could be addressed later.

As to piggy-backing Cambodian needs and some other shortfalls on an Israeli request, we must recognize that a Conference Committee is currently considering our FY 74 MAP request of \$652 million. Any new request would be referred to the same committees and would be considered in light of our previous request. A case can be made for additional funds for Cambodia in light of the continued fighting but a case for \$500 million additional grant assistance to other countries can not be supported convincingly.

If the DOD proposal were submitted in its current form, I believe we would get the amount requested for Israel but the other requests would be deleted, or if granted, would be offset by cuts from FY 74 request of \$652 million.

Options

1. Go forward with the DOD proposal. [This option is counter-productive in terms of the current crisis and will probably not get us additional resources for Cambodia or other countries.]
2. Do not send a proposal to the Congress, but provide additional credit to Israel under the Jackson Amendment. [This option satisfies all needs arising out of the crisis and does not have adverse side effects with the Israelis, Arabs or Soviets. However, it does nothing for our other MAP funding problems.]
3. Send a proposal to Congress requesting \$500 million in grant assistance for Israel and \$200 million in grant assistance for Cambodia to meet emergency needs arising from the conflicts. The remainder of Israel's needs could be handled by credits under the Jackson Amendment. [This option limits the adverse side effects of the DOD proposal and might provide funds for Cambodia.]

RECOMMENDATION:

- That you reject the DOD proposal at the WSAG meeting.
- That you direct DOD to pursue Option 3 (\$500 million for Israel and \$200 million for Cambodia).

Lehman concurs.

H. R. _____

A Bill to provide additional foreign assistance authorizations,
As it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be
 cited as the "Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1973."

Sec. 2. In addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized
 to be appropriated to the President for military assistance for the fiscal
 year 1974, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the
 President for the fiscal year 1974 not to exceed--

- (1) ~~\$2,000,000~~ ^{\$2,200,000} for military assistance for Israel;
- (2) \$200,000,000 for additional military assistance for Cambodia;
 and
- (3) \$500,000,000 for additional military assistance to such other
 friendly foreign countries and in such amounts as the
 President may determine.

Sec. 3. Military assistance furnished out of funds appropriated
 under section 2 of this Act shall be furnished in accordance with all of
 purposes and limitations applicable to military assistance under the
 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 424; P.L. 87-195), as amended.

Sec. 4. Israel is hereby released from its contractual liability
 to pay for defense articles and defense services purchased under the Foreign
 Military Sales Act (82 Stat. 1320; P.L. 90-629), as amended, during the
 period beginning October 6, 1973 and ending on the date of enactment of
 this Act, and funds appropriated under section 2 of this Act for military
 assistance for Israel shall be used to reimburse current applicable

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4918

ACTION

SECRET (GDS)

September 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT:

Israel's Policy Toward Occupied Territories

As you know, the Israeli Labor Party has developed a program for dealing with the occupied Arab territories over the next four years. There is nothing we can do to affect the adoption of the program, but its eventual implementation is yet to be determined. In the past, Israeli leaders have read our silence as acquiescence in the steps Israel has taken toward annexing or settling parts of the occupied areas. The most explicit statement made on this topic was by Ambassador Yost in 1969 [Tab B], which was reaffirmed by the State Department on August 23.

Three elements of the new Israeli program could cause us difficulties if a genuine negotiation were ever to take place. First, the Labor Party is calling for an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. Second, the policy of restricting private land purchases by Israelis in the occupied territories may be loosened. Third, a sizable Israeli town is planned for the northeastern Sinai, which would effectively cut Gaza off from the Egyptian town of al-Arish.

Ambassador Keating has suggested in a cable to you [Tab A] that we should talk to the Israelis to try to persuade them to delay implementation of the new program. He feels that Ambassador Dinitz would be the proper person to discuss this with at the outset, and that he be authorized later to raise the matter officially in Israel before the elections are held.

Henry note Assistant Secretary Sisco has indicated an interest in talking to the Israelis about this when he gets back to Washington this week. Before then, you may want to make the point quietly with Dinitz that any Israeli actions in the occupied territories that make negotiations less likely will not have our support. In addition, if this process leads toward disguised annexation, the US and Israel will end up inevitably on opposite

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

sides of some of the key issues of a peace settlement. One purpose of talking to Dinitz yourself is to avoid the appearance of a major public US demarche on the subject.

RECOMMENDATION: That you talk informally with Ambassador Dinitz about our concern with Israel's new policy toward the occupied territories.


_____ Approve

Let Sisco talk to Dinitz about this,
but tell him not to make a public
demarche.

SECRET (GDS)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7316345

4992
Tab A

September 6, 1973

SECRET/EXDISMEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Occupied Territories Policy

The Labor Party's Secretariat has now overwhelmingly approved a platform plank on occupation policy that will give a new and substantial fillip to Israeli settlement and investment in the occupied territories. Approval by the full Party Central Committee and ultimate adoption as Government policy now seem certain. The Acting Secretary and Assistant Secretary Sisco have been considering what action we might take to minimize the damage to our interests from this step and have concluded that the Acting Secretary should make a low-key demarche to Ambassador Dinitz setting out our concern and objections. This would be followed up by Ambassador Keating to Eban in Jerusalem. We believe, if this demarche is to have the desired impact, the Israelis should know that it is done with approval in the White House. This course is consistent with what we have done over the past four years - to indicate our disassociation with Israeli unilateral actions in the occupied territories and Jerusalem, which in our judgment prejudices any ultimate solution.

The Israelis now have 47 settlements in the occupied territories with a population of over 5,000, exclusive of some 15,000 in East Jerusalem. We have in the past taken public issue with this development on the grounds that it is contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions proscribing movement by the occupying power of its own population into occupied territory, and is a further obstacle to inducing the Arabs to come to the negotiating table. We believe it is important now that we restate our position to the Israelis. Our silence in the face of this latest development may be construed by them as acquiescence,

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS

and so encourage the pace of this activity. Our demurrer would give some help to Israeli minimalists who, though badly outnumbered, are speaking out against this platform plank, which was an election compromise made by Meir and Sapir to keep Dayan in the Labor Party fold. For example, some of the doves in Israel have rightly branded this action as creeping annexation.

A demarche at this time would be useful to Dr. Kissinger during his UNGA discussions. We may expect Arab and non-aligned interest here in New York in this matter and what we are doing about it; it will help blunt criticism if we can say we have talked to the Israelis and that our policy continues to be opposed to any such actions prejudicial to a solution.

With your concurrence, the Acting Secretary will express to Ambassador Dinitz our concern at this latest Labor Party action and what it portends for GOI policy, and our objections to such actions which are prejudicial to a peaceful settlement and to King Hussein in particular.



Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

really think it's very fruitful for me, or for any official really to focus on the difficulties of the past. I think it's better to look ahead.

- Q. Mr. Sisco, from time to time we read in official American policy statements about the Palestinians. How would you define this problem?

MR. SISCO:

Well, you undoubtedly noted that there was reference to the legitimate interests, and here I'm quoting, of the Palestinians in the recent Soviet-American communique. This is intended to express what has been our long-held view that obviously for any durable peace to be achieved in the area it not only has to meet the interests and the aspirations of each of the states, of Israel, of Egypt, of Syria, of Lebanon, of Jordan, but it also has to meet the legitimate interests, the aspirations of the Palestinian people and, it means just that, no more, no less. It doesn't mean that the United States has opted for one form of solution as against another. We think, for example, that this is something for the Arab people themselves to decide and so that, we've not, on the basis of anything that we have ever either said publicly or any substantive ideas that we've ever developed over

Q. How do you see the future American policy towards the Middle East in the very immediate future?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I think obviously, our efforts are going to continue in the direction of trying to be helpful in getting a negotiating process started. The very fact that you've had a cease-fire continuing, of course, is a helpful element. The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States have adopted a non-confrontation policy is helpful. On the other hand, the longer there is no solution, the more difficult it is to try to achieve a solution, and therefore the protracted period in which there has been no serious, practical progress toward an overall settlement makes it more complicated. Moreover, as you well know, while our interests in many respects are parallel to the interests of Israel, they are not synonymous with the State of Israel. The interests of the United States go beyond any one nation in the area. We have important political, economic and strategic interests in the entire area, whether you are talking about the Middle East as well as the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. There is increasing

concern in our country, for example, over the energy question, and I think it is foolhardy to believe that this is not a factor in the situation. It's a factor in the situation as are a good many others, so that in any one action that the United States has to weigh, it has to take all of these variegated interests into account. We have long ago concluded that there's really only one satisfactory answer, and that satisfactory answer is a peace in which both sides have established a vital interest, and I think you can assume that the United States will remain engaged in trying to get a serious diplomatic process started. We feel that whatever influence the United States can exercise, that it should be exercised within the context of ongoing negotiations, not in the abstract.

- Q. You have mentioned naturally the energy crisis and the obvious question is do you think the Arab oil-producing countries will use the oil as a political weapon against the United States in the future, in the 1980's?

MR. SISCO:

Well, of course I'm in no position to be clairvoyant and to predict it. My hope is that the mutual interest that has existed between producer and consumer will continue. There are obvious voices in the Arab world

who are pressing for a linking of oil and politics, if I can put it this way. I would hope that these questions can be viewed by all concerned in their own proper perspective, because as I say, I think there is a mutual interest between the countries that use this oil and market this oil and so on, and those that have it in the ground and produce it.

the last four or five years, chosen any one solution as against another. But we do think that if you're going to have a peace that really means anything and lasts that it's obviously going to have to meet their concerns as well.

Q. You're probably aware of the controversy among the Israeli leadership on this question --

MR. SISCO:

Oh, yes.

Q. --the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for another Palestinian state between the sea and the desert?

MR. SISCO:

Well, again, as I say we have not adopted any kind of a position as it relates to either the federal type solution which King Hussein talked about about a year ago, or a so-called Palestine entity that some Palestinian leaders talk about, or for that matter, a Palestinian state which has appeared rather frequently in recent public statements of the Egyptian Foreign Minister inside and outside of the UN Security Council. We have no specific substantive position in this regard. What we have said is that the interests of the Palestinian people need to be taken into account in any solution. In what form, I think is something for the Arab people to work out.

Q. I have the feeling that this is one of the subjects that were (sic) not discussed very much between the Israelis and the United States, and there was no serious dialogue between the two countries on this question of the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for such a dialogue?

MR. SISCO:

You mean between the United States and Israel?

A. Yes.

MR. SISCO:

Well, I don't think it is entirely accurate to say that we haven't discussed this. Over the years I think we have had the fullest kind of an exchange, on all the various substantive elements of a possible solution with the Israeli Government. As I say, we have not adopted any substantive position as such, but certainly there have been regular exchanges, and if you go back, for example, to the 1967 resolution there, of course, it only talks in terms that there must be a solution to the so-called refugee question. Obviously, this whole matter has become much more politicized in the last four or five years. But, I don't see any particular advantage to single out this element as against any others. I don't think there is any lack of substantive exchange on any of these questions.

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| TRANSMITTAL SLIP | | DATE |
| | | 2-7-73 |
| TO: Mr. Lucius Robertson NCC | | |
| ROOM NO. | BUILDING | |
| 381 | Executive Office Bldg | |
| REMARKS: | | |
| Priority | | |
| Call when it arrives | | |
| [REDACTED] SANITIZED | | |
| T-100 | | |
| FROM: [REDACTED] CRS [REDACTED] | | |
| BUILDING | | EXTENSION |
| 105 | | [REDACTED] |
| FEB 95 241 | | (4) |

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NLN 02-07/12 sec 3.4(L)(1) 12-18-02

By Xub NARA Date 5-27-03

[12 pages]

[page 1]

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41. JOSEF- (2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *Small*



DIA/AP/BIO V 55-07-71
BIOGRAPHIC DATA

S-5519/DI-5A

ISRAEL
Col (Josef ALON)
July 1971

(U) NAME: Col Josef Alon (AHL-on),
Army. Variants: Yosef; Allon. Alias:
Placek.

(U) POSITION: Assistant Armed Forces
Attaché, Washington, D.C., since 6 Aug
1970. Also accredited in Ottawa, Canada.



(U) 1970

(C/NFD) SIGNIFICANCE: A very intelligent
and capable officer, he is highly regarded
by superiors and associates for his profes-
sional ability and is considered one of the
best officers in the air force. He is an
efficient, responsive manager, has a thorough
understanding of the duties of a military attaché, and has been praised
by U.S. observers for his performance as Assistant Armed Forces Attaché
in Washington, D.C. A jet-qualified pilot (Mirage III aircraft), he has
commanded fighter squadrons (1962, 1963-1964) and a tactical air wing
(1966-1967?), and he served as Commander of the Hatserim Air Base from
about 1967 to 1970. He is proud of the performance of the air force
during the June 1967 conflict with the Arab states, but he has commented
that the army does not understand the limitations of the air force and
has an unrealistically high estimate of air force capabilities. He
attended the British Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover, Hampshire,
England, in 1964.

(C/NFD) POLITICS:

(C/NFD) International: Oriented toward the West and friendly
toward the United States, Alon would probably favor U.S. policies
insofar as they did not conflict with the interests of Israel.

(C) Internal: He is not believed to be a member of any political
party.

(C) PERSONAL DATA:

(U) Birth: 27 Jul 1929 in Ein Harod, Israel.

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ISRAEL
Col Josef ALON
July 1971

(C) Family: His family name was originally Placek; all members of family but a brother and himself killed in Germany (date not known). Raised by an English Quaker family (Davidson) in Mospeth, England. Wife, Dvora Alon (born 17 Jul 1928 in Yemen; tall; plain face; wears plain clothes; works hard, good mother and housekeeper; unpretentious; pleasant; somewhat embarrassed about birthplace; speaks Arabic and excellent English; not interested in politics; exercises little influence over husband). Children (3): Dalia (f), born in 1954; Yael (also reported as Jial) (m), born in Mar 1959; Rachael (f), born in 1968.

(C) Description: Stocky build (5'10", 170 lbs); bushy dark brown hair, dark eyes, ruddy complexion; powerful, muscular physique; presents clean but sloppy appearance; wears inexpensive, ill-fitting clothes; seldom combs hair; sociable, friendly, direct, unassuming, candid, judicious, self-confident, appears to have accomplished something he has long sought, shows considerable self-satisfaction and well-being; enjoys discussions, will support either side of an issue for the sake of debate; smokes heavily (cigarettes); drinks moderately (Scotch and soda or gin and tonic); eats lightly; would respond best to a direct, businesslike approach.

(U) Language: Native Hebrew, good English, possibly some Czech or Slovak.

(C) Religion: Jewish (practicing); proud of being a Jew, enjoys the personalness of the Jewish religion; admires the informality and closeness of the Quaker religious meetings.

(U) Decorations: One unidentified Israeli decoration; another unidentified award.

(U) CIVIL EDUCATION: Attended Friends (Quaker) School, Middleboro, England, three or eight years.

(U) CAREER:

- ? - Entered military service, in Israel.
- 1955 - Visited England and Cyprus.
- 1959 - Commander, Combat Crew Training Squadron, Flight Leader School. Orientation tour of the U.S., Aug-Sep 1959.
Rank: Maj.
- 1960 - Visited the United Kingdom.
- 1961 - Visited Malta.
- 1962 - Commander of a fighter squadron.
- 1963-1964 - Commander, 101st Fighter Squadron, Hatzor Air Base, near Kefar Aviv, Aug 1963-about Jan 1964.

2

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[NLN 02-07/12 p3]

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ISRAEL
Col Josef ALON
July 1971

| | |
|--------------|---|
| 1964 | - Student, British Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover, Hampshire, England, from Jan 1964. |
| 1965 | - Commander, Flight Safety Branch, Headquarters, Israel Defense Force Air Force, Jan 1965-Jul 1966. Rank: Lt Col. |
| 1966-? | - Commander of a tactical air wing, Hatserim Air Base, near Beersheba, from Jul 1966. |
| 1967?-1970 | - Commander, Hatserim Air Base, near Beersheba, from about 1967 to 4 Aug 1970. Promoted to Col, 1967. |
| 1970-Present | - Assistant Armed Forces Attaché, Washington, D.C., from 6 Aug 1970. Also accredited in Ottawa, Canada. |

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[NLN 02-07/12 p4]

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10/14, Joseph
(5)

Deceased

ISRAEL 1 July 1973

al Israel

Embassy of Israel

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
483-4100

2

DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



Major General (Mordechai GUR)
Israeli Defense Forces
7011 McArthur Boulevard, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016 (Montgomery County)

Wife.....Rita
Daughter....Ruth (1962)
Son.....Ori (1963)
Daughter....Tamal (1966)
Son.....Yoram

ASSISTANT ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



Colonel (Joseph ALON)
Israeli Defense Forces
5519 Trent Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015
686-9462

Wife.....Dvora
Daughter....Dalia (1954)
Son.....Yael (1959)
Daughter....Rachel (1963)

ASSISTANT ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



Lieutenant Colonel (David LEVIN)
Israeli Defense Forces
4701 Willard Avenue Apt 1205
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015
652-4289

Wife.....Miriam
Daughter....Haralla (Absent) (1950)
Daughter....Orna (1956)
Daughter....Inbal (1966)

[NLN 02-07/12 p 5]

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per sec. 3.4(b)(1)(b)
E.O. 12958

NLNO2-07/12 page 6

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| | |
|---|---|
| COUNTRY: ISRAEL | 6. REPORT NUMBER: 2 201 8022 71
(6002.02) |
| SUBJECT: (U) Biographic Report on COL Yosef ALON, Assistant Armed Forces Attache, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) | 7. DATE OF REPORT: 13 January 1971 |
| ISC NUMBER: | 10. NO. OF PAGES: 1 |
| | 11. REFERENCES: DIRM 7 A 5 |
| DATE OF INFORMATION: 7 January 1971 | 12. ORIGINATOR: US ARMY FIELD ACTIVITIES COMMAND |
| PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Washington, D. C.
8 January 1971 | 13. PREPARED BY: US ARMY FIELD ACTIVITIES COMMAND |
| EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>A</u> INFORMATION <u>2</u> | 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>[Signature]</i>
ALFRED W. BAGOT
COL, MI, Commanding |
| SOURCE: ICN F 3915 | |

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------|
| SUMMARY: | EVALUATION REQUESTED | (Leave Blank) |
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USAINTC (ICDS-B) | 17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
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1 Incl:
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MY FIELD ACTIVITIES COMMA

DATE OF INFORMATION: 7 January 1971

PLACE AND DATE OF ACC: Washington,
8 January 1971

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12. PREPARED BY: US ARMY FIELD ACTIVITIES, COMMA

EVALUATION: SOURCE A INFORMATION 2

SOURCE: ICN F 3915

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY

ALFRED W. BAGOT
COL, MI, Commanding

3. SUMMARY:

EVALUATION REQUESTED

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OPNAV FORM 3820 (Rev. 10-61),
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 65

D FORM 1396

[NLN 02-07/12 p 7]

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Page 2 of 7 Pages

6. PERSONAL APPEARANCE - Approval of subject's dress, personal habits, mannerisms, eccentricities, peculiarities of speech and gait, prominent or unusual physical features, e.g., teeth, eyes, shape of face, complexion, tendency toward balding, etc.

Subject is not concerned about his personal appearance and it is obviously not important to him. For this reason, he is a sloppy, although clean person. He wears inexpensive clothes that are ill fitting and does not bother to comb his hair. He gives a "wind blown" appearance and reflects a man who has spent a great deal of time out of doors. For him, clothes are a tolerated necessity. Subject is a heavy smoker and enjoys his scotch. His English is excellent as he has no British accent despite his youth in England. He is a short, muscular, powerfully built man.

7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SPOUSE - Spouse's political views, appearance, personality, attitude toward United States and other countries, influence on husband. Spouse's family connections influencing the husband's career.

Subject's spouse is about his height and is a very plain looking woman. She has a nice manner about her and speaks excellent English. She wears short cut hair, dresses nicely and has a nicely arranged home. She is a hard worker, is not in the least pretentious, and is a good, stern mother who runs a good home. She is not a pretty woman, however, and wears plain, old fashioned clothes. She is obviously a very hard worker.

8. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

a. Length of time collector has known subject and frequency of contact(s). Indicate how much of the information is based on the collector's own observation. Indicate other sources for information on subject.

b. Best ways of gaining subject's confidence and exerting influence on him.

Approach subject directly from a professional standpoint and relate your request directly with a current item of business that subject is interested in.

c. Military reputation, competence, and significance. Include financial status, dependence on personal or political connections for military position. Reputation in own service, collector's own assessment of military competence, and military and/or political potential of subject.

Subject is extremely competent and reputable. He ranks among the top officers and has definite potential for promotion. He has no outside source of income other than his military salary.

and is a good, stern mother who
and wears plain, old fashioned

DECLASSIFIED

is a pretty woman, however,
very hard worker.

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56. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

- a. Length of time collector has known subject and frequency of contact(s). Indicate how much of the information is based on the collector's own observation. Indicate other sources for information on subject.

- b. Best ways of gaining subject's confidence and exerting influence on him.

Approach subject directly from a professional standpoint and relate your request directly with a current item of business that subject is interested in.

- c. Military reputation, competence, and significance. Include financial status, dependence on personal or political connections for military position. Reputation in own service, collector's own assessment of military competence, and military and/or political potential of subject.

Subject is extremely competent and reputable. He ranks among the top officers and has definite potential for promotion. He has no outside source of income other than his military salary.

[NLN 02-07/12 p. 8]

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

ORANCE: This supplementary intelligence is attached to Form 1040-1. The supplement has been designed to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information to foreign nationals and to provide for a collector's assessment of subject. Sensitive information of an operational nature which must be omitted from this (paragraph 7b, DIAL SR-13) should not be included in this supplement. Where practicable, the following information will be furnished:

1. RECORD (Other than actual violations).

2. RELIGION - Effect of subject's religion or religious connections on his actions, military advancement, political views, etc. Subject states that he is a "good Jew" is proud of the fact and is not, in the least, inclined to admit it. He likes the intimacy and personalness of his religion. He stated that if he had to choose another religion, he would choose the Quakers. Subject attended a Quaker school in England for eight years and likes their informality and personal-type programs. Subject probably still has friends and acquaintances in England from his youth.

3. ACQUAINTANCES AND RELATIVES - Apparent influence of acquaintances and relatives on subject's views or career.

Subject's character reflects a tremendous amount of experience in life. Having been born and raised by foster parents in England, subject has a good number of acquaintances and friends in England. Subject is very close to his current superior, MG Eliahu ZEIRA, the current Israeli Ambassador to the US, LTC Yitzhak RABIN.

4. CHARACTER - Subject's character, strengths and weaknesses, intelligence, loyalty, judgment, ability to communicate, leadership ability, and influence. Significance of individual in shaping international policies of his country.

Subject's character reflects a tremendous amount of experience in life. He has been through a great deal and now reflects a person who is very self-confident. He has inner satisfaction with what he is doing and what he has done. He demonstrates a sense of well-being and success. He is a direct and unassuming person. He states the truth with candor as it is. He is a very intelligent man and is someone who has a very complete sense of being master of his trade. He is a thorough and responsive manager and quite certainly is doing an excellent job as assistant armed forces attaché. This type of man who "digs his teeth in," enjoys his job, and is successful.

5. POLITICAL ORIENTATION - Attitude towards United States and other countries. Remarks and actions of subject toward representatives of the United States and its allies, and to representatives of nonaligned nations and Communist bloc nationals. Political activities and attitudes, important political contacts, party affiliations, potential political influence in country in the event of a change in government.

Subject has a very positive attitude towards the US. His assignment is strictly business and he is getting the business response that he likes.

ACQUAINTANCES AND RELATIVES - Apparent influence on [illegible] views or career.

Subject's character reflects a tremendous amount of experience in life. Having been reared and raised by foster parents in England, subject has a good number of acquaintances and friends in England. Subject is very close to his current superior, MG Eliahu ZEIRA, the current Israeli Ambassador to the US, LTG Yitzhak RABIN.

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Subject has a very positive attitude towards the US. His assignment is strictly business and he is getting the business response that he likes.

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA

ISRAEL
Col Josef ALON
May 1972

(U) NAME: Col Josef Alon (AHL-on),
Army. Variants: Yosef; Allon. Alias:
Flaotek.

(U) POSITION: Assistant Armed Forces
Attaché, Washington, D.C., since 6 Aug
1970. Also accredited in Ottawa, Canada.

(C/NFD) SIGNIFICANCE: A very intelligent
and capable officer, he is highly regarded
by superiors and associates for his profes-
sional ability and is considered one of the
best officers in the air force. He is an
efficient, responsive manager, has a thorough
understanding of the duties of a military attaché, and has been praised
by U.S. observers for his performance as Assistant Armed Forces Attaché
in Washington, D.C. A jet-qualified pilot (B-70 aircraft), he has
commanded fighter squadrons (1962, 1963-1964) and a tactical air wing
(1966-1967?), and he served as Commander of the Matserim Air Base from
about 1967 to 1970. He is proud of the performance of the air force
during the June 1967 conflict with the Arab states, but he has commented
that the army does not understand the limitations of the air force and
has an unrealistically high estimate of air force capabilities. He
attended the British Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover, Hampshire,
England, in 1964.



(U) 1970

(C/NFD) POLITICS:

(C/NFD) International: Oriented toward the West and friendly
toward the United States, Alon would probably favor U.S. policies
insofar as they did not conflict with the interests of Israel.

(C) Internal: He is not believed to be a member of any political
party.

(C) PERSONAL DATA:

(U) Birth: 27 Jul 1929 in Ein Harod, Israel.

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GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

[NLN 02-07/12 p10]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISRAEL
Col Josef ALON
May 1972

(C) Family: His family name was originally Placek; all members of family but a brother and himself killed in Germany (date not known). Raised by an English Quaker family (Davidson) in Murreth, England. Wife, Dvora Alon (born 17 Jul 1928 in Yemen; tall; plain face; wears plain clothes; works hard, good mother and housekeeper; unpretentious; pleasant; somewhat embarrassed about birthplace; speaks Arabic and excellent English; not interested in politics; exercises little influence over husband). Children (3): Dalia (f), born in 1954; Yael (also reported as Jial) (m), born in Mar 1959; Rachael (f), born in 1963.

(C) Description: - Stocky build (5'10", 170 lbs); bushy dark brown hair, dark eyes, ruddy complexion; powerful, muscular physique; presents clean but sloppy appearance, wears inexpensive, ill-fitting clothes; seldom combs hair; sociable, friendly, direct, unassuming, candid, judicious, self-confident, appears to have accomplished something he has long sought, shows considerable self-satisfaction and well-being; enjoys discussions, will support either side of an issue for the sake of debate; smokes heavily (cigarettes); drinks moderately (Scotch and soda or gin and tonic); eats lightly; would respond best to a direct, businesslike approach.

(U) Language: Native Hebrew; good English, possibly some Czech or Slovak.

(C) Religion: Jewish (practicing); proud of being a Jew, enjoys the personalness of the Jewish religion; admires the informality and closeness of the Quaker religious meetings.

(U) Decorations: One unidentified Israeli decoration; another unidentified award.

(U) CIVIL EDUCATION: Attended Friends (Quaker) School, Middleboro, England, three or eight years.

(U) CAREER:

? - Entered military service, in Israel.
1955 - Visited England and Cyprus.
1959 - Commander, Combat Crew Training Squadron, Flight Leader School. Orientation tour of the U.S., Aug-Sep 1959.
Rank: Maj.
1960 - Visited the United Kingdom.
1961 - Visited Malta.
1962 - Commander of a fighter squadron.
1963-1964 - Commander, 101st Fighter Squadron, Hatzor Air Base, near Kfar Aviv, Aug 1963-about Jan 1964.

2

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[NLN 02-07/12 p 11]

2
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISRAEL
Col. Josef ALON
May 1972

1964 - Student, British Royal Air Force Staff College, Andover,
Hampshire, England, from Jan 1964.
1965 - Commander, Flight Safety Branch, Headquarters, Israel
Defense Force Air Force, Jan 1965-Jul 1966. Rank: Lt Col.
1966-? - Commander of a tactical air wing, Hatzerim Air Base, near
Beerseheba, from Jul 1966.
1967-1970 - Commander, Hatzerim Air Base, near Beerseheba, from about
1967 to 4 Aug 1970. Promoted to Col, 1967.
1970-Present - Assistant Armed Forces Attaché, Washington, D.C., from
6 Aug 1970. Also accredited in Ottawa, Canada.

3

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[NLN 02-07/12 #12]

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PARTICIPANTS:

Max Fisher

Jacob Stein

Richard Maas

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4002

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

July 18, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jewish Leaders, July 19

I assume that one of the topics is your assessment of what we can expect from the Soviets in the wake of the summit. They will be fully aware of Brezhnev's figures and the general pitch he made to the Senators and Congressmen. Brezhnev probably "misspoke" in giving his totals. For your reference, here is where we stand:

Brezhnev

68,000 left before January 1973

61,000 applicants last year

60,200 actually left last year* US estimate - about 31,000

11,400 applicants so far this year

10,100 permitted to leave this year US estimate - about 12,600

*Possibly he meant last two years or to date.

While it is possible to make some sense out of these figures, a key problem is the Soviet claim that 95 percent of those that applied were permitted to leave. This is widely disputed, and is probably phony. Moreover, there is the problem of those who are deterred from applying by fear of retaliation -- some claim this figure would be in the hundreds of thousands.

Thus, it would be prudent not to get very involved in whether Brezhnev's figures are correct. Rather, you might want to make the following points:

-- the exit tax is removed; this is in itself a rather major accomplishment. It is very unlikely that it would have occurred without the political

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

improvements in our relations resulting from the President's policy. No Soviet leader could have justified such a retreat to the Politburo unless he could point to a general trend in US-Soviet relations;

-- the fact remains that emigration continues at about the same level as for 1972; by the end of the year if this continues, the totals will be about 85,000 for three years.

Special Cases

There are a growing number of cases where special interest groups here and abroad have organized to publicize the plight of one person: i. e., an economist, or a scientist, or a ballet dancer, etc. In some instances this pressure may be helpful -- the Soviets have, for example, let some well known dissidents leave, never to return. But there is also the basic injustice to all those faceless people who do not command well placed friends in the West. In any case, the White House cannot become a court of special pleading, taking up every person who has the backing of a group. The Soviets are well aware of the more infamous cases. We have some hope that they will make a gesture.

MFN-Jackson

If you decide to discuss this, there are some points you might want to bring out:

-- While the Jackson amendment is directed against the USSR, its practical effect will be far more sweeping. Technically it will have to apply to all communist countries plus Yugoslavia; if we were to apply it to the letter, all credits, government sponsored insurance for investors, and MFN treatment should be cancelled or suspended for Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia, etc., and also for China.

-- We could not claim in good conscience that only Russia denies free emigration.

-- Thus, the entire structure of what we have been trying to do is undermined.

-- The President must have some discretion to carry out a realistic foreign policy. It would be madness to cut off Yugoslavia when it faces

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

the uncertainties of the post-Tito period. It would be crippling to cut off all prospects of economic relations with China at this stage in our relations.

In short, the Jackson amendment as it is now written risks a major damage to US policy in return for which we can only expect that the Soviets will no longer have any incentive to let the current rate of emigration continue.

At Tab A is a current State compilation of the emigration rate.

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 17, 1973

SECRET-NODISMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet MFN and Jewish Emigration

Jewish Emigration in 1973. Monthly arrivals of Soviet Jews in Israel this year are at roughly the level of the first six months of 1972:

| | <u>1972</u> | <u>1973</u> (rounded figures) |
|----------|-------------|--|
| January | 2,300 | 2,700 |
| February | 2,000 | 2,400 |
| March | 2,800 | 2,600 |
| April | 2,000 | 2,700 |
| May | 2,700 | 2,200 |
| June | 3,300 | 1,900 |
| | 15,100 | 14,500 (approximate six-month figures) |
| July | 2,000 | 1,000 (first 15 days only) |

The Israeli Embassy tentatively regards the drop-off in emigration in June 1973 as coincidental and believes that the total for 1973 will be roughly the same as that for 1972. There has been little progress in the hardship or prominent emigration cases or in reported harassment of applicants for emigration.


Brezhnev Visit and MFN. Our soundings on the Hill indicate that Brezhnev's meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not materially improve the chances for passage of the MFN aspect of the Trade Reform Act without undesirable conditions. Brezhnev's claim that there is no "so-called Jewish question" in the USSR and the figures he addressed were not convincing to members of Congress. In short, at the moment prospects do not appear bright for Congressional authorization of MFN for the Soviet Union without onerous restrictions related to Soviet Jewish emigration.

SECRET-NODIS--GDS

SECRET-NODIS

-2-

Timing for formal Congressional consideration of the Trade Reform Act and the amendments is still uncertain. If formal consideration of the Act is delayed, Jackson-Vanik amendment supporters may seek some earlier opportunity to restrict MFN and credits.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Theodore L. Eliot Jr." in a cursive script.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

SECRET-NODIS

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF :

| | | | |
|-------|----------|---------|------------------|
| DOC | RECD | LOG NBR | INITIAL ACTION D |
| MO DA | MO DA HR | 4002 | J Feldt |
| 7/17 | 7/18/70 | | |

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ✓ FROM: ROGERS ✓ UNCLAS ✓ NO FORN ✓ NODIS ✓
 KISSINGER ✓ RICHARDSON ✓ LOU ✓ EYES ONLY ✓ EXDIS ✓
 SCOWCROFT ✓ SCHLESINGER ✓ C ✓ CODEWORD ✓
 ELIOT ✓ S ✓ SENSITIVE ✓

SUBJECT: Jewish Immigration & arrivals in Israel & status of Soviet MFN passage in Congress

REFERENCE: S/S 7313143 OTHER ✓ NOT XEROXED ✓

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

| | ACTION | INFO | REC
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FOR |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|------------------|
| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT | <u>✓</u> | | |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | |
| FAR EAST | | | |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | | | |
| MID EAST/NO. AFRICA/SO. ASIA | | <u>✓</u> | |
| EUROPE/CANADA | <u>✓</u> | | |
| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | |
| ECONOMIC | | | |
| SCIENTIFIC | | | |
| NET ASSESSMENT GROUP | | | |
| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | |
| NSC PLANNING | | | |
| CONGRESSIONAL | | <u>✓</u> | |
| OCEANS POLICY | | | |

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ✓
 MEMO FOR PRES. ✓
 REPLY FOR ✓
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ✓
 MEMO TO ✓
 RECOMMENDATIONS ✓
 JOINT MEMO ✓
 REFER TO ✓ FOR: ✓
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ✓
 CONCURRENCE ✓
 DUE DATE: (7/22)
 COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

| DATE | FROM | TO | S | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): | CY TO |
|------|------|-----|---|--|-------|
| 7/18 | | HAK | X | Talkies (7/19/73) | |
| 7/20 | | C | | Noted by HAK | |
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NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH ✓ NOTIFY ✓ & DATE ✓
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION ✓
 OR RECORD COMMENT: ✓
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ✓
 CROSS REF W/ ✓ JOINED BY LOG # ✓
 SEE # ✓ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D Aoc BY ✓
 CYS FOR: SA ✓
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 TO ✓ PA ✓
 SF ✓
 NS ✓
 EP ✓
 DESTROY: DY ✓

JUL 23 1973

7534

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

February 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. THEODORE L. CLIFT, JR.

FROM: William Watts *Watts*

SUBJECT: Congressional Correspondence on Israeli Desalting Plant

Could you please provide clearance or suggestions from the Department and AID on the attached proposed response to Congressman Aspinall by February 23.

Dispatched 2/17/70 Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Henry-

I had this typed up
in case you wished
to send it to the
President.

~~XXXX~~
Bunt

No
HK

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister
Golda Meir

I thought you would be interested in reading Prime Minister Golda Meir's response to your message of condolence on the death of the Israeli Assistant Military Attache.

"Dear Mr. President:

"On behalf of the people of Israel I wish to express to you my sincere thanks for your moving message of condolence on the murder of Colonel Yosef Alon. It is tragic that this young and brave man should have fallen victim to such a senseless dastardly act of violence.

"My Government and I deeply appreciate your determination to devote all available resources to investigate this brutal act and to bring the perpetrators to justice.

"I recall, Mr. President, the sad day in Washington when your diplomats were being held in the Capital of Sudan and then murdered. I remember your firm stand at the time. When we face tragic events of that kind I often think of your reaction in a moment of trial and draw encouragement from it.

Sincerely,

's' Golda Meir"

IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM
TO: CAMPBELL FOR MR. KISSINGER
INFO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
RON ZIEGLER

RELEASED BY: *[Signature]*

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: TOHAK 289

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O 031522Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8962

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 5240

E O 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, IS, US
SUBJECT: PRIMIN'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ON DEATH OF
YOSEF ALON

1. EMB RECEIVED FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM EVRON OF FONMIN
FOR DELIVERY TO PRESIDENT NIXON. GOI INTENDS TO
RELEASE TO PRESS AT 11 PM ISRAEL TIME JULY 3, I.E. 5 PM
WASHINGTON TIME.

2. " DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
" ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY
SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR MOVING MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE ON THE
MURDER OF COLONEL YOSEF ALON. IT IS TRAGIC THAT THIS YOUNG
AND BRAVE MAN SHOULD HAVE FALLEN VICTIM TO SUCH A SENSELESS
DASTARDLY ACT OF VIOLENCE.

" MY GOVERNMENT AND I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR DETERMINATION TO
DEVOTE ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATE THIS BRUTAL
ACT AND TO BRING THE PERPERTRATORS TO JUSTICE.

" I RECALL, MR PRESIDENT, THE SAD DAY IN WASHINGTON WHEN YOUR
DIPLOMATS WERE BEING HELD IN THE CAPITAL OF SUDAN AND THEN
MURDERED. I REMEMBER YOUR FIRM STAND AT THE TIME. WHEN WE
FACE TRAGIC EVENTS OF THAT KIND I OFTEN THINK OF YOUR REACTION
IN A MOMENT OF TRIAL AND DRAW ENCOURAGEMENT FROM IT.

SINCERELY,
GOLDA MEIR".
ZURHELLEN
BT

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, SAUNDERS, DAVIS

PSN:027807 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:184/16:09Z DTG:031522Z JUL 73

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D*****S COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr President

On your behalf
I have approved
a C-135 To return
The body.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER /HK
SUBJECT: Death of Israeli Attache

Colonel Yosef Alon, Assistant Armed Forces Attache, Israeli Embassy, was shot several times outside his home in Bethesda, Maryland, upon returning home from a private party. He was declared dead on arrival at Suburban Hospital at 0130 (Washington time) of multiple gunshot wounds in the chest. A car was seen departing the scene of the shooting, but no suspects have been apprehended.

An Israeli military spokesman in Tel Aviv declared the shooting could have been the work of Arab terrorists. He speculated the shooting could have been in retaliation for the death of a suspected Arab guerrilla in Paris on Thursday. No money or other valuables were taken from the body, leading officials to discount robbery as a motive in the killing.

Condolences on your behalf were expressed early this morning to the Israeli Ambassador, and a letter is being prepared.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1973

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Aircraft Deliveries for Israel

The President has reviewed the options for F-4 and A-4 aircraft deliveries to Israel presented in the State Department's memo of April 2, 1973. The President has directed the following:

-- That the US offer to deliver 48 F-4 aircraft to Israel over a four-year period with deliveries evenly spaced at the rate of 12 aircraft in each twelve-month period following the expiration of present deliveries.


-- That the US deliver 42 A-4 aircraft evenly spaced over the period between June 1974 and December 1977.

The President has emphasized that this decision should remain confidential between the governments of the US and Israel.



Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)




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DAYAN'S VIEWS ON SINAI

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DAYAN'S VIEWS ON WEST BANK

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
2650

SECRET (GDS)

May 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Foreign Minister Eban--
9:30 a.m. Saturday, May 12

Eban's Main Points

Eban in his conversation with Secretary Rogers covered the following points:

- Security Council Debate. There was agreement that there should be no change in the balance of Resolution 242 and that it would be undesirable for the Council to establish new machinery for dealing with the dispute.
- Area Stability. Eban said Israel estimated the chance that Egypt would initiate hostilities as very low.
- Lebanon. He does not expect as clean-cut a solution of the Fedayeen problem in Lebanon as there had been in Jordan but felt Lebanese government action definitely made for a better situation. Israel is watching for Syrian intervention but has some optimism that this will not happen.
- Aircraft. He asked about the status of Israel's aircraft requests. Secretary Rogers indicated that we did not expect that a decision would be long delayed. [Note: You have a decision memo for the President, but the timing of any public knowledge should be considered for its effect on Egypt.]
- Soviet Jews. Eban expressed gratitude for US efforts to facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, though he also expressed concern at continuing harassment of Jews desiring to emigrate. Secretary Rogers stressed the key place that MFN holds in our plans for improving relations with the USSR and expressed the hope its approval would not be linked to further Soviet concessions on Soviet-Jewish emigration. Eban was noncommittal.

SECRET (GDS)

Eban saw Secretary Shultz, who explained that we will be starting GATT consultations directed at minimizing the damages to US trade from the discriminatory provisions of Israel's agreements with the EEC. The point to be made to Eban is this is directed at broader trade problems and should not be read as an anti-Israeli act. We want to cooperate with Israel.

Points You Might Make

1. We have no desire to see pressure on Egypt to negotiate diminished. Nor do we want to see Resolution 242 tampered with.
2. We do, however, believe it is important to get the Arab-Israeli problem into a negotiating context. The alternative is a continuing confrontation which Israel can manage now but which would endanger Israel over an historical period. Israel's success depends on coexistence with its neighbors and, to some degree, on US support.
3. A policy of simply standing pat is not necessarily the best way to get talks started.
4. A strong US position in the Middle East is important both to the US and to Israel. While the US position over the past six years has not suffered as much as the scare-mongers predicted, it is not basically improving.
5. We recognize that there is an element of posturing in Sadat's present threats of military action. We do not, however, discount the possibility of his taking a foolish step. No rational prediction would have foreseen war in 1967.
6. We like Israel have a strong interest in quashing the Black September. We wonder whether raids like the one in Beirut are the best way to do this. Americans potentially bear the brunt of Arab retaliation because our people and property are accessible.
7. On aircraft: The President's decision to continue unbroken supply stands. We have had to work on the question of delivery schedules to take our own needs into account.



73 Department of State

PM 11:28
SECRETW4
TELEGRAMWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 2561Q

RECD: 10 OCT '73 3:29P

*****CORRECTED COPIES TO FOLLOW*****

O 101326Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 071
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 7955

HAK
Scowcroft
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MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, IS, US, SI
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ALLON

1. DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH MORNING WITH DEPRIMIN ALLON, HE GAVE ME HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION (SEE SEPTELS FOR OTHER SUBJECTS). ALLON NOTED THAT HIS COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE NOT THE AUTHORITATIVE GOI POINT OF VIEW AND HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PROJECT HIMSELF INTO THE ROLE OF GENERAL ZEIRA, WHO HE KNOWS IS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH SITUATION. I ASSURED HIM THAT I WELCOMED HIS VIEWS AND UNDERSTOOD HIS POSITION.

2. ALLON INITIATED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT, STRATEGICALLY SPEAKING, THE GREATEST DANGER TO COME FROM SYRIAN ATTACK IN THE NORTH. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SYRIAN TWO-PRONG ATTACK BE BLUNTED SINCE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS SHE RAN A GRAVE RISK OF ALSO LOSING NORTH ISRAEL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE ATTACK BY THE SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS ON YOM KIPPUR HAD, IN RETROSPECT, PROBABLY HELPED RATHER THAN HINDERED THE ISRAELI MOBILIZATION SINCE THE RESERVISTS WERE EITHER AT HOME OR CONCENTRATED AT SYNAGOGUES. HE NOTED THAT THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTIES GAVE THE JOINT CARTE BLANCHE WITHOUT HESITATION TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEFENSE ON THIS MOST HOLY DAY.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT '73

3. ALLON CREDITS THE SUCCESSFUL CONTAINMENT OF THE SYRIAN SURPRISE ATTACK TO THE FEROCIOUS DEFENSE BY THE REGULAR ARMY BRIGADE ON THE GOLAN. HE STATED THAT THE MEN OF THIS UNIT FOUGHT STRAIGHT THROUGH VIRTUALLY WITHOUT CEASE FROM SATURDAY AT 2:05 P.M. UNTIL LAST NIGHT (TUESDAY). HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THE RESERVISTS NEAR THE FRONT LINE AREAS WERE FIGHTING VIRTUALLY AS THEY WERE BEING MOBILIZED.

4. FOR ALLON THE TURNING POINT IN THE WAR IN THE NORTH CAME YESTERDAY. HE NOTED THAT THE ARABS FOUGHT BETTER THAN THEY FOUGHT BEFORE AND CREDITS THIS TO MASSIVE SOVIET SUPPLIES OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION - VIRTUALLY AN OVER-SUPPLY, THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WITH OVERWHELMING FORCES, AND THE BLANKET OF SAMs, INCLUDING SAM 6s, WHICH PROVED AN EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST CLOSE GROUND SUPPORT BY THE IAF. HE NOTED THAT BY LAST NIGHT ISRAEL HAD TAKEN THE ENTIRE GOLAN HEIGHTS BACK EXCEPT FOR SOME UNITS ON MT. HERMON. HE RECOGNIZED THAT MT. HERMON, IF IT WERE TO STAY IN ENEMY HANDS COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS BUT HE SAID THAT THE GOI INTENDS TO COME BACK AND MOP UP THAT AREA LATER.

5. AT PRESENT, HE SAID, THE PROBLEM IS TO MAKE THE SYRIANS NERVOUS AND THINK THE ISRAELIS ARE "GOING TO TRY TO TAKE DAMASCUS." THEN THE IDF WILL SWING INTO ACTION PAST THE CEASEFIRE LINE WITH AIM OF SMASHING THE 600-800 SYRIAN TANKS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE AREA. HE NOTED THAT THE SAMs APPEAR TO BE A SWORD WHICH CUTS BOTH WAYS: IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE SAMs ARE TROUBLE FOR GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT, THE FORCE SO PROTECTED FINDS ITSELF VIRTUALLY HUED TO THIS COVER.

6. IN DEVELOPING HIS THEME, ALLON REFERRED TO THE BOMBING OF DAMASCUS AS AN ACTION TAKEN "NOT WITHOUT HESITATION" BY THE CABINET, BUT HE DEFENDED THE BOMBING OF THE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AS STRATEGICALLY NECESSARY. ONCE SYRIA WAS KNOCKED OUT, THUS ELIMINATING THE THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL, ISRAEL COULD TURN ITS ATTENTION TO THE SINAI. (HE NOTED A QUICK KNOCK OUT OF SYRIA WOULD SOLVE HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM AS WELL SINCE HE WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER PRESSURE TO JOIN IN: SEE SEPTTEL ON JORDAN.)

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TELEGRAM

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-3- TEL AVIV 7955 10 OCT ;73

7. ALLON SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD "EXPLOIT HER SUCCESS" ON THE GOLAN TODAY AND CRUSH THE SYRIANS. HE THEN FUZZED THE TIMETABLE A BIT SINCE, AS HE POINTED OUT, HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR A WHILE. CORRECTED VERSION WAS THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT, ALLON STATED THAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS WERE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE UNTIL THE SYRIAN PROBLEM WAS SETTLED. EVEN THEN, HOWEVER, HE CONFESSED THAT ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TASK IN DISLOGGING THE EGYPTIANS, (AGAIN) PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE SAM COVER. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WERE LOATH TO RISK LEAVING THIS COVER BEHIND AND HE SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO SEE THE EGYPTIANS STRIKE EAST FROM THE CANAL.

9. COMMENT: ALLON IS NOT ONLY A SENIOR GOI FIGURE BUT SURVIVED FORMER GENERAL. I WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT. MY DATT HAS JUST RETURNED FROM IDF BRIEFING DURING WHICH IDF REITERATED ALLON'S CLAIM ISRAEL IN CONTROL OF ALL GOLAN (MINUS PARTS OF MT. HERMON). AS OF THIS EVENING, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NO INFO RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI THRUST ACROSS CEASEFIRE LINE AS PROPOSED BY ALLON. AS DATT IS REPORTING, AMMO SHORTAGES MAY BE HOLDING UP ISRAELI MOVES.

10. AS CONCERNS SUBJECT OF RESUPPLY, I DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO REPORT OF THIS EVENING BY DATT THAT IDF CLAIMS AT LEAST 16 SOVIET CARGO PLANES ARE FLYING TO SYRIA AND SUPPOSITION IS THAT CARGO IS MISSILES. I ALSO HAVE NOTED REPORT FROM OUR CAIRO MISSION (CAIRO 3031) THAT SOVIETS ARE REPORTEDLY PROMISING TO SUPPLY AMMUNITION FOR EGYPTIANS.

KEATING

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#7955

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Department of State

SECRET

R 041319Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9652

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 6927

NODIS

11:55Z: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, XF/ IS

SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

AMB KEATING FEELS
THAT WE SHOULD RAISE
MATTER OF LABOR PARTY
POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES IN ORDER TO
POSSIBLY RESTRAIN
CAMPAIGN RHETORIC AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW GOI
MORE FLEXIBILITY RE
IMPLEMENTATION.

REF: A) TEL AVIV 6846, B) TEL AVIV 6913, C) TEL AVIV 6905

1. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE LABOR PARTY HAS NOW OFFICIALLY APPROVED ITS PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (REF B). WE EXPECT THAT, DESPITE MIGIVINGS WHICH MAPAM WILL VOICE, THIS PROGRAM WILL EMERGE VIRTUALLY INTACT AS THE LABOR ALIGNMENT'S PLATFORM FOR POLICY TOWARD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES DURING THE ELECTIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WILL BE THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE GOI.

2. IT IS, OF COURSE, TOO LATE TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE SHAPE OF THIS PROGRAM AS THE LABOR ALIGNMENT WILL PRESENT IT TO THE PEOPLE DURING THE CAMPAIGN. IN RESPONSE TO CRITICS, LABOR PARTY SPOKESMEN HAVE EMPHASIZED PUBLICLY THAT PROPOSED POLICIES ARE MERELY CONTINUATION OF ONGOING PROGRAMS AND NOT INTENDED AS ANY DRAMATIC NEW DEPARTURES IN THIS FIELD. AS NOTED IN REF C, FONMIN EBAN MADE SAME POINTED TO WALDHEIM WHEN SYG RAISED THIS SUBJECT TO HIM.

3. WE COULD, OF COURSE, DECIDE NOT TO RAISE THE MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE GOI UNTIL THE PARTY PLATFORM BECOMES OFFICIAL GOI POLICY AFTER THE ELECTIONS. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PREFERABLE COURSE WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE GOI IN THE NEAR FUTURE, EMPHASIZING THOSE ASPECTS OF THE POLICY WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE THE MOST TROUBLESOME. THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY WILL SIMPLY TAKE THE OCCASION TO EXPLAIN TO US, ALONG THE LINES OF THE PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE SPOKESMEN AND EBAN'S REMARKS TO WALDHEIM, THAT THIS IS JUST A LITTLE MORE OF THE SAME AND HENCE NOTHING TO GET EXCITED ABOUT. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT DESPITE WHAT THEIR OFFICIAL REACTION TO US MAY BE, OUR DEMARCHE(S) COULD TO SOME EXTENT RESTRAIN THE CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON THIS SUBJECT AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE GOI TO HAVE MORE FLEXIBILITY RE IMPLEMENTATION THAN OTHERWISE MIGHT BE THE CASE.

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KEATING

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Department of State

73 SECRET AM 10:38

TELEGRAM

WH

O 301450Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9618

BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 6846

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 8464Q

RECD: 31 AUG 73 3AM

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FOR ACTING SECRETARY, SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, ASST. SECRETARY
SISCO

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFCR, PEOR, XF

SUBJECT: GOI POLICY TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: TEL AVIV 6819

1. WE HAVE REPORTED AND ANALYZED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND REFTEL HIGHLIGHTS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM WILL POSE FOR ANY US POLICIES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE AT LEAST THE INITIATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE ARE ONLY TOO AWARE THAT THE REAL DIFFICULTY IS PROPOSING SOLUTIONS TO THESE PROBLEMS. WE PROPOSE TO USE THIS CHANNEL FOR A DIALOGUE WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE US SHOULD DO ABOUT THE ISRAELI LABOR PARTY PROGRAM, HOW AND WHEN. IN THIS RESPECT, WE HAVE REPORTED THAT THIS PROGRAM IS EXPECTED TO BE ADOPTED OFFICIALLY BY THE LABOR PARTY EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. WE ARE UNABLE TO RECONSTRUCT FROM OUR FILES THE HISTORY OF US REPRESENTATION TO THE GOI HERE ON SUBJECT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IT APPEARS LAST AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS MADE BY AMBASSADOR YOST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 1, 1969, WHICH OUTLINED OUR CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO "ANY ACTION-- IN JERUSALEM OR ELSEWHERE -- THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS PREJUDICING OR PREJUDGING A FINAL COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE." FOR THE LAST FEW ~~YEARS~~, WE APPEAR NOT TO HAVE OFFICIALLY PROTESTED TO THE GOI ITS ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOTE THAT ON AUG 23 THE DEPT SPOKESMAN REFERRED TO THE 1969 YOST STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION CONCERNING US ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REPORTED LABOR PARTY PROGRAM. SINCE THE SUBJECT WAS RAISED PUBLICLY ON AUG 23, SEVERAL LEADING US NEWSPAPERS HAVE WRITTEN EDITORIALS WARNING THAT THE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS EQUIVALENT TO DE FACTO ISRAELI ANNEXATION, WITH ALL THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS THAT HAS FOR HOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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PAGE -2- TEL AVIV 6846, AUG 30

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISRAELIS WERE LISTENING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE AUGUST 23 EXERCISE WAS USEFUL IN THAT AT LEAST IT PUT US ON THE PUBLIC RECORD AS NOT HAVING CHANGED OUR OFFICIAL POLICIES TOWARD THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS IN THE TERRITORIES. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THIS ACTION IN ITSELF IS GOING TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE LABOR PARTY'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOR ON SUBSEQUENT LONGER RANGE GOI PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS COMPONENT PARTS.

4. WHAT, AS STATED IN REFTEL, MUCH OF THE PROGRAM IS A CONTINUATION OF AN INTENSIFICATION OF ONGOING GOI PROGRAMS. WE CANNOT EXPECT THE ISRAELIS EITHER TO REPUDIATE PUBLICLY THESE PROGRAMS OR TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY REQUEST FROM US THAT THEY JUST TURN THE WHOLE THING OFF. AND IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT MANY ISRAELIS BELIEVE SINCERELY WITH DAYAN THAT THE ONLY HOPE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA IS TO CONVINCE THE ARABS THAT TIME IS NOT ON THEIR SIDE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS TO US THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF BEING ABLE TO ASSURE THE GOI OF ANY REAL HOPE FOR AT LEAST INITIATING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, WE SHOULD FOCUS ANY ACTION WE DECIDE TO TAKE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THE GOAL OF GETTING THEM TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM WHICH REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE NEW DEPARTURES. WE COULD, THEREFORE, EMPHASIZE OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF YAMIT AND ITS ADJACENT NETWORK OF SETTLEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, WHILE EXPRESSING GENERAL CONCERN ABOUT THRUST OF LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN CONTEXT OF CONTINUITY OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (SEE REFTEL FOR MORE DETAILS.)

5. HOW AND WHEN. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INITIALLY RAISE SUBJECT WITH GOI IN NEAR FUTURE. FOR OPENERS, WE WOULD SUGGEST AN EARLY CONVERSATION WITH AME DINITZ IN WASHINGTON. EMBASSY, OF COURSE, IN NO POSITION TO GUARANTEE WHAT SUCCESS WE MIGHT HAVE WITH GOI. DEPENDENT IN PART ON RESULT OF SUCH A MEETING, DEPT CAN DETERMINE WHETHER WE SHOULD MAKE DEMARCHE AT OUR END. ALTHOUGH WE RECONGIZE COMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN IMMINENCE OF ELECTIONS HERE, ON BALANCE I RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO RAISE THIS MATTER OFFICIALLY WITH THE ISRALIS HERE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. HOPEFULLY, EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERNS WOULD HELP MODERATE AT LEAST SOME CAMPAIGN RHETORIC ON SUBJECT AND SHOULD STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TREND TOWARD ANNEXATION. ALSO, IT WOULD SERVE AS REMINDER TO GOI DECISION MAKERS THAT IN THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC ISRAELI CONSIDERATIONS THEY SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF FACTOR OF US-GOI RELATIONS.

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION TO THIS MESSAGE.

KEATING

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8080
BT
S E C R E T STATE 206834

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, USMAS
SUBJ? RESUPPLY AIRLIFT

REF: TEL AVIV 8061

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR DECISION TO UNDERTAKE MILITARY RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL. I SAID IN MY PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT IS RIGHT IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION, AND WE ARE DOING IT. WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET, AND WE MUST SEE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IS MAINTAINED AS WE SEEK AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES AND A WAY TO GET DIPLOMACY WORKING ON A FINAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

2. I AM SURE I HAVE YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS WHY, IN THIS COMPLEX AND FAST-MOVING SITUATION, WE WERE UNABLE TO CONSULT OR INFORM YOU OF OUR POLICY DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE WAY WE WOULD NORMALLY WANT TO. KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON:MTB
10/16/72 EXT 19380
THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 OCT 19 AM 9:58



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2644Q

RECD: 10 OCT 73 9PM

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HOWE
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O 102344Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE ASHCC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7988
BT
SECRET STATE 201359

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MASS, IS
SUBJ: ISRAELI AMMUNITION NEEDS
REFS: TEL AVIV 7917 AND 7937

FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING

WE HAVE NOTED VARIOUS OF YOUR TELEGRAMS REGARDING ISRAELI
NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS MATTER IS
BEING HANDLED QUIETLY BACK HERE IN WASHINGTON. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: S:LEAGLEBURGER

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S/S:MR.PICKERING

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TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY NEA/RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY NEA RODGER DAVIES
S/S MR KELLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 083911

EXDIS

TEHRAN FOR SISCO

1. ISRAELI DMI GENERAL YARIV TOLD DAVIES 23RD THAT HE HAD INFORMED DIA THAT IN VIEW INTELLIGENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL INCREMENTS TO UAR MILITARY EQUIPMENT SCHEDULED FOR 1970-1971, ISRAEL DESIRES REVIEW WITH USG ADDITIONAL ISRAELI AIR AND GROUND EQUIPMENT NEEDS OVER NEXT THREE YEARS. HE SAID DEPT MIGHT WISH CONSIDER SETTING UP A SESSION SIMILAR TO EXCHANGE WITH GENERAL WEIZMAN IN FALL OF 1967.

2. DAVIES REPLIED THAT IF GOI REQUESTED SUCH REVIEW, HE CERTAIN IT WOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF EXCHANGE AGREED TO, IT ALSO SHOULD COVER IN DEPTH THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE NEAR EAST.
OF-3. RICHARDSON

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN02-28/9 DOS 12-14-04

By AM/s NARA, Date 9-9-05

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 071

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ORIGIN SS 30

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/UAR:HEBOVIS

APPROVED BY: NEA/UAR:RICHARD B PARKER

NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON

S/R: MR ABERNETHY

S/S: MR BROWN

NEA: MR PRECHT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USINT CAIRO

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET STATE 070635

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JEWS IN UAR

WE UNDERSTAND FROM JACOBSON (UNITED HIAS) THAT ISRAEL SEEKING TO ARRANGE THROUGH ICRC DIRECT SWAP OF UAR PILOT BEING HELD BY ISRAEL FOR ISRAELI SOLDIER BEING HELD BY UAR. HE SURMISES GOI WANTS TO DISASSOCIATE QUESTION OF PILOT FROM QUESTION OF DETAINEES AND BELIEVES THIS BEST METHOD FOR DOING SO WHILE AT SAME TIME SATISFYING UAR'S PREREQUISITE FOR RELEASE REMAINING JEWS. GP-1. ROGERS

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATEI 069861

COUNTER-ACTION BECAUSE QUOTE HE'S NOT THAT RATIONAL. THEY NEVER ARE UNQUOTE. RABIN SAID EGYPTIANS HAD PASSED TO SECOND STAGE OF QUOTE ACTIVE DEFENSE UNQUOTE BECAUSE MILITARILY THEY FEEL THEY ARE STRONG ENOUGH. IN REPLY QUESTION RABIN AFFIRMED EGYPTIANS ARE STRONG ALONG CANAL AND HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE CROSS-CANAL RAIDS GROW IN SIZE, FROM CURRENT 15 MEN TO 100 OR 200 MEN AND IN FREQUENCY. RABIN CONVINCED THAT NASSER HAS DECIDED CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY CANAL ACTIVITY AND HAS WRITTEN OFF EVERYTHING ALONG CANAL.

3. SISCO ASKED AT WHAT PRICE. RABIN SAID BY EVACUATING CANAL AREA NASSER HAS CREATED FOR HIMSELF A REFUGEE PROBLEM OF SOME QUARTER MILLION PEOPLE. NASSER ALSO ABANDONING INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, E.G. AT SUEZ WHERE ACCORDING ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE EGYPTIANS NO LONGER TRYING TO REPAIR DAMAGE. INSTEAD, THEY ARE MOVING SALVAGED EQUIPMENT ELSEWHERE.

4. SISCO ASKED HOW MUCH DAMAGE IS BEING DONE TO ISRAELIS AT CANAL. RABIN SAID NOW THAT PROTECTIVE BUNKERS BUILT, NUMBER OF CASUALTIES EGYPTIANS CAN INFLICT IS LIMITED. STILL, BY ISRAELI STANDARDS IT IS QUITE A NUMBER. NASSER, BY CONTRAST, CAN AFFORD LOSE HUNDREDS. RABIN AGREED THAT NASSER FEELS HE CAN AFFORD LOSSES HE NOW SUSTAINING IF MILITARY ACTIVITY IS CONFINED TO CANAL AREA. RABIN OBSERVED NASSER HAD USED TIME FOLLOWING IDF RAID LAST OCTOBER UNTIL MARCH TO MAKE SURE ASWAN DAM DEFENSES ADEQUATE, AND MAY HAVE IMPROVED DEFENSES ELSEWHERE TOO. ISRAELI RAID APRIL 30 WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE NASSER TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, AND WITHOUT SOMETHING MUCH MORE SEVERE, HE WON'T CHANGE.

5. SISCO ASKED AGAIN WHY NASSER DOING THIS. RABIN SAID NASSER MUST SHOW OTHER ARABS AND REST OF WORLD THAT HE NOT ONLY HAS MILITARY EQUIPMENT AGAIN, BUT HAS ALSO GAINED CAPABILITY TO USE IT. FURTHERMORE HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE IN SUPPORT HIS POLITICAL EFFORTS. HE KNOWS THAT IN ITSELF MILITARY ACTION CANNOT BRING ABOUT SOLUTION. LOGICAL PURPOSE IS NOT TO BRING ABOUT WAR, BUT TO PLAY SOME SORT OF BRINKSMANSHIP.

6. FOUR-POWER TALKS: SISCO CONTINUED THAT NASSER HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN TERRIFYING FOUR POWERS OR US ALONE INTO ACTING PRECIPITATELY. HE ASKED HOW NASSER COULD BE PRESSURED TO STOP PRESENT GAME ON CANAL. RABIN REPLIED: ANNOUNCE POSTPONEMENT FOUR POWER TALKS UNTIL PEACE RETURNS TO CEASEFIRE LINE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM



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PAGE 03 STATE 069861

7. ISRAELIS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT NOW THAT FOUR POWER TALKS LAUNCHED, THERE WOULD BE BUILT-IN PRESSURE TO MAKE COMPROMISES FOR THEM TO SUCCEED. SISCO SAID ISRAEL IS OVEREMPHASIZING THIS PROBLEM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED TALKS CREATE CERTAIN MOMENTUM TO TERMINATE WITH A QUOTE SOLUTION UNQUOTE, BUT IT IS NOT IRRESISTIBLE. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN CONCESSIONS FOR CONCESSIONS SAKE. WE WANT A SETTLEMENT. BITAN NOTED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FOUR POWER AND TWO POWER TALKS IS LATTER CAN PROCEED WITHOUT PUBLICITY AND ACCOMPANYING PRESSURES. FOUR CANNOT.

8. SISCO SAID HE DISTURBED BY HOW MANY TIMES ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD US TO QUOTE LEAVE US ALONE UNQUOTE TO FIND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN MID EAST. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST ARGUING US DOES NOT HAVE ROLE THERE. RABIN DEMURRED, NOTING HE NEVER SAID TO LEAVE ISRAEL ALONE. HE HAD SAID PLEASE SUPPORT ATTEMPTS TO FIND PEACE. BITAN ADDED WE ARE SAYING TO US, IF YOU DO REACH REAL PEACE, THEN FINE. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT THINK SOVIETS OR FRENCH WANT THIS. AS LONG AS POSTURE OF US REMAINS AS IT HAS BEEN OVER LAST TWENTY-TWO MONTHS, ISRAEL IS READY TO TAKE THE HEAT (OF CONTINUING STATUS QUO). IN RESPONSE QUERRY AS TO WHY ISRAEL OBJECTS TO OUR TALKING WITH SOVIETS WHEN OUR PURPOSE IS TO FIND OUT IF THEY PREPARED PAY PRICE FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT, RABIN AND BITAN REPLIED ISRAEL DOESN'T OBJECT US TALKING WITH SOVIETS. IT DOES OBJECT TO FOUR POWER MECHANISM. US PROBING OF SOVIETS IS NO PROBLEM.

9. FUTURE OF MODERATE ARAB REGIMES: SISCO OPENED DISCUSSION OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AND JORDAN BY OBSERVING FOLLOWING: ASSUMING AS WE DO THAT THERE WILL BE NO EARLY US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN MID EAST, AND THAT OUTBREAK ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES NOT IMMINENT, WHAT REALLY CONCERNS US IS POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN AREA. HUSSEIN IS UNDER GREATER PRESSURE FROM FEDAYEEN. LEBANESE FACE SAME THREAT. SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE LEBANESE WILL COME OUT OF PRESENT TURMOIL OTHER THAN WEAKER POLITICALLY. SISCO OPINED INCREASING INSTABILITY THESE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY RELATED TO ABSENCE REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE SETTLEMENT. HE ASKED IF GOI WASN'T CONCERNED ABOUT THESE DEVELOPMENTS, AND WOULD ISRAEL BE BETTER OFF BY RADICALIZATION JORDAN AND LEBANON.

10. BITAN REPLIED GOI PLAYING LEBANESE SITUATION BY EARLY PRAGMATICALLY, AND OF COURSE WOULD BE CONCERNED IF GOL FELL.

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IN BITAN'S OPINION HUSSEIN RETURNED FROM US VISIT IMPRESSED BY ONE THING: FOUR POWER TALKS WILL GET HIM A BETTER DEAL THAN DIRECT DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL. SISCO REITERATED EMPHATICALLY FOUR POWER TALKS NOT AT FAULT FOR NO PROGRESS, TOLD BITAN GOI NOT GETTING VERY FAR WITH US ON THIS ARGUMENT AND REMINDED HIM THESE TALKS WERE PRECEDED BY TWENTY MONTHS OF NO PROGRESS BY PARTIES TOWARDS SETTLEMENT. WE UNIMPRESSED WITH ARGUMENTS SEEKING TO MAKE FOUR POWER VEHICLE THE SCAPEGOAT.

11. SISCO ASKED WHAT PREVENTS ISRAEL FROM MAKING PROGRESS WITH JORDAN. BITAN REPLIED ISRAEL'S POSITION IS NOT PALATABLE TO HUSSEIN, BUT IT IS BARGAINING POSITION AS HUSSEIN WOULD LEARN IF HE ENTERED NEGOTIATIONS. SISCO SAID HUSSEIN COULDN'T ACCEPT ALLON PLAN AND SURVIVE. HE URGED ISRAELIS TO PROPOSE SOMETHING REASONABLE, IN WHICH CASE HE THOUGHT HUSSEIN WOULD ACCEPT IT AS BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS, REGARDLESS OF FOUR POWER TALKS, EVEN IF IT MEANT GETTING OUT AHEAD OF NASSER. KING CANNOT EVEN BEGIN TO FOCUS ON PROBLEMS OF JERUSALEM OR WEST BANK AS LONG AS ALLON PLAN IS ISRAELI PROPOSAL.

12. RABIN SAID HE NOT SO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POTENTIAL FOR SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN. LATTER FEELS, AND US DOES TOO, THAT TO ACHIEVE SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL HE WILL HAVE TO GET BACK MOST OF WHAT HE LOST IN SIX-DAY WAR, TO JUSTIFY HIS DEPARTING FROM DECISIONS TAKEN BY ARAB SUMMIT MEETING. THERE IS GREAT RISK FOR HIM WITHOUT THIS. BUT NASSER IS NOT GOING TO LET HUSSEIN GET SEPARATE PEACE. KING FEISAL HOPES THAT PRESENT SITUATION WILL CONTINUE AND THAT NASSER WILL GET INTO ANOTHER WAR WITH ISRAEL AND LOSE. SISCO OBSERVED HUSSEIN HAS VERY GOOD HANDLE ON FEISAL BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAS BEEN A FRONT-LINE PARTICIPANT AGAINST ISRAEL. IF IN SETTLEMENT RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF JERUSALEM CAN BE MET TO FEISAL'S SATISFACTION, HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE VERY GOOD LEVERAGE WITH HIM. TO MAKE SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, HUSSEIN WOULD NEED MORE THAN RELIGIOUS POSITION IN JERUSALEM.

13. SOVIET POLICY: AT LUNCH SISCO ASKED WHAT IS SOVIET POLICY AND ARE THEY AFTER PEACE OR ONLY A LIMITED ACCOMMODATION. RABIN REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY TO LATTER AND OBSERVED THAT WHEN SOVIET ARE FOR SOMETHING HE BECOMES SUSPICIOUS. SOVIETS HAVE LEARNED CONTINUATION PRESENT SITUATION CAUSING LOT OF HARM. IF IT CONTINUES, THEY NOT SURE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN EGYPT WHERE NASSER'S FALL WOULD BE AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. NASSER'S FALL



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COULD FREE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO RECONSIDER THEIR OWN POSITIONS, AND HUSSEIN TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. SISCO EXPRESSED DOUBT ON THAT SCORE. BITAN SAID RUSSIANS WERE STOPPED IN 1967 BY AN UNWRITTEN ISRAEL-US ALLIANCE. HE AGREED THAT SOVIET PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO PRESERVE NASSER. THEIR RESOURCES, ALSO, ARE LIMITED. ARGOV QUIPPED THAT SOVIETS WANT QUOTE TIME-OUT UNQUOTE IN MID EAST. HE NOTED THAT SOVIETS ARE GLUED TO UAR SITUATION, AND WANT TO FREE RESOURCES FOR OTHER ACTIVITY IN MID EAST.

14. ISRAELI POSITION: IN DISCUSSING ISRAELI AIMS IN PEACE SETTLEMENT RABIN SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, BY NAME, BY EGYPT; RECONCILIATION BY ARAB STATES TO FACT ISRAEL EXISTS; AND OPEN BOUNDARIES FOR FREE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND COMMERCE. HE CALLED FOR NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES, WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE FINALIZED BY FACE-TO-FACE TALKS. ARAB BOYCOTT SHOULD END ALSO. RABIN SAID SO FAR AS HE COULD SEE, US AND SOVIETS WERE VIRTUALLY AGREED ON ELEMENTS OF SETTLEMENT WITH EXCEPTION OF (A) DEFINITION OF PEACE AND (B) FORM OF PEACE INSTRUMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, US AND USSR TOOK SAME POSITION ON REFUGEES AND BOTH AGREED THAT FINAL BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE BASED ON ARMISTICE LINES WITH MINOR RECTIFICATIONS. BOUNDARY CHANGES ISRAEL HAD IN MIND, ON OTHER HAND, WERE NOT RPT NOT MINOR, RABIN SAID.

15. IN LATER CONVERSATION WITH BITAN AND ISRAELI MINISTER ARGOV, DEPTOFFS MADE POINT THAT ISRAELI POSITION THAT STATUS QVO ENDURABLE RAISED SPECTER OF FALL OF MODERATE GOVERNMENTS, RADICALIZATION ON ARAB SIDE, AND POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS WOULD MOVE TO SUPPORT OF EXTREMISM TO PREEMPT CHICOM INFLUENCE. AT PRESENT, SOVIETS SEEM EAGER TO MOVE TOWARD SETTLEMENT. WE NOW PROBING TO SEE WHETHER SOVIET WORDS CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO ACTION BY THEM WITH THEIR CLIENTS. DEPTOFF ASKED WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD FIND A SOVIET-US AGREED CONCEPT OF A SETTLEMENT UNACCEPTABLE IF IT PROVIDED THAT THE DETAILS WERE TO BE WORKED OUT DIRECTLY BY THE PARTIES UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. BITAN REITERATED THAT SOVIETS AND US MIGHT WELL AGREE BUT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN BASIC POINTS ON WHICH US AND ISRAEL DISAGREED. NEVERTHELESS, IF PROCEDURES INVOLVED WORKING OUT OF DETAILS BY PARTIES DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER, ISRAEL PROBABLY COULD ACCEPT THIS OUTCOME OF TWO OR FOUR POWER TALKS. NECESSARY CAVEAT WAS THAT US NOT COMPROMISE ANY OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES TO WHICH SO FAR IT HAS ADHERED.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET STATE 063517

EXDIS

1. SISCO INFORMED SWEARINGEN APRIL 23 OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH RABIN PREVIOUS DAY. SISCO REPORTED RABIN HAD SAID IT GOI POLICY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH AL-MURGAN AND DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS PRESENT HAD IMPRESSION HE MEANT IT. WE THEREFORE THOUGHT WE HAD RECEIVED SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES THIS REGARD. SWEARINGEN ASKED WHAT LIGHT RABIN HAD THROWN ON LATTER'S REMARKS TO ROBERT ANDERSON. SISCO SAID WE PREFERRED NOT GET INTO THAT QUESTION. PERHAPS THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT WE HAD RECEIVED RIGHT KIND OF ASSURANCES FROM PROPER PERSON.
2. SISCO NOTED THAT RABIN'S REMARKS REGARDING EGYPTIAN PIPELINES HAD BEEN LESS SATISFACTORY. IN EFFECT, RABIN HAD SAID THAT AS LONG AS SHOOTING CONTINUED ANYTHING COULD HAPPEN AND THAT IF EGYPTIANS WANTED PROTECT PIPELINES OR OTHER INSTALLATIONS THEY SHOULD STOP SHOOTING. SWEARINGEN ASKED WHETHER WE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO MEAN ISRAELIS MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST NEW PIPELINE FACILITIES EGYPTIANS WERE CONSTRUCTING. SISCO SAID HE NOT SURE.
3. SWEARINGEN ASKED WHETHER RABIN HAD GIVEN US ANY INFORMATION ON REPORTS THAT ISRAEL HAD GRANTED CONCESSION TO MID-BAR. SISCO SAID RABIN HAD DISCLAIMED KNOWLEDGE AND HAD SAID HE WOULD CHECK WITH JERUSALEM. WE WOULD LET SWEARINGEN KNOW AS SOON AS WE HEARD FROM RABIN.

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4. SWEARINGEN ASKED IF WE HAD TOLD RABIN ABOUT PAN-AMERICAN'S PLANS FOR SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF AL-MURGAN. SISCO SAID WE HAD NOT. SWEARINGEN THEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS OUR BELIEF PAN-AMERICAN COULD PROCEED WITH ITS ACTIVITIES AT AL-MURGAN IN A NORMAL FASHION. SISCO SAID IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT THAT IT COULD.
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET STATE 062778

EXDIS

REF: STATE'S 060716

SUBJ: ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN GULF OF SUEZ

1. SWEARINGEN OF STANDARD OF INDIANA CALLED ON SISCO APRIL 22. HE REVIEWED STANDARD'S INTEREST IN AL-MURGAN FIELD, WHICH LOOKED INCREASINGLY PROMISING, AND SAID HE DISTURBED BY REPORT FROM ROBERT ANDERSON OF RABIN'S REMARKS REPORTED REF. TEL. STANDARD ALSO DISTURBED BY REPORTS IN INDUSTRY THAT ISRAELIS HAVE GRANTED CONCESSION TO BRITISH FIRM, MID-BAR, WHICH WHOLLY AMERICAN OWNED, FOR EXPLORATION IN GULF OF SUEZ, INCLUDING AL-MURGAN FIELD. HE SAID STANDARD WOULD LIKE USG TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH ISRAELIS AND OBTAIN ASSURANCES AS TO LATTER'S INTENTIONS. STANDARD WOULD ALSO LIKE ADVICE AS TO WHAT THEY SHOULD TELL EGYPTIANS.

2. RABIN CALLED ON SISCO AFTERNOON APRIL 22 FOR DISCUSSION NUMBER MATTERS AND SISCO TOOK OCCASION TO RAISE GULF OF SUEZ PROBLEM. NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NUMBER OF REPORTS IN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY PRESS THAT ISRAELIS INTENDED TAKE SOME MILT.

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TARY ACTION AGAINST AL-MURGAN INSTALLATIONS. WE HAD RAISED THIS IN JERUSALEM IN LATE MARCH AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT GOI WELL AWARE OF OUR INTERESTS AND THAT THEY WOULD BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER ROBERT ANDERSON HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED TO SISCO HIS CONCERN THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT NOT ONLY TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST AL-MURGAN BUT MIGHT ALSO SEEK TO PREVENT EGYPTIANS FROM BUILDING PIPELINES. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AND STANDARD OF INDIANA IN PARTICULAR, WERE VERY DISTURBED BY RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT. WAS THERE ANYTHING RABIN COULD GIVE US BY WAY OF ASSURANCES?

3. RABIN SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO MATTER OF EGYPTIAN PIPELINES, HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO ROBERT ANDERSON THAT HE TELL EGYPTIANS TO STOP SHELLING ISRAELIS ALONG CANAL. AS LONG AS EGYPTIANS CONTINUED FIRING, ANYTHING MIGHT HAPPEN. IF THERE WAS SHOOTING FROM EGYPTIAN SIDE, THERE WOULD BE SHOOTING FROM ISRAELI SIDE. IF ANDERSON WAS WORRIED ABOUT PIPELINES, HE KNEW THE ADDRESS TO WHICH HE SHOULD REPORT HIS CONCERN.

4. ARGOV, WHO ACCOMPANYING RABIN, SAID HE BELIEVED ELIZUR HAD GIVEN ZURHELLEN ASSURANCES IN JERUSALEM SAME MORNING THAT ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION OF BLOWING UP AL-MURGAN FIELD. RABIN COMMENTED THAT ISRAELIS WERE NOT CRAZY.

5. SISCO SAID HE WAS GLAD WE HAD THESE ASSURANCES. HE WOULD LIKE TO RAISE SECOND MATTER, HOWEVER, WHICH WAS REPORT FROM INDUSTRY CIRCLES TO EFFECT ISRAELIS HAD AWARDED CONCESSION IN EASTERN HALF OF GULF TO AMERICAN-OWNED BRITISH COMPANY CALLED MID-BAR. CONCESSION REPORTEDLY INCLUDED AL-MURGAN FIELD.

6. RABIN COMMENTED WITH SURPRISE THAT MID-BAR WAS ISRAELI NAME MEANING "DESERT". SAID HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT ANY CONCESSION BUT AGREED TO ASK JERUSALEM. THEN SAID HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH AL-MURGAN. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS STILL ISRAELI POLICY. HE WISHED EMPHASIZE HOWEVER, THAT THIS SEPARATE FROM QUESTION OF EGYPTIAN PIPELINES FROM SUEZ TO MEDITERRANEAN.

7. SISCO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT RABIN WAS SAYING. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT, WHILE WE KNEW ISRAELIS DID NOT AGREE WITH OUR LEGAL POSITION ON EXPLOITATION OF EASTERN GULF, WE

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TOOK THIS MATTER SERIOUSLY. RABIN NODDED AND SAID HE SAW THE OIL LOBBY HAD BEEN BUSY.

8. COMMENT: RABIN SPOKE WITH APPARENT SINCERITY. IT POSSIBLE HE WAS REFERRING ONLY TO PIPELINES IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ANDERSON AND THAT LATTER MISUNDERSTOOD HIM. RABIN'S EXPLICIT SINGLING OUT OF PIPELINES AS SEPARATE QUESTION SUGGESTS ISRAELIS MAY BE KEEPING OPTION OPEN IN THAT REGARD.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 062555

EXDIS:

1. ALTHOUGH YOU MAY ALREADY HAVE INFO, WE ARE RELAYING TO YOU FOLLOWING REPORT FROM HIAS. GROUP OF DETAINEES WHO ARRIVED PARIS APRIL 21 SAYS 121 DETAINEES LEFT IN TRANSIT CAMP (PRESUMABLY BARRAGES). UAR AUTHORITIES PLAN TO EMPTY CAMP BY END OF MONTH ALLOWING DETAINEES DEPART EGYPT IN GROUPS OF FIVE TO 10. SEVEN EXPECTED IN PARIS ON WEDNESDAY, FIVE ON SATURDAY, AND FIVE ON MONDAY. FAMILIES OF DETAINEES WILL BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE COUNTRY AFTER CAMP EMPTIED. THIS WILL LEAVE 95 EGYPTIAN NATIONALS IN PRISON (PRESUMABLY TOURAH), ALL OF WHOM HAVE BEEN GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO RENOUNCE NATIONALITY. ONLY 23 HAVE NOT YET DECIDED TO RENOUNCE. ONCE TRANSIT CAMP EMPTIED, IT IS HOPED DETAINEES IN PRISON WHO HAVE RENOUNCED NATIONALITY WILL BE ALLOWED LEAVE COUNTRY WITH FAMILIES.

2. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT ALL FIVE DETAINEES WHO ARRIVED IN PARIS ON MONDAY HAD SPANISH DOCUMENTS ALTHOUGH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN STATELESS. THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM YOUR ASSESSMENT GIVEN IN PARA. 1 CAIRO 974.

GP-1 • ROGERS

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66636

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P 190048Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 060716

EXDIS:

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1. JOHN SWEARINGEN, PRESIDENT OF STANDARD OF INDIANA, IS CALLING ON SISCO APRIL 21 TO DISCUSS ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN GULF OF SUEZ. SWEARINGEN IS CONCERNED BY WHAT HE UNDERSTANDS TO BE ISRAELI THREAT TO SEIZE AL-MURGAN FIELD IF EGYPTIANS DO NOT CEASE HARASSMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES IN CANAL AREA. IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF HIS CONCERN IS REMARKS TO THIS EFFECT REPORTEDLY MADE BY ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN TO ROBERT ANDERSON IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK.

2. WE HAVE CALLED ANDERSON, WHO HAS INFORMED US THAT RABIN WAS SPEAKING IN CONTEXT OF ISRAELI INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHY EGYPTIANS ENGAGING IN SUICIDAL TACTICS ALONG CANAL. RABIN REPORTED BY ANDERSON TO HAVE SAID EGYPTIANS HAD ALREADY LOST ONE REFINERY AND MAJOR FERTILIZER PLANT. NEXT THING THEY WOULD LOSE WOULD BE AL-MORGAN FIELD. EGYPTIANS WERE ALSO PLANNING TO BUILD TWO PIPELINES FROM SUEZ GULF TO MEDITERRANEAN AND ISRAELIS COULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO DO SO IF EGYPTIANS CONTINUED FORWARD POLICY ALONG CANAL. ANDERSON SAID THIS WAS NOT COINED IN TERMS OF THREAT BUT RATHER AS DISCUSSION OF CONSEQUENCES CONTINUED EGYPTIAN SHELLING OF ISRAELIS.

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ORIGIN SS 30

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66642

R 100029Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

060545

S E C R E T STATE 054653

EXDIS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DIMONA VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 1246

WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN PM'S REQUEST THAT VISIT BE POSTPONED UNTIL LATE JUNE. OUR EXPERTS HAVE ALWAYS FELT LAPSE OF YEAR BETWEEN VISITS TOO GREAT TO GIVE US COMPLETE CONFIDENCE CONCERNING ACTIVITIES AT DIMONA. THIS WAS REASON WE PRESSED FOR SEMI-ANNUAL VISITS IN 1963 AND WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED ESHKOL'S AUGUST 19, 1963 LETTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOGETHER WITH HIS ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS TO YOU AS CONSTITUTING GOI COMMITMENT TO VISITS ON SEMI-ANNUAL BASIS. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD REDPEN QUESTION WITH GOI, ASKING THAT PM BE REMINDED OF OUR 1963 UNDERSTANDING WITH ESHKOL, AND THAT SHE RECONSIDER RESPONSE CITED REFTEL. WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER VISIT TAKE PLACE MAY 5. GP-3. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI: MCLISSFELT
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66633

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3

NLN 02-28/10 DOS 12-14-04
By WMS Admin. Date 9-9-05

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P R 290109Z MAR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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EXDIS

1. AT OUTSET MEETING MARCH 27 WITH ISRAELI CHARGE ARGOV ON ANOTHER SUBJECT (SEPTEL), ASST SEC SISCO REFERRED UPCOMING US VISIT BY KING HUSSEIN. HE REITERATED IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES MAINTAINING MODERATE HUSSEIN REGIME AND AVOIDING EXTREMIST TAKE-OVER. HE EXPRESSED REGRET INCIDENT MARCH 26 (ISRAELI ATTACK AT SALT) AND OTHER RECENT INCIDENTS BOTH SIDES ISRAELI-JORDAN CEASEFIRE LINE, AND NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WOULD NOT MAKE PROGRESS OTHER MATTERS ANY EASIER.

2. SISCO SAID USG WILL BE DISCUSSING ARMS SALES WITH JORDANIANS AS PART OF REGULAR REVIEW CALLED FOR IN MARCH 1968 ARMS AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN. CONSULTATIONS BEGIN MARCH 31 WITH CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH. OUR INTENTION IS THAT PACKAGE BE MODEST IN SIZE AND EMPHASIZE ITEMS NEEDED FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE. WE ARE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING KING'S DOMESTIC POSITION.

3. ARGOV OBSERVED, ALSO PARENTHETICALLY, THAT LAST YEAR KING ENDED UP GETTING MORE ARMS THAN ISRAEL HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE, AS A RESULT OF SOME TANK PURCHASES FROM UK.

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4* WITHOUT HAVING FIGURES AVAILABLE, DEP ASST SEC DAVIES
OBSERVED HE THOUGHT THE OVERALL JORDANIAN ARMS LEVELS
DID NOT EXCEED 1967 FIGURES. GP-3 ROGERS

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 038852

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED ACCOUNT OF SECRETARY'S RESPONSE TO EBAN'S MARCH 12 PRESENTATION REPORTED SEPTEL, AND OF EBAN COMMENTS THEREON. IT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE ON REVIEW, FYI, NOFORN.
2. AFTER EXPRESSING CONDOLENCES ON ESHKOL DEATH AND CONGRATULATIONS TO MRS. MEIR, SECRETARY SAID NEW ADMINISTRATION FULLY AWARE OF SPECIAL US-ISRAELI RELATIONS WHICH IT HAS NO INTENTION OF CHANGING.
3. SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT HE AGREED WITH MUCH OF WHAT EBAN HAD SAID AND COULD ASSURE EBAN THERE WAS NO LESSENING OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE OF CONTRACTUAL SETTLEMENT WHICH IS LASTING AND FULLY PROTECTS ISRAEL'S SECURITY.
4. US STANDS FIRMLY ON CONCEPT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN

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PARTIES. OUR PURPOSE IN TWO POWER AND FOUR POWER TALKS IS TO SUPPORT JARRING EFFORTS WITH PARTIES, NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THEM.

5. SECRETARY SAID WE DO NOT THINK PARTIES HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT EFFORT, HOWEVER, TO GET INTO SUBSTANCE OF A SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT WISH TO ARGUE QUESTION OF BLAME BUT WANT TO MOVE THINGS ALONG. WE ARE NOT ASKING ISRAEL TO MAKE PROPOSALS WHICH UNDERMINE ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION BUT FEEL WE HAVE OBLIGATION TO HELP PARTIES MOVE TOWARD PERMANENT PEACE.

6- WE HOPE ISRAEL WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN ITS REPLIES TO JARRING. WE ALSO HOPE ARABS WILL SAY WHAT THEY MEAN BY PEACE. THIS IS FUNDAMENTAL AND WE AGREE WITH EBAN'S ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF PEACE.

7. IN URGING ISRAEL TO BE FORTHCOMING, WE MEAN WE HOPE ISRAEL WILL BE WILLING TO SPECIFY BOUNDARIES TO WHICH IT WILL WITHDRAW. WE WILL NOT SUGGEST TO ANYONE, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ARAB ASSURANCE ON PEACE.

8. AS CONCERNS ISRAEL'S POSITION, WE SEE TERRITORIAL QUESTION AS GUTS OF ISSUE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AGREEMENT BINDING ARABS TO PEACE, BULWARKED BY ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEMILITARIZATION AND BY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, CAN MORE ADEQUATELY INSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY THAN CAN CONTINUATION OF PRESENT UNSTABLE NO-WAR, NO-PEACE SITUATION. ON THIS POINT, SECRETARY SAID, WE AND ISRAEL MAY HAVE DIFFERENCES. WE SOMETIMES HAVE IMPRESSION ISRAEL MAY THINK PRESENT SITUATION IS BETTER THAN PEACE.

9. SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT NOW IS TIME TO MAKE DETERMINED EFFORT. WE VIEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND JARRING MISSION AS PROPER FOCUS FOR SEARCH FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE PLAN TO MOVE NEXT WEEK IN BILATERAL AND FOUR POWER CONTEXTS SINCE WE BELIEVE JARRING HAS REACHED IMPASSE AND THAT MAJOR POWERS CAN NOW PLAY HELPFUL ROLE. WE ARE MAKING NO CONCLUSIVE JUDGMENTS ABOUT SOVIET AND FRENCH INTENTIONS AND REALIZE WE MUST BE SKEPTICAL, PARTICULARLY RE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH LATTER MAY HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR WANTING TO MOVE. WE HOPE ISRAEL WILL GIVE FRENCH THEIR DETAILED VIEWS ON FRENCH PROPOSALS.

10. SECRETARY THEN HANDED EBAN COPY OF USG DESCRIPTION OF



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PRINCIPLES WHICH WE FEEL SHOULD GOVERN PEACE SETTLEMENT AND WHICH WE PLAN TO SUBMIT TO OTHER THREE POWERS NEXT WEEK. (TEXT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO POSTS AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH EBAN.) WE WOULD APPRECIATE ISRAEL'S COMMENTS ON THESE PRINCIPLES AND COULD PERHAPS DISCUSS THEM FURTHER NEXT DAY.

11. ELABORATING ON STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, SECRETARY SAID WE DO NOT FAVOR IMPOSED SETTLEMENT AND BELIEVE PRECISE BOUNDARIES ARE FOR PARTIES TO WORK OUT. AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT CONSIDER EITHER QTE ALLON PLAN END QTE OR ISRAELI RETENTION OF TERRITORY AT SHARM AL-SHEIKH CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES.

12. SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT WE WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO HEAR HOW ISRAEL ENVISAGES RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS FOLLOWING PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN OUR VIEW, TYPE OF RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN NEIGHBORING STATES THAT HAVE LONG LIVED IN PEACE IS UNATTAINABLE IN MIDDLE EAST AT THIS STAGE IN HISTORY. WE THINK JURIDICAL PEACE, BUTTRESSED BY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, CAN BE ATTAINED AND COULD EVOLVE INTO FULLY NORMAL RELATIONS ISRAEL SEEKS. IT ALSO POSSIBLE THAT QUITE DIFFERENT RELATIONS MIGHT EMERGE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ON ONE HAND AND BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR ON OTHER.

13. EBAN RESPONDED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO SECRETARY'S SUGGESTIONS ABOUT GIVING ARABS GOI CONCEPT OF BOUNDARIES, QUESTION IS AT WHAT STAGE THIS SHOULD BE DONE. IF ISRAEL DID SO BEFORE ARABS REACHED DECISION TO MAKE PEACE, LATTER WOULD SIMPLY REJECT ISRAELI PROPOSALS. JARRING HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT GIVE ARABS A MAP. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT AGREED BOUNDARIES MUST CLEARLY BE RELATED TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

14. IN RESPONSE TO EBAN'S QUERY RE STATUS OF DOCUMENT HANDED HIM BY SECRETARY, LATTER SAID IT WAS STILL IN-HOUSE DOCUMENT ON WHICH WE WANT ISRAEL'S COMMENTS. EBAN REPLIED THAT, WHILE HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH OUR USE OF WORD QTE MINIMAL END QTE IN DISCUSSING BOUNDARY CHANGES AMONG OURSELVES, TO GIVE THIS FORMULATION TO OTHERS AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WOULD ERODE US POSITION FURTHER. ON QUICK READING OF OUR PRINCIPLES, EBAN SAID SEVERAL POINTS CAUGHT HIS EYE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE ISRAEL'S POSITION. SECRETARY AGREED WE COULD DISCUSS PRINCIPLES PAPER FURTHER NEXT DAY.

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15. COMMENTING ON SECRETARY'S STATEMENT RE CONTINUATION OF STATUS QUO, EBAN SAID ISRAEL BY NO MEANS CONSIDERS PRESENT SITUATION PERFECT; IT IS BETTER, HOWEVER, THAN TO WITHDRAW FROM CEASE FIRE LINES WITHOUT PEACE. ISRAEL AGREES IT SHOULD NOT SIMPLY STAND PAT. US SHOULD NOT BE TOO IMPATIENT, HOWEVER. STATUS QUO CAN CONTINUE FOR SOME MONTHS WITHOUT DANGER OF HOSTILITIES.

16 SECRETARY REFERRED TO INDICATIONS THAT ISRAEL BELIEVES FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE PROGRESS. WE AGREE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS DESIRABLE BUT BELIEVE AGREEMENT COULD ALSO BE PRODUCED BY NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH JARRING WHICH PARTIES COULD THEN COMMIT THEMSELVES TO. EBAN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL AGREED SOME MONTHS AGO TO MOVE FROM INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO A PHASED APPROACH. DECISION RE WHEN TO MOVE FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE MADE EMPIRICALLY BUT HE COULD NOT SEE HOW PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT MEETINGS BETWEEN PARTIES. EBAN ADDED THAT GOI HAD EVEN BEEN PREPARED TO GIVE JARRING DRAFT OF WHAT CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT MIGHT LOOK LIKE AND MIGHT STILL DO SO LATER, BUT FOR PRESENT WOULD STAY WITH JARRING'S QUESTION AND ANSWER EXERCISE.

17. TURNING TO FRENCH PROPOSALS, EBAN SAID THEY WERE EVEN FURTHER THAN SOVIETS FROM CONCEPT OF AGREEMENT. SISCO NOTED THAT WE HAD GIVEN FRENCH OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS AND THAT FRENCH WERE REFINING THEIR PROPOSALS AND HAD GIVEN US SOME ELABORATION PREVIOUS DAY. SISCO SAID WE WERE AWARE OF FRENCH-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS AND KNEW THAT GOI WAS WEIGHING QUESTION OF GIVING FRENCH SUBSTANTIVE REACTIONS. EBAN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL HAD POINTED OUT CERTAIN FATAL FLAWS IN FRENCH PROPOSAL WHICH INVALIDATED THE REST.

18. SISCO MADE POINT THAT FRENCH WILL DEVELOP THEIR POSITION WITH OR WITHOUT ISRAELI VIEWS. WE BELIEVE ISRAEL CAN INFLUENCE FRENCH POSITION BY MAKING ITS SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS KNOWN, REGARDLESS OF WHAT IT THINKS ABOUT PROCEDURE FRENCH ARE PROPOSING.


19. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR RABIN'S QUERY WHY USG PAYING SUCH ATTENTION TO FRENCH, SECRETARY SAID WE HAD MADE CLEAR TO FRENCH THAT SETTLEMENT MUST BE A PACKAGE AND WE WOULD NOT AGREE ON PHASED

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WE STRONGLY PREFER THAT VISIT TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. IN MAKING REQUEST, YOU SHOULD SEEK GOI AGREEMENT FOR VISIT OF TWO DAYS DURATION. ON LAST VISIT, TEAM FELT STRONGLY THEY WERE BEING RUSHED TO COVER EVERYTHING AT SITE IN 12 HOURS.

GO-1. ROGERS

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DESTINY UNQUOTE. ARMS EMBARGO WAS NECESSITATED BY ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT BUT, ASIDE NON-DELIVERY MIRAGES, WAS NOT IN FACT PUTTING ISRAEL INTO DIFFICULT SITUATION.

(B) FRANCE NOT PLAYING SOVIET GAME AND SAW SAME AMBIGUITIES IN SOVIET DECEMBER 30 PLAN AS DID WE.

(C) FRENCH PROPOSAL WAS FOR FOUR POWER CONVERSATIONS, NOT CONFERENCE.

(D) FRANCE FELT IT HAD GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY THAN APPARENTLY DID THE U.S. AND FELT THAT OUTSIDE HELP OF GREAT POWER NEEDED TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT BY THE PARTIES.

(E) FRANCE BELIEVED ISRAEL SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE UP ANYTHING UNTIL PEACE AGREED TO.

3. IN ANSWER TO QUERY, ARGOV SAID FRENCH HAD NOT REPEAT NOT RECENTLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS AND THIS WAS FIRST INSIGHT INTO FRENCH THINKING THEY HAD.

GP-3. ROGERS

051/10/4099



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CONFIDENTIAL 004

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI: UKMATTER/MSTERNER

APPROVED BY: S/S: RLBROWN

NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON

NEA: MR. HART

WH: MR. SAUNDERS

IO: MR. SISCO

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 008053

EXDIS

1. FOL MSG FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO PRIMIN ESHKOL. ORIGINAL WILL BE SENT BY POUCH.

2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: WITH THE HELP OF MR. GEORGE WOODS, I HAVE REVIEWED THE PROGRESS OF OUR JOINT STUDIES ON DESALTING. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, I HAVE ACCEPTED MR. WOODS' RECOMMENDATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DESALTING PLANT IN ISRAEL WHICH WOULD PRODUCE 40 MILLION GALLONS OF DESALTED WATER PER DAY. I BELIEVE HIS PROPOSAL IS AN ADMIRABLE RESOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE JOINTLY BEEN STUDYING FOR SEVERAL YEARS. ACCORDINGLY, AS ONE OF MY LAST OFFICIAL ACTS, I HAVE INCLUDED A REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION OF A MAXIMUM OF DOLS 40 MILLION FOR THIS PROJECT IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM WHICH I AM RECOMMENDING TO THE CONGRESS FOR OUR FISCAL YEAR 1970.

3. I MUST, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZE THAT MY ACT IS A RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS. BY OUR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES, IT CANNOT AT THIS STAGE BE CONSIDERED A COMMITMENT OF MY GOVERNMENT. THAT COMMITMENT REMAINS FOR THE CONGRESS AND THE NEXT PRESIDENT

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TO CONSIDER. HOWEVER, I DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE OFFICE WITHOUT TELLING YOU PERSONALLY WHERE I AM LEAVING THIS MATTER WHICH YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED SO OFTEN.

4. IN CLOSING THIS, MY LAST OFFICIAL NOTE TO YOU, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION IN THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WE AND THOSE WORKING WITH US HAVE ENJOYED. OUR ASSOCIATION HAS MADE ME KEENLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY AWARE OF YOUR PROBLEMS.

5. I SHALL CONTINUE TO PRAY FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS. AS YOU KNOW, NOTHING HAS OCCUPIED MORE OF MY TIME AND ENERGIES IN OFFICE THAN THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE-MAKING. GREAT OBSTACLES MUST BE OVERCOME, GREAT SACRIFICIES MUST BE MADE, AND RISKS MUST BE TAKEN, IF WAR IS TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO PEACE.

6. I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES ISRAEL FACES IN THIS RESPECT. YET I LEAVE OFFICE WITH A DEEP CONVICTION THAT IF PEACE IS TO BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES BOTH SIDES MUST BRING A GREATER EFFORT AND A GREATER DARING TO THE TASK. UNLESS STATESMEN ARE WILLING TO TAKE SMALL RISKS TODAY TO EXPLORE EVERY POSSIBILITY FOR PEACE, I FEAR THEY WILL BE INCURRING FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN THE TERRIBLE RISK OF ENDURING HOSTILITY WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. ISRAEL ASTONISHED THE WORLD WITH ITS CAPABILITY IN WINNING MILITARY VICTORY IN JUNE 1967. I SHALL PRAY THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IN THE CRUCIAL MONTHS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD MAY FIND THE COURAGE TO BE AS DARING AND AS IMAGINATIVE IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE.

7. AS THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF OUR RECENT LUNAR FLIGHT WHICH I AM SENDING YOU SUGGEST, THIS SHRINKING GLOBE IS RAPIDLY BECOMING A SINGLE NEIGHBORHOOD. EVEN THE MOST DISTANT NATIONS NOW LIVE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER THAN VILLAGES IN A SINGLE NATION DID ONLY A FEW CENTURIES AGO. COUNTRIES ARE LEARNING THAT THEY MUST WORK TOGETHER FOR COMMON ENDS IF ANY ARE TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER IN THE NEW WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE HELPING TO CREATE.

8. THE WORLD HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS TO THIS END IN RECENT YEARS. NEW FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ARE EVIDENT IN MANY AREAS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE, AND THAT ONE DAY AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL COME INTO BEING WHICH IS AS SOLIDLY GROUNDED IN COMMON INTEREST AND COMMON

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INSTITUTIONS AS NATIONAL COMMUNITIES ARE TODAY.

9. BUT THAT WILL REQUIRE COURAGE, FOREBEARANCE, AND PATIENCE. BOTH OUR COUNTRIES MUST PLAY A PART IN THIS GREAT VENTURE. DESPITE MY RETIREMENT FROM THE PRESIDENCY, MY INTEREST IN ISRAEL'S ROLE AND MY FRIENDSHIP FOR ITS PEOPLE WILL REMAIN STRONG AND UNDIMINISHED, AS WILL MY DEDICATION TO THE GOALS WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SHARE. SINCERELY, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
END QUOTE GP-3 RUSK

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ - CODEWORD

✓
Thursday, Jan. 30, 1969

TO: Mr. Kissinger

FROM: Colonel Haig *(Signature)*



The initial report from Baghdad News stated that the Israeli incursion had occurred at 11:30 ~~B~~ (4:30 a. m. local), thus it may be that the Israelis merely reacted to this announcement.

We also have a Jordanian news report that the enemy formation of four fighter planes flew over Jordan at 14:30 Z (7:30 a. m. local) adding that ground resistance forced them to flee. The initial impression to be gained from the above is that there has been an Israeli incursion, but that it probably occurred after the Iraqis made their first claim this morning.

~~SECRET~~ CODEWORD

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3

NLN 02-28/12 p. 3.3 (L)(1)(3) 8-26-04

By *KMB* NARA, Date *9-9-05*

[p 1 of 4]

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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NLN 02-28/12

[page 2 of 4]

FEJG 17***** (SUB FOR 15)

430

PAGE 40 DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1105 GMT 30 JAN 68 M

(TEXT) AT 1130 TODAY SEVEN ISRAELI PLANES STAGED AN AIR RAID ON OUR UNITS STATIONED ON THE EASTERN FRONT. OUR FORCES INTERCEPTED THEM AND SHOT DOWN ONE PLANE. IT WAS SEEN ON FIRE HEADING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SYRIAN NEIGHB. THERE WERE NO LOSSES AMONG OUR UNITS.

SIGNED: DIRECTOR OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

30 JAN 1126Z PAK/TH

FBIS 25 (SEE 16,17)

AMMAN ON ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS

AMMAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1400 GMT 30 JAN 69 M

(TEXT) THE JORDANIAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN STATED THE FOLLOWING:

730 AT 1430 TODAY AN ENEMY FORMATION CONSISTING OF FOUR FIGHTER
PLANES FLEW OVER SOME AREAS IN IRBIB PROVINCE. OUR GROUND RESISTANCE
FORCED THEM TO FLEE.

30 JAN 1420Z AL/BG

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(4)

ISRAEL/ARAB STATES:



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Meanwhile, an Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram, is reporting that Israel will probably carry out a retaliatory raid against Egypt for the commando attack against the El Al airliner, (Reuters 254)

Early yesterday afternoon three flights of Israeli aircraft were noted active in an unknown area of Jordan, Two of the flights contained at least five transport aircraft with accompanying fighter escort, (2/W/JOM/R23-69, Spot Report)

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02/28/15 per sec. 1.4(c)(d) + 3.3(b)(1)(b)

By SB Date 3 MAY 07 Hr. 17 Jan 07

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[p. 1 of 5]

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MR NLN 02-28/15

p. 2 - 3 of 5 pp.

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1853 : MIDEAST--AHRAM :

CAIRO, U.A.R., FEB. 21 (FRIDAY) (REUTERS)--THE AUTHORITATIVE CAIRO NEWSPAPER AL AHAM SAID TODAY THAT ISRAEL WAS EXPECTED TO CARY OUT A RAID AGAINST EGYPT AS A REPRISAL FOR THE ARAB COMMANDO ATTACK ON AN EL AL AIRLINER AT ZURICH AIRPORT TUESDAY.

IN A DESPATCH FROM ITS UNITED NATIONS CORRESPONDENT SPLASHED ACROSS THE FRONT-PAGE, AL AHAM SAID DELEGATES AT THE WORLD ORGANIZATION BELIEVED ISRAELI REACTION WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST EGYPT DESPITE STRONG PRESSURE ON THE JEWISH STATE NOT TO MAKE ANY RETALIATION.

THIS BELIEF PREVAILED AT THE UNITED NATIONS FOLLOWING A STATEMENT BY ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN WEDNESDAY HOLDING ALL ARAB STATES RESPONSIBLE FOR PALESTINIAN COMMANDO ACTIVITIES.

REUTERS RH/NOR/MH

[NN02-28/15:4]

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MR NLN 02-28 / 15 p. 5 of 5 pp.

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(11)

ISRAEL/FRANCE: [REDACTED] the recent French arms embargo poses no immediate threat to the Israelis, however, over a long haul the embargo will take its effect. It will take about a year for Israeli industry to tool up for production of certain parts, but in the interim, the parts can be obtained thru third-country sources. The Israelis reportedly have enough French related materiel to last through another round like the six-day war. [REDACTED]

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3.3(b)(1)

[p. 1 of 3]

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 02-24/16 per ser. 3.3(b)(1) 17 Jan 06
By [Signature] Date 9 MAY 07

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MR NLN 02-28 / 16 p. 2-3 of 3 pp.



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TOSEC 44

NODIS

1. On eve of his departure for consultations in Jerusalem, Ambassador Rabin late May 14 delivered to Sisco text of letter to President from Prime Minister Meir. Please advise if text has been made available to you or if you wish us to transmit it. In commenting on Mrs. Meir's letter, Rabin said he particularly wanted to emphasize following sentence: QUOTE I have felt duty-bound because of our friendship, and our mutual concern, to ensure that there be no lack of clarity regarding our position and the motives which inspire it. UNQUOTE

2. Sisco said we would want to study text before commenting on substance. On quick reading, however, he thought it was a good letter in the sense that it was written

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/IAI:ALAtherton, Jr:mob

DRAFTING DATE

5/15/69

TEL EXT.

2942

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. Brown

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PAGE 2

in context of spirit of special US-Israeli relationship. Sisco then asked Rabin whether there really was concern in GOI that USG would evolve position with Soviets on Middle East on basis of what Soviets would do in Viet Nam. He had heard this thesis and wanted to say it was simply not true. Middle East involved complex of problems all its own and no such idea had ever been suggested in any US policy discussions.

3. Rabin said that, while he not privy to US policy thinking, it was clear to him, that there was nothing Soviets could do for US in Viet Nam. He had, however, heard view that Middle East was the only area where US and Soviets were engaged in active negotiations and offered first opportunity to reach agreement with Soviets. This being the case, other matters might become involved and these US-Soviet discussions might be viewed outside of Middle East context. Israel, Rabin said, did not intend to let this happen.

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PAGE #3

4. In closing, Sisco said letter would be studied carefully and a reply forthcoming.

5. Summary and analysis of Meir letter being transmitted to the Secretary.

GP-2

END

ACTING

RICHARDSON

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

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APPROVED BY:

REMARKS:

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CONFIDENTIAL

September 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Jewish Community's Reaction to the President's
Phantom Jet Decision

In response to your memorandum of September 22, 1969, I have discussed with Len Garment the lack of response by the American Jewish Community to your Phantom Jet decision. Len has assured me that the facts of your decision have been conveyed to the Israeli Government and to his contacts. He is confident that there will be some playback but is also disappointed that none has been received as of now.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1969

*Hand sent
reply to
HAK
called to Garment*

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

What, if anything, did Garment report to you on the absolute failure of the American Jewish community to express any appreciation by letter, calls or otherwise for RN's over-ruling both State and Defense in sending the phantom jets to Israel?

Get me an answer before I see Mrs. Meir Thursday.

call Garment

INFORMATION

September 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger (signed) HK

SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)(6)

SUBJECT: The Israeli Position --

1. The Arabs are now waging a war of attrition. Israel's present military strategy is to show Nasser that this will cost Egypt heavily. The latest raids have greatly damaged Nasser's personal prestige.
2. The Israelis think that if they continue their present course of military action, Nasser may well fall. Nasser's fall would open the way for a new play of forces in the area.
3. If Nasser falls, his successor will be less dangerous to Western interests because he will not have Nasser's personal charisma. Moderate Arab leaders will be more free to make peace.
4. The USSR has exploited Arab frustration with Israel's and Egypt's ambition to dominate the Arab world by leading the attack on Israel. The present struggle is above all an Egyptian-Russian struggle against Israel. Israel's very existence prevents total Soviet domination over the region.
5. The Soviet Union, therefore, can have no interest in a real Arab-Israeli peace. With peace, the Arab states would divert their major energies to economic and social development. Soviet capacity to compete with the US in that field is small.
6. The Soviets hope that the war of attrition in the Mid-East will make the US weary of the situation and ready to accept a compromise peace formula.
7. The war of attrition makes heavy demands on Israel's resources. Prime Minister Meir will discuss additional military and economic aid with you. The "necessity of this aid is beyond the US and Israel" justifies US material support for Israel's security.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

By SP Date 6 MAY 07 3.3(b)(1)(6)
14r. 17 Jan 07

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(p. 1 of 17)

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COMMENT

This is a forthright statement of Israel's strategy -- change the overall situation in the Mid-East by removing Nasser. It is also a clear example of Israel's assumption that our interests and Israel's are identical. The questionable points about this thesis are:

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3.3 (b)(1)(6)

1. [REDACTED] the USSR profits from tension and the US can outrun the USSR in peaceful competition.

2. Therefore, for us to have an interest in supporting Israel's strategy, that strategy must promise peace.

3. It is not at all certain that Hussein will be any more able to make peace without Nasser than with him. The fedayeen or the radical governments of Syria and Iraq may prove just as much of an inhibition as Nasser.

4. It seems more likely -- and some Israelis admit this -- that Israel's purpose is to surround itself with weak Arab governments so that it can weather prolonged tension behind its present borders.

HAK:HHS:feg:9/24/69

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[NLP 02-28/20:2]

~~SECRET~~

24 September 1969

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST - SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

1. During the past 15 years, since President Nasser opened his country's gates to Soviet penetration, the Soviets have entered the region as a force active in all developments of the area.
2. Since the inception of this period we are witness to a situation in which the Israel-Arab conflict has become a central focal point, though not the only one, for the efforts of the Soviet Union to establish an identity of interest between itself and the Arab States. The Soviet Union, perforce, chose this method as the principal means to undermine Western influence, and particularly that of the United States, while establishing its own presence. The Soviet Union fostered and exploited the sense of Arab frustration towards Israel, and Egypt's ambition to establish its hegemony within the Arab world through the elimination of Israel, Israel serving as a geographical barrier between it and the major centers of the Arab world. The Soviet Union supplied Egypt and the other Arab countries the means with which to achieve their aims in relation to Israel, i. e. unlimited political support in the international community (for example: Moscow placed its right of veto at the disposal of the Arab nations, to be

[NLD 02 - 28/20:8]

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-2-

exploited whenever it was deemed necessary to frustrate a resolution unacceptable to the Arabs). More important, the Soviet Union supplied the primary means necessary for the Arab States to achieve their final purpose - Israel's elimination - through a program of military aid. The Soviet Union dispatched a massive supply of the most sophisticated weapons to the Arab countries under the most favorable financial and political conditions. Economic aid was supplied only to the extent necessary to sustain the political support and military aid.

3. Thus, the Soviet Union set out to perpetuate a state of tension between Israel and the Arab States, while seeking to avoid all-out local war. This situation remains true so long as the Soviet Union believes that the Arab armies are incapable of defeating the Israel Defense Forces and subduing Israel.

4. On the eve of the Six Day War the Soviet Union, when it forwarded false information to Syria and Egypt on Israel's intention to launch an attack against Syria, did not have the intention to bring about war. The unstable nature and the easily sparked passions of the Arab peoples led to a speedy deterioration that was not foreseen by the Soviet Union during the first half of May 1967.

5. The central problem confronting the Middle East at the present time is the struggle over the end result of the Six Day War, the

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-3-

Israel-Arab conflict being intimately intertwined with the Soviet effort to break Israel's resistance, so that it might dictate the future developments of the region. At the same time, the Soviet Union continues to undermine the moderate Arab regimes so as to weaken Western influence over the area. Consequently, the present struggle over the results of the Six Day War is first and foremost an Egyptian-Russian struggle against Israel whose very existence and continued survival prevent the establishment of total Soviet domination over the region. The Soviet Union will persist in its quest to demonstrate to its Arab allies that it, and it alone, can bring about the restoration of their lost territories without their having to pay in return with the coinage of a genuine peace settlement, the kind of peace that will once and for all eradicate from the life of the Middle East the Israel-Arab conflict as a central issue. The achievement of such a situation is manifestly contrary to the needs of the Soviet Union since, once peace is established, the necessity for massive military assistance would be eliminated, as would the political support of the type given by the Soviet Union. A peace situation would bring about a weakening of Arab dependence upon the Soviet Union. More than that, with a peaceful settlement, the Arab States of the region would divert their major energies to their own economic and social development, whereupon the capacity of the Soviet

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30 May 1969

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. HAIG

FROM: Ray Wotring

SUBJECT: Attack against Trans-Arabian Pipeline

At 4:30 PM EDT today the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (US owned) was blown up in the vicinity of Banis, Syria. The pipeline carries about 300,000 barrels of oil per day into the oil refinery at Sidon, Lebanon and if the line is seriously damaged this could conceivably effect the economic situation in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia can be expected to denounce the incident since they are the recipient of the refined oil.

I have called Mr. Saunders and briefed him on the incident.

see FBIS

09 - attached

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Crude



S/S 2616

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft reply to Chairman Aspinall's letter
on the subject of a proposed desalting
plant in Israel.

In response to Mr. Watts' request of February 17 concerning a draft reply to Chairman Aspinall's letter on the subject of a proposed desalting plant in Israel, the State Department and AID have redrafted the letter to take more fully into account Chairman Aspinall's previous testimony expressing opposition to the plant (attached). The revised draft lays greater stress on the need to construct and test a module in this country and on the benefits such research and development may bring to U.S. industry and water-deficit areas in the United States.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested reply
2. Aspinall's testimony — not received by Saunders.
H.S.

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Now that the President's budget has been formally submitted to the Congress, I should like to reply in greater detail to your letter of January 16 on the subject of the desalting plant in Israel.

In consideration of a large-scale desalting plant, it would seem desirable to take advantage of the savings in cost and the increased efficiency which the experts believe new technology may offer. The Administration believes that intermediate experimentation with the new technology is necessary before a large operating desalting plant can be built anywhere. I trust you will agree there are compelling advantages to conducting such research in the U.S. Not only are there significant cost savings, but we would want to insure that the results of such research are directly available to U.S. industry and for applications in water deficit areas of the U.S. as well as overseas.

Such research is the responsibility of the Department of the Interior and the President has included in the Department of the Interior's FY 71 budget \$4.4 million for the construction in the U.S. of a desalting module to test new technology combining the techniques of vertical tube evaporation and multistage flash. It is this combination which offers the best prospect for achieving a significant reduction in the

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cost of desalted water.

If the module proceeds as scheduled, it is our understanding that the information developed by it would be available for use in studying larger desalting plants in about three years. As a consequence, the 1970 and 1971 budget estimates for the Agency for International Development do not include expenditures for a desalting facility in Israel, and no obligations are planned for this period. Should obligations be incurred, they would, of course, be in accordance with the legislation authorizing and appropriating the funds.

The Government of Israel has been informed of this proposed course of action and, as has been standard practice, Israel has been invited to send observers as the test module project proceeds.

Sincerely,



Department of State

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01358 141627Z

JEWS BE LOOKED UPON BY ARAB GOVERNMENTS AS HOSTAGES FOR RELEASE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL. ISRAEL HAD CAPTURED 5000 EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS IN SIX-DAY WAR AND COULD HAVE MADE THEIR RELEASE CONTINGENT UPON RELEASE OF JEWS IN UAR, BUT NEVER SAW FIT TO DO THIS.

4. RAFAEL SAID PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF GOI WAS TO PRODUCE SOLUTION FOR JEWISH COMMUNITY IN EGYPT. HE THOUGHT TOTAL ABOUT 1750 PERSONS, CERTAINLY LESS THAN 2000, AND THOUGHT THEY WOULD ALL LEAVE IF ALLOWED TO DO SO.

5. RAFAEL SAID GOI WOULD LIKE TO HAVE USG INFORM UARG (ESPECIALLY FAWZI IF HE IS STILL AVAILABLE) THAT IF UAR WOULD ALLOW DEPARTURE OF 129 DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED, AND CONSIDER THIS AS BEGINNING OF TOTAL EVACUATION OF JEWISH COMMUNITY FROM UAR, THEN USG HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SPECIAL PROBLEM OF INTEREST TO UAR WOULD FIND SOLUTION, THOUGH THESE TWO MATTERS NOT LINKED.

6. RAFAEL FURTHER SAID, (FOR USG INFO ONLY) ISRAELI HAS CHANNEL THROUGH HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES FOR DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES WITH UAR AND ALL THAT WAS ASKED OF USG WAS TO GET ACROSS GENERAL IDEA.

7. DCM SAID THAT, IF USG WERE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY OF TELLING UAR QUOTE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF INTEREST TO UAR WOULD FIND SOLUTION UNQUOTE DEPT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WANT TO KNOW, AT LEAST FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES, SPECIFICALLY WHAT GOI WOULD EXPECT OF UAR BEFORE PILOT IS RELEASED. RAFAEL REPEATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE USG RECOMMEND THAT UAR QUOTE SOLVE PROBLEM OF JEWISH COMMUNITY AND AS FIRST STEP CARRY OUT RELEASE OF 129 DETAINEES AND FAMILY UNQUOTE AND THAT QUOTE USG HAD REASON TO BELIEVE PROBLEM OF INTEREST TO UAR WOULD FIND SOLUTION." IT VERY IMPORTANT, RAFAEL SAID, THAT IT BE UNDERSTOOD RELEASE OF JEWS AND OF PILOT WOULD BE TWO UNCONNECTED ACTS.

8. DCM NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IF USG PASSED MESSAGE TO UAR, IT WOULD BEAR CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOI PERFORMANCE AND WOULD NOT WANT TO BE IN POSITION LATER

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01358 141627Z

INFO SS0 00, /030 W

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R 141550Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5943

SECRET TEL AVIV 1358

EXDIS

SUBJ: RELEASE OF JEWS FROM EGYPT

1. DIRGEN MFA RAFAEL CALLED DCM TO FOREIGN MINISTRY
APRIL 14. HE SAID GOI HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT AND
WORRY TO PREDICAMENT OF JEWS IN EGYPT WHOSE DEPARTURE
INTERRUPTED BY UAR WITH DEMAND THAT EGYPTIAN PILOT
SHOT DOWN OVER ISRAEL BE RETURNED FIRST.

2* RAFAEL SAID GOI INFO WAS THAT 129 DETAINEES WERE INVOLVED, WITH TOTAL NUMBER SCHEDULED TO DEPART EGYPT, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF FAMILY, BETWEEN 400 AND 500. FAWZI TALKS IN PARIS AND LONDON HAD USED QUOTE RELEASE UNQUOTE OF JEWS AS EVIDENCE LIBERAL ATTITUDE ON CAIRO'S PART. HE DID NOT MENTION DEMAND FOR PILOT. RAFAEL SAID ISRAELI EMBASSY HAD ASKED DEPT RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH FAWZI AND THAT DEPT HAD REPLIED CURRENT LINE WAS INDEED THAT RETURN OF PILOT WAS INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH DEPT DID NOT SHARE UAR VIEW THAT THIS WAS PROPER. RAFAEL FURTHER SAID NASSER HAD TOLD FRENCH AMBASSADOR CAIRO HE WANTED TO GO THROUGH WITH PROMISE BUT THAT ARMY WAS PRESSURING HIM TO GET PILOT BACK.

3* RAFAEL SAID THAT IN LIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARAB COUNTRIES (SUCH AS RECENT EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ) ISRAELI HAD EMOTIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH EGYPTIAN JEWS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY INTENDED TO COME TO ISRAEL UPON DEPARTURE FROM EGYPT. GOI HAS TWO PROBLEMS: FIRST INSTINCTIVE HUMANITARIAN DESIRE TO GET JEWS OUT OF BONDAGE, SECOND, GRAVE CONCERN LEST

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 01358 141627Z

OF NOT BEING ABLE TO GUARANTEE PERFORMANCE IF MESSAGE
HAD BEEN TOO VAGUE. RAFAEL FINALLY SAID URGENT THING IS
FOR FIRST GROUP (I.E. 129 DETAINEES AND FAMILY) TO GO BUT
THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT EXPECT THAT THIS WAS THE END BUT
THAT UAR WOULD CARRY THROUGH WITH PROMISE FOR WHOLE
JEWISH COMMUNITY TO LEAVE.

GP-1. BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01340 111614Z

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42
ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

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R 111530Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5934
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1340

EXDIS

SUBJ: INCREASED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 2931

1. WE SEE NO OBJECTION, IF APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, TO TELL GOI (PARA 7 REFTEL) THAT GOI POLICY TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN IS UNCHANGED AND THAT LEBANESE ARMY OPERATING UNDER CONTINUING AND CLEAR ORDERS TO SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ALONG BORDER.

2. WE WOULD NOT SEE ANY POINT IN OUR PRESSING ISRAELIS TO "EXERCISE RESTRAINT" IN EVENT FEDAYEEN ATTACK DOES OCCUR ACROSS BORDER. WE FEEL SURE ISRAELI REPLY WOULD BE THAT QUIET ON LEBANESE BORDER IS DUE TO SUCCESS OF GOL IN PREVENTING FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS BUT THAT, IF SUCH INCURSIONS OCCURRED, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE COUNTER MEASURES. GOI WOULD ARGUE THAT ONLY WAY FOR LEBANON TO REMAIN SAFE FROM RETALIATION IS TO PREVENT ATTACKS IN FIRST PLACE.

34. IF GOL BELIEVES (PARA 4 REFTEL) THALUSYRIANS AND FEDAYEENS DELIBERATELY MOUNTING SERIOUS EFFORT TO INVOLVE LEBANON BY PROVOKING ISRAELI REPRISALS ACROSS BORDER, THEN IT WOULD SEEM TO US ONLY SAFE COURSE FOR GOL IN LONG RUN OF AVOIDING SUCH INVOLVEMENT IS SOMEHOW TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL.

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01340 111614Z

4. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL WOULD MOUNT MASSIVE REPRISAL AGAINST SMALL, ISOLATED INCIDENTS, ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ARE NOT INVOLVED. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SUCH INCIDENTS AND ISRAELIS APPEAR TO US TO HAVE TAKEN THEM IN THEIR STRIDE.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01298 082019Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

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O 081955Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5915
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T EXDIS TEL AVIV 1298
EXDIS

FOR LSBO WRWFJEFZVPTCQZGKZ #
EMBASSY THAT MESSAGE FROM PRIME
MINISTER MEIR TO KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO ISGQED #

EMBASSY WASHINGTON WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REQUEST DEPT TO DELIVER
TO KING. MESSAGE SAID TO EXPRESS DISMAY AT EILAT-AQABA INCIDENT,
RECALL THAT ISRAEL HAD THOUGHT IT MUTUALLY AGREED THIS AREA
WAS OUT OF BOUNDS FOR ATTACKS, AND EXPRESSES HOPE EFFECTIVE STEPS
WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE.
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NOTE: # AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION
TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01269 071208Z

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043715

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1269

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: TEL AVIV 1244

1. I HAD OPPORTUNITY LAST EVENING TO ASK RAFAEL, FONOFF DIRGEN, FOR INFORMATION REGARDING CONVERSATION BETWEEN EBAN AND JARRING APRIL 2 WHEN EBAN GAVE JARRING REPLIES: LATTER'S ELEVEN QUESTIONS AS REPORTED REFTEL.

2* RAFAEL DESCRIBED JARRING'S POSITION ESSENTIALLY ALONG SAME LINES AS REPORTED BY BUNCHE TO YOST USUN 1042, THAT IS THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH ISRAELI POSITION AND THAT HE DOES NOT RPT NOT CONTEMPLATE FURTHER INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME. RAFAEL SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN NEGATIVE ASPECTS ISRAELI RESPONSES ON GROUNDS VARIOUS MEMBERS CABINET CONTINUE TO BE APPREHENSIVE OF FOUR POWER PROCEEDINGS AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES INSISTED ON DETAILED SPELLING OUT ISRAELI POSITION OF FAMILIAR LINES. HE NOTED DELIBERATIONS WHICH PRODUCED RESPONSE WERE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND HE GAVE IMPRESSION HE REGARDS OUTCOME AS UNNECESSARILY RIGID.

3* RAFAEL SAID EBAN ENDEAVORED TO SELL JARRING IDEA THAT
WITH REPLIES FROM ALL SIDES AT HAND JARRING SHOULD AGAIN BE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: May 9, 1970

SUBJECT: Romanian - Israeli Conversations

REF: Memcon of April 10 Conversation between Gideon Rafael and Deputy Assistant Secretary Swank

EXDIS

On April 29 Gideon Rafael, Director General, Israeli Foreign Ministry, took initiative to give me rundown, which he emphasized should be held in strictest confidence, concerning the latest round of Israeli - Romanian political discussions which he had conducted some ten days earlier in Rome. Apparently Macovescu was Rafael's Romanian counterpart in these talks. There seems to have been no new or startling development in Romanian relations as revealed to Rafael on this occasion. However, briefly summarized he said talks covered essentially three fields: (1) Romanian assessment of Soviet internal developments, (2) Romanian relations in Eastern Europe and with the West, including the United States, and (3) bilateral Israeli - Romanian problems.

Under the first heading relating to Soviet internal developments the Romanians told Rafael that, as has been subsequently reported publicly in Time magazine, it appears that the latent power struggle in the Kremlin may be achieving more clear definition with Brezhnev leading Kosygin and Podgorny by an appreciable distance. Romanian contacts in Moscow also support the theory that this development has been accompanied by a more than heretofore degree of intervention in the political arena by the Red Army. The Romanians could not be specific as to the reasons for Red Army intervention at its current level but speculated that the Red Army's role in Czechoslovakia had convinced it of the essentiality of playing a political role commensurate with its possible military involvement, particularly in the Eastern European Soviet satellites.

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Contents and Classification Approved by

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NPN 02-39/18 per ltr 28 Nov 2007

By: CLM NARA, Date 9 Sept 2008
[P. 10/2]



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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01269 071208Z

IN BUSINESS. HOWEVER, JARRING COUNTERED TO EFFECT HIS MERCHANDISE IS NOT VERY ATTRACTIVE AND EVEN WINDOW DISPLAY OF IT WOULD PROBABLY DRIVE CUSTOMERS AWAY. IN ANY CASE HE, JARRING, WOULD STUDY REPLIES CAREFULLY IN EFFORT FIND ANY COMMON GROUND WHICH HE COULD USE FOR SALES PROMOTION. MEANTIME HE CONFIRMED HE WOULD NO DOUBT RETURN MOSCOW AND AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. I AGAIN TOOK OCCASION TO PRESS RAFAEL ON POTENTIAL RPT POTENTIAL VALUE OF FOUR POWER TALKS AND TO URGE ISRAELI COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THAT EXERCISE. I SEE THAT MY PRESENTATION WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS AMBASSADOR YOST'S TO TEKDAH REPORTED USUN 1041 RECEIVED SUBSEQUENTLY. MY PRINCIPAL STRESS WAS ON POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS AND FRENCH MIGHT BE PERSUADED IN THAT FORUM THAT THE RISK OF MAJOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE US IS SUFFICIENT TO DICTATE THEIR TAKING A HARDER LINE TOWARD THE ARABS AND PERHAPS THUS HAVE SOME USEFUL EFFECT IN MOVING THE LATTER TOWARD PEACE. I REITERATED OUR CONVICTION THAT ISRAELI EFFORTS THAT DIRECTION FOR TWO YEARS HAD BEEN FRUITLESS INSOFAR AS I COULD SEE FROM READING ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE. I REGRET, HOWEVER, THAT AS CONCLUDED BY AMBASSADOR YOST I CANNOT REPORT ANY INDICATION THAT MY ARGUMENTS MADE MUCH IMPRESSION.

GP-2. BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01308 101215Z

02

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

063487

R 101145Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5919

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1308

EXDIS

SUBJECT: DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 054653; TEL AVIV 1246

1. DEPARTMENT SUGGESTION THAT I INITIATE PROCEDURE FOR VISIT DIMONA THIS YEAR WAS APPARENTLY BASED ON CONCERN THAT IF WE RAISED MATTER NEARER THE USUAL PERIOD GOI MIGHT EDUCE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS AS EXCUSE TO POSTPONE UNTIL NOVEMBER WHICH WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY EIGHTEEN MONTHS FROM LAST VISIT. ACCORDINGLY, I TOOK UP QUESTION ON THAT BASIS AND TEL AVIV 1246 REPORTED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO JUNE VISIT AND ASSURANCES ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE.

2. AS TO SIX MONTHS VISITS, DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT DESPITE ESHKOL LETTER 1963 TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS TO ME, ESHKOL NEVER REPEAT NEVER IMPLEMENTED THAT COMMITMENT. HE MAINTAINED AND I BELIEVE GENUINELY THAT SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS PRECLUDED HIS DOING SO. MOST OBVIOUS SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WERE CONTINUED LEAKS TO FINNEY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES (HAPPILY ABSENT THIS PAST YEAR) AND ALLEGEDLY CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES ESHKOL EXPERIENCED WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES AND KNESSET SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. OPPOSITION IN THOSE BODIES TO THE WHOLE IDEA OF SUCH VISITS RESULTED IN A COMPROMISE UNDER WHICH PRIME MINISTER BECAME COMMITTED TO AGREE ONLY TO ANNUAL VISITS.

3. THERE IS IN CIRCUMSTANCES NO REPEAT NO LIKELIHOOD THAT

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SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 01308 101215Z

MRS. MEIR COULD SUCCESSFULLY REOPEN QUESTION OF FREQUENCY AND IN ANY CASE BECAUSE OF THE ESSENTIALLY INTERIM CHARACTER HER GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT REFLECT HER ULTIMATE INTENTIONS BUT IS HER CURRENT PUBLIC POSTURE, IT EXTREMELY UNLIKELY SHE WOULD ENDEAVOR TO DO SO.

4. CONSEQUENTLY I SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENT ASSURANCES ARE BEST WE CAN EXPECT AND THAT WE PROCEED AS OUTLINED TEL AVIV 1246.
GP-3
BARBOUR

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0604/01/072



TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01246 041038Z

INFO / 030 W

032592

R 041016Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5890

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1246

EXDIS

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR DIMONA VISIT

REF: TEL AVIV 1093 AND STATE 036436

1. PM MRS. MEIR IS AGREEABLE TO VISIT IN PRINCIPLE BUT SHE WISHES TO MAKE NO RPT NO CHANGES FROM PAST PROCEDURES. SPECIFICALLY THE ONE YEAR INTERVAL BETWEEN VISITS AND THE ONE DAY DURATION THEREOF MUST BE MAINTAINED. SHE ASSURES THAT FORTHCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN WILL CONSTITUTE NO RPT NO PROBLEM.

2. ACCORDINGLY, BITAN, FONOFF, SUGGESTS THAT NEARER THE END OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD (LAST VISIT TOOK PLACE JUNE 29, 1968) WE PROPOSE DATE AND INDICATE COMPOSITION OF TEAM. BITAN SUGGESTS ALTERNATIVE DATES AROUND JUNE 29, PRESUMABLY SATURDAY THE 28TH OR SATURDAY JULY 5TH.

GP-1. BARBOUR

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TELEGRAM

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SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 1165

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTION NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 2)

ISRAEL-JORDAN IN SECURITY COUNCIL

USUN 945

1. WE AGREE IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS TO DRAG OUT UNSC HEARING ON LATEST JORDANIAN COMPLAINT. HOWEVER, COURSE PREPOSED BY AMB YOST WILL BRING DOWN UPON US BITTER GOI CHARGES OF BEING ONE-SIDED. ALMOST CERTAINLY, COMING ON TOP OF GREAT UNEASINESS ALREADY EXPRESSED HERE BY ISRAELIS CONCERNING FOUR POWER INITIATIVES, SUCH A US STANCE WILL RESULT IN FURTHER STRAIN IN OUR RELATIONS AND PERHAPS LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE GOI IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD JUST AHEAD.

2* I RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT THE STATEMENTS AMB YOST WOULD MAKE ABOUT TERRORIST ACTIVITY (PARA 4 REFTTEL) BE COINED IN SPECIFIC, HARD HITTING TERMS WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFY TERRORISTS AS CAUSE OF ISRAEL ATTACKS. THERE MUST BE NO DOUBT THAT IT IS THE USG VIEW THAT A CRITICAL BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RISING SPIRAL OF VIOLENCE IN THIS AREA RESTS WITH THE TERRORIST GROUPS AND WITH THOSE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHICH ABET THEM. ONLY BY FORTHRIGHT, UNEQUIVOCAL COUNCIL STATEMENTS WILL WE AFFIRM THE CONSTANCY OF OUR VIEW OF TERRORISM.

3. AS TO EFFECT ON BILATERAL OR FOUR POWER TALKS, I CANNOT,

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WITH DUE DEFERENCE TO AMB YOST, BELIEVE VOTE OF ABSTENTION BY US EVEN IF IN ISOLATION COULD HAVE ANY REAL INFLUENCE ON WHATEVER MAY BE ESSENTIAL ATTITUDES OF POWERS TOWARD SETTLEMENT.

4. UNLESS WE CAN GET A BALANCED RESOLUTION FORCEFULLY CON-
DEMNING TERRORISM - (SUPERMARKET, UNIVERSITY DINING HALL ETC.
ARE CIVILIAN TARGETS ANDIQRPOSELY SO), I THINK WE SHOULD SPEAK
STRONGLY AND ABSTAIN ON VOTE.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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ACTION SS 30

INFO / 030 W

117046

P R 271335Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5851

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 1159

EXDIS

SUBJ: RETURN OF ISRAELI PILOT REMAINS

1. INFORMATION WHICH WE PREVIOUSLY GAVE FOREIGN MINISTRY (TEL AVIV 1135) WAS IN GENERAL TERMS AND WITHOUT DETAILS.

2. PARA 2 TEL AVIV 1135 WAS NOT MEANT TO SUGGEST WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PASS INFO TO GOI. AS LONG AS ICRC HAS MATTER IN HAND, WE WOULD PREFER IT BE KEPT IN THAT CHANNEL AND WILL THEREFORE NOT PASS INFO AMMAN 1473 TO GOI.

GP-30 BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01135 261158Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

108045

R 261120Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5835

SECRET TEL AVIV 1135

EXDIS

SUBJ: RETURN OF ISRAELI PILOT REMAINS

1. EMBASSY HAS INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTRY IN
ACCORDANCE AMMAN 1443 AND STATE 46084.

2. IF FEASIBLE, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO US HERE IF
AMMAN COULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ICRC REP WITH VIEW
TOWARDS EARLY RETURN OF REMAINS.

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BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01098 241402Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCD 00, /030 W

093705

U R 241325Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5822
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO DIA

SECRET TEL AVIV 1098

EXD15

REF: USDAO TEL AVIV 0774 DATE TIME GROUP 220900Z

1. AS NOTED PARA 2 REFTEL, IAF MARCH 21 INFORMALLY ASKED WHETHER DATT COULD ASSIST IN OBTAINING INFO CONCERNING FATE OF PILOT OF ISRAELI PLANE SHOT DOWN THAT DATE OVER JORDAN AND RETURN OF BODY IF, AS ASSUMED, HE HAD BEEN KILLED. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH EMBASSY, DATT SUGGESTED OTHER CHANNELS BE EMPLOYED FOR MESSAGE, AND THAT, IF USG ASSISTANCE DESIRED, REQUEST SHOULD COME FROM GOI LEVEL.

2. FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOW INFORMED EMBASSY INITIAL CONTACT WITH GOI WAS MADE THROUGH RED CROSS. RED CROSS HAS IN TURN, INFORMED GOI JORDAN IS LINKING RETURN OF BODY TO RELEASE OF THREE PERSONS ALLEGEDLY HELD BY GOI. GOI FEELS THAT RED CROSS IS QTE SO FORMALISTIC UNQTE IN HANDLING DELICATE BUSINESS THAT IT DOUBTS RESULTS OF FURTHER CONTACTS THROUGH RED CROSS AND REQUESTS USG ACT AS CHANNEL FOR TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGE. FOREIGN MINISTRY THEREFORE REQUESTS FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED TO JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES QTE AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL UNQTE: QTE RETURN OF THE BODY OF THE ISRAELI PILOT HAS BEEN LINKED BY JORDAN TO THE RELEASE OF THREE JORDANIANS. TWO OF JORDANIANS ALLEGED TO BE IN GOI CUSTODY ARE UNKNOWN TO GOI. IRRESPECTIVE OF THIS FACT, JORDAN SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT SUCH LINKAGE, WHICH IS UNJUSTIFIABLE ABUSE OF THE DEAD UNQTE.

FOREIGN MINISTRY WENT ON TO REQUEST THAT SECOND MESSAGE ON UNRELATED SUBJECT ALSO BE TRANSMITTED TO JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES:

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 01098 241402Z

QTE THERE ARE INDICATIONS TERRORISTS ARE PAINTING THEIR VEHICLES IN JORDAN ARMY CAMOUFLAGE COLORS. AS THIS MAY RESULT IN UNFORTUNATE MISUNDERSTANDINGS, JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE ADVISED TO RECTIFY THIS. UNQTE

4. EMBASSY NOTED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT PREVIOUS INST
ETL

REF#TRANSMISSION OF MESSAGES BETWEEN GOI AND GOJ HAD GENERALLY INVOLVED CASES OF URGENT OPERATIONAL NATURE OR HIGH SENSITIVITY WHERE USE OF US COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES MADE CONTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF SPEED OR SECURITY. IT WAS ON GROUNDS THESE ELEMENTS LACKING IN CASE OF RETURN OF PILOT'S BODY THAT EMBASSY DEMURRED FROM ORIGINAL IAF REQUEST. EMBASSY NOTED USG MIGHT FEEL THAT RED CROSS CHANNEL, HAVING ONCE BEEN USED, SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED AND THAT NO PROMISE COULD BE GIVEN USG WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE REGARDING PILOT'S REMAINS. SECOND MESSAGE, RE CAMOUFLAGE PAINT, ALSO DOES NOT SEEM TO BE OF URGENT OPERATIONAL NATURE, BUT CASE MAY POSSIBLY BE MADE THAT THIS IS SENSITIVE MATTER WHICH CANNOT BE HANDLED IN OTHER CHANNELS. EMBASSY WARNED FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT, EVEN IF MESSAGES WERE PASSED, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY FOR USG TO INDICATE TO GOJ, AS WAS STANDARD PRACTICE, THAT WE WERE ACTING AS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL ONLY AND BORE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTENT.

54. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT GOI HOPES, WHATEVER DISCLAIMER OF RESPONSIBILITY WE MIGHT INCLUDE, THAT MESSAGE THROUGH USG MAY HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN OBTAINING RETURN OF PILOT'S BODY THAN WOULD RED CROSS MESSAGE. IT IS TRUE, OF COURSE, THAT BURIAL IN ISRAEL HAS EXTREMELY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE AND PUBLIC PRESSURE TO OBTAIN RETURN OF PILOT'S REMAINS WILL BE STRONG. IF GOJ ACCEDES TO GOI REQUEST, WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. HOWEVER, KEEPING CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS OPEN BETWEEN GOI AND GOJ HAS MERITS OF ITS OWN. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE WOULD HOPE THAT EMBASSY AMMAN COULD TRANSMIT MESSAGES TO GOJ.

GP-10 BARBETUR

IF HAS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

092844

R 241050Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5819

SECRET TEL AVIV 1093

EXDIS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DIMONA VISIT

REF: STATE 036436

1. I HAVE TODAY INITIATED PROCESS SETTING UP DIMONA VISIT REPEAT VISIT BY SUBMITTING REQUEST THROUGH CHANNEL WHICH HAS BEEN UTILIZED IN PAST (BITAN, FONOFF). IN DOING SO I MADE POINTS REFTEL URGING EARLIEST FEASIBLE RESPONSE. I ADDED SPECIFICALLY THAT WE DESIRE VISIT OF TWO DAYS DURATION.

2. BITAN SAID HE NOT IN POSITION PREDICT REACTION NEW PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT HE WOULD ASCERTAIN HER VIEWS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1. BARBOUR

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 01035 191950

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ACTION SS 30

INFO CCG 03, SSO 03, WSCB 00, 7037 W

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O 191915Z MAR 69

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5794

SECRET TEL AVIV 1035

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

1. AMBASSADOR HAD NINE AND FIFTEEN MINUTE MEETING WITH MRS. MEIR THIS EVENING. ATMOSPHERE FRIENDLY. PRIME MINISTER BECAME INCREASINGLY EMOTIONAL ON SUBJECT OF FOUR POWER TALKS.

2. PRINCIPAL POINT OF PRIME MINISTER'S PRESENTATION WAS THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT IDEA THAT FOUR POWERS CAN DECIDE HER FATE. ANY "RECOMMENDATION" THAT COULD COME FROM FOUR POWER TALKS INCLUDING SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS NOT FRIENDLY, AND FRANCE, WHICH IS NO LONGER FRIENDLY, AND WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ARAB WORLD, PRACTICALLY BY DEFINITION. SHE SAID THERE IS NO WAY FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT RECOMMENDATION. THIS WOULD BE AN END TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AS TO HAVE ISRAEL ACCEPT RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE TO ACCEPT DEFEAT NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO THE ARAB WORLD BUT ALSO TO THE FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. MRS. MEIR SAID THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION ON HER PART THAT U.S. WOULD TRY TO "IMPOSE" SOLUTION ON ISRAEL IN ONLY SENSE OF WORD THAT WOULD HAVE ANY MEANING, I.E. USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE. NEVERTHELESS, JOINT "RECOMMENDATION" OF FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO "IMPOSITION" IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE. NEVERTHELESS, ISRAEL WOULD ADAMANTLY REFUSE TO WITHDRAW ONE INCH UNLESS ISRAEL ITSELF WAS COMPLETELY SATISFIED AS TO ITS OWN SECURITY, WHICH GOI FEELS IMPOSSIBLE UNDER ANY REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF FOUR POWER TALKS.

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 0103 191953Z

3. PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS, FIVE POINTS MADE BY USS. THIS INCLUDED IDEA THAT NO COUNTRY COULD DECIDE WHAT ISRAEL'S BORDERS OUGHT TO BE. THIS WAS AN ISSUE OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY, AND NO OTHER COUNTRY COULD BE IN POSITION OF DECIDING WHAT WOULD OR WOULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE FEELING OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. SHE ALSO CAME DOWN HARD AGAINST IDEA OF REFUGEES HAVING OPTION TO RETURN TO ISRAEL. SHE SAID ISRAEL HAD BEEN FIGHTING THIS "ARTICLE 11" IDEA FOR MANY YEARS AND WAS NOT PREPARED TO HAVE ARAB STATES ENTER ISRAEL TO CARRY ON ITS DEGRADATIONS FROM WITHIN.

4. PRIME MINISTER MADE MUCH OF HER OPINION THAT US OUGHT NOT TO HAVE DECIDED TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES REGARDING ISRAEL'S ESSENTIAL INTERESTS WITHOUT HAVING OBTAINED AGREEMENT OF ISRAEL IN ADVANCE. SHE ASKED FOR TIME TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH USS AND SAID GOI HAD FEELING EVERYTHING GOING SO FAST THAT ISRAEL HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO PERSUADE USS OF WHAT GOI FELT WAS ABSOLUTE RECTITUDE OF ISRAEL'S POSITION. SHE ASKED THAT, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, U.S. HOLD OFF ON SUBSTANTIVE TALKS IN FOUR POWER CONTEXT AND TAKE REASONABLE TIME, EVEN IF SOME WEEKS, TO DISCLOSE MATTER WITH GOI. SHE FELT CERTAIN THAT "SOMETHING TERRIBLE" WOULD HAPPEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN TERMS OF ANY INEVITABLE OUTBREAK OF WAR IF THIS WERE DONE.

5. A BASSADOR FOLLOWED LINE OF INSTRUCTIONS AND PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SUGGEST THAT USS WOULD NOT GO THROUGH WITH TALKS AS PLANNED.

6. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS BY TELEGRAPH TOMMOROW.

BR-1. BARBOUR

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(A) IN BROADEST SENSE PURPOSE OF TRIP IS, OF COURSE, TO MAKE CONTACT WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AT EARLIEST

2



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POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY AND TO CREATE PUBLIC CONTINUITY ISRAEL-US RELATIONSHIPS. EBAN WILL DISPLAY USUAL ELOQUENCE, POSSIBLY EVEN IN AN ENDEAVOR IN TIME AVAILABLE TO REHEARSE IN THE AREA AS ISRAEL SEES THEM BEFORE AND SINCE TO EMPHASIZE WHAT ISRAEL REGARDS AS FUNDAMENTAL. LATTER CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCLUDE STRESS ON HER POSITION FROM BOTH SECURITY AND DIPLOMATIC. TENABLE ON PRESENT LINES FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD. FUTURE, THAT PEACE MUST, TO BE LASTING, RESULT FROM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND NOT BE IMPULSED. THAT FRENCH INITIATIVE FOR ACTION IN FOUR POINTS. FURTHER STEP IN DEGAULLE'S STATUS SEEKING FOR THERE ONLY TWO SUPER POWERS WHOSE INFLUENCE CAN BE ANYTHING AND THAT WHILE BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN AND USSR THEREFORE MAY BE PRODUCTIVE, EVIDENCE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS STRONGLY SUGGESTS TO ISRAEL THAT MOTIVE IS MERELY FURTHERANCE ITS OWN DESIGNS THAN ACHIEVEMENT STABLE PEACE.

(B) AS HE FREQUENTLY HAS DONE IN THE PAST THE MINISTER WILL POINT TO ISRAEL AS ONLY STABLE INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST. HE WILL ARGUE THAT STRENGTH IS THE BEST GUARANTOR OF PRESENT STABILITY AND FUTURE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THUS, IN ORDER OF ESSENTIAL MILITARY ITEMS MUST BE ASSURED, THERE NEED BE, FROM US SOURCES. HE MAY AGAIN SEEK DELIVERY OF PHANTOMS OR TO SOFTEN FINANCIAL PURCHASE, ALTHOUGH SEEMS UNLIKELY HE WILL MAKE HIS PITCH ON EITHER POINT. HE WILL STRIVE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THINKING ABOUT MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AND MOST PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AREA.

(C) EBAN WILL

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HOWEVER, HE STILL APPARENTLY ENVISAGES CONSIDERABLE DELAY (QTE SUMMER UNQTE) BEFORE BREAKTHROUGH MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

(D) EBAN WILL URGE CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR JARRING AS APPROPRIATE CATALYST TO BRING PARTIES TO INDIRECT TALKS AND ULTIMATELY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. JARRING SEEMINGLY WILL HAVE BEEN IN ISRAEL BETWEEN NOW AND EBAN'S DEPARTURE AND JARRING MAY ON THAT OCCASION, OF COURSE, PRODUCE PROPOSALS OR QUESTIONS DESIGNED FURTHER HIS MISSION. IT IMPOSSIBLE PREDICT NATURE ANY SUCH PROPOSALS OR QUESTIONS BUT TIME FACTOR MAKES UNLIKELY THAT EBAN WOULD HAVE ANY AUTHORITY TO INDICATE ISRAELI REACTIONS EXCEPT IN GENERAL TERMS. BY SAME TOKEN DESPITE RECENT URGINGS BY US AND OTHERS, WE DOUBT EBAN WILL HAVE HAD AUTHORITY ADVANCE ANY SPECIFIC ISRAELI PROPOSALS OR CLARIFICATIONS TO JARRING.

(E) EBAN MAY SEEK TO LAY THE BASIS FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON LATER IN THE SPRING BY THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER.

(F) HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY MAKE KNOWN ISRAEL'S EAGERNESS TO HAVE PRESIDENT NIXON VISIT ISRAEL.

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INFO 1030 W

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R 051340Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5686
INFO USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 819

EXDIS

EBAN WASHINGTON VISIT

REF: STATE 023228

1. STATE OF PLAY IN REGARD TO FORMATION OF NEW ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL OBVIOUSLY EFFECT TO SOME EXTENT TONE AND CONTENT OF FONMIN EBAN'S PRESENTATION TO SECRETARY AND, IF OPPORTUNITY OFFERS, PRESIDENT WHEN HE VISITS WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. HOWEVER, EVEN IF, AS SEEMS PROBABLE BUT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, NEW GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FORMED BY THAT TIME OR IS WELL ON WAY TO FORMATION IT UNLIKELY EBAN WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENDED CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AND HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THEREFORE HE WILL COME WITH ANY EXTENDED MANDATE BEYOND THAT GIVEN IN GENERAL TERMS BY PREVIOUS CABINET. IN SPITE OF THESE LIMITATIONS, THIS CAN BE A HIGHLY USEFUL EXCHANGE. EBAN WILL PURSUE SEVERAL THEMES AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TOPICS THAT WE BELIEVE MERIT RAISING WITH HIM.

2. TOPICS FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN WILL RAISE.

(A) IN BROADEST SENSE PURPOSE OF TRIP IS, OF COURSE, TO MAKE CONTACT WITH SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY AND TO CREATE PUBLIC IMPRESSION CONTINUITY ISRAEL-US RELATIONSHIPS. EBAN WILL NO DOUBT DISPLAY USUAL ELOQUENCE, POSSIBLY EVEN IN UNUSUAL DEGREE, IN ENDEAVOR IN TIME EVTFITABLE TO REHEARSE DEVELOPMENTS IN

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THE AREA AS ISRAEL SEES THEM BEFORE AND SINCE THE 1967 WAR AND TO EMPHASIZE WHAT ISRAEL REGARDS AS FUNDAMENTALS OF ITS POSITION. LATTER CAN BE EXPECTED TO INCLUDE STRESS ON ISRAEL'S VIEW THAT HER POSITION FROM BOTH SECURITY AND DIPLOMATIC STANDPOINT IS TENABLE ON PRESENT LINES FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD INTO THE FUTURE, THAT PEACE MUST, TO BE LASTING, RESULT FROM CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND NOT BE IMPOSED BY OUTSIDERS, THAT FRENCH INITIATIVE FOR ACTION IN FOUR POWER FORUM IS ONLY FURTHER STEP IN DEGAULLE'S STATUS SEEKING FOR FRANCE, THAT THERE ONLY TWO SUPER POWERS WHOSE INFLUENCE COUNTS FOR ANYTHING AND THAT WHILE BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR THEREFORE MAY BE PRODUCTIVE, EVIDENCE SO FAR ON SOVIET INTENTIONS STRONGLY SUGGESTS TO ISRAELIS THAT SOVIET MOTIVE IS MERELY FURTHERANCE ITS OWN DESIGNS IN AREA RATHER THAN ACHIEVEMENT STABLE PEACE.

(B) AS HE FREQUENTLY HAS DONE IN THE PAST THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL POINT TO ISRAEL AS ONLY STABLE BASTION OF US INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST. HE WILL ARGUE THAT ISRAELI MILITARY STRENGTH IS THE BEST GUARANTOR OF PRESENT STABILITY AND FUTURE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THUS, ISRAELI SUPPLIES OF ESSENTIAL MILITARY ITEMS MUST BE ASSURED, IF NEED BE, FROM US SOURCES. HE MAY AGAIN SEEK TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF PHANTOMS OR TO SOFTEN FINANCIAL TERMS FOR THEIR PURCHASE, ALTHOUGH SEEMS UNLIKELY HE WILL MAKE MAJOR PITCH ON EITHER POINT. HE WILL STRIVE FOR AN AGREED FRAMEWORK OF THINKING ABOUT MIDDLE EAST POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS, AND MOST PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AREA.

(C) EBAN WILL AVER THAT ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE CONFIRMS ISRAELI CONCLUSION THAT NASSER NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION MAKE VIABLE PEACE BUT HE WILL NO DOUBT ADD EXPRESSION GREATER CONFIDENCE IN POSSIBILITIES FOR SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN. IN LATTER CASE, ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO REFER VAGUELY TO PROGRESS IN INDIRECT CONTACTS AND IT MAY RPT MAY BE EBAN WILL HAVE AUTHORIZATION TO BE MORE SPECIFIC IN REVEALING CONTENT SUCH CONTACTS THAN HE HAS HERETOFORE. HOWEVER, HE STILL APPARENTLY ENVISAGES CONSIDERABLE DELAY (QTE SUMMER UNQTE) BEFORE BREAKTHROUGH MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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R 051340Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO 173#:/SECSTATE WASHDC 5687
INFO USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 819

EXDIS

EBAN WASHINGTON VISIT

REF: STATE 023228

(G) ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (REDUCTION ISRAEL'S FOREIGN RESERVES) ARE VERY MUCH ON THE GOI'S MIND BUT THE BURDEN OF THEIR DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WOULD LIKELY REST WITH FINANCE MINISTER SHAREF DUE THERE MARCH 10-11 THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND RESUMPTION HIS INTERRUPTED VISIT MAY BE POSTPONED. IT IS POSSIBLE BUT PROBABLY UNLIKELY THAT EBAN WILL SEEK TO ENLARGE US INTEREST IN DESALTING IN ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH, WHETHER OR NOT HE GOES SO FAR AS TO SAY SO AT THIS TIME, ISRAEL WILL NOT FIND REVIVAL STRAUSS PLAN WITH ITS AREA POLITICAL EMPHASIS A FEASIBLE STARTER.

3. SUGGESTED TOPICS TO RAISE WITH EBAN.

(A) IN CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM SURPRISING IF EBAN DISPLAYS, EXCEPT BROADLY, ANY ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE ON POSITION TO WHICH ISRAEL HAS SO FAR BEEN ADHERING. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE ISRAELIS, INCLUDING EBAN, ARE NOT EXPERIENCING A MEASURE OF APPREHENSION, DESPITE THEIR PROTESTS TO THE CONTRARY, AS TO POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF TWO OR FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS ON ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO PLAY WAITING GAME INDEFINITELY. HE WILL CONSEQUENTLY NO DOUBT BE SENSITIVE TO ANY EXPRESSION OF THE NECESSITY FOR AND URGENCY OF A MORE POSITIVE ISRAELI POSTURE WHICH THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO CONVEY TO HIM.

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(B) THERE ARE SEVERAL ITEMS, POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US, WHOSE OMISSION OR CURSORY MENTION WOULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD. I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE USG POSITION ON THESE MATTERS BE RESTATED IN FORCEFUL TERMS. THESE ITEMS ARE: (I) NEED FOR ISRAELI MILITARY RESTRAINT IN RESPONDING TO ARAB TERRORISM. (II) ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. (III) NEED FOR ENERGETIC ISRAELI ACTION ON REFUGEE RETURN. (IV) OUR CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ISRAELI MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, INCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM, THAT TEND TO BE IRREVOCABLE AND THUS ARE CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE IN ARAB COUNTRIES INCREASINGLY INIMICAL TO THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM.

GP-39) BARBOUR
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SECRET 547

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00798 041314Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAF 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /113 W
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R 041227Z MAR 69

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5675

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET TEL AVIV 798

MILITARY SITUATION ALONG CANAL

REF: JERUSALEM 125

USUALLY WELL INFORMED LOCAL JOURNALIST, NAMING IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF YARIV AS HIS SOURCE, HAS INFORMED US THAT FACT SHELTER CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM ALONG CANAL NOT COMPLETED HAS BEEN REASON IDF HAS NOT RETALIATED FOR UAR HARASSMENT IN CANAL SECTOR. SAID IDF SOLDIERS CHAFING UNDER STRICT INSTRUCTIONS NOT RETURN FIRE. JOURNALIST SAID YARIV SAID CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM DUE BE COMPLETED BY END MARCH, THEN INHIBITIONS ON REPRISAL WOULD BE LIFTED CONSIDERABLY.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, AF 12, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, RSR 01,
SSO 00, /137 W

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P 240955Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5609
INFO RUOMBE/AMEMBASSY BIRUT PRIORITY 1373
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 665

ISRAELI AIR STRIKE IN SYRIA

REF: DAO 0476 FEB 69

1. ISRAELI AIR FORCE ATTACK THIS MORNING ON TERRORIST BASES AT EL HAME AND MASSILUN IN SYRIA WAS PRECEDED ON FEB 23 BY STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALLON AND FONMIN EBAN PROMISING RETRIBUTION FOR ATTACK ON EL AL PLANE IN ZURICH AND JERUSALEM MARKET BOMBING. AT FUNERAL FOR TWO STUDENTS KILLED IN SUPERMARKET BOMBING FEB 21, ALLON SAID IDF'S ARM IS LONG AND THOSE GUILTY OF TERRORIST ACTIONS WILL BE PUNISHED. EBAN REPORTED BY PRESS TO HAVE TOLD CABINET ON FEB 23 THAT ISRAEL RESERVES RIGHT OF QUOTE ACTIVE SELF-DEFENSE UNQUOTE AGAINST TERRORISTS. EBAN REPORTEDLY SAID ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED EXPLAIN TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAT DECLARED INTENTION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CONTINUE THEIR ATTACKS GIVES ISRAEL RIGHT TO ACT.

2. USUALLY WELL-INFORMED LOCAL NEWSPAPERMAN TELL US THIS MORNING THAT GOI DECISION TO MAKE AIR ATTACK ON TERRORIST BASES IN SYRIA WAS GUIDED BY DESIRE NOT TO CREATE MAJOR

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00665 241123Z

INCIDENT AT TIME PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE. SOURCE SAID TWO MAIN FACTORS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION BY CABINET WERE LACK OF AMERICAN INTERESTS OR DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH SYRIA AND PURELY MILITARY NATURE OF EL HAME AND MASSILUN TARGETS.

3. WE RECEIVED FROM IDF MORNING FEB 24 PAPER ENTITLED QUOTE INCREASE IN SABOTA ACTIVITIES UNQUOTE WHICH, TAKING AS POINT DEPARTURE QUOTE JANUARY 20, WHEN PRESIDENT OF EGYPT... DECLARED UNRESERVED SUPPORT FOR SABOTEURS UNQUOTE, DETAILS INCREASED SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN QUOTE SYRIAN SECTOR UNQUOTE AND SYRIAN SUPPORT. THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN THE LENGTHY RATIONALE TO ZURICH OR JERUSALEM SUPERMARKET INCIDENTS. BARBOUR

CONFIDENTIAL



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84
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSD 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

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0 232040Z FEB 69 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 662

EXDIS

10 FONOFF HAS ASKED FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE TRANSMITTED FROM
GOI TO GOJ:

QTE AT 1320 A ROUTINE PATROL OF IDF HEAR KAVANDAL CROSSED
CEASEFIRE LINE PURSUING FATAH BAND. IT BECAME INVOLVED WITH
REGULAR JORDANIAN FORCES. IN COURSE OF EXCHANGE OF FIRE, AN
ISRAELI SOLDIER WAS WOUNDED AND A HALFTRACK WAS PUT OUT OF
ACTION. ISRAELI AIR FORCE WAS BROUGHT IN IN ORDER TO EXTRICATE
ISRAELI PATROL. GOI WISHES TO ASSURE GOJ THAT THIS PATROL
WAS IN NO WAY DIRECTED AGAINST THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES IN AREA.
UNQTE.

2* I DECLINED TO ASSURE FONOFF WE WOULD FEEL IT APPROPRIATE TO DO SO BUT SUGGEST EMBASSY AMMAN FORWARD MESSAGE IF IN ITS DISCRETION SUCH ACTION DESIRABLE.

3. FYI FONOFF, IN RESPONSE MY REACTION, SAID MESSAGE ESSENTIALLY AN APOLOGY. IN FACT, BORDER NOT MARKED THIS AREA, PATROL WANDERED AND QTE MET FORCE LARGER THAN EXPECTED UNQTE.

GP-30 BARBOUR



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FILE COPY

Saunders

Allen

Lyons

McGuire

Taylor

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 12,ARA 08,EA 10,EUR 15,RSC 01,IO 13,SSO 00,NSCE 00,CIAE 00,
DODE 00,JPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,SP 02,SS 20,
USIA 12,AID 28,NIC 01,ACDA 16,RSR 01,184 W

024414

P 190949Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5590
INFO USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECRET TEL AVIV 619

1. OUTRAGE AT ZURICH ATTACK IS ONLY SLIGHTLY TEMPERED HERE BY RELIEF THAT CASUALTY LIST NOT GREATER. PAPERS THIS MORNING ARE REplete WITH FAMILIAR PHRASES, QTE WE MUST DRAW NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS UNQTE, QTE NO ARAB PLANE WILL BE SAFE UNQTE, AND SO ON. INDIGNATION WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY GATHER MOMENTUM.

2. WE BELIEVE PROBABILITY OF REPRISAL ACTION IS HIGH. ON FACE OF IT, BY CRITERIA EMPLOYED BY GOI IN DECEMBER, FINGER WOULD SEEM AGAIN POINT TO LEBANON.

3. PRESS REPORTS DISSEMINATED HERE THIS MORNING HAVE PFLP CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY UNDER BEIRUT DATELINE, GIVING NAMES OF ATTACKERS AND ISSUING THEIR PHOTOGRAPHS. REPORTS SAY TICKETS ISSUED TO FOUR IN BEIRUT FEBRUARY 6. IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, THE MANY UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BEIRUT RAID ARE NOT LOST ON THE GOI AND WILL LIKELY MILITATE AGAINST A REPEAT AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS IN LEBANON.

4. HAZARDING GUESS AS TO LIKELY REPRISAL TARGET, WE VENTURE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00619 191331Z

UAR. UAR WAS LIKELY ON LIST OF ALTERNATIVES FOR ATHENS REPRISAL ACTION (TEL AVIV'S A-19). IT IS GOI'S FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT CAIRO IS TRUE FOUNT OF TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL AND NASSER'S RECENT WIDELY PUBLICIZED PRAISE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES A REFERENCE POINT, QUICKLY RECOGNIZABLE BY WORLD OPINION, FOR AN ISRAELI REPRISAL DIRECTED AGAINST THE UAR. ATTACK AGAINST UAR AT THIS TIME COULD IN IDF EYES SERVE ANCILLARY PURPOSE AS WELL; COOLING OFF UAR HARRASSMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES ALONG THE CANAL.

5. DEPARTMENT'S CONDEMNATION OF ZURICH ATTACK IS MOST TIMELY. WE HOPE IT CAN BE FOLLOWED UP WITH VIGOROUS REPRESENTATIONS TO THOSE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WITH WHOM WE HAVE RELATIONS OR CONTACTS, AND WHO ARE PROVIDING AID AND COMFORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS AS THE ZURICH ATTACK, URGING IN STRONGEST TERMS THEY PREVAIL ON THESE ORGANIZATIONS DESIST FROM SUCH ATTACKS.

6. I WAS AT DINNER LAST NIGHT WITH LOURIE, FONOFF DEP DIRGEN, WHEN REPORTS OF ATTACK WERE COMING IN. BRITISH, CANADIAN, AND AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADORS ALSO PRESENT. LOURIE'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS THAT ATTACK WOULD SERVE PURPOSES OF THOSE (FRENCH AND RUSSIANS) WHO ARE EMPHASIZING DANGERS CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ADVOCATE URGENT FOUR POWER ACTION. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT EFFECT WOULD BE MAJOR DETERRENT TO PUBLIC FROM USE EL AL. LOURIE OBVIOUSLY FELT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BUT DID NOT OPENLY SUGGEST REPRISALS.

7. SUPPORTED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR I TOOK STRONG LINE THAT REPRISAL NOT ONLY WOULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING BUT WOULD AGAIN PUT ISRAEL IN THE WRONG, COUNTER THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS FOR ISRAEL OF WORLD CONDEMNATION OF THIS ATTACK. HADOW NOTED THAT BEIRUT REPRISAL HAD NOT ONLY GIVEN EXCUSE FOR FRENCH BOYCOTT; IT HAD BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN STIMULATING FRENCH-SOVIET INITIATIVE TOWARD FOUR POWER INTERVENTION IN DIPLOMATIC ARENA. WHILE OBVIOUSLY DEPLORING ZURICH OUTRAGE, WE BOTH URGED IN STRONGEST TERMS NEGATIVE EFFECT UNILATERAL ISRAELI RETALIATION.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

A-134
Page 2

On point two, Romania's relations with Eastern and Western European countries, Rafael said that the Romanians expressed considerable displeasure at various aspects of the Warsaw Pact and reiterated that they would refuse to allow maneuvers in Romania and were particularly concerned to maintain an increasing degree of flexibility and independence in opposition to the Pact's monolithic features. Macovescu told Rafael that as part of their Romanian political effort in this connection they were endeavoring to strengthen their relations with Yugoslavia and might also improve their contacts with Albania. As to Western Europe, the Romanian concerns were largely economic and this particularly continues to apply to their relations with the United States. According to Rafael, Macovescu said that following President Nixon's visit the Romanians had anticipated a considerably higher degree of commercial interchange with the United States than has yet been possible but that they continue to look toward expansion of activities in that field.

As to direct bilateral Romanian - Israeli problems, seemingly both sides expressed satisfaction at the tone and frankness of their political exchanges and agreed to continue this series of discussions. Also economically they welcomed the expansion of trade which has taken place between the two countries and agreed to overlook no opportunities for further development.

Finally, Rafael said some reference had, of course, been made to the Arab - Israel situation but he detected nothing significant in the Romanian attitude nor was he, of course, in a position to do other than reiterate Israel's well-known position.


BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

[NLM 02 39/15 P 2 0/2]

92/10/009


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Back
TELEGRAM

SECRET 338

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00559 140924Z

18
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

127479

R 140830Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5560
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 559

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 0740

PASSED MESSAGE PARAGRAPH THREE REFTEL AND SUBSTANCE
PARAGRAPH TWO TO FONOFF (BITAN) FOR TRANSMISSION TO
PRIMIN FEB 13. BITAN HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT.

GP-3. BARBOUR

SECRET

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SECRET 562

2

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00548 131100Z

20
ACTION SS 30

INFO 7030 W

120442

R 131015Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5556
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET TEL AVIV 548

EXDIS

REF: STATE 023230

1. WHILE IMPOSSIBLE BE COMPLETELY SANGUINE RE LEAKS
IN VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE, IMPORTANCE SECURITY THIS CURRENT
ESHKOL-HUSSEIN EXCHANGE HAS NOT ONLY BEEN STRESSED BY
EMBASSY BUT IN FACT ISRAELI FONOFF TOOK INITIATIVE WHEN
IT ASKED US TRANSMIT LATEST ESHKOL COMMUNICATION TO
POINT OUT IT SHOULD BE HANDLED QUOTE TOP SECRET UNQUOTE.

GP-3. BARBOUR-

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 623

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00525 121024Z

17
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

112868

O P 120935Z FEB 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5546

SECRET TEL AVIV 525

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 517, 518, AMMAN 716

I. FONOFF, BITAN, HAS JUST CALLED TO ASK THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PM ESHKOL TO KING BE TRANSMITTED AS FOLLOW-UP TO REPLY TO KING GIVEN TEL AVIV 518:

A. QUOTE IN PURSUANCE TO OUR MESSAGE OF LAST NIGHT IN REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION LOCAL ARAB LEGION COMMANDERS HAVE STATIONED MORTARS FACING AND THREATENING DEAD SEA WORKS WHICH IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE OBJECTIVE. FOR OUR GOAL OF RESTORING CALM IN THAT AREA MAY I URGE THAT YOU ORDER REMOVAL OF THESE MORTARS. YOU WILL SURELY APPRECIATE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION ARISING FROM THREATS TO THE DEAD SEA WORKS. THESE MORTARS ARE NOT NEEDED FOR YOUR OPERATIONS AGAINST FATAH NOR FOR DEFENSE OF YOUR FORCES WHICH IN ANY EVENT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING. YOUR ACTIONS IN REMOVING MORTARS AND IN ARRESTING FATAH IS IMPERATIVE FOR RESTORATION OF CALM.

B. QUOTE IT IS SURELY OUR COMMON GOAL TO AVOID THREATS AND INCIDENTS PARTICULARLY IN SUCH A SENSITIVE AREA WHICH WOULD DANGEROUSLY PREJUDICE TRENDS TOWARDS PEACE. UNQUOTE.

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(4)

ISRAEL/JORDAN: In response to the Jordan request that the IDF cease attacking Jordan's forces attempting to round up Fedayeen operatives in the Dead Sea area, the Israelis have presented our Ambassador in Tel Aviv a message to be relayed to Jordan. The message states that Israel has no interest in attacking these Jordanian forces if they are in fact rounding up terrorists and that Jordan should continue this operation and Israel's Defense forces will not interfere. (Tel Aviv 518)



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

22

84
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SS0 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

110386

0 112145Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5542

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 518

REF: TEL AVIV 517

EXDIS

1. BITAN INFORMS US CAREFUL CHECK SHOWS THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO IDF ACTION IN LOCALE DESCRIBED AMMAN 0716 IN LATE AFTERNOON. THERE WAS ACTIVITY INVOLVING IDF AIRCRAFT APPROXIMATELY NOON ENDING 1315 LOCAL. THIS WAS IN ANSWER TO ARTILLERY OR MORTAR FIRE FROM JORDANIAN SIDE.

2. BITAN NOTED THERE HAS BEEN ACTION IN THIS AREA YESTERDAY AND ALSO DAY BEFORE. MOREOVER, HE SAID THERE HAS BEEN MORTAR FIRE FROM JORDANIAN SIDE AGAINST KEFAR RUPPIN IN BEISAN VALLEY APPROXIMATELY 2040 LOCAL TONIGHT.

3. WITH ABOVE AS BACKGROUND, BITAN ASKED FOLLOWING MESSAGE
BE PASSED IN REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM KING:
QTE WE HAVE NO INZREST TO ATTACK HIS FORCES IF
THEY ARE DOING WHATIOE SAYS, NAMELY ROUNDING UP
TERRORISTS. ISRAEL KNOWS THERE ARE TERRORISTS IN
AREA AND BY ALL MEANS JAA SHOULD CONTINUE AND IDF
WILL NOT INTERFERE. IN ISRAELI EYES ATTACK SUCH
AS OCCURRED ON SDOM PLANT VERY SERIOUS.
GOI HOPES GOJ CAN GET TERRORISTS AWAY FROM AREA OR
PREVENT THEM FROM CARRYING OUT ATTACKS. UNQTE

4* IN PASSING MESSAGE TO BITAN WE NOTED WE WERE DOING

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00518 112324Z

SO AS EFFORT TO BE HELPFUL TO BOTH SIDES BUT WITHOUT
ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTENTS OF MESSAGE.
PRESUME AMMAN WILL USE SIMILAR CAVEAT WITH REPLY.
GP-3.
BARBOUR

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54
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,1030 W

109179

0 111950Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5541

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 517

REF: AMMAN 0716

EXDIS

CONTENTS REFTEL CONVEYED BITAN, ASST. D.G., MFA,
WHO SAID HE WOULD CHECK AND BE IN TOUCH WITH US.
GP-3
BARBOUR

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 625

02

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00412 031534Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,7030 W

058248

O 031525Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5496

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 412

EXDIS

ESHKOL JANUARY 31 LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON

REF: STATE 16669

1. FONOFF TODAY GAVE US TWO ADDITIONS TO ESHKOL LETTER OF JAN 31, WHICH THEY SAID HAD INADVERTENTLY NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN CABLE SENT THEIR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON FOR DELIVERY DEPARTMENT. ADDITIONS FOLLOW:

2. AT END PARA 6 AFTER WORDS QTE FREE WORLD INTEREST UNQTE ADD QTE PRESIDENT DEGAULLE'S ACTION IN VIOLATING AN AGREEMENT FOR THE SUPPLY OF FIFTY MIRAGE AIRCRAFT, AND SUSPENDING THE DISPATCH OF SPARE PARTS FOR EQUIPMENT CRUCIAL TO ISRAEL'S DEFENSE, SHOWS HOW LITTLE WE CAN REGARD HIS INITIATIVES AS OBJECTIVE UNQTE.

3. IN NEXT TO LAST PARA AFTER WORDS QTE IN NOV 1967 UNQTE ADD QTE AT THIS TIME WHEN ISRAEL'S HEART IS SORELY WOUNDED BY THE BRUTAL AND BARBARIC EXECUTIONS OF INNOCENT JEWS IN BAGHDAD, I AM TRYING TO KEEP OUR PEOPLE IN A BALANCED MOOD. I HOPE THAT IN WHATEVER THE UNITED STATES SAYS AND DOES, IT WILL HELP US FACE OUR DELICATE PROBLEMS IN A CONFIDENT MOOD UNQTE.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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SECRET 889

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00316 271213Z

2

IN
ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

016443

R 271107Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5449
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET TEL AVIV 316

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 749; BEIRUT 751

1. WE NOTE FROM PARA 5 BEIRUT 751 THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HAS UNDERSTANDING THAT US INTERVENTION WITH ISRAEL PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN LAST THREE WEEKS TO RESTRAIN POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION. HELOU WAS GRATIFIED AND EMPHASIZED HOPE US WOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS.

2. WE THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT GOL NOT BE UNDER ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF ACTUAL SITUATION. AS AMB PORTER POINTED OUT TO GOL (PARA 2 BEIRUT 749) IT IS CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN BY GOL THAT ENABLES BORDER TO REMAIN QUIET. IF GOL GOT FEELING US COULD PUT SAFETY CATCH ON ISRAELI WEAPONS, IT MIGHT ALST FEEL THAT IT WAS US WHO HAD PULLED TRIGGER IF INCIDENT WITH ISRAEL SHOULD OCCUR. NEITHER OF THESE, OF COURSE, IS ACTUAL SITUATION.

3. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE, IN SPITE OF ILL-ADVISED BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID, THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT HAVE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AGAINST LEBANON AND THAT EVEN REPRISAL AGAINST ATTACKS EMANATING FROM LEBANON WOULD CURRENTLY BE LIMITED BY EXPECTATION ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND BY DESIRE TO AVOID BUILDING UP INTERNAL PUBLIC OPINION TO CRISIS POINT WHICH MIGHT FORCE GOI TO GO BEYOND WHAT IT TERMS BEST IN OWN INTERESTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, GOI APPARENT SUPPRESSION OF NEWS REGARDING INCIDENT ON BORDER JAN 18 (BEIRUT 734) IS PERTINENT.

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00316 271213Z

4. OUR CONSIDERED OPINION IS THAT ISRAEL DEFINITELY DESIRES PEACE IN AREA AND BUILDS ITS POLICIES AND TAKES ITS ACTIONS ON THAT BASIS. THAT IS NOT TO SAY POLICIES AND ACTIONS ARE BY ANY MEANS ALWAYS IN ACCORD WITH EITHER US ESTIMATES OF THREATS TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY OR OBJECTIVE STANDARDS OF EFFECTIVE MEANS OF OBTAINING PEACE. NEVERTHELESS, HOWEVER MISTAKEN FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THEY MAY BE IN SOME OF THEIR CONCLUSIONS, WE BELIEVE ISRAEL IS PROCEED FROM OBJECTIVE OF PEACE.

DISAPPOINTED THOUGH WE ARE AT ISRAELI REFUSAL TO ACCEPT UN CEASE-FIRE OBSERVERS ON ITS SIDE OF LEBANON BORDER, WE CANNOT AGREE WITH BEIRUT'S CONCLUSION (PARA 6 BEIRUT 7331) THAT THIS INDICATES ISRAEL IS NOT IN FACT SEEKING PEACE.

5. IN OUR OPINION, PROBLEM BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IS NOT THAT ONE SIDE SEEKS PEACE WHILE OTHER SEEKS WAR, BUT THAT NEITHER SIDE IS ABLE, BY REASON OF ITS OWN PSYCHOLOGICAL HANG UPS AND DOMESTIC POWER CONSIDERATIONS, TO GO THE WHOLE WAY IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OTHER FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. IF THIS IS SO, THEN WHAT IS NEEDED IS PRESSURE ON BOTH TO MOVE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN EFFORT BY OTHERS TO HELP BRIDGE WHATEVER GAP REMAINS BETWEEN THEIR CAPABILITIES. IN OUR OPINION, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO RETAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. IN GIVING USSR OUR ESTIMATE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT ABOUT TO ATTACK ITS NEIGHBORS (STATE 9167) WE DID NOT BANK ONE HUNDRED PERCENT ON ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US, BUT WENT BACK AGAIN AT GOI TO IMPRESS UPON THEM ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY SHOULD IN FACT CARRY OUT SUCH ATTACK. ON OTHER HAND, WE WERE IN DISCUSSING WITH GOI SITUATION ON LEBANON BORDER HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED IT WAS USG CONSIDERED BELIEF THAT GOL WAS SINCERELY DOING ALL IN ITS POWER TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN ATTACKS AND THAT, IF SUCH ATTACKS NEVERTHELESS OCCURRED, THEY WOULD BE RESULT NOT OF GOL DUPLICITY BUT OF ITS INABILITY TO DELIVER COMPLETELY.

6. IF WE ARE TO HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS IN THIS SITUATION, WE BELIEVE SAME DEGREE OF CREDENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN GOI'S BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE. ON THAT BASIS,

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PAGE 03 TEL AV 00316 271213Z

WE CAN OBJECT TO AND CRITICIZE ISRAELI POLICIES
AND ACTIONS CONSTRUCTIVELY. IF WE CALL SERIOUSLY INTO
QUESTION THIS BASIC ASSUMPTION, HOWEVER, THEN WE LOSE
BASIS FOR OUR WHOLE CURRENT POLICY TOWARDS ARAB-ISRAEL
CONFLICT.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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SECRET 609

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00290 231232Z

14
ACTION SS 32

INFO / 030 W

R 231105Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5436

128038

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 290

FXDIS

SUBJ: NASSER'S JANUARY 20 SPEECH

1. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN TOLD AMBASSADOR JAN 22 NASSER SPEECH OF JANUARY 20 WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF RIGIDITY IN UAR POSITION. WORST ELEMENT WAS DISTINCTION HE MADE BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY OF UAR AND LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY ON PART OF TERRORISTS. US EMPHASIS ON TERRORISM IN REPLY TO SOV PROPOSAL HAD BEEN IMPORTANT POINT. EBAN THOUGHT NASSER SPEECH WAS ORIENTED INTERNALLY RATHER THAN EXTERNALLY. EBAN SAID GOI MIGHT PUT ON NEXT AGENDA FOR TALKS WITH JARRING NASSER CLAIM THAT TERRORISTS WERE NOT BOUND BY SC RESOLUTION. IN GOI VIEW, CEASE-FIRE RULES OUT TERRORISTS' ACTIVITIES BEFORE PEACE, AND SC RESOLUTION RULES THEM OUT AFTER PEACE IS MADE. HE THOUGHT NASSER MIGHT HAVE TAKEN QTE TOUGH UNQTE STAND BECAUSE HE BELIEVED PARTIES WERE AT NEW NEGOTIATING STAGE OR BECAUSE HE DESIRED TO EXERT PRESSURE ON SOVIETS.

2. AMB SAID HE IMAGINED UAR ATTITUDE NOT TOO WELL APPRECIATED IN MOSCOW.

3. EBAN REMARKED GOI DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ARAB SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE A GOOD THING OR NOT BECAUSE IT COULD NOT TELL WHO WOULD COME OUT ON TOP.

GP-3

HARBOUR

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SECRET 752

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00255 221018Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

120530

R 220823Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5415

SECRET TEL AVIV 255

2

EXDIS

SUBJ: SOV APPROACH ON ISRAEL-ARAB MILITARY ACTIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 223

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

1. ELIZUR, DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, MFA,
JAN 21 GAVE DCM FURTHER GOI VIEWS ON SOV DEMARCHE TO
US. SAID GOI WAS VERY HAPPY WITH US RESPONSE BECAUSE
IT PUT FINGER ON RUMORMONGERING OF PAST SEVERAL WEEKS.

2. ELIZUR SAID HE WAS ABLE TO REPEAT ASSURANCE GIVEN
US PREVIOUSLY BY GOI THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT PLANNING OR
INTENDING ANY HOSTILE INITIATIVE AGAINST NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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EXDIS
EXDIS



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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 675

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00207 171238Z

30

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO SS0 00, NSCE 00, CCD 00, /030 W

097365

0 171220Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5388

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 207

EXDIS

REF: STATE 008053

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO ESHKOL RE DESALINIZATION PROJECT

1. LETTER CONTAINED REFTTEL DELIVERED MORNING JAN. 17.
2. ELIZUR (DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICA DEPT, MFA) HAS JUST CALLED TO ASK WHETHER LETTER CAN BE MADE PUBLIC.
3. PLEASE ADVISE.
- BARBOUR

CONFIDENTIAL

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You and Hal Saunders should watch this one on early delivery of F-4s to Israel. The current position is no earlier than Sep 69 because the Israelis won't be set well enough to handle the planes themselves earlier, therefore, requiring substantial U.S. presence -- and possible conflict involvement.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'L.' with a stylized flourish.

William L. Lemnitzer

SECRET



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SECRET 951

PAGE 01 171558Z

51
ACTION NEA 06

SUMMARY

INFO GPM 04, INR 07, RSR 01, MC 01, ACDA 07, EUR

10,

E 04, FILE 01, /062 W

P 171105Z JAN 69
FM USDAO/TEL AVIV
TO CSAF
INFO DEPT STATE
DIA
OSD/ISA

S E C R E T NOFORN 0149 JAN 69
JOINT EMBASSY/USDAO MESSAGE.

SUBJECT: ISRAELI REQUEST FOR EARLY EXPOSURE OF F-4S IN ISRAEL.
1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DATT ON 11 JAN, GEN HOD MADE THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. DELIVERY OF A FEW F-4S IN APRIL OF 1969 WAS REQUESTED IN
ORDER THAT THE IAF COULD BENEFIT BY THEIR PHYSICAL
PRESENCE DETERRING THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE. HE REPORTED THAT HE
WAS TURNED DOWN BECAUSE THE PENTAGON DID NOT THINK HE WAS
CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THE ACFT. HE APPEALED TO DATT TO EXPRESS
HIS JUDGEMENT CONCERNING THE IAF MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT A FEW AIRCRAFT. HE ADMITTED THAT HE WOULD NEED HELP FROM
A LIMITED NUMBER OF MCDONNELL AND G.E. TECH REPS.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 0149 S E C R E T NOFORN

B. IN TERMS OF ANOTHER MAJOR CLASH, HE THOUGHT THE FRENCH
EMBARGO WOULD HURT THE ISRAELI CAPABILITY BUT NOT BE DECISIVE. HE
THOUGHT THE WORST EFFECT OF THE EMBARGO WOULD BE THE EGYPTIAN
MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IT WOULD DO TO ISRAEL. HE CLAIMED THAT
BECAUSE THE UAR AIR FORCE WAS LIMITED BY SOVIET POLICY TO A THIRTY
DAY LEVEL OF SUPPLIES, THEY WOULD, AFTER ONE MONTH, JUDGE THE IAF
CAPABILITY TO BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED. THIS COULD GIVE FALSE
CONFIDENCE
AND ENCOURAGE THE UAR TO LAUNCH AN AIR ATTACK. HE REMINDED DATT
THAT HE WAS STILL BADLY OUTNUMBERED IN TERMS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE
ACFT.

SECRET



SECRET

PAGE 02 171538Z

HE BELIEVES EARLY EXPOSURE OF A FEW F-4S IN THE SKY OVER ISRAEL COULD DISCOURAGE SUCH AN AIR INITIATIVE BY THE EGYPTIANS.

C. HE THOUGHT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT (CSAF MSG DTG 272207Z DEC 68) (NOTAL) OF THE LOGISTICAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SURVEY TEAM WOULD BE AN IDEAL TIME TO LOAN HIM A FEW ACFT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ACFT COULD BE ADVANTAGEOUSLY USED BY THE SURVEY TEAM TO CHECK THE USE OF REVENUE PENS, ADAPTABILITY OF GROUND POWER, SERVICING, OXYGEN, AND OTHER LOCAL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. HE CLAIMED IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK OUT RUNWAY APPROACHES, TAXIWAYS, AND OTHER GROUND ENVIRONMENT FOR THE NEW ACFT. ADDITIONALLY, HE FELT THIS ACFT PRESENCE WOULD SERVE THE DETERRENT PURPOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE.

PAGE 3 RUHVL 0109 S E C R E T NOFORN

2. DATT INDICATED TO HOD THAT HE BELIEVED THE CHANCES OF A JANUARY LOAN WERE SLIGHT BUT HE WOULD REPORT HOD'S VIEWS.

3. DATT BELIEVES THAT IAF IS CAPABLE OF OPERATING THE F-4 FOR THE PURPOSE HOD ADVERTISES, PROVIDED THEY HAVE THE BENEFIT OF AN AIRCREW CHECKOUT AND HELP FROM TECH REPS OF MCCONNELL AND GSE. BESIDES AN ENGINE TECHNICIAN, THEY WOULD NEED A MINIMUM OF FOUR OR FIVE ACFT SYSTEM SPECIALISTS. RADAR BOMBING AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM SUPPORT WOULD NOT INITIALLY BE REQUIRED.

4. HOD'S DEPUTY, GEN PELED, ADVISED DATT 16 JAN THAT HOD HAD ASKED ISRAELI EMBASSY AIR ATTACHE YARON TO REOPEN THIS QUESTION.

GP-4.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 TEL AV 00081 071102Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

039251

R 071022Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5331
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 81

EXDIS

REF: STATE 001944, 2016, AMMAN 0071

1. PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED STATE REFTELS I CALLED RAFAEL, DIR GEN, FONOFF, THIS MORNING AND URGED ON ISRAELIS UTMOST RESTRAINT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN REGARD BOTH LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN BORDERS. REFERRING TO CONVERSATION BETWEEN UNDER SEC ROSTOW AND AMBASSADOR RABIN AND FACT THAT WE WERE SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION TO CALL RABIN IN, I NOTED OUR CONVICTION THAT BOTH LEBANESE AND JORDANIANS ARE DOING MAXIMUM TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN. I ADDED THAT AS FOR LEBANON WE BELIEVED LEBANESE ASSURANCES THAT THERE ARE NO TRAINING CAMPS OR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS FOR FEDAYEEN THERE. AS TO EILAT I SAID I ASSUMED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE AWARE OF THE JORDANIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THAT AREA AND RECENT EXCHANGES WITH US HAD DEMONSTRATED THE LENGTHS TO WHICH HUSSEIN PREPARED TO GO IN PRECLUDING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. FINALLY I NOTED THAT DESPITE ALL BEST EFFORTS AND MAJOR LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN PRECAUTIONS IT OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN ACTION ONE HUNDRED PERCENT AND I URGED MOST STRONGLY ISRAEL VIEW SITUATION AS CALMLY AND RESPONSIBLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE OBJECT OF AVOIDING CONFLICT.

2. RAFAEL, WHO SEEMED RELATIVELY RELAXED, DESCRIBED REFERENCE FEDAYEEN TRAINING CAMPS OR HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 00081 071102Z

AS SEMANTICS, NOTING THAT LEBANESE HAD THEMSELVES ADMITTED
EXISTENCE CONCENTRATION FEDAYEEN THERE AND THEIR POSSESSION
FACILITIES SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS. IN ANY EVENT HE GAVE
ASSURANCES THAT THERE NO RPT NO ISRAELI DESIRE STIR UP
SITUATION AND THAT IF NO ATTACKS BYHHEDAYEEN
OCCURED THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
FACT WE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO URGE LEBANESE AND
JORDANIANS TO EXERT MAXIMUM CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN WHICH
HE WELCOMED.

GP-3 • BARBOUR

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

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S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001

EXDIS

REF STATE 293876

1. REFTEL DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION AND NOT RECEIVED UNTIL MIDDLE OF NIGHT. IN MEANTIME, ACTING ON BEIRUT 15404 WE HAD QUERIED FONOFF AND IDF AND HAD REPORTED IN TEL AVIV 6659 THAT ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS ON LEBANON BORDER WERE SAID TO BE DEFENSIVE AND THAT ISRAEL HAD NO INTENT TO INITIATE ACTION. REFTEL WAS THUS OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS.

2. RE PARA 1 TEL AVIV 6659, THIS ASSURANCE GIVEN BY ELIZUR, DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICAN DEPT, FONOFF, AFTER CHECKING AND WITH AUTHORITY HIS SUPERIORS.

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APPROVED BY: JOSEPH J. SISCO
S/S - MR. ELIOT

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SECRET STATE 180300

EXDIS

1. WE NOTE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO ALLON THAT ISRAEL HAS WARNED ARAB NATIONS AND GUERRILLAS THAT IT WILL NOT STAND IDLE IF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS OVERTHROWN FROM WITHOUT. WHILE WE CAN APPRECIATE ISRAELI CONCERN, WE DO NOT FEEL PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THIS KIND AT THIS JUNCTURE ARE HELPFUL. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT SYRIAN GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IS HELPING TO BRING TOGETHER MORE LEBANESE OF ALL STRIPES WHO HAVE PARTICULARLY RESENTED THIS KIND OF OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT. WHILE WE CAN APPRECIATE PRESSURES ON ISRAEL TO SAY SOMETHING, EVEN KIND OF LOW KEY STATEMENT APPARENTLY MADE BY ALLON BECOMES A LIGHTNING ROD FOR ALL ANTI-LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES. HOPE YOU WILL TALK THIS OVER PROMPTLY AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS. GP-3.
ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET #78

PAGE 01 STATE 155575

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CINCUSAFE

SECRET STATE 155555

EXCIS.

CINCUSAFE FOR GENERAL HOLZAPPEL

SUBJ: DELIVERY OF F-4S TO ISRAEL

1. SEPARATE MESSAGE THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS FROM CHIEF OF STATE AIR FORCE TO CINCUSAFE (COPY TO YOU) INSTRUCTS SENIOR USAF OFFICER TO APPROACH GREEK AIR FORCE, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE, REGARDING F-4 DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL. MESSAGE IN QUESTION HAS BEEN CLOSELY COORDINATE WITH DEPT.

2. WE ANTICIPATE THAT ISSUE WILL BE RAISED RATHER QUICKLY FROM MILITARY TO GOVERNMENT LEVEL IN GREECE. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE BE PREPARED PROMPTLY TO PICK UP DISCUSSION SO AS TO PROMOTE GREEK ACCEPTANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, FIRST FLIGHT OF FOUR F-4S ARRIVED IN ISRAEL ON SEP 1. THE PLACES WERE FLOWN BY USAF

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PAGE 02 STATE 155555

PERSONNEL DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL VIA SINGLE REFUELING STOP IN AZORES AND AERIAL REFUELING TWICE EN ROUTE FROM THERE TO ISRAEL. WE HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT HAVING USAF PERSONNEL FLY THE PLANES INTO ISRAEL BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY IF PLANE (WHICH UNARMED) SUFFERED ACCIDENT OR CAME UNDER ATTACK EN ROUTE. WE DECIDED, HOWEVER, TO GO AHEAD WITH FIRST FLIGHT IN ORDER MEET DESIRED DELIVERY DATE. WE WISH FIND DIFFERENT DELIVERY METHOD FOR FUTURE FLIGHTS, THAT WILL OBYVATE HAVING USAF PERSONNEL ACTUALLY FLY PLANES INTO ISRAEL.


4. WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES AND HAVE DECIDED THAT DELIVERY VIA GREECE, WITH ISRAELI PILOTS TAKING OVER PLANES AT GREEK AIRFIELDS, IS BEST ONE OPEN TO US. WE RECOGNIZE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL BE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH ARABS. ANTICIPATE ALSO THAT GOG WILL BE INCLINED LOOK FOR CONNECTION BETWEEN OUR PROPOSAL ON F-4S AND OUR POLICY TOWARD GREECE (INCLUDING ARMS SUPPLY). FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS FOR YOUR USE IN RESPONDING POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ON THESE POINTS:

1. ON QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH ARABS, WE HAVE NO DESIRE SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY TO GREECE. USG HAS ANNOUNCED SALE OF F-4S AND ALSO FACT THAT IT HAS BEGUN DELIVERY. F-4S INVOLVE TRANSACTION BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE, HOWEVER, FOR USAF PERSONNEL TO FLY PLANES TO ISRAEL ITSELF. OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE ISRAELIS PICK UP PLANES IN GREECE APPEARS MOST EFFICIENT WAY TO AVOID THAT PROBLEM.

WE HOPE THIS WOULD NOT BECOME SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR GREECE. IF GREEKS SHOULD INDICATE THEY ARE WILLING GO AHEAD BUT DO NOT WISH COMMIT THEMSELVES FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD, YOU SHOULD STATE THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED REVIEW MATTER WITH GREEK AUTHORITIES IF PROBLEM ACTUALLY EMERGED.

2. WE DO NOT SEE OUR PROPOSAL ON F-4S AS HAVING IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE TO OUR ARMS SUPPLY POLICY FOR GREECE. AS GREEK AUTHORITIES KNOW, THIS SUBJECT IS UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW IN US GOVERNMENT. FYI, WE DO NOT WISH LEAVE GREEK GOVERNMENT WITH IMPRESSION THAT FAVORABLE RESPONSE ON F-4 PROPOSAL WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE ANY IMPACT ON OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS CURRENT GREEK ARMS SUSPENSION. WE ARE MOVING AHEAD AS FAST AS WE CAN HERE TOWARD HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW OF OUR GREEK POLICY, AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT DECISION WILL BE REACHED IN FEW WEEKS, END FYI.

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5. IF GREEKS ASK WHETHER ISRAELIS WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO OUR PROPOSAL, YOU SHOULD SAY "YES". FYI. ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OUR PROPOSAL TURN OVER PLANE* IN GREECE, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT GOC, CONVEYED IN COURSE EXCHANGES PAST WEEK BETWEEN ISA AND ISRAELI DEFENSE ATTACHE HERE. END FYI.

6. UNLESS YOU HAVE URGENT OBJECTIONS, WHICH SHOULD BE REPORTED AT ONCE, REQUEST THAT YOU COORDINATE WITH YOUR MILITARY COLLEAGUES REGARDING SEPARATE CSAF INSTRUCTION AND PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPORT PROMPTLY IF, AS WE EXPECT, GOC RAISES CONSIDERATION OUR PROPOSAL OUTSIDE OF MILITARY CHANNELS. GP-3.
ROGERS

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N O D I S

SUBJECT: Discussion of Middle East Policies with Israeli Officials

FOLLOWING IS FYI UNCLEARED NOFORN AND SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW.

SUMMARY: During call by Israeli FonMin Director General Rafael and Amb. Rabin April 10, Secretary urged Israel make clearer to world it willing seek a peaceful solution and compromise on issues of withdrawal and direct negotiations. Noting continuation of status quo served Soviet interests, Secretary said we are anxious to find a way to get negotiations started. Israel should recognize American public opinion will not support heightened US confrontation



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connotation with certain positions demanded by Arab states.

In further exchange, Rabin said speaking personally without instructions he was sure if US came with a formula that Arabs make public declaration of willingness enter into peace with Israel as Jewish independent state with agreed and recognized boundaries (not 1967 lines)

to be negotiated between the parties, US would be successful in getting Israel agree use word withdrawal. Rafael commented jokingly it easier for military man to say this than for Foreign Office type.

✓ 10. Discussing Soviet role in Middle East, Rabin said Soviets by supplying SA-3s ^{had} ~~which~~ saved Nasser from being forced to accept restoration of cease-fire. Soviets thus proved they back Nasser's war of attrition, albeit at controlled level. Secretary said Soviet move could be seen as saving Nasser's skin and strengthening his position in a way not to have a major conflict. It obvious that Soviet policy is working; only way to prevent it from working is to

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Union to compete under such conditions with the United States will be small. A peace situation would not only prevent the undermining of U.S. positions in the region; it would go much further in generating an increasing American influence.

The Soviet Position on Solving the Situation Created Since the Six Day War

6. The following are the consistent elements of basic Soviet policy: (as expressed in the document presented to Secretary of State Rogers by Tcherniakov on June 17, 1969):

- a) Insistence on total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before June 5, 1967.
- b) Solution of the Arab refugee problem on the basis of the principle of personal free choice between repatriation and compensation.

In return for the achievement of these two aims, the Soviet Union is prepared (with Egypt's consent) to agree to peace, the meaning of which would be, by Soviet lights, nothing more than the cessation of the state of belligerency, and this without the need to recognize Israel, directly or indirectly. Hence the opposition to direct negotiation, the very

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undertaking of which would constitute recognition of Israel. The Soviet Union cannot acquiesce to a situation which could be interpreted as a state of "peace" that goes beyond the mere cessation of belligerency. It must, perforce, plant into the body of a political settlement the seed of continuing tension and even the seed of nullification, if and when the necessary circumstances might occur. The inclusion of the free-choice principle for the refugees creates the opportunity for a situation to emerge at some future time in which any number of refugees might demand repatriation to Israel; Israel would refuse to accept them, and by its refusal provide the pretext for the Arabs to nullify whatever obligations they might have undertaken. The situation of past belligerency would thus be restored with the Arab States already having received back all the territories they lost in the Six Day War.

7. In all its diplomatic contacts, public and private, the Soviet Union has not departed from these principles. There has been, moreover, no sign whatsoever, that the Soviet Union is prepared to alter its stand on these matters. Today, with the Arab armies having been so substantially rehabilitated, the Soviet Union prefers the present situation, on the assumption that contact with the United States prevents the renewal of war in the region. The prospect of a war between Israel and Egypt in

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the near future is a source of great anxiety to the Soviet Union since its end result is certain and known. One more Egyptian failure in war would bring about the downfall of Nasser. Another war with the Soviet Union standing on the sidelines would crucially undermine Soviet credibility in the eyes of the Arab public and leaders. The Soviet Union and Egypt have thus opted for a policy of limited warfare or, more precisely, a war of military, economic and political attrition. The guiding principles are non-acceptance of any political solution that is not in harmony with the basic principle of Soviet policy mentioned above; the initiation of restricted military action on the part of the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and, as far as influence will allow, Syria and Iraq; and finally, increased support for the activities of the Palestinian terrorist organizations. The purpose of this total design is:

- a) To wear Israel down by increasing the number of casualties, knowing the Israeli sensitivity in this matter.
- b) To erode the political position of the United States on the assumption that the American public and administration will grow weary of the absence of a solution to the Middle East conflict and will ultimately become reconciled to the Soviet formula. The Soviets are alive to the corrosive

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influence of the Vietnam war on the American public's readiness to undertake further risks in other areas of the world. The Soviets hope that the mood of neo-isolationism in the United States will ultimately leave its mark on American policy in the Middle East. Moreover, a comparison of the American stand as indicated in the various documents it has presented since March 1969 and continuing through May and June 1969, encourages the Soviet hope of a possible U.S. shift in their favor. They are able, furthermore, to point to a change in the American position towards Egypt and the other Arab States, demonstrating that the war of attrition is bearing fruit.

The Position Proposed for the United States & Israel

8. Despite differences of view with regard to the details of the substance of peace, the peace map, the means to achieve the peace, and the instruments of peace, there exists a broad mutual consensus as to the origins of the tension and on the need to replace the current situation and the cease-fire lines by nothing less than a state of peace with borders of peace. The United States and Israel must, therefore, continue to strive for the achievement of a political solution founded upon

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this consensus.

9. The essential prerequisites for the obtaining of such a solution are:

- a) Israeli military and economic steadfastness in face of the war of attrition.
- b) A clear and explicit American posture within the international arena that will thwart a situation allowing the Soviets to dictate a political settlement on their terms.

10. Israel does not ask of the United States to fight its wars. The identity of interests between the United States and Israel justifies the Israeli request that the U. S. supply, in part, the necessary tools for defence (arms and the financial aid for the purchases of the required arms); Israel, for its part, is ready and resolved to do the work alone. Any undermining of Israel's endurance capacity will serve nothing but the Soviet interest in the region and will lead to a further undermining of the American interest, whether short or long term.

11. A forceful American stand, one that would demonstrate a readiness not to compromise on peace, coupled with a continued preparedness for talks with the Soviets on the achievement of a genuine peace, would deprive the Soviet Union of their so-called "gains" to be

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exhibited to the Arabs as the fruit of the negotiations. It would introduce into Arab consciousness a greater sense of realism and would demonstrate that the key to what the Arabs want, namely the return of the lost territories, is in American, not Russian, hands. With this and the strengthening of Israel's military and economic capacity, it will be that much easier and certain to transfer the weight of the war of attrition to the Arab side.

Conclusions

12. The United States and Israel have to conduct a broad and general policy in face of the war of attrition imposed and waged by the Soviet Union and Egypt. The means are:

- a) The strengthening of Israel, militarily and economically.
- b) The conduct of a war of attrition against Egypt by means and methods short of war. In this manner it will be possible to bring about the downfall of the Nasser regime and inflict a blow at Soviet prestige in the region.
- c) No erosion of the American policy that postulates meaningful peace. Such a peace would deprive the Soviets in their Middle East actions of the Israel-Arab conflict as a central instrument.

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13. To the extent that what is recommended above will be acted upon, it will be possible to bring about a turning point in the events of the Middle East. The fall of Nasser, who more than any other leader in the Arab world symbolizes the policy of identification with the Soviet Union, will open the way for a new play of forces in the area. Such a development is the only practical way to alter the direction of events in the Middle East so as to bring about a limitation of Soviet influence and launch the prospect of a new deployment of forces in the area, one that would increase the chances of peace and reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

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24 SEP 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

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1. 

a. The Israelis have been facing a war of attrition for the past year. Their talks with King Hussein have not been fruitful because the King is too weak vis-à-vis the terrorists and is unable to stand up to Nasser, and back of Nasser, the Russians. Since the Israelis have not been successful in their attempts to achieve an atmosphere for political discussions on the Middle East, they have had to turn to military action, short of war, as a substitute.

b. Despite the Israeli fortifications along the Suez Canal, the Israelis continue to take casualties, primarily from the shelling

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by artillery, in which the Egyptians hold a marked superiority, particularly in long-range guns. Israel's long-range raids were intended to prove to Nasser that the battle can be taken to the Egyptian heartland and thereby bring the realization of the continuing war to the smallest Egyptian villages. The thousands of Egyptian soldiers along the Canal have seen with their own eyes the MIGs falling in flames and they cannot be persuaded otherwise by official Egyptian claims of few, if any, losses of aircraft. Further, the Egyptians realize that even their strongest positions are vulnerable to Israeli attack.

c. The latest Israeli raids on the Egyptian coastal installations on the Gulf of Suez have greatly damaged Nasser's personal prestige. In order to insure his personal posture with the Egyptian military, Nasser had to dismiss his chief of staff and replace him by the former intelligence chief, an appointment revealing that the Egyptian armed forces are now a danger to Nasser's position. Twenty Egyptian naval officers have been removed recently, topped by the dismissal of the head of the Navy. [REDACTED] Egyptian officers in high command positions - up to generals commanding divisions - criticize Nasser and make jokes about him.

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d. The re-equipment of the Egyptian military has been accomplished more rapidly than the Israelis had expected. By 1970 the number of aircraft and tanks in the Egyptian armed forces will be double that of June 1967. Nonetheless, Nasser's position in the armed forces is not strong now, and the Israelis think that if they continue their present course of military action, which has brought Nasser "to the crossroads" and which has affected his health, Nasser may well go. The Israelis do not think that the Soviets can save Nasser if the Israelis continue their present course of action.

e. If Nasser falls or is removed, his successor will be less dangerous to Western interests because he will not have Nasser's personal charisma in the Arab and Moslem world. There should be no fear that a more radical successor will better serve USSR interests - the Soviet role is already pervasive and complete: their advisers are down to company level, they remain the principal arms supplier, and they are still in control although not in command. They will continue to support Nasser as long as possible because they realize that he is their best vehicle.

f. The war of attrition makes heavy demands on Israel's resources. Forty percent of the Israeli budget goes for defense and

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security, approximately double the pre-1967 figure and represents about 20 percent of Israel's GNP. The Israeli economy shows a creditable growth of nine percent in GNP, but the heavy defense allocations and demands upon Israeli manpower to hold the cease-fire line make it imperative for Israel to obtain additional military and economic assistance. The Prime Minister will raise these problems with the President with hopes of obtaining a favorable response.

g. If the Israelis have time, they will bring about a change in the Middle East either by weakening Nasser's position so that other Arab leaders, such as Helou in Lebanon and Hussein in Jordan, can take some action toward peace or by causing Nasser's downfall and replacement. Any successor to Nasser would be an improvement, since he cannot be worse than Nasser.

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h. The present stalemate in the Middle East is best for the Soviets because they profit from Nasser's influence in other states. While the Sudanese rapprochement with Egypt and the recent Libyan

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coup may not have been instigated by Nasser, these events were possible only because of Nasser's wide appeal in the area.

i. There is no limit to military action the Israelis can take against Egypt. The only restraints are of a political nature. It is difficult to justify these restraints; if the Egyptian leadership cannot defend its own people, it cannot expect to survive. The Israeli course of action should be encouraged, since it benefits the West as well as Israel.

2. [REDACTED]

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Dirh

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment:

The Situation in the Middle East -
Summary, 24 September 1969

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATIONAugust 19, 1969
8-27-69 HAK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Israeli Minister Argov

The Israeli Minister came in at his own request to ask about US-Soviet negotiations on the Middle East. He said the Israelis were deeply disturbed by propositions that Joe Sisco had given the Soviets and by the whole process of American-Soviet negotiations. They saw no movement in the Soviet position and all the concessions in ours. I said that I was not directly concerned with these negotiations and had not, in fact, had an opportunity to study the exchanges with the Soviets in recent weeks and, therefore, was not in a position to make any specific comment on the status of negotiations. In general, however, I said that I could see no settlement in the Middle East that was really viable if it was not accepted by the parties. I said that we had had long experience negotiating with the Soviets and I really felt Israeli fears that we were being played for suckers were misplaced.

The Minister said that if we really stuck by the propositions that Sisco had put forward in Moscow we could only have in mind that they would be imposed because the Israelis would never accept them of their own free will. I said that from what I had seen the Soviets and the Arabs had, after the Sisco Mission, criticized us for taking the Israeli side on all issues and we seemed therefore to be under attack for opposite reasons from both sides.

Argov asked me whether I thought the Soviets really wanted a settlement since it was the Israelis' judgment that they did not. I said in my mind this was an open question. I felt that the Soviets understood that a fourth round of fighting would pose the most serious problems for them but I doubted whether, either intellectually and politically, the Soviets had yet reached the point where they understood that to avoid a fourth round over the long run, a real settlement was going to have to be made. As regards our attitude, I referred the Minister to the President's brief reference to the Middle East in his Bucharest toast where he pointed out not only that the security of all countries in the area had to be safeguarded

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but that no power inside or outside the region should seek narrow gains from a settlement. I suggested to the Minister that this principle was applicable to the Soviet Union.

The Minister then shifted the discussion to more general questions of Soviet aims in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and also asked about the probable impact on Soviet policy in the Middle East of the Sino-Soviet tensions. On this latter question I said that I found it difficult to reach a clear judgment. The Sino-Soviet conflict, in my view, had very ambiguous consequences in several places. For example, many argued that because of their troubles in the East the Soviets wanted detente and peace in the West, but in practice peace and quiet in the West meant clamping down on the Eastern European countries, which in turn inhibited prospects for detente with the West. In the Middle East I supposed that the Sino-Soviet conflict contributes to Soviet desires to avoid involvement in new fighting. But it was less clear to me whether the Soviets were trying to work toward this objective by negotiating a viable settlement or by attempting to gain greater influence and control over the Arabs, or both.

Reverting to Israeli fears of US-Soviet collaboration, I referred the Minister to the President's statement during his Asian trip regarding the Brezhnev proposals for Asian collective security. I said it had been made clear that we had no interest in condominiums or in joining coalitions with the Soviets against third countries. I said that in my view this attitude had application beyond Asia.

At the conclusion of the conversation, I again told the Minister that I did not have direct responsibility on the staff for the Middle East negotiations, but that I would be willing at occasional intervals to discuss with him general matters of US-Soviet relations if he wished.

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
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

22 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


SUBJECT: American Interests in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The present situation in the Middle East is of grave concern to the Department of Defense. Because of the rather sizeable Middle Eastern involvement of the Department of Defense in matters ranging from U.S. military bases to the sale of arms, we are giving constant attention to the relationship of military to political questions in this region, especially as these matters relate to the Arab-Israeli dispute. In this connection, I am sending to you a short report, prepared by OSD/ISA, on the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Department of Defense interest in the Middle East.



Attachment

*Henry -
I feel
this report is well
done and wanted
you to have it -*



Copy 1 of 4 copies.

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HOW CAN THE SITUATION BE IMPROVED?

Contrary to the arguments of some foreign governments, or some persons in this country, the United States is not responsible for all of the tragedies of Middle Eastern politics. This politics had received its impetus and its direction before the United States became actively involved in the area. We were in some measure responsible, along with the Soviet Union, for the creation of the State of Israel, but the main currents of Arab politics, the struggles between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and the interest of the Russians in the Middle East go back before 1947. Under these circumstances, where our powers and responsibilities are limited, it seems imperative that we identify our national interests in the Middle East and then state them forcefully and without wavering from them. There are first of all the general American interests identified in Section II of this paper. Second, there are some more immediate interests which ought to be emphasized. They are listed below.

1. The United States, as a member of the United Nations, has supported Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of combatants in the June 1967 War. This means that we do not officially recognize the present cease-fire lines as being permanent boundaries, and furthermore, that these lines are cease-fire lines and not lines for combat. From the standpoint of American policy and strategic interests, therefore, in the sale of military equipment to any party at war in the Middle East, it is necessary to avow that the United States does not and will not support the movement by air or other means of belligerent forces across these lines.

2. As a power dedicated to the humane treatment of persons and to the protection of national citizenship, the United States should be troubled that Palestinian refugees continue to be deprived of a permanent status as persons in the international community. If there were no Palestinian refugee problem, much of the Arab/Israeli conflict would subside and until this question is settled there will be conflict in the Middle East regardless of what the various states in the area or outside it do. Through various guerrilla organizations, the Palestinians have achieved semi-autonomous status in the Middle East and show evidences of improving this status, to the possible detriment of all other parties in the area.

3. Israel clearly requires weapons for its protection, because the Arabs have evinced their willingness to back threats with force. Yet Israel sees its defense in largely offensive

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and/or retaliatory terms. The IDF has been very successful with the blitzkrieg-type war. All Israeli requests for purchase of equipment from the United States center on this type strategy. Given the nature of Israeli defensive strategy, it is extremely difficult to control Israeli operations in this highly volatile situation. Some effort should be made to sit down with the Israelis and discuss these strategic questions in order to come to some meeting of minds, particularly as the Israelis request our most sophisticated forms of offensive military equipment for their defensive requirements.

A case in point is the standing Israeli request for purchase of CBU-49 Cluster Bomb Units. The CBU is an extremely effective anti-personnel and anti-aircraft weapon, which involves many little bomblets clustered together which explode at different intervals and with varying kinds of impact. At one point in its development, the CBU was a very closely guarded military secret in the United States, but the Vietnam War occasioned its extensive use with significant results. The North Vietnamese made a propaganda play over our use of this "nasty" weapon, and Mary McCarthy reported about its use after she visited Hanoi. Its explosion is unmistakable in terms of the kind of weapon which is being used. Sale to Israel of this weapon, with its highly political overtones, is a difficult matter, since Israel is virtually at war and the United States would be selling this kind of weapon to a nation who has survival uppermost in its mind. Under the circumstances, we could hardly control the use of the CBU. ISA has tried an experiment, by agreeing to sell a limited number of CBU-49s with a caveat that Israel would not use them in routine reprisals across cease-fire lines, but the Israeli Government will not agree to such a caveat.

4. Diplomatic overtures to the Arabs will have to be accompanied by some sort of tangible proof of America's good intentions. This could involve a political proof, in the form of reaching some sort of arrangement with the Israelis on occupied territory, or even on military strategy, which would help convince the Arabs that we are not arming the Israelis for what the Arabs think of as Israeli expansion.

The doctrine of evenhandedness is a rather nebulous or ambiguous policy. To give it reality, something more is

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needed than selling inferior military equipment to the Arabs as a kind of token reciprocity for what has been sold the Israelis. Sometimes simple political gestures, such as taking certain Arab powers into our full confidence, might help. Perhaps an encouragement of certain Arab Embassies in Washington to establish closer relations with both State and Defense would help. In any case, these gestures are relatively inexpensive in monetary terms, and in no case do they add to the competition for arms in the Middle East. Evenhandedness is in this instance more a matter of gesture than of ambitious diplomacy.

5. The United States should be extremely cautious about reading into Soviet activities any kind of basic change in their policy of radicalizing the Middle East. Every effort should be made to contain these efforts, while at the same time reaching that area of the Middle East which is most affected by revolutionary war, the Palestinian Arab area. Talks with the Soviets will proceed in order to provide some sort of context for dialogue between the great powers, but if this is not accompanied by direct relations between the great powers and those in the Middle East, there can be no settlement.

Reaching the Palestinian Arab population should be of paramount concern for the United States. This matter has already been discussed here, but it is necessary to reiterate the importance of the Palestinian refugee problem. A clear policy toward this problem by the United States and a forceful statement of this policy to the nations of the Middle East and to the nations of the world is imperative.

6. In connection with the last item, it might be appropriate for leading American officials to become more vocal on the subject of the Middle East; to let the Arabs, Israelis and Soviets know that our involvements in the Middle East will be seen through American eyes with no apologies for this view. The multi-faceted nature of American society is such that American national interests in the Middle East can only be broad rather than narrow ones, ranging all the way from economic advantage to cultural presence. Many Americans

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live and work in the Middle East and have long provided cultural presence for America there, one that is valued by Arabs and Israelis alike (and perhaps feared by the Soviets) for what it represents in the way of economic progress and political philosophy.

There are those who insist that the present situation between the Arabs and the Israelis is not to be solved by us, because the issues go beyond the scope of American power. It is easy to succumb to this pessimism. Yet "American power" has many dimensions: some cultural, some economic, some political, some military. It is the multi-faceted nature of American society which makes for American power. Where one area might be closed, another area of endeavor, such as economic cooperation, might be opened. In any event, loss of the Middle East to some form of revolutionary power which is antithetical to America's cultural traditions would be disastrous for the United States. The development of some new form of Leninism or Maoism in the Arab world is a possibility which could very well develop after years of humiliation and defeat. Present Arab leadership does not represent this extreme form of politics, but Soviet and Chinese plans for the area clearly envisage something along these lines. Before this disaster occurs, it is worth considering alternatives in American policy toward the Middle East which can guide political change and prevent these extreme developments.

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BASIC AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. The United States has a number of legal and political commitments in the Middle East. These commitments take the form of multilateral alliances, bilateral security agreements, general unilateral policy pronouncements, multilateral policy pronouncements, and unilateral pledges.

2. The American military presence in the Middle East requires certain key installations, [REDACTED]

3. The United States has an interest in preserving friendly governments.

4. The containment of Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion in the Middle East, through various means, is another interest of the United States.

5. Access to oil is an interest of the United States.

6. The United States is concerned with maintaining various transportation routes and communications facilities.

7. Historically, the United States has developed a number of important cultural relationships with the Middle East.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-28/23 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) (tr. 17 Jan 07)

By [Signature] Date 8 MAY 07

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III

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In the first instance, the Department of Defense is concerned with military questions in the Middle East. In no area of the world, however, does the military side of human activity blend more completely with the political side than in this area. This means that for every question relating to the sale of military equipment to a Middle Eastern state or to American strategic involvements in a given country, there is a political problem of some sort to reckon with in making Defense decisions. In no sector of the Department of Defense's involvement with Middle Eastern countries is this more evident than in the sale of weapons to various countries.

It is recognized that military preparedness by one nation against others is only a symptom of wider and deeper political conflicts between nations. At the same time, however, it is difficult to keep encouraging these symptoms when one knows that basic political causes will be left unsettled.

This is the basic dilemma which is faced by those in the Department of Defense who are involved in military transactions in the Middle East: the arms sold, or infrequently supplied through MAP channels, are usually considered necessary by the belligerents for their military security, but the powers involved seem to make little headway toward solving their underlying political difficulties. The United States is caught in a position where it at once urges peaceful settlement on the parties involved in the dispute, but in terms of tangible relationships with these parties, it is primarily an arms supplier. Without any progress toward a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, it is extremely difficult to argue that our arms supplies to the area are in any way a support for peace in the area; and yet the United States hopes for peace in this troubled region.

Under circumstances in the Middle East today, described by the UN Secretary General as a situation of "open warfare," the Department of Defense continues to weigh carefully, on a case-by-case basis, all requests for US sale of arms to any Middle Eastern power. In the absence of some political accommodation by the belligerents, the flow of arms from the United States into the Middle East will have to be closely monitored.

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IV

THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is well known and there is no need to make a detailed description of it here. Israel became an independent state in 1948 and then went to war with the Arabs. A year after its independence, Israel became a member of the United Nations and obtained diplomatic recognition from a majority of the member states, but has never achieved this recognition from any Arab state.

In 1956, the Israeli Army struck at the Suez Canal, supported by the British and French, in a short and abortive war. The Israeli Army clearly demonstrated its superiority but was forced back to its original lines under the pressure of world opinion, including that of the United States.

In June 1967, Israel, its air force in a brilliant tactical strike and its armies under the leadership of the present Ambassador to the United States, scored a dazzling victory in which it occupied territory along all of its frontiers.

Since 1967, as one of the most ominous developments since that date, the Palestinian guerrilla movement has grown to the proportions of between 5,000 and 10,000 members. Although it is somewhat disorganized, fractured by a number of groups supported by various powers, it nevertheless poses a constant threat to Israel's security. It has also stirred the imagination of some of the 2.25 million Arab refugees now living either in the Israeli occupied territories or in the countries of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. In the long run, this fedayeen movement may be the most significant political factor in the Arab world.

At the base of the Arab-Israeli dispute lie fundamental human questions which do not fit into the standard lines of competition between nations, although this competition is also present. First, there is the presence of three dynamic ideologies in the Middle East: Pan-Arabism, Zionism, and Communism. While paying lip service to the traditional boundaries of nations, these ideologies are by nature internationalist. If it were not for the presence of Communism in the area, it might well be that Pan-Arabism and Zionism could find some modus vivendi although this would be quite provisional. But the added presence of Communism and the competition between at least two brands of Communism adds to the dynamic equation. It is clear from Soviet pronouncements and from the declaration by the one indigenous Communist party which still makes public pronouncements -- the Syrian Communist Party -- that the Communists see the present national liberation movements in the Arab Middle East as but steps toward scientific socialism.

The second human factor in the Middle East is the Palestinian refugee situation. Many of these people are without citizenship. At least two

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generations have grown up in camps, on relief, and only partially employed in any kind of productive, positive enterprise. The misery and hopelessness of this situation is at the base of the human tragedy which one associates with the Arab-Israeli war.

Third, there is the vision of the "ascent" of world Jewry to Israel. This means that there is a feeling of almost Messianic deliverance about the State of Israel for many Jews still living in dispersion throughout the world. Israel represents a universalist movement, set against the background of the Nazi destruction of 6 million European Jews in World War II. Yet Israel also pursues policies associated with its own calculated national interests.

Fourth, under these circumstances there exists an emotionalism about the Arab-Israeli dispute which turns otherwise rational men into true believers. The Israeli often hides his emotion behind a facade of calm, deliberate and sometimes ironic thought, but it does not take much provocation to bring to the surface the kind of sentiment expressed by Prime Minister Meir: "The world doesn't know what to do with the Jews when it can no longer pity them." On the Arab side, this emotion is visibly on the surface in many private conversations and always in public.

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V

SALE OF ARMS TO ISRAEL BY THE UNITED STATES

1. The Arab-Israeli military situation seems gradually to be worsening. In reports from both Cairo and Tel Aviv there seems to be a growing consensus that the Arabs may have decided that their best strategy is to continue present cross-border activities and hope to develop a "war of attrition" which they hope the Israelis will not be able to sustain due to their population limitation and consequent sensitivity to casualties. It is emphasized that this is still conjecture and that we do not have firm evidence that this is a conscious Arab decision.

2. The Israelis have chosen to meet these continual cease-fire violations by increasing the intensity of their response. They explain their strategy as a method of precluding Nasser from implementing his announced plans, i.e.: first, solidifying defense of present positions; second, stepping up retaliation (the present phase); and third, liberating lost territory, with the extent of liberation presumably unlimited. In this context, Israel sees its defense problem as being primarily to deter another war. Israel is sure it can win a war but is concerned that if Nasser does not realize this, he will be foolish and escalate the border clashes to his "phase three" or liberation attempt. In this connection, Israel is very concerned that it be able to "deter the deterioration" towards war, which it sees in the increased Arab border exchanges.

3. This concern led Israel to adopt, last month, an intensified aerial response to Arab border violations. Lacking the Egyptian massed artillery capability, they undertook extensive aerial strikes against cross-canal positions, at the same time challenging the Egyptian Air Force to come out and engage. According to Israeli claims these exchanges during the last three weeks of July resulted in 18 Egyptian aircraft being shot down (against a loss of 2 Israeli Mirages) and the destruction of some Egyptian SAM sites along the canal. The Israelis claim this has forced Nasser to realize that he is not strong enough to enter phase three (liberation) and thus has deterred a further worsening of the situation.

4. Israel considers that Hussein is "playing Nasser's game," responding to Nasser's pressures to open up on the East front to take pressure off Egypt and put it on Israel. They feel the King is personally responsible for what they claim was a sharp increase in artillery bombardment and other cross-border incidents originating in Jordan during the last two weeks. Accordingly, they responded with air strikes against Jordan -- and also struck targets in Lebanon. There are Arab claims in this connection, that the strikes against fedayeen camps in Lebanon actually included villages with many non-fedayeen inhabitants. This is almost inevitable, as we learned in Vietnam, when the terrorists mingle with the population. The strikes also included the sensitive East Ghor canal in Jordan.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 1, 1972

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Effect of Israeli-Syrian Fighting
on Suez Ceasefire

I attach for your information a memorandum prepared in the Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It discusses the effect of Israeli-Syrian fighting on the Suez ceasefire.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert Blackwell Sr.".

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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5. In accordance with their position of the past several years, and probably intensified due to this expanded air response philosophy, Israel has been pressing hard for sale of more and better equipment for their air force. Some of the major items on their rather long list are:

a. Sale of 25 additional F-4s and 100 additional A-4s (giving a total of 75 and 200, respectively).

b. Sale of 500 CBU's (cluster bombs), particularly the CBU-49, an anti-personnel weapon suitable for use against anti-aircraft and artillery emplacements.

c. Sale of 100 AJB-3 bombing systems for use in the 100 A-4s now being delivered. Israel is getting a simplified version of the AJB-3 without a bombing computer, which in the past we have refused to sell because it would improve their delivery capability for atomic weapons. They, however, are most anxious to get it as it would also provide a major improvement in their conventional bombing accuracy (reduce circular error probability about 1/2 or increasing the bombing effectiveness about fourfold).

d. Delivery of eight F-4 aircraft in September, instead of the four now scheduled. Israel pressed for deliveries beginning in August but was refused.

6. We are hesitating on approving Israeli requests to buy these new and sophisticated items. We want to provide the Israelis sufficient arms to protect themselves against the growing number of arms being provided the Arabs by the Soviets, and, in fact, even to deter another round of hostilities. On the other hand, we do not want to escalate the arms race in the Middle East. The sale of the additional aircraft would almost certainly be interpreted as this, even though our estimates indicate that the Israelis would still have only half as many first line aircraft as the combined Arab air forces. The Israeli retaliation policy could result in strikes on targets that include non-combatants and on targets not directly military in nature: i.e., the Sweetwater Canal in Egypt (supplying drinking water to civilians) and the Eash Ghor Canal in Jordan (supplying irrigating water to major farming developments established with U.S. aid).

7. OSD/ISA offered to sell Israel 25 CBU's on condition that they agree not to expend them in reprisals across cease-fire lines against either national or paramilitary forces. This would meet legitimate self-defense concerns, without constituting an escalation. The condition, however, has been rejected by Israel, and it is clear that similar restrictions would probably be rejected. Israel wants to use any weapons they have in implementing their deterrence policy.

8. An additional problem we must face is that sale of these items will carry the implied obligation to continue the supply, regardless of levels of Israeli use. Also, there is no assurance whatever that the desired deterrent effect will be achieved by the Israeli policy of cross-border air attacks, and we might only be adding to the present deterioration in the situation.

9. Finally, it should be noted that the US has been pressing for Israeli assurances regarding development of nuclear weapons. We considered making delivery of the F-4s contingent on assurances that Israel would not develop a nuclear capability, and as we deliver more and more nuclear capable equipment to them, our leverage on them decreases (see NSSM 40).

10. We are studying the problem of further arms sales on a continuous basis and will use our best judgment to try and meet minimum legitimate Israeli defense needs with a minimum escalating effect on the arms race and with a minimum of adverse Arab or international reaction against the US.

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VI

NSSM 40

In the highly disturbing situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons are about to be introduced. There is good evidence that the Israelis now are capable or soon will be capable of waging nuclear war against the Arabs. It was in light of this information that NSSM 40 was undertaken by the U.S. Government.

The scenario which was finally drafted for NSC approval on NSSM 40 did not explicitly connect our concern over growing Israeli nuclear capability with the upcoming delivery of F-4 Phantom jets. However, it was clear from the way the scenario opened that implications of the connection between the two matters would be made. Subsequent to the final draft of the scenario, no final meeting of the NSC was held on the subject. Instead, Under Secretary of State Richardson, Deputy Secretary Defense Packard, and Ambassador Rabin of Israel, met to discuss American concern about nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but without raising at the beginning of the discussion the question of F-4 deliveries. In this meeting Ambassador Rabin was confronted with our concern and was asked to convey our concern to his government.

It has now been over three weeks since this meeting, and there is no word from Ambassador Rabin yet. The scenario for NSSM 40 calls for a second meeting with Rabin, presumably tougher than the first, if no satisfactory reply is forthcoming.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLW02-28/24 LOS 12-14-04

BY *[Signature]* NARA Date 9-9-05

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VII

SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Since the June 1967 War, the USSR has made good on its support to the armed forces of the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. In the case of the UAR, this has meant the resupply of a vast amount of Egyptian equipment lost in 1967. In addition to this resupply, Soviet assistance has been forthcoming in the form of advisers, planners, and even directors of military operations.

Soviet naval activity has increased in the eastern Mediterranean since 1967. This presence is of concern to American naval forces in the same area. Among other interesting aspects of the Soviet fleet in this area, there are various forms of naval craft which are different from the emphasis in our Sixth Fleet; the Soviet craft include more submarines than we employ, no aircraft carriers but instead an antisubmarine warfare helicopter carrier, and finally destroyers and cruisers with guided missile capability. According to American naval intelligence, this guided missile capability, along with the high speed of Soviet naval vessels, makes the Soviet fleet a highly effective tactical force, particularly in a surprise attack situation.

It is generally agreed that although the Arabs lost the 1967 War, and the Soviets backed the Arabs in this war, the Soviet Union has improved its over-all position in the Middle East since 1967.

SECRET/LIMDIS



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

'69 SEP 4 0423 EDT 4 September 1969

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR AIR FORCE COMMAND POST

Subject: F-4 Aircraft Delivery

Reference: a. State 149044
b. Tel Aviv 3400

1. OSD had advised, after coordination with state, that the requirements of reference (a) for minimum publicity, specifically no arrival ceremony, have been essentially met in reference (b), and that delivery of initial four aircraft should proceed as planned.

2. This confirms NMCC telecon advising that the planned delivery operation is cleared to commence on schedule.

3. The OSD coordinator is Mr. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ISA. State coordinators are Mr. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA, and Mr. Wahl, FSO, NEA.

W.S. Miller

W. S. MILLER
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

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ACTION

SECRET/EXDIS

September 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Delivery of Phantom Aircraft to Israel

Prior to the TWA hijacking, Defense had completed arrangements to deliver the first eight Phantom aircraft to Israel -- four on September 5, four on September 22, both groups to be flown into Israel by USAF pilots for delivery there. Apparently both State and Defense were concerned about the arrangements established but did not raise these concerns with us. The heightened tension in the Middle East has intensified concerns in both State and Defense. Both the Mosque fire and the hijacking incident are cited. What makes this issue acute is the fact that the Departments have raised this issue now -- just thirty-six hours before scheduled delivery.

The Israelis were asked Monday morning whether they felt delivery would undercut efforts to get their citizens out of Damascus and whether they would like a brief delay. They were strongly opposed to any delay.

There are two closely related issues:

-- Timing of delivery. The first group of four will arrive this Friday. Although the Israelis have agreed not to trumpet the arrival, they will announce it since they could not keep it secret for any period. We can then expect sharp Arab reactions.

-- Method of Delivery. Secretary Laird would then like to find some way to transfer the planes to Israel so that Israeli pilots and not ours can fly the planes into Israel. The Israelis are willing to explore ways of doing this for all later deliveries, but they do not want any delays in the first increment while new arrangements are made. This will require political clearance for a transfer point in a third country and a refueling stop within 1200 miles of Israel. The Israelis cannot fly the planes across the Atlantic because they are not checked out for in-flight refueling.

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-2-

OPTIONS

We can:

1. Again attempt to delay delivery on the general argument we want to wait until the temperature cools in Arab capitals. (The Israelis argue that this is an admission that the US can be intimidated.)
2. Tell the Israelis we do not want US pilots flying into Israel at this time and want to delay the first flight of Phantoms only long enough to make alternative arrangements. (It might take two weeks to arrange the political clearances necessary.)
3. Go ahead as planned.

RECOMMENDATION:

My judgment is that the nationality of the pilots will be less significant than the fact that the planes have been delivered. Therefore, the issue is whether to delay in the light of current heightened tension. There is no good time in the Arab world to deliver these planes: Now is worse than normal; but two weeks from now may be no better. Weighing that judgment against extremely strong Israeli reaction to any delay and in light of our previous commitment, I recommend: (a) we go ahead with this delivery, (b) we inform the Israelis that the delivery is contingent upon minimum publicity -- and specifically upon there being no public ceremony and (c) we tell the Israelis that we are reviewing the method of delivery for the second increment to enable us to find alternate means that would not involve U.S. personnel in Israel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

September 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Delivery of Phantom Aircraft to Israel

Prior to the TWA hijacking Defense had completed arrangements to deliver the first eight Phantom aircraft to Israel as follows: four on September 5, four on September 22, both groups to be flown all the way into Israel by USAF pilots to be transferred to Israel there.

The heightened tension in the Middle East has caused second thoughts. First, the Jerusalem mosque fire triggered demonstrations, partly against us, in a number of Muslim capitals. Second, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--the sponsor of the TWA hijackers--has now said the hijacking was in protest against the US delivery of Phantoms. Thus an already angered Muslim mood has been further sensitized to the Phantom delivery by the hijacking.

For this reason, the Israelis were asked Monday morning whether they felt delivery would undercut efforts to get their citizens out of Damascus and whether they would like a brief delay. They said, "No."

That leaves us with concern about our interests. There are two closely related issues:

1. Timing of delivery. The first group of four will arrive this Friday. Although the Israelis have agreed not to trumpet the arrival, they will announce it. They could not keep it secret for any period.

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- 2 -

Our embassies and other installations--especially Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya where there is a new nationalist government--may be attacked. This is never easy to predict; sometimes the Arabs ignore this sort of act and at other times they over-react.

2. Method of delivery. Given heightened visibility, Secretary Laird would like to find some way to transfer the planes to Israel so that Israeli pilots and not ours can fly the planes into Israel. The Israelis are willing to explore ways of doing this for all later deliveries, but they do not like the idea for the first four because they would have to delay while new arrangements are made. Mainly, this would require political clearance for a transfer point and a refueling stop within 1200 miles of Israel. The Israelis cannot fly the planes across the Atlantic because they are not checked out for in-flight refueling.

Secretary Laird has argued delay until we can make new arrangements for delivery by Israeli pilots--and incidentally get a little beyond the current period of tension. Alex Johnson, after painful consideration of the possible consequences, concludes that we do not have much choice but to go ahead as planned. He points out that there is no good time in the Arab world to deliver these planes; now is worse than normal; but no one can honestly say that two weeks from now will be better. Weighing that judgment against very strong Israeli reaction if we delay against their wishes, he believes we should warn our installations to prepare for the worst and go ahead.

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- 3 -

Your choices are these:

1. Delay delivery on the general argument that US interests and installations are at stake and we want to wait until the temperature cools in Arab capitals. (The Israelis argue that this is an admission that the US can be intimidated.)
2. Tell the Israelis we do not want US pilots flying into Israel at this time and want to delay the first flight of Phantoms only long enough to make alternative arrangements. (It might take two weeks to arrange the political clearances necessary.)
3. Go ahead as planned.

My judgment is that the nationality of the pilots will be less significant than the fact that the planes have been delivered. Therefore, the issue is whether to delay or not in the light of current tightened tension. I could not in good conscience say that things are likely to be better two weeks from now. I conclude that we should prepare for the consequences and go ahead.

Recommendation: That you approve going ahead as planned.

SECRET/EXDIS

*Doc - was 1.01 sent to State
at 1015, 3 Sept.
RSV*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

FROM: LCDR Jonathan T. Howe *JTH*


SUBJECT: Phantom Jets for Israel

We have been informed by the Western White House that the President has directed that:

1. The U. S. Government will proceed as scheduled with delivery of first increment of Phantom Jets to Israel.
2. We will inform Israelis that the delivery is contingent upon minimum publicity and specifically upon there being no public ceremony.
3. We will tell the Israelis that we are reviewing the method of delivery for the second increment to enable us to find alternate means that would not involve U. S. personnel in Israel.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-NODIS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AI:  O B E
H

Getting this out
today would give HAK
the flexibility of going
ahead with the meeting
on fairly short notice.

Hal H

HAK - I agree if
we are going to
hold till Monday.
@

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


S/S # 13254

September 1, 1969

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

Subject: Memorandum concerning
Phantom Delivery to Israel

Enclosed is a memorandum to
you from Under Secretary Johnson
concerning the planned September 5
delivery of four Phantoms to Israel.


For
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE



13254

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 1, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Initial Delivery of Four Phantoms to
Israel on September 5

I am sending you this brief memorandum on the above subject which may be of use to you as background and which indicates why we believe we must go ahead on delivery of the first four F-4 aircraft to Israel. I am also sending a copy of this memorandum to Secretary Rogers who expects to be discussing this matter with you and/or the President.

The first four planes are scheduled to be flown to Israel by US Air Force pilots, arriving in Israel this Friday, September 5. Our contract commits the United States to make deliveries in September, and Israel has been advised of the September 5 date and of the plan to use American pilots. Immediately upon arrival in Israel, the planes will be turned over to the Israeli Air Force and the American markings replaced by Israeli.

We have reviewed the proposed date and mode of deliveries in light of the present situation in the Middle East, in particular the TWA hijacking incident and the heightened emotions generated by the fire in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. We pointed out to the Israelis that delivery on September 5, in light of the expected adverse Arab reaction, might prejudice current efforts being made to free the two remaining Israeli TWA passengers in Syrian hands. We asked their views on possible postponement of delivery. Eban has replied that Israel is strongly opposed to any delay in delivery of the F-4's.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

- 2 -

The fact of the matter is that there will never be a good time in terms of Arab reaction, and there is no assurance that a delay would make delivery any easier later. For another, to delay delivery against strong Israeli wishes, particularly at this time when Israel is wrought up over the TWA incident and generally nervous about US policy, would result in a major crisis in US-Israeli relations. While the September 5 delivery date has not become known publicly, a number of key people in Israel are fully aware of the scheduled date and a classified arrival ceremony at which the Prime Minister will be present has already been arranged. (We intend to press the Israelis to keep any ceremonial aspect to an absolute bare minimum.) Not only would there be difficulties with the Israelis privately, but delay in the delivery would become known publicly which in turn would cause a public outcry both in Israel and here.


On the related question of mode of deliveries, Defense has explored alternatives to delivery by US Air Force pilots but has not been able to come up with any satisfactory solution which would permit delivery of the initial four planes on the scheduled date. Delivery by sea is not possible for the initial four Phantoms if the September date is to be met. The alternatives of having Israelis fly the planes all the way or of transferring the aircraft en route to Israeli pilots is ruled out because the Israelis are not trained for air refueling and refueling stops for political reasons would be most difficult, if not impossible to arrange. It may be possible to work out some alternatives for future deliveries. The Israelis have agreed to maintain secrecy about the mode of delivery, and our Air Force pilots will leave Israel immediately thereafter. Even should the delivery by American pilots become known, we do not see this as a major problem since the adverse reaction will be focussed primarily on the fact of the F-4 arrivals and not on how they got there. We also believe the risk of any incident en route, about which Mel Laird is particularly concerned, is minimal. We therefore favor proceeding as planned with delivery by the US Air Force.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

- 3 -

We plan to send advance guidance to our posts in Arab countries to assure that they take every security precaution against anticipated adverse reactions. Such will also be for use with host governments in an effort to soften those reactions to the extent possible.



U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

1829


S/S # 13254

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SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE



13254

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 1, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

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SECRET/EXDIS

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SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

- 3 -

We plan to send advance guidance to our posts in Arab countries to assure that they take every security precaution against anticipated adverse reactions. Such will also be for use with host governments in an effort to soften those reactions to the extent possible.



U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs

SECRET/EXDIS

Mudd's East
J. (Mosque)
file

August 22, 1969
9:00 S.C.time

Consulate in Jerusalem was notified of the fire at approximately 0800, 21 August (0200 21 Aug. EDT). It was reported to them by a clerk who reported "The Jews have put a bomb in the Asqua Mosque." ConGen went to scene of fire. They reported 7 fire trucks at the scene. The Arab complaint that there was no fire-fighting equipment is a little out of context. ConGen said there was insufficient flow of water until 8:45. He was reporting at 0900. He got there 0830 and was notified 0800.

Mayor of Jerusalem told Tad Schultz he had no idea how fire started and that first fire truck arrived on scene 4 minutes after fire reported to Israeli officials. Arabs say it was gasoline fire. One ConGen secretary near temple said heard no explosion.

Significance of Mosque - important Moslem shrine - ranks after Mecca and Medina.

Israelis have put curfew on. Golda Meir has announced inquiry would be made to determine cause of fire.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1969

547

NO COPY
FOLLOW UP

HOYDETS

10/27

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*
SUBJECT: Announcing Golda Meir's Visit

Dwight Chapin has given us September 25-26 for Mrs. Meir's visit. Rabin confirms that she could come on those dates.

I think we should go ahead and announce the dates before we go off to Asia. This will quiet concern that we're too preoccupied with Asia to pay attention to Israel and the Middle East.

Recommendation:

That you send the attached memo to Chapin just as a final check before announcing next Monday.

547

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*
SUBJECT: Announcing Dates of Golda Meir's Visit

You have given us September 25-26 as the dates for Prime Minister Golda Meir's visit, and she has indicated informally that she could come on those dates.

On that basis, we shall go ahead and issue a formal invitation for those dates.

Recommendation:

That Ron Ziegler inform the press on Monday, July 21 at 11:00 a.m. that these dates have been set. He has already announced the invitation and Mrs. Meir's acceptance in principle.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

SANITIZED COPY

1969 JUL 18 20 34 ✓

4:25 PM 7-18-69 RNK

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 002

ATTN: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE, NO DISSEMINATION

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA 002

TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL (BY MESSENGER)

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

S E C R E T (NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

GP-1

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

NLN 02-28/25 sec. 3.3(1)(1)(6) FBI 9-28-04

89-112 NARA, Date 9-9-05

[1 page]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONSECRET/NODIS
EYES ONLY

July 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Rabin on the State of Israeli Decisions

You will recall when you spoke with Gideon Rafael that he and Rabin took different tacks on the state of the Israeli Government's decisions about the terms it wants in a peace settlement.

The attached is a report of some extremely interesting comments by Rabin later that day which essentially say that the Israelis have been less than straightforward with us about the state of their decisions on the requirements on a territorial settlement.

There are no immediate operational conclusions to be drawn from this, except to be wary of Eban's vague statements.

I have sent a copy of the attached to Joe Sisco but, because of the extremely personal nature of Rabin's talk, am not distributing it through the system.

Att: Memcon between Rabin and Saunders, 6/25/69

SECRET/NODIS
EYES ONLY

SECRET/NODIS

June 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Harold H. Saunders

DATE AND PLACE: June 20, 1969, after dinner at the Sisco's home.

Caution: The conversation recounted below was labelled by Rabin as strictly personal. Therefore, no distribution of this memcon should be made beyond those with an immediate interest, and in no case, should Rabin or any other Israeli be confronted with the substance of the Ambassador's remarks.

Background. As background to this conversation, two points need to be made:

1. On May 13, while waiting with Rabin, Bitan and Argov for Dr. Kissinger to see them, I had remarked in the course of our conversation that it was very difficult for us to know exactly what Israel's position on a territorial settlement is. Ambassador Rabin said he could not understand my remark since Foreign Minister Eban last November had told Secretary Rusk very specifically that Israel, in a settlement with the UAR, would require an Israeli position at Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it. I recalled that comment but noted that always when we had heard such remarks from Israeli officials, they had been couched as "illustrative" rather than as firm Israeli government positions. In fact, we had been repeatedly told right up to the present that the Israeli Cabinet would not take a firm position on a territorial settlement until the Arabs presented themselves for direct negotiations. Prime Minister Eshkol, and other Israeli officials quoting him, had repeatedly said that they would not have a Cabinet crisis over a hypothesis.

2. On the afternoon of June 20, during the call of Rafael, Rabin and Argov on Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Kissinger had commented that the time was coming when he felt it would be to Israel's advantage to state more precisely its territorial requirements and to come out from behind the screen of "sacramental words--'just and lasting peace' and 'secure and recognized boundaries.'" Ambassador Rabin had taken exception to that remark, saying that Foreign Minister Eban last November had told Secretary Rusk specifically that Israel required an Israeli position at Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it. When Dr. Kissinger asked my

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8298

Effect of Israeli-Syrian Fighting
on Suez Ceasefire

So far the intensification of fighting between the Israelis and Syrians has not affected the ceasefire along the Suez Canal. But the question arises whether, in case hostilities on this front continue at an accelerated level, Sadat will be able to stay out indefinitely.

There is no doubt that Cairo is concerned about the recent, more serious incidents on the Syrian border. Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat separately summoned Minister Greene and the representatives of the other major Powers November 23 to register a formal expression of concern. Zayyat's demarche was mild, and he did not threaten any specific action, but he reminded us of the pressures Egypt had been brought under as a result of fighting on the Syrian border in April and May of 1967.

While the analogy cannot entirely be dismissed, we think there are important differences between the present situation and the one in 1967. The main one is that the Egyptians are now in a position to profit from that bitter experience. Moreover, the present ceasefire lines are far less advantageous than the 1967 lines from the point of view of an Egyptian military initiative.

The ceasefire along the Canal has been in effect now for more than two years and there is every sign that Egypt as well as Israel has thus far considered its continuance, even in the absence of negotiating progress, to be in its fundamental self-interest. We believe Egypt's leadership continues to have a healthy respect for Israel's ability to punish Egypt hard, at

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Classified by Michael Sterner
XGDS - Category 5(B) 3
Declassified Dec. 31, 1992.

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

reaction, Rabin stepped right in and, smiling, told Dr. Kissinger that I would say that the remarks by Israeli officials had been "illustrative." I then went on to add that we had repeatedly been told by Israeli officials that the Israeli Cabinet would take no position until the Arabs sat down to negotiate with them. After another comment by Dr. Kissinger, Rafael spoke up and said that the Israeli government would not take a firm position until the Arabs sat down and negotiated with them. Ambassador Rabin looked about as angry and disgusted as I have ever seen him look.

Conversation. Walking downstairs beside Ambassador Rabin after dinner at the Siscos' that evening, I asked Rabin whether he blamed me for being confused. When he asked what I meant, I recalled that afternoon in Dr. Kissinger's office when I had seen demonstrated right before my eyes within about 75 seconds precisely the contradiction which I had been talking about. He paused for a moment and then said, "No, I don't blame you for being confused."

He said that when he had been in Israel he had, in his private conversation with Prime Minister Meir, explained that the Israeli Government position is not firmly understood in Washington. He recommended to her that she come to Washington and explain to the President exactly what positions the Israeli Cabinet has taken. He said he had told her that he did not believe she would return home with any "political victory" but that she did not badly need this and it was far more important that the President of the United States understand clearly Israel's position.

He then motioned me to a chair and proceeded to explain the Israeli Cabinet decisions on this subject in the following general way:

When Eban had made his comment to Rusk in November 1968 about Israeli desire for a position in Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it, Eban was speaking from a firm Cabinet decision. Recalling the Israeli scurrying to ready a position vis-a-vis Jordan before the UNGA session, I asked whether that decision had been made in August or September. He said that it had been taken in December 1967. He added that he, as then Chief of Staff, had not been told of the decision at that time. He had only learned of it as he prepared in May 1968 to come to Washington as Ambassador. He said he asked for and got the record of the Cabinet meeting. When he had learned of it, he had told the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, and Prime Minister Eshkol had been "very angry" at Rabin for telling them. He had then gone to Dayan who had been surprised that the US had not been told.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 3 -

Rabin then summarized the position the Cabinet had taken on its four fronts as follows:

1. On the UAR front, the Cabinet had made a definite decision to require an Israeli position at Sharm el-Sheikh and land access to it.
2. On the West Bank, the Israelis had needed a position to ready for the Jordanians and there was "an 80-85% consensus" in the Cabinet for the Allon plan. At one time, Dayan had suggested an alternative of fortifying the heights, but no one pressed that plan now.
3. On Syria, the Cabinet had decided not to decide.
4. On Lebanon, there is no territorial issue.

I asked him whether he did not feel that the Israeli position on Sharm el-Sheikh would rule out the peace settlement with the UAR. I said I realized that the Israelis may judge that such a settlement is impossible now anyway and that this would not disturb them.

He made two points in reply:

1. If the Egyptians unexpectedly show themselves to want peace, the Cabinet could always revise its own decision.
2. More realistically, Rabin--emphasizing that he was speaking strictly personally--said that responsible Israelis fully realize that peace can not come about all at once. He therefore thought the objective was to create a situation which would gradually reverse hostility and create a situation in which Arabs and Israelis could learn to live together. He thought, for instance, that it might be possible to agree that the Israelis would occupy Sharm el-Sheikh for a period of five-ten years with the possibility of review at the end of that period. If at that time it appeared that there had been substantial progress toward living together in peace, then the Israelis might as well decide that they could return that position.

When I asked what evidence the Israelis would consider adequate manifestation of Egyptian desire for peace, he repeated the familiar position that Nasser's willingness to negotiate directly with the Israelis--"under Jarring, of course"--would be the first step.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

- 4 -

I said that if this were the case, I could not see why the Israelis objected so strongly to our current diplomatic exercise if we were simply trying to find out whether the Russians could deliver the Egyptians for direct negotiations, and, what I felt was even more important, deliver an Arab willingness to recognize the political independence, the territorial integrity and inviolability of Israel and renounce the use of force or threat of force against Israel. Rabin replied that these would be very important for Israel, but that our document had not supplied that kind of recognition for Israel.

He volunteered that when he had last been in Israel, he had been asked at the Cabinet to explain U.S. intentions in this diplomatic exercise with the Soviet Union. Rabin said that he personally felt that the US without committing itself to the principle of withdrawal, had been trying to probe how far the Soviet Union and the UAR were willing to commit themselves to peace.

I said we had developed our position in June 1967 on the assumption--confirmed by Israeli statements--that Israel had no territorial aspirations. Rabin replied, "You were justified."

Comments:

1. The nuance which is not clear is whether Rabin is referring to a firm but secret Cabinet decision or to a consensus, such as Eban refers to. While there may be a technical difference to cover Eban, Rabin's blunt characterization may be more accurate in describing the net effect of the Cabinet action.
2. Rabin himself noted that the Cabinet could reverse itself, but he clearly sharply disagrees with the Eban-Rafael formulation that the Cabinet will make a decision only when the Arabs negotiate. Whatever the technicality, Rabin states firmly that the Cabinet has made up its mind as far as its UAR border is concerned, and Eban-Rafael continue to suggest that the Cabinet has yet to commit itself. Rabin seems to believe that the "politicians"--to his dismay--have misled us and feels strongly they should now state their position forthrightly.
3. Going back to re-read the report of the November 3, 1968, Rusk-Eban conversation, I am struck by the careful way both Eban and Rabin seem to be avoiding stating that Israel wants permanent annexation of Sharm el-Sheikh. They seem to be talking carefully about "a position" and not "sovereignty."

SECRET/NODIS

H. H. S.
Harold H. Saunders

5

Israel
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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

30 JUL 69 20 33Z

ACTION: Amembassy BANGKOK ~~XXXXXXXX~~ IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TOKYO

✓

MOONGLOW FOR S/S

FOR SECRETARY ROGERS, HENRY KISSINGER AND JOSEPH SISCO

BOOK X A T S K R K A K K X S E O R E K A K K X S K S O O X A N D O R S S K N O G E R X O R X M E K K E X H O U S E X P A R T Y

TOSEC

With Deputy Secretary Packard, I called in Ambassador Rabin yesterday to carry out the first step of the NSSM 40 exercise. ~~xxxx~~
~~xxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx~~. Rabin had no authority to go beyond previous Israeli position but undertook of course to convey our approach to his government. I will have full report of yesterday's meeting ready for President upon his return.

GP-1

END

RICHARDSO

Not passed White House by OC/T

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:ALatherton, Jr:mqb

| Table | Est |
|-------|-----|
|-------|-----|

20840

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **The Acting Secretary**

Clearance

S/S - Mr. Walsby

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TOP SECRET/NODIS

Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

Info:

STATE 124641

NODIS

SUBJ: Dimona Visit

1. Inspectors briefed Dept. and other interested agencies July 16 on results their visit to Dimona July 11. Team said they had been cordially received by Tulippman and were given accelerated tour of main parts of facility. Inspectors found good materials balance, assuming shipments to France as claimed. Reactor operating time and visible activities at facility tend to confirm that reactor being used for research purposes. From cursory inspection that was possible under limitations imposed on duration and manner of visit, inspectors saw no evidence of chemical separation plant or program for production of weapons material at site.

2. However, inspectors returned this time with even stronger feeling than on previous occasions that visit had been conducted as GOI rather than they wished. Size and complexity of site, plus Tulippman's insistence that team visit all major parts of facility, meant there was no time to have thorough look at those areas most critical to detection possible weapons related activity. Considerable time wasted, for example, talking to ~~xxx~~ researchers about their projects because of Tulippman's insistence

26 JUL 69 21 03Z

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended: Sec 1.5

By DP Date 8 MAY 07
 N/A 08-28/32 Dec 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 17 Jan 07

ANITIZED

3(b)(1)

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:MSterner:mau 7/26/69

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Acting Secretary

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA - Mr. Sisco

S/- Mr. Gleysteen

INR - Mr. Hughes

SCI - Mr. Trevithick

ACDA/IR - Mr. Gleysteen

~~SECRET~~

ACDA/ST - Mr. Rochlin

AEC - Mr. Brown

AEC - Dr. Reinhardt

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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[p. 1 of 6]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (CONT.) PAGE 2

Info

this was only way that visit could be "explained." Despite team's specific request, team again did not get to waste treatment building and waste disposal area until late in day when insufficient time left for careful and thorough inspection.

3. As result, team convinced one-day visit inadequate to provide real confidence concerning activities at Dimona. Team believes essential that it be allowed to return to site second day to allow intensive inspection of three or four areas which inspectors feel is necessary as result initial time-limited tour. GOI preference that visits be conducted on Saturdays is accepted and inspectors would be prepared allow week to elapse before returning following Saturday. With respect to current visit, they would like to return to Dimona on date acceptable to GOI in August to complete inspection. Alternative is heavily qualified report making it clear inspection was too circumscribed to provide full confidence that no weapons-related activity is underway at site.

4. Review of manner in which visits to Dimona have been conducted over the years reveals that limitations which Israelis originally asked us to accept because of Israeli political sensitivities have gradually

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SEE PAGE 1

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

SEE PAGE 1

Clearance:

SEE PAGE 1

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Classification

[NW 02-25/32:2]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (CONT.) PAGE 3

Info:

become institutionalized to point where team's appearances at Dimona have become more and more ritualized "visits" and less and less "inspections" as originally intended. GOI has insisted there must be full year's interval between inspections, that they can take place only on Saturdays, that they cannot last more than one day, that they cannot include tests with instruments or even "Kleenex swipes," and that team cannot be composed of more than three members. All of these restrictions, but most importantly limitations on frequency and duration of inspections, vitiate original purpose of inspections, which, as GOI will remember, was to give the USG full confidence that this major nuclear facility is devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. Conversations and letters exchanged between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion, as well as your own conversations with Israeli officials at time, attest to high importance USG attached, and still attaches, to this objective. Need for such confidence has become even greater recently because of Israel's continued delay in signing NPT.

5. We are anxious, as we always have been, to conduct inspections in manner that does not cause unnecessary problems for GOI. But we have

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SEE PAGE 1

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

SEE PAGE 1

Clearances:

X SEE PAGE 1

~~SECRET~~

Classification

[NLK] 03-45/32:3



Department of State TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (CONT.) PAGE 4

consistently made it clear to GOI that we cannot accept restrictions on visits that defeat purpose of conducting them.

President Kennedy's letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion of July 4, 1963 said "It would be essential...that our scientists have access to all areas of the Dimona site and to any related part of the complex...and that sufficient time be allotted for a thorough examination."

6. GOI has at highest levels assured us that our requirements concerning inspections will be met. In December 1962 at Palm Beach Mrs. Meir herself said in response to President Kennedy's expression of concern that "there would not be any difficulty between us on the nuclear reactor." Eshkol assured you on August 19, 1963 that visits could be conducted as the USG desired and that agreement thereon would give us no trouble. We have always taken these statements as solemn assurances from GOI. Rigid restrictions imposed on recent visits are clearly inconsistent with these assurances.

DRAFTED BY:

SEE PAGE 1

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

SEE PAGE 1

CLEARANCES:

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ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (CONT.) PAGE 5

7. At your next meeting with Prime Minister, you should explain our dissatisfaction with last visit drawing on foregoing as you feel appropriate and request that another visit be allowed as soon as possible to complete our inspection. We suggest next month so that inspectors' report can be held until second stage of visit can be reflected in it. We consider it especially desirable that another visit take place prior to Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

8. In talking to Prime Minister you should stress that Israel and United States have mutual interest in seeing that visits to Dimona be conducted as thoroughly as possible. We are dealing with subject that impinges directly on US global and security interests. Israel has much at stake in doing what it can to remove any possible doubts within USG concerning its nuclear intentions. If such doubts grow, they will inevitably affect US-Israel relations to Israel's detriment. Dimona is not whole story but it is important part of it, and it is one on which we have always

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ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV (CONT.) PAGE 6

assumed we had satisfactory understanding, reached at highest levels of our respective governments.

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comparatively little cost to itself, for any infractions of the ceasefire. What information we have about the attitudes of top Egyptian military leaders suggests realism and awareness that Egypt is still unprepared to resume even limited hostilities against Israel. Cairo must also know that the departure of the Soviet military from Egypt removes some of the inhibitions Israel previously felt about striking Egyptian targets wherever and whenever it wished. We think these considerations argue strongly in Egyptian councils for not allowing Egypt to be drawn into shooting at this time.

There is also Cairo's present overall political strategy to consider. Although he is prepared to be disappointed, Sadat still hopes for a change of policy in Washington. Here he is torn in opposite directions. On the one hand he broods that so long as the Middle East is calm there is little incentive for the powers to act decisively to alter the impasse; on the other he knows that any breakdown in the ceasefire could throw the US even more firmly into support for Israel. Our judgment is that for the next few months at least, while he is awaiting signs of renewed US activity, he will see it in Egypt's interests to preserve the ceasefire.

Reinforcing these tendencies in our judgment are Egypt's relations with the USSR. Sadat is currently engaged in an effort to mend his relations with Moscow and improve his long-term prospects for obtaining the latest and best equipment in the Soviet arsenal. He would realize that any rash Egyptian military action, which the Soviets have long counseled against, would jeopardize this objective.

To be weighed against these factors are the pressures that are mounting in Egypt against Sadat's inability to achieve any movement toward recovery of Sinai. Sadat's restraint and realism about the military option earlier contrasted favorably with Nasser's resort to warfare, but after two years without results this may now increasingly take on the appearance of weakness and indecisiveness. While such pressures are undeniably present and do become more acute whenever there is fighting on other fronts, we are inclined to think they have not yet reached the point of driving Sadat into actions of desperation. Although Syria and Egypt are linked

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(together with Libya) in the "Confederation of Arab States", this organization has never amounted to anything and relations between Cairo and Damascus are not particularly close.

We believe therefore that the balance of considerations weighs in favor of the likelihood that Cairo will continue to observe the ceasefire for at least the next several months, even in the face of continued serious incidents on the Syrian front. While Sadat may eventually decide that continuation of the ceasefire is no longer in Egypt's interests, he will resist having the timing and manner of this decision forced upon him by events over which he has no control. The next danger point could well come in the weeks preceding the US-Soviet Washington Summit, when Sadat could calculate that he needs to create a Middle East crisis to force the Soviets and us to pay more attention to his problems than he feels was the case at the Moscow Summit.

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SUBJECT: State paper on Effect of Israeli - Syrian
Agreement on Arab League - FYI

REFERENCE: S/S 22/10/88 OTHER ✓ NOT XEROXED ✓

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSECRET/NODIS

November 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israeli Arms Requests

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan made a number of requests for assistance when he was in Washington recently. He asked for help in producing in Israel a high-performance fighter airplane, the subject of my memorandum to you of September 11, 1972. In addition, Dayan asked for continuing provision of U.S. aircraft after 1973 when present commitments will be largely fulfilled, and for air-to-surface missiles and "smart" bombs. We believe we should begin immediately to follow up on these matters.

I have decided to proceed with a two-stage plan to explore further with the Israelis the background factors and other details of their requests about which we are not fully informed. First, we would send to Israel a very small team of highly qualified military personnel for a few days in December. They would review preliminarily with the Israelis their proposed program for the development and production of a fighter aircraft, discuss their needs for additional U.S. provided aircraft beyond present commitments, and also review their assessment of the threat and Israeli planning for forces to meet that threat.

The second step, building on the work of the earlier military team, would be to have the Israelis send a senior level team to Washington similar to a mission sent here in 1971 led by the then Israeli Chief of Intelligence. This team would review with senior U.S. officials Israeli estimates of the threat over the next several years and

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their views on the forces which they need. This team would arrive about February 1, 1973. Our discussions with the last Israeli team were particularly helpful in contributing to a broadly-based understanding in Washington of their view of the security situation and we believe it is time now to up-date that understanding.

Within the next week we would plan to propose the above to the Israelis. We expect that following the completion of these exchanges we will be in a position to make recommendations to you for further steps in responding to Minister Dayan's requests.


William P. Rogers

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SUBJECT: Report on Israeli DM began's request for arms & military assistance

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

Tab B 1018

February 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assistance for Israel

As you will recall, in FY 1971 we began providing Israel high levels of assistance, partly in order to strengthen their economy and very weak balance of payments situation. Their position has turned around completely, to the point where substantially lower levels of United States assistance for the coming fiscal year can be considered.

Extensive discussions have been held with the Israelis on their economic position and on our own present budget and balance of payments situation. While the Israelis agree their situation is strong, they still believe one more year's high level of assistance is needed. Their goal essentially is to build an international economic position, which is stronger than that which they had during the pre-1969 period.

The 1974 budget includes a proposed \$28 million reduction in assistance from last year's level. After analysis with the Israelis, there is a consensus of Treasury, State and OMB that up to an additional \$145 million could be cut without materially affecting their economic position.

If you should decide that a reduction of this general magnitude is desirable, it could simply be proposed or either of two alternative approaches could be followed:

1. Inform Israel that while substantial cuts seem to be justifiable for next year, we accede to their request to continue assistance at approximately last year's level, but with a clear understanding that a phasedown would occur in subsequent years.

2. Agree to offset partially the impact of a substantial reduction in FY74 by a softening of terms on military credits or by an increase in other programs which do not have a budgetary impact or are not generally considered assistance, such as loans from the Export-Import Bank.

I understand the National Security Council will be providing you with a fuller consideration of these options, as part of their overall recommendations on our relations with Israel.

CONFIDENTIAL

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I regard the economic discussions and considerations as helping to open options to you but I would not regard them as compelling in themselves.



George P. Shultz

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)ACTION

January 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Ambassador Rabin's
Meeting with the President -- Thursday,
January 25

Due to funeral services here for former President Johnson, I understand that Ambassador Rabin's farewell call on the President (originally set for Thursday afternoon) has been rescheduled and is now set for Thursday morning, January 25, at 11:30 a.m. I also understand that time may slip by half an hour and that Ambassador Rabin is so informed.

I wanted to put the attached talking points in your hands in any event. You will note on the attached that I have left a blank for the time, in the event the 11:30 a.m. time does slip. It can be filled in when finalized.

The draft talking points do not get into substance in any kind of detail.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

THE PRESIDENT AS SEEN... 5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Israeli Ambassador
Rabin

Thursday, January 25, 1973

11:30 a.m. (30 minutes)

Oval Office

I. PURPOSE

To say farewell formally to the departing Israeli Ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

A. Background: Ambassador Rabin had scheduled his formal departure for the end of January, but then his government decided to extend his tour through Prime Minister Meir's visit in early March. So he is leaving formally on January 25 with Mrs. Rabin, for consultations in Israel. He will then return quietly on February 3 and remain here as Israel's Ambassador until after the visit (March 1 in Washington). As of now, he hopes to run for the Knesset in Israel's elections next fall.

B. Participants: Ambassador Rabin

C. Press Plan: Photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

III. TALKING POINTS

Attached

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

TALKING POINTS

Meeting with Ambassador Rabin

1. It is nice to be able to say goodbye, knowing you will see the Ambassador again soon [or some such allusion to the fact that he will return to the US in February to prepare for Prime Minister Meir's visit and remain Israel's Ambassador here until the visit].
2. You have appreciated the Ambassador's efforts to present a complete picture of US concerns in Israel. It is a difficult job to have to interpret two sometimes strong-minded "constituencies" to each other.
3. You are glad that US-Israeli relations have steadily improved over the past four years. There is and will continue to be a very genuine concern here for Israel's well-being.
4. You continue to feel that movement toward an Arab-Israeli settlement will be in the interest of Israel as well as of the US. We want to be very careful how we proceed and will want to discuss this further with Israel. But we do feel that there should be some steady movement, however measured.

5. You are looking forward to seeing Prime Minister Meir again [March 1]. It is a good time for an exchange of views. The Israelis know there is no question about firm continuing US support. You do look forward to discussing the future.

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SUBJECT: Israeli Shootdown of Libyan AirlinerREFERENCE: S/S ✓ OTHER ✓ NOT XEROXED ✓

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

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February 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*

SUBJECT: Israeli Shootdown of Libyan Airliner

The Facts

According to wire reports from Tel Aviv, an Israeli spokesman announced that Israeli Air Force interceptors forced a Libyan Boeing airliner which had penetrated Sinai airspace during a flight from Bahrain (in the Persian Gulf) to Alexandria, Egypt, to crash land in the Sinai. Seventy of the 83 passengers are reported to have died in the crash landing; Israeli medical teams are evacuating the injured. The Israelis say most of the passengers were Egyptian.

According to the Israelis: (1) the jetliner had overflown Israeli Defense Force positions along the Suez Canal and a nearby military airport, penetrating some 50 miles into the Sinai; (2) the plane was warned to land; (3) it did not respond to either those instructions or warning shots and (4) was ultimately fired on by IDF planes and forced to land.

The Concern

The main concern in State is that the Libyans will react against the US, which it considers responsible for Israeli actions. A second possible area of reaction would be some sort of Egyptian, Libyan or Syrian reprisal. It is difficult to know exactly what they might devise.

This comes against the background of increased Israeli penetrations of Egyptian airspace in the past few days and an Israeli commando raid into Lebanon last night.

Press Handling

Secretary Rogers is before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. State has sent him the report and suggested that he say, if asked, that if the reports are accurate, the action is "inexplicable and incomprehensible." The reports we have so far come from Israeli announcements.

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May 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yitzhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Moshe Bitan, Israeli Foreign Ministry
Shlomo Argov, Israeli Minister
Henry A. Kissinger
Harold H. Saunders

DATE AND PLACE: May 13, 1969, in Dr. Kissinger's Office

Since Dr. Kissinger was deeply involved in an urgent project for the President, the conversation was limited to fifteen minutes in the early evening as the Israelis had an engagement shortly after. Ambassador Rabin suggested that he raise just one substantive question so that Mr. Bitan could have a chance to hear Dr. Kissinger's views.

The Ambassador's question was, in essence: What is the purpose of the present US talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East?

Dr. Kissinger began his answer by saying that he felt the US in these talks was negotiating from a position of strength. The Soviet clients had lost the 1967 war. They would lose the next war. They had lost their territory and wanted to get it back. The United States is under no obligation to get Nasser's territory back for him for the second time in twelve years.

That having been said, Mr. Kissinger said that both we and the USSR have an interest in avoiding confrontation with one another. He personally felt that the Soviet Union would not be able to stand by and accept another Arab defeat. While that is just a personal belief, he said that if it is true the US must act on its assumption that a continuation of the present situation can lead only to another round of fighting in which the Soviet Union would be seriously pressed to intervene in some way.

Although Dr. Kissinger said he personally operates on those hypotheses about the situation, he understands that no one can say for certain now what the Soviet position is, how badly the Soviets want peace or what they are willing to pay for it. Therefore, the purpose of our current exercise is to probe hard enough to learn as best we can the answers to those questions and to learn how hard the Soviet Union is willing to press the UAR for the concessions that will be necessary to achieve peace.

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March 13, 1969

SUMMARY

Eban's Talks in State

Eban's initial presentation:

1. Israel will move from present cease-fire lines only to peace. This means:

--Arab governments must tell their people they must accept a sovereign Israel in full political and juridical sense.

--Arab governments must abandon belligerent claims, blockades, secondary boycotts, ostracism of Israel, terrorism.

2. Agreement between the parties must be contractual. Arab signatures are important because if one side violates a clear agreement, the other is freed of its obligations. There can be no misunderstanding about what was agreed. Involvement of outside parties is undesirable because it increases the possibilities for conflicting interpretations.

3. Secure and recognized boundaries must be different from armistice lines. Israel's approach to borders rests on these points:

- They must be based on agreement;
- They must reflect Israel's security needs;
- They must preserve the Jewish character of the state.

4. All elements of a peace settlement must be executed as a package.

5. Both the USSR and France are far from the US position and are trying to break through the US position.

6. Everyone should try to keep Jarring in motion.

Secretary Rogers' main points:

1. The new Administration has no intention of changing the special US-Israeli relationship.

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2. The US stands firmly on the concept of agreement between the parties.

3. We do not think the Near Eastern parties have made sufficient effort to get into the substance of a settlement. We are not asking Israel to make proposals that would undermine its negotiating position but feel an obligation to help the parties move toward peace. We hope Israel will be willing to specify boundaries to which it will withdraw, but we know Israel cannot withdraw without an Arab assurance of peace.

4. We sometimes have the impression Israel may think the present situation is better than peace.

5. We remain properly skeptical of the Soviet and French positions.

6. We plan to give UK, USSR and France next week our description of the principles we feel should govern a peace settlement. [The Secretary gave Eban a copy.] We would welcome Eban's comments.

7. Our objective is a juridical peace buttressed by international guarantees.

Eban's reaction:

1. Israel strongly objects to our presenting a paper in the four-power context. He "formally" asks Secretary Rogers to convey to the President Israel's request that the US not go ahead with this exercise. [Comment: The heart of Eban's objection is Israel's desire to be left alone to negotiate with the Arabs.]

2. Israel also objects to some of the substantive points in the memo and will have specific comments to make.

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MEMORANDUM

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WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

Wednesday, March 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger /K

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Abba Eban--3:00 p.m. Friday, March 14

By the time you see Eban, he will have met with Joe Sisco, Under Secretary Richardson and twice with Secretary Rogers. They will have given him in writing our view of the principles that we believe should govern an Arab-Israeli settlement and heard his preliminary reactions. You will receive reports on these conversations before you see Eban. The purpose of this material is to help you begin ordering your thoughts for your own talk with him.

As you will recall from Secretary Rogers' memo on our next steps, our initial purposes in talks with Eban are (a) to reassure the Israelis that we are keeping their interests in mind and (b) to engage them in our process of bilateral consultations. The thought behind this is that, while we will not give Israel a veto over our position, we need to know when we talk with the UK, France and the USSR what is realistic in terms of Israel's requirements. In the process, of course, we want to do all we can to encourage the Israelis to be as flexible as possible.

Attached are:

1. Secretary Rogers' stage-setting memo and attached paper on next steps (which you approved Monday).
2. The paper on principles governing a settlement that Secretary Rogers will have given Eban.
3. Talking points suggested by Secretary Rogers.
4. Talking points drafted in my staff to focus your responses on the points Eban will make.

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WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, March 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Eban

Briefing papers are attached, but I need to confirm one procedural item with you.

Eban will bring Ambassador Rabin and Rabin's deputy when he comes to see you.

If you approve, I should like to bring Joe Sisco and my Middle East man, Hal Saunders. These are the men most directly responsible for following through on your wishes, and it seems important for them to hear directly what you say so that the Israelis will not know your thinking better than they do.

Approve



Other

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March 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban - Friday,
March 14

Our talks with Eban this week will constitute the first move in the strategy for next steps on the Arab-Israel dispute which you approved in my memorandum of March 7 (Enclosure No. 1). Eban will wish to describe to you in some detail Israel's current assessment of the situation. You may wish to share with him your impressions of your talks in Europe on the Middle East.

We will shortly be engaged in increasingly substantive discussions of the elements of a possible settlement - with the Soviets in Washington, and with the Soviets, British and French in New York. Our consultations with Eban are an essential preliminary step to those discussions, not only to avoid to the extent possible any crisis of confidence in United States-Israel relations but also to provide some guide to how far we can go in our initial talks with the other three powers, who will expect us to produce Israeli concurrence in anything which may be agreed among the four of us.

The Israelis are uncertain about the direction in which the Middle East policy of this Administration may evolve and are apprehensive of a possible big power deal at their expense. They would prefer that we resist all efforts to inject outside powers into the negotiating process.

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In these circumstances, we have a complicated task to accomplish in our talks with Eban. On the one hand we want to get across a sense of our concern about the continued stalemate in the area and of our determination to explore actively all possibilities of generating early movement toward an Arab-Israel settlement. In this connection, we want to impress on Eban that the best way for Israel to assure that the principal initiative for peace remains in its hands is for the Israelis to be as forthcoming as possible in their substantive responses to certain specific questions Jarring gave Eban on March 9. If the replies of Israel, the UAR, and Jordan to his questions show some area of agreement, Jarring plans to invite the Foreign Ministers to meet with him at a neutral place. We consider it very much in Israel's interest that Jarring have a basis for proceeding with this plan, although this does not depend exclusively on the Israeli views. A positive indication by the UAR is also needed that it in fact wants to work out a peace settlement based on a binding agreement with Israel. In the absence of any indication of agreement he plans to return to Moscow, where he will remain available to the parties but inactive while the four powers pursue their talks.

As a practical matter the Israelis will be inhibited in taking significant initiatives by their own domestic political situation, which has been further complicated by the death of Eshkol. The interim nature of Mrs. Meir's government will probably reinforce the natural tendency in an election year to avoid new departures in Israeli policy toward a settlement with the Arabs.

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At the same time, while stressing our determination to seek ways of getting negotiations started, we want to allay Israeli nervousness about the policies of a new American Administration. Specifically we want to make clear that: (a) we will support no proposals which could jeopardize Israel's fundamental and long run security interests; (b) we stand firm on the need for a lasting peace based on binding agreements between Israel and the Arabs; and (c) our purpose in discussions with the Soviets, French and British is to find a better formula than the other three have so far proposed which could be recommended to the parties and to Jarring in an effort to help promote agreement under the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

It will not be easy to win Israeli confidence in our approach, given the Israelis' deep distrust of Nasser, the Soviets and the French; their uncertainty about British and even US policy; and their lack of faith in the United Nations and in international arrangements and guarantees of any kind. The essence of their approach is that they must rely on their own military strength and their control of the situation on the ground while the United States stands off pressures, particularly from the Soviets, to intervene in the negotiating process. Israel opposes efforts to alter the status quo while it waits for the Arabs to accept the inevitability of negotiating a genuine peace settlement.

In my meeting with Eban, on which I will brief you before his call on you, I propose: (a) to hear his assessment of the situation and of how he sees

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the negotiating situation developing; and (b) to give him our draft principles concerning a settlement and explain to him how we envisage our own efforts unfolding in the days ahead. I would hope this will set the stage in such a way that your meeting with Eban can be devoted largely to explaining the fundamental philosophy of our approach to an Arab-Israel settlement in the context of our larger interests, rather than simply listening to a reiteration of Israeli concerns and policies. It will be particularly important to convey to Eban our conviction that US interests require us to take a more active role in the negotiating process, including exploring whether the Soviets and French can be brought closer to our position, and to persuade him that such a role on our part will be fully consistent with the need to achieve an agreed peace and to safeguard Israel's security. Suggested detailed talking points for your meeting with Eban are at Enclosure No. 2



William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

- No. 1 - Memorandum of March 7 - "Next Steps on the Arab-Israel Dispute"
- No. 2 - Suggested Talking Points

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1 to Tab A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps on Arab-Israeli
Dispute

The visit next week of Foreign Minister Eban, the Soviet readiness for an early resumption of the dialogue with us, the French proposal handed to me by Debre in Paris require us to decide promptly how we should proceed in dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute. Against the background of general disillusionment with Jarring's efforts and of the growing conviction that it is now up to the four powers to break the stalemate, world attention is focussed especially on what the United States will do next.

This memorandum recommends that we proceed in several coordinated channels as follows:

1. With the Israelis

In our discussions with Eban March 12 through 14, we should: (a) encourage the Israelis to submit constructive proposals to the UAR through Jarring on the key questions of withdrawal and peace or at least to respond positively to the substantive questions posed to them by Jarring; (b) provide Eban with a written description of the principles which we believe should govern a settlement, receive any reaction his Government may have, and inform him of our intention to submit these principles to the other three powers in New York (TAB A); and (c) inform him of our intention to proceed promptly with bilateral discussions with the Soviets and four power talks at the UN.

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2. With the Soviets

The Soviets have informed us, that while they support four power talks, they attach "utmost importance" to bilateral discussions with us on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Dobrynin described the Soviet view of such talks to Joseph Sisco on March 4. They want them businesslike (which is Soviet jargon for serious), private, without publicity, and specific. Dobrynin and Sisco explored preliminarily the possibility of a systematic review on a point-by-point basis of the different provisions of the Security Council resolution. The purpose would be to identify common ground between us; from such talks might come some agreed "pieces of paper" between us. Dobrynin described these talks as "in support of Jarring". The Soviets see this dialogue going on concurrently with the Four Power talks in New York and are prepared to hold the discussions with us either in Washington or Moscow.

I believe we should tell Dobrynin that we are prepared to begin such discussions, preferably in Washington. I would intend to meet with him from time to time; Joe Sisco would meet with him regularly to discuss the Security Council resolution on a point-by-point basis to see whether some progress could be made. He would also be informed that we are open-minded about the possibility of transferring our discussions to Moscow at some later date if this seems desirable.

There is no need to decide at this stage a priori whether the two or four power forum will be fruitful at any given moment. They can proceed in tandem and in a mutually supporting manner; our approach therefore should be flexible, tailored to the developing situation.

3. Consultations among the Four Powers

While any agreements and discussions between the United States and USSR on the Arab-Israeli dispute may prove decisive, four power consultations provide a plausible, if not real, facade of multilateral negotiation and action. The United Kingdom, France, and the USSR have made it clear they desire to get into substance. Jarring wants the help of the four powers as he proceeds to probe the parties, either in the form of some common agreement on

- 3 -

substance between the four and/or some specific help with the parties on specific points he is likely to raise with them.

The French have presented us with some preliminary ideas on substance; the so-called Soviet plan of December 30 is still in the wings, and the UK can be expected to come up with some ideas.

In these circumstances, we suggest Ambassador Yost be authorized: (a) to enter into bilateral and quadrilateral talks, the mix between bilateral and quadrilateral being kept flexible and dependent on which at any given time seems most conducive to progress; (b) to submit to the other three the U.S. statement of principles (those which Eban will have previously reviewed) for their consideration as our contribution to the discussion. This paper would be intended as a basis for a formula which the four powers could pass on as their recommendations to the parties and to Jarring in an effort to help promote agreement in accordance with the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

We should seek neither to encourage nor discourage the submission by the Soviets and the French of their respective substantive plans for consideration in the Four Power mechanism. However, we should seek clarification and make suggestions promptly to the French to bring their views closer to ours. The French plan is only a starting point, and a number of important improvements are required. The French are ready to receive our suggestions. We should have some leverage with them because they are so anxious not to be excluded from any efforts to achieve a settlement.

We do not know whether either the Soviet or French plan can lead to common ground between us, but our approach to both should be constructive. Our own statement of principles should also have a clarifying effect on the views of the other three major powers.

Finally, the four powers could give considerable attention to the question of guarantees of a settlement.

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WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

May 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Up-to-the-Minute Background for Your Talk with Rabin,
Bitan--5:30 p.m. Today

The talking points in the attached memo are still valid. You will want also to have in mind:

1. We had a rapid-fire exchange with Eban over the weekend. He pressed us not to give any of our specific points to Dobrynin (main arguments in attached). We told him we would complete our current round, then pause to consider Israeli comments. In the course of the exchange, we accepted a couple of Israeli points and made changes before talking to Dobrynin Monday. We now expect detailed comment from Eban and probably a letter from Mrs. Meir to the President.

The most encouraging fact in the weekend exchange--though we have not heard the last word--is that Eban so far has decided to try to influence our position rather than to bank on trying to stop us by refusing to talk further.

The only answer to Rabin and Bitan on this is:

- a. We want to go ahead in close consultation.
- b. But our interests--and, we believe, theirs--require us to go ahead.

2. Rabin has relayed to Sisco a request from Mrs. Meir to see the President. I imagine he will repeat that request to you.

You will want to be careful in answering. The President did not approve her making an early visit, though he may now reconsider since this might be important in bringing Israel with us. The only answer possible now is that you will pass this request to the President.

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May 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Rabin, Bitan Argev--5:30 p.m.,
Tuesday, May 13

You may have met Moshe Bitan in Jerusalem. Since Israel's Foreign Ministry is smaller than ours, Bitan is at Alex Johnson's level but with the regional responsibilities (Africa, North America) of an assistant secretary in our system. He is one of several #3's to Eban.

Rabin and Bitan will make these main points:

1. The US, in the Sisco-Dobrynin talks, is compromising the objective--real peace. Rabin, at least, will define "peace" in terms of open borders and freedom of people and commerce to flow back and forth.
2. The US is undercutting its own interests in trying to move Israel out of the Sinai.
3. The four-power talks have slowed progress toward peace by giving Nasser hope that someone else will save him from the costs of his own folly.

The tone of your response, I suggest, should convey the notion that we are no babes in the woods vis-a-vis the Soviets and have no intention of jeopardizing Israel's security or our interests. As the President told Eban, he has been accused of a lot of things--but not of being naive about the Russians.

The toughest point to handle is Rabin's insistence that we are willing to settle for less than "real peace." He can sound very persuasive, saying that the only way to break the armed truce of 20 years is to throw down the gates and create a legal situation in which Arabs and Israelis can rub elbows and learn to live together.

I would suggest your weaving the following points into the conversation:

1. One of our purposes in talking with the Russians is to probe what price they are willing to pay for peace. They and their clients got themselves into their current mess, and we intend that they--not we--should pay the price for getting out. But the only way to find out what price Moscow and Cairo will pay is to put a specific proposition on the table--less than they want--and see what they'll pay to improve it.

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2. We have no illusions about long-run Soviet purposes in the Mid-East. But continuation of the present situation does not serve our interests--
or Israel's:

a. The next major round of fighting might hasten changes of government in Lebanon, Jordan, UAR. Only in the UAR might that improve our situation.

b. Only a peace settlement will give moderate governments an excuse to suppress the fedayeen. They are potentially Soviet and Chicom proxies directed at the moderate regimes who are our friends.

c. We believe we can beat the USSR in peaceful competition in the Mid-East because we have the know-how to help build modern economies and the USSR does not. But we can't build in the current atmosphere, and we think we're losing.

3. Our objective is to establish Israel's legitimacy and to help create a situation in which Israel will survive and prosper. 'Peace' is a matter of definition. Israel faces two broad choices if Nasser is serious about a settlement:

a. Israel can hold out for a UAR commitment to the "open borders" definition of "peace"--perhaps even more--in advance of negotiations. If Nasser refuses, Israel can sit where it is and hope that he or his successor will change position after their next defeat.

b. Israel can consider a peace in which: Arabs recognize Israel's legitimacy by sitting with Israelis and signing a contract with them; permanent borders are agreed; borders are secured both by location and by the policed demilitarization of zones around them; certain Israeli rights are accepted such as passage through Suez and freedom from secondary economic boycott; and maybe even some borders such as those around Jerusalem are open.

Defining peace produces a spectrum of precise terms. Israelis will have to decide where they are ready to draw the line and in return for what. Israel and the UAR have not yet had an opportunity to consider that choice in concrete terms. Our interest is to put a concrete proposition for both sides to accept, reject or bargain over. Only then will we know who wants peace badly enough to pay for it.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET-NODIS

May 11, 1969

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TO : The Secretary
THROUGH : S/S
FROM : NEA - Joseph J. Sisco *JJS*
SUBJECT : Eban's Reply

Attached is Eban's reply to your oral message of yesterday. He indicates strong objections to two points, a sentence on de jure recognition and our formula on refugees, and he renews his request for a few days interruption in our bilateral talks so that Prime Minister Meir can convey further Israeli views to us.

We have weighed this matter carefully once again and have drafted the attached reply for your consideration. We recommend that Eban be informed that: (a) we will meet with Dobrynin on Monday to complete the present phase of our discussions; and (b) we will make every effort to arrange after that a few days delay before holding another meeting with Dobrynin. This will give the Israelis full opportunity to convey their views to us in whatever form. There are four principal considerations which seem relevant:

1. The Israeli reaction was foreseen when the President approved this course of action.
2. We want the Israelis to react to an entire package, not a partial one. Going ahead will require them to address themselves to its totality in a letter from the Prime Minister rather than their distorted interpretation of what has happened thus far.
3. We are embarked on a tough strategy of pressing the Soviets to press the UAR to make the kind of commitments to peace and direct negotiations and the necessary concessions which are required. We cannot get Moscow's reaction, nor could they

SECRET-NODIS

be expected to press Cairo, on the basis of two-thirds of the elements being discussed and no formulas on the gut issues of withdrawal, borders and demilitarized zones.

4. The Israeli cabinet has undoubtedly been discussing this situation all day Sunday. We can expect leaks. It is important therefore that, if necessary, we be able to defend our position domestically on the basis of a total package, which includes the proposal for direct negotiations which will be made on Monday. Direct negotiations is the central demand of the current domestic campaign against our talking in the two and four power contexts.

If we delay for a few days, there is apt to be a protracted delay. The reason is that it will take time to respond to any long letter and in the meantime we will be under increasing pressure in the Four-Power talks to begin to crystallize formulations which go beyond those which we are considering with Dobrynin. We have an opportunity to begin to turn the screws on the Soviets after tomorrow's meeting, and we should begin to do so on the basis of the proposals which are fully protective of Israel's position.

I see signs of Israeli concern, particularly in light of the known Soviet intervention with the UAR in recent days that it should continue to abide by the cease-fire, that the Soviets in fact are moving toward us.

We can agree to a delay of several days after tomorrow's meeting because Dobrynin will need some time to get Moscow's specific reactions. We would leave open the date of the next meeting with him. Moreover, the formulas being discussed with Dobrynin are clearly ad referendum to governments. We will be able to continue to take into account any specific Israeli views on substance during the course of subsequent talks with Dobrynin.

I am in fact pleased that the Israelis have apparently made up their minds that we are serious and that they had better begin to express their specific views to us rather than reiterate their fundamental objections to the two-power and Four-Power talks and snipe from the sidelines.

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March 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

| | | |
|---------------|--------------------|---------------|
| PARTICIPANTS: | The President | Abba Eban |
| | Joseph J. Sisco | Yitzhak Rabin |
| | Henry A. Kissinger | Shlomo Argov |
| | Emil Mosbacher | |
| | Harold H. Saunders | |

The President received Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in his office for fifty-five minutes on Friday, March 14, 1969.

After an exchange of pleasantries and a picture-taking session, the President explained his policy toward the four-power discussions on the Middle East. He frankly admitted that he had been "dragging his feet." He referred to his press conference statement that the US did not wish to enter a negotiating situation where the cards would be stacked against us and added that his main purpose in the current exploratory bilateral talks is to see how far we can go in drawing the other three Governments closer to our position. The Soviets have been refueling one group of protagonists in the Middle East, and the French have been seeking a role as "spoilers." In a situation of this kind, he felt it was better to draw them into the process of trying to reach some sort of accommodation than to "leave them in left field." That said, the President assured Mr. Eban that we continue to support Ambassador Jarring but we felt we could usefully engage the other three governments in discussion of what guarantees might be possible for a settlement.

The President concluded this part of his explanation by asking Eban disarmingly, "Don't you think we ought to try?" He said he realized that some of Eban's colleagues would argue that we should stand aloof. The President said he would not question that approach if we were dealing with stable governments and rational people. But we are not dealing with such people, and we feel we have a clear obligation to do what we reasonably can to make the situation less dangerous. We are particularly concerned, of course, with avoiding a clash with the Soviet Union.

The President assured Mr. Eban that we have Israel's interests at heart and that is why we have wanted to consult with Israel's representative this week before moving further in the four-power forum. But, he said, "We need your help. Don't make our role impossible."

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Mr. Eban said that he had deeply appreciated the opportunity for a frank exchange of views. He said he felt that, after his three days of talks in Washington, our positions were close enough for us to work harmoniously together. He said that he had been asked at the Press Club whether he had noticed any distinct erosion in the American position and he had answered that he saw none. When he had been asked whether US and Israeli views were identical, he had replied that the views of two free Governments are never likely to be identical but that there can be enough harmony in the positions of each for close cooperation.

The President acknowledged that there are differences of view and that these differences are natural. "Just don't hit us too hard," he said.

The President went on to emphasize that, although he had been accused of many things, he had rarely been charged with being naive about Soviet intentions. "I know what they are up to." Having no illusions about the possibility of reaching full agreement with the USSR, he still felt it desirable to talk with the Soviets, keeping our guard up all the while, to see what common ground we and they might reach.

Mr. Eban then said he wanted to state his views on three subjects: the issue of war and peace, the four-power discussions, and Jordan.

On the issue of striving toward peace, he said that negotiations must continue; otherwise, a "war psychosis" would seize the people of the area. However, he did not see the present situation as capable of leading to a world conflagration because, first, the Arabs are in no position to wage a war and they know it, and, second, the Soviets do not want war. In a brief exchange on this point, the President pointed out that, while the Soviets may want continuation of enough tension for them to exploit, they had found out in 1967 that they are not capable of controlling their Arab friends and must therefore not draw too fine a line between the exploitable and the dangerous. Mr. Eban went on to say that the current situation is difficult for Israelis--with the persistent border-shelling and the occasional terrorist grenades--but it does not seriously threaten Israel. However unpleasant it may be, the present situation is better than "the great historic mistake" of retreating from present advantageous positions for less than a peace which would assure the existence of Israel.

On the four-power talks, Mr. Eban began by saying that only one of the four is really important for Israel--the U.S. Differences do exist between our positions, but he felt after his talks here this week that we have moved closer and they are close enough to make cooperation possible.

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The President interjected that it was important for us to engage in this process to give ourselves "some running room with the moderate Arabs." Mr. Eban nodded his understanding and went on to comment individually on the positions of the USSR and France.

The Soviets, he believed, "want us out without peace." Israel has a "robust skepticism" about the Soviet position. The Soviets' purpose is to cement their position in the Arab world and to undercut the US position as completely as possible.

The French position is "more tragic." A great deal of emotion is involved because the relationship has moved from a "romantic love affair" to a love-hate situation. President de Gaulle, he said, seemed incapable of anything but black or white feelings. Mr. Eban traced much of the current Israeli feeling toward President de Gaulle from his failure in May of 1967 to "understand our peril." Mr. Eban described how he had tried to convince de Gaulle on May 24, 1967, of the threat which Israel faced. He said the Israeli man in the street feels that, if de Gaulle could not understand Israel's plight in that situation at a time when men in the street from Montevideo to Tokyo knew that Israel's very existence was threatened, Israelis could not trust guarantees which depended on the French because they would have no assurance that a French government would be any more likely in the future to understand Israel's peril than the French Government did in May 1967.

The President said he believed that the French position could be moved. He conceded that it would not be moved if the Middle East were the only issue we were discussing, but there are other issues which are perhaps even more important to France. The President did not say it in so many words, but the clear implication was that he felt that the French desire to participate with us in talks with the USSR would influence France to give on the Middle East. At any rate, the President said, "Let us give it a whack."

Mr. Eban returned to the question of guarantees for a peace settlement. "If two of the four guarantors are against us, why should we put our trust in guarantees?" Then he went on to argue against "globalizing" the Middle Eastern conflict. He felt that big-power guarantees would get the US "involved too early" in any crisis. He used the analogy of Berlin to point out how the whole world becomes involved by the smallest border incident which involves the US and the USSR. The President nodded seriously that this was "an important point."

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
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After an off-the-record discussion of Mr. Eban's views of the possibilities of peace with Jordan, the President said that King Hussein would be coming to the United States on a visit in early April and asked Mr. Eban what he felt we should say to the King. Mr. Eban said that what we tell him will be very important to the prospects of a settlement between Israel and Jordan because Hussein feels a need for international support. Mr. Eban suggested that we urge Hussein to enter serious negotiations with the Israelis and to tell him of our feeling--"if you believe it"--that we thought it possible for Jordan to win serious concessions from Israel if it negotiated seriously.

In a brief aside to this part of the conversation, the President asked Mr. Eban his views of the situation in Cairo and whether or not we should resume relations. Mr. Eban said he thought Nasser's internal situation was shaky--perhaps even more so than Hussein's. When the President stated his position as not setting conditions on the resumption of relations with Egypt, Mr. Eban said he felt this was exactly right. When the President asked whether we should do more, Mr. Eban said he felt that it would look too much as if we were running after Nasser. When the President asked directly whether Mr. Eban felt it was in Israel's interest for us to resume relations, Mr. Eban a couple of times avoided a direct answer.

The meeting closed with another exchange of pleasantries and with reiteration of a theme that the President struck throughout the meeting--that we intend to proceed in close cooperation with Israel.


Harold H. Saunders

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 2060

SUBJ: TAPLINE

REF: TEL AVIV 2055 (NOTAL)J

1. TODAY BEING SABBATH, THERE ARE NO NEWSPAPERS IN ISRAEL. RADIO REPORTS OF LAST NIGHT'S BLOWING UP TO TAPLINE NEAR BANIAS BEING PLAYED NON-SENSATIONALLY, AND SOMEWHAT LOWER KEY THAN WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED.
2. BEIRUT HAS INDICATED VIA TELECON THAT COMPANY IS GOING THROUGH UNTSO CHANNELS TO TRY TO ARRANGE WITH IDF FOR ENTRY OF REPAIR CREW. BRIG GEN ZEIRA, OUR IDF CONTACT ON THIS MATTER, ABSENT ALL MORNING AND PRESUMABLY AT SCENE. WE HAVE HAD NO RPT NO CONTACTS INITIATED BY ISRAELIS SINCE WE PASSED LAST INFO TO THEM LAST NIGHT ABOUT PIPELINE BEING CLOSED DOWN. WE HAVE NO RPT NO INDICATION AS YET AS TO WHAT THEIR ATTITUDE WILL BE TOWARDS APPROACH FROM TAPLINE THROUGH UNTSO.
3. DEFENSE ATTACHE PLANS FLY TO SCENE OF EXPLOSION TODAY. WE WILL REPORT DETAILS OF DAMAGE WHEN AVAILABLE.

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GP-3. ZURHELLEN

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, E 15, INT 06,

IO 13, EUR 17, RSR 01, /121 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 6291

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE UNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 2055

SUBJ: TAPLINE

1. AS REPORTED TO OPERATIONS CENTER BY TELEPHONE, WE WERE NOTIFIED TONIGHT THAT TAPLINE HAD BEEN BLOWN UP IN ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORY. LARGE OUTFLOW OF OIL REPORTED. ISRAELI ARMY USING BULLDOZERS IN ATTEMPT STOP OIL, AND HAVE ALSO SET IT ON FIRE. IDF UNABLE CLOSE VALVE BECAUSE OF PRESSURE.

2. TELECON ESTABLISHED WITH BEIRUT WHICH ASCERTAINED THAT FLOW HAD BEEN REDUCED TO TWENTYFIVE PERCENT IMMEDIATELY WHEN PRESSURE FELL BECAUSE OF BREAK, AND PUMPING STOPPED ENTIRELY SOME TIME LATER. INDICATED WHICH VALVES SHOULD BE CLOSED BY ISRAELIS. INFO PASSED TO IDF IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE.

3. BELIEVE ALL HAS BEEN DONE THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TONIGHT. NEXT QUESTION IS WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE.
GP-3

ZURHELLEN

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SECRET-NODIS

May 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Request for Discussion of Israeli Oil Drilling in
Gulf of Suez

Henry is very chary of this memorandum to the President and would like you to add one of the pitfalls which he thinks the action encompasses, i. e., the Israelis may misread this action just as the Egyptians might. He would like you to add a paragraph to that effect. I am not sure that this will do the job because I think he basically questions the action. Please take another hard look at it and if you come out the same way, make the addition requested and we will try again.

SECRET-NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON*Code not
included*SECRET/NODIS

May 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HL*

SUBJECT: Request for Discussion of Israeli Oil Drilling in Gulf of Suez

Mr. Haldeman has asked you to see John King, a major campaign contributor who wants to drill oil for Israel in the Gulf of Suez (Tab B).

State has persistently pressed Israel not to drill there (a) because it is beyond the cease-fire line and therefore does not belong to Israel, (b) because it would be poaching on a concession held, in major part, by Standard Oil of Indiana and (c) because it is a clear sign of Israel's consolidating its hold on the Sinai at a time when we're exploring conditions under which Israel might withdraw.

Early in February, I gave Dick Allen a memo explaining State's position and why I thought it not a good idea for us to acquiesce in an Israeli attempt to exploit resources which aren't theirs--even by right of occupation--and which belong partly to a major US company (Tab C).

Mr. King has apparently continued to press for an appointment with the President and that is why Haldeman now asks you to see him.

I have spelled out the problem in a memo for you to send the President (Tab A). The President told Haldeman to have you turn State around unless you are concerned about possible repercussions. I believe we are and think you might want to be sure the President understands all the angles. But if you don't want to send this to the President, it will serve as a briefing memo for you.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President.

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SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

When Ambassador Rabin said he felt that there is a substantial difference between Israel's definition of peace and the concept which underlay the proposals which we had made to the Russians, Dr. Kissinger said he felt that peace negotiations normally were designed to create one of two situations: (1) a situation which would reduce the will of the parties to fight each other; (2) a situation which would reduce the ability of the parties to "get at each other."

Mr. Argov noted on this second point that the Israeli concept was exactly the opposite--that peace should not keep Arabs and Israelis from "getting at each other," but should, to the contrary, enable them to get at each other on a massive scale. Israel believes that there should be open borders and the free flow of people and commerce, although Argov acknowledged that perhaps that is unattainable now, "in which case Israeli withdrawal is unattainable now."

Mr. Bitan, in following up the Ambassador's question, felt that the process we are engaged in is quite different in concept from the original US objective of simply trying to create a situation in which the parties could negotiate their differences. When Dr. Kissinger asked what the alternative American approach would have been, Mr. Bitan suggested we could simply have agreed with the Russians to ask Jarring to call a meeting and then to press the UAR to attend. As it is, there will be little left to be negotiated.

When Mr. Argov made the point that we had already told the Russians what our positions on borders was, Dr. Kissinger questioned that. He said he thought we had been quite careful to give the Russians a very general formulation on our view of the Israel-UAR border. Ambassador Rabin made it quite clear that this was the case as far as the formal position presented to Dobrynin was concerned but he did not disagree with Argov that the Soviets had easily deduced that our concept of the border was that there should be little change from the pre-war boundaries.

Mr. Saunders pointed out that, regardless of what our in-house feelings might be, we had been scrupulously careful not to reaffirm to anyone the Dean Rusk formulation of last November. Cairo would be deeply disappointed by our present formulation. Dr. Kissinger recalled that Dr. Fawzi had pressed for a more precise formulation.

Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Rabin what Israel wanted on the Egyptian border, and Rabin said "an Israeli position at Sharm el-Sheikh and a land connection with it." Dr. Kissinger pressed him to say, at least illustratively, how wide a land connection he had in mind. Ambassador

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- 3 -

Rabin evaded specific answer at first, but finally, when pressed, said, "something like 30 miles" but made it clear this was a purely personal thought.

The Israelis returned to the idea that we had already given away our position to the Russians and had not left ourselves an opening to take Israeli views into account. Both Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Saunders made clear that we felt that we still had every opportunity to reflect Israeli views and that, as Mr. Sisco had made clear, the formulations we were discussing with Dobrynin, were ad referendum and subject to change. Somebody had simply had to start by putting something on paper.

Rabin asked what we saw as the next step. Dr. Kissinger said that Mr. Sisco had arranged for a hiatus in the talks with Dobrynin and that as far as we are concerned, the next step was to hear Israeli comment.

In parting, Dr. Kissinger invited Ambassador Rabin to come back for a more relaxed and longer discussion when the pressure of this week's business was over.

* * * * *

While waiting to see Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Rabin relayed to Mr. Saunders the request of Israeli Prime Minister Meir to come and talk with the President. The Ambassador said, as forcefully as he could, that there is no question about who is the boss in Israel today. It is crucial that Mrs. Meir hear our position at first hand. If there is any doubt in American minds about the Israeli position, we can hear it authoritatively from her.



Harold H. Saunders

SECRET/NODIS

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May 27, 1969

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S - JOHN WALSH

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Dr. Kissinger's Conversation with Israeli Officials

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the memorandum of Dr. Kissinger's conversation with Israeli Ambassador Rabin and Foreign Ministry official Bitan.

Attachment

SECRET/NODIS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1969

HAK:

Since receiving this, Dwight Chapin has called to say that the President would like you to call King today. This is terribly touchy politically and the President would like you to offer to see King as soon as possible.

I have already asked Saunders to give us a memo urgently on the background.

CIA desk

LSE

*Quinn W.
Haldeman*
QH

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Dick Allen has handled contact with John King (a major contributor during the campaign) at the President's request. As you can see from Allen's memo, King is insisting upon seeing the President to discuss the matter of drilling for oil in Israel.

The President does not want to talk to King about this matter and feels that you should do so.

For your background, the President feels that unless there is overriding reason against it, we should instruct the State Department to go along with King's request that they not "lean" on the Israelis when Pan American starts objecting to Israeli drilling in the El Murgan field.

In other words, the President sees no reason not to permit King to go ahead and thinks this should be worked out by you unless you have enough concern about the NSC report of possible repercussions to suggest holding up on it.

H. R. HALDEMAN

~~HAK: I'd like to get Saunders to do
a quick piece on this, then we'll
set up a meeting for you with
King.~~

~~OK~~

~~No~~

~~See me~~

[Handwritten signature]

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May 20, 1969

12:15 p.m. Tuesday

ONLY COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

RE: Appointment for John King

You know why John King wants to come in and see the President (a memorandum explaining the situation is attached).

King has talked to Dick Allen several times a week and ^{King} has been calling me daily. Someone or some word must be passed to him regarding the matter.

The subject has not gone through Henry Kissinger's shop. It is a political matter which may have enormous implications -- I just don't know.

1. Set an appointment with King _____
2. Do nothing _____
3. Other _____

*Have Henry Laddie -
I'll talk to him*



DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1969

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN 

RE: JOHN KING

On three separate occasions during the campaign John King discussed with the President the matter of drilling for oil in the El Murgan field, located in the Gulf of Suez. At the present time, the only company drilling in the El Murgan field is one owned half by the Egyptian government and half by Pan American, a subsidiary of Standard of Indiana.

In the past, when the Israelis made motions of drilling in the Murgan field, Pan American protested vigorously to, and was upheld by, the Department of State. Thus, the Israelis have been unable to proceed with the exploitation of the field.

King proposes to do the drilling for the Israelis. During the campaign the President told King that, under the Nixon Administration, the State Department would not "lean" on the Israelis should the drilling go forward.

One of King's main points is that there is enough oil to go around for many years. What he wants to discuss with the President is this matter, principally to determine whether the State Department will bring pressure on the Israelis to stop drilling.

I have had this matter examined by the NSC expert on the

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TOP SECRET/EXDIS

2.

Middle East, and have a memorandum expressing his concern over the possible repercussions. However, that memorandum was written in February, and may not be as valid today as it was when written.

In short, King is insistent upon seeing the President--who told King that he would look forward to seeing him after assuming office.

In view of King's very heavy contributions to the campaign, and in view of his determination to discuss the matter on the strength of prior encouragement, I recommend he be given an appointment at an early date.

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

May 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Your Memo Attached

*I have re-done
page 2 per your request.*

I agree with Henry that this is messy. But I think it is made so more by the injection of domestic politics than by the foreign policy issues.

This would never have come to Henry as a foreign policy issue. The Israelis know we have a case and have backed away each time the issue has come up. They are not pressing their case on its merits. Instead, they are trying to work around us by using the President's political supporters and other such channels.

In that connection, I should record the fact that, early in February, Dick Moose had a call from Jim Jones, President Johnson's appointments secretary and now a lawyer in Tulsa. Jones explained how a client company had been approached by the Israelis to drill for oil in the Gulf of Suez. At my suggestion, Dick put him in touch with Len Meeker, General Counsel at State, since he wanted to get a feel for the law of the case. I cannot be sure, but I understand that King Resources is hooked up with that client company. Anyway, the Israelis or whoever is pushing this for them are playing both sides of the political street.

So this case comes to Henry only because of domestic politics. That is why I suggest his seeking the President's guidance because so far I am afraid no one on our political staff has seen all the facts. For instance, the file that went to Mr. Haldeman did not make clear that what is involved is Israelis contracting with Americans to poach on the legal concession of other Americans. Also, I assume that John Swearingen of Standard of Indiana may be a Republican contributor, but I don't see any evidence from the file that anyone has focused on that question.

In short, I'm just as wary as Henry is of our getting involved in this and would like to heed the President's instruction that domestic politics not determine foreign policy. My only desire is that, if Henry has to get involved, he do so on the basis of a full and accurate picture of the facts all around.

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1419

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-NODIS

May 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

FROM: Al Haig *al*

SUBJECT: Request for Discussion of Israeli Oil Drilling in
Gulf of Suez

Henry is very chary of this memorandum to the President and would like you to add one of the pitfalls which he thinks the action encompasses, i. e., the Israelis may misread this action just as the Egyptians might. He would like you to add a paragraph to that effect. I am not sure that this will do the job because I think he basically questions the action.

Done. [Please take another hard look at it and if you come out the same way, make the addition requested and we will try again.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

May 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HL*

SUBJECT: Request for Discussion of Israeli Oil Drilling in Gulf of Suez

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State has persistently pressed Israel not to drill there (a) because it is beyond the cease-fire line and therefore does not belong to Israel, (b) because it would be poaching on a concession held, in major part, by Standard Oil of Indiana and (c) because it is a clear sign of Israel's consolidating its hold on the Sinai at a time when we're exploring conditions under which Israel might withdraw.

Early in February, I gave Dick Allen a memo explaining State's position and why I thought it not a good idea for us to acquiesce in an Israeli attempt to exploit resources which aren't theirs--even by right of occupation--and which belong partly to a major US company (Tab C).

Mr. King has apparently continued to press for an appointment with the President and that is why Haldeman now asks you to see him.

I have spelled out the problem in a memo for you to send the President (Tab A). The President told Haldeman to have you turn State around unless you are concerned about possible repercussions. I believe we are and think you might want to be sure the President understands all the angles. But if you don't want to send this to the President, it will serve as a briefing memo for you.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President.

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: John King's Proposal for Oil Drilling in Gulf of Suez

Bob Haldeman has asked me to talk with John King--in lieu of you--about King's proposal to sign a contract with the Israeli government to drill for oil in the El Murgan field in the Gulf of Suez. Before I do, I want to be sure that the facts of the case are fully understood so that my line is consistent with yours. As I understand the background, King discussed this proposal with you during the campaign, asking you to instruct State Department to stand aside.

The oil field in question--the Murgan field--is located in the Gulf of Suez on both sides of mid-Gulf. As you know, the Gulf of Suez runs wholly between two branches of sovereign UAR territory, the Sinai Peninsula and that part of the UAR on the African continent. In 1964, the UAR Government awarded this concession to a company owned half by Egyptian government companies and half by Pan American, an Egyptian-chartered subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana. Commercial production began in the spring of 1967, and about 200,000 barrels of oil a day are being pumped from this field today. The oil has always been piped to the African rather than to the Sinai side of the Gulf.

The Israelis in the 1967 war occupied the Sinai shore of the Gulf of Suez. In August 1968, Standard of Indiana reported that the Israelis had approached Standard, asserting their claim to all oil in the eastern half of the Gulf and forbidding Pan Am to do any more drilling there. State Department persuaded the Israelis to withdraw their approach to Standard, and then they began approaching independent companies--like King Resources--with contracts to drill for Israel in the eastern half of the Gulf. State again urged the Israelis to stop.

State Department's position rests on these points:

1. Legal. Insofar as Israeli-sponsored drilling is proposed in the El Murgan concession, it would violate a legally granted concession where another American company--Standard of Indiana--has already invested \$100 million and is operating successfully.

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SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

2. International law. Our lawyers hold that Israel has no legal authority to grant concessions anywhere in the Gulf. By right of occupation they can exploit captured oil on the Sinai shore. But the occupation stops at the cease-fire line along the shoreline.

3. Political. If the US Government acquiesces in this Israeli effort to push its borders beyond the cease-fire line into the Gulf--especially when that move encroaches on the property of a major American company--the Egyptians will assume US support for Israel's continued occupation of the Sinai. Such support would be incongruous with our diplomatic effort to work out a Mid-East peace settlement including Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

4. Protection. Any company drilling for Israel would be subject to UAR air attack and would not have any recourse to law.

On foreign policy grounds, the case seems clear. The Israelis should have no trouble understanding why we would oppose their (a) violating the cease-fire lines and (b) encroaching on the established legal concession of an American company. While they could read into our position a more general inclination to work against them, State has openly explained the reasons for its position to avoid such misunderstanding, and Israel has not pressed its case on the merits.

I realize that domestic factors are involved, and that is why I seek your guidance. I am not the appropriate judge of the relative interests of John King and John Swearingen of Standard of Indiana, who I understand would also try to see you if he thought we were going to reverse the present position.

Recommendation: That I hear Mr. King out, explain in general terms the purpose of your current diplomatic effort and point out why such drilling would be inconsistent.

Approve _____ Other _____

cc: Mr. Haldeman

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

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H. R. HALDEMAN

HAK: I'd like to get Saunders to do a quick piece on this, then we'll set up a meeting for you with King.

OK _____

No _____

See memo _____

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May 20, 1969
12:15 p.m. Tuesday

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. R. HALDEMAN

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1. Set an appointment with King _____

2. Do nothing _____

3. Other Have Henry handle -
I'll talk to him


DWIGHT L. CHAPIN

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1969

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN 

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SECRET EXDIS

February 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ALLEN

Dick:

Attached is the paper on Israeli oil
"claims" in the Gulf of Suez.

In short, it would be completely
contrary to everything the President seems
to want to do on the Arab-Israel front to
support--tacitly or otherwise--the project
you described.

Hal Saunders

SECRET EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET EXDIS

February 5, 1969

Israeli Oil Aspirations in the Gulf of Suez

The Six Day War ended with the Israelis in control of the Sinai shore of the Gulf of Suez and with the Egyptians on the African shore. Since that time the status of the Gulf itself and its oil have been in question.

At the present time the Egyptians are taking about 200,000 barrels a day from the Murgan field in the Gulf. Although this field falls largely on the Sinai side of the middle of the Gulf it was more convenient for the Egyptians to build their installations on the African shore. The company controlling the Murgan concessions is owned half by Egyptian government companies and half by Pan American, an Egyptian subsidiary of Standard of Indiana.

The Israelis are pumping from 35,000 to 65,000 barrels a day from a smaller field, the installations for which were on the Sinai shore. The company which had been exploiting this concession before June 1967 is owned by Egyptian government companies and the Egyptian subsidiary of an Italian company.

There are also a number of partially explored fields on both sides of mid-Gulf.

The Israelis claim that their occupation of Sinai gives them the same rights to offshore oil that they would have were Sinai part of Israel. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, they thus make a claim to all oil in the Eastern half of the Gulf. Last August they began asserting this claim by forbidding Pan American to do any more drilling in the "Israeli" part of the Gulf. In December we received a report that Israel was trying to interest American oil companies in drilling under Israeli auspices in the eastern half of the Gulf, including some areas included in the Pan American concession.

We are not sure how far the Israeli government intends to go in asserting its claim, or even the extent of support the claim has in the government. We may be seeing actions of over zealous lower ranking officials rather than decisions at the cabinet level, though we have made Foreign Minister Eban aware of the issue. So far the Israelis have made no attempt to stop pumping in areas they "claim", although they have asked that production be limited to pre-June 1967 levels.

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- 3 -

The oil is important to Israel, although they have not mentioned it in discussions of a Near East settlement. Israeli consumption is about the same as the upper limits of their present estimated pumping, and this represents not only a saving of as much as \$60 million a year, but also the only source of oil which does not have to come through Arab controlled waters.

We have based our legal position on the fact that occupation does not grant sovereignty to the occupying power. Israeli occupation, by our theory, stops at the Sinai shore and the UAR retains all its rights in the Gulf. We feel that the cease-fire agreement--which called for forces to stop where they were--supports that interpretation. We contend that at no time prior to the cease-fire was the Israeli navy in occupation of the gulf so that an extension of power is in effect a violation of the agreement.

Our political reasons for opposing the Israeli position are even more important than the legal ones. The investments of an American-owned company (Pan Am) are involved, and another American concession in the Gulf of Aqaba would be endangered if the same principle were applied. More important, if the US appears unwilling to defend clear American interests against Israel, the legend of Zionist control in Washington will be strengthened and our ability to deal with the Arabs even further decreased. There are also other problems, such as Egyptian retaliation for Israeli action, and the need for greater subsidies to Egypt from the oil rich Arabs if the Suez oil revenue disappears.

We vigorously protested the original Israeli attempt last summer and even persuaded them to withdraw a note they had sent Standard of Indiana. Given President Nixon's decision to take the initiative in trying to defuse the Middle East crisis, we shall need all the influence we can muster on both sides of the Arab-Israeli fence. Having the Nixon Administration tabbed in Arab eyes as supporting "another Zionist expansionist grab" would get us off on the wrong foot.

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WASHINGTON

ACTIONCONFIDENTIAL

May 20, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *hhs*

SUBJECT: Following up with Rabin

You will recall that--at the end of your abbreviated talk with Rabin and Bitan last week--you invited Rabin to come back for a more leisurely talk.

Rabin will return from consultation in Israel. Also, Aharon Yariv, Israel's military intelligence chief, will be in town next Monday and Tuesday (after 3:30 p.m. Monday, all day Tuesday). I understand you saw Yariv in Israel last summer.

Recommendation: If you feel an obligation to follow up with Rabin, it would make sense to do it while Yariv is here. That would give you Israel's latest intelligence assessment on Egyptian and Soviet intentions plus Rabin's late sense of the state of the debate in the Israeli Cabinet on our peace effort.

I will see them Monday or Tuesday HF

5/21/69 4:45 p.m.

No, we'll try to fit Rabin in later _____

*I suggest you wait until after
Friday.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Xerox copy to Saunders 5/23/69

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**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

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NLN 02-28/1 5 pp.

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 18 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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SECRET

May 14, 1969

AL HAIG AND LARRY EAGLEBURGER

SUBJECT: Forestalling a Small Flap Tonight

You may this evening receive on the LDX a copy of a letter from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to the President.

It does not need to bother Henry or the President tonight.

This is the message we have been expecting since last Friday stating Israeli objections to our talks with Dobrynin. We will provide comment and send it up tomorrow when we've had a chance to reflect on how bad it is.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

January 5, 1970

5832

U. S. OPTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

I. ISRAEL'S REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Israel's requests fall into two groups. There is a collection of specific requests on which Israel seeks an answer soon which would fit into FY 1970 U. S. programs. Israel has also presented a projection of its balance of payments deficit for the next five years, 1970-1974, and has asked the U. S. to consider ways in which it might help meet that deficit. In this connection, Israel has projected its military import needs over five years, and it is necessary for the U. S. in considering its response to take account of the implications of these projected imports.

A. Requests already presented for FY 1970.

1. Jet aircraft. Israel has requested the sale of 25 F-4 Phantom and 100 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft with delivery to start in 1971. These would cost approximately \$270 million, and the Israelis have said they would like to discuss credit once the sale is arranged. Purchases by the U. S. Navy or other governments will affect the duration of the Skyhawk production line and the price of the aircraft, but at the moment there does not seem to be an imminent prospect that the line would end.

2. Financial assistance. The Israeli Ambassador has sent three letters requesting the following:

a. \$119 in additional military sales credit. This would finance that remaining portion of the 1968 Phantom sale for which Israel originally contracted to pay cash. Israel has also asked for improvement of terms to provide for a two-year grace period before repayments begin. This \$119 million would be in addition to \$30 million in FY 1970 credit already committed.

b. \$54 million in P. L. 480 purchases.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5832

TOP SECRET/NODIS

INFORMATION
& ACTION

January 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Papers on Israeli Assistance Requests

Attached are the two papers I promised to have in your hands by the beginning of the week:

At Tab A: A draft paper for consideration by your special Under Secretaries' level committee. This attempts to lay out in less technical language the Israeli requests, what they imply, our options and the arguments for and against the main options.

At Tab B: A clean final version of the basic analytical paper which incorporates answers to the questions you penned on the earlier version.

I want to point out that the paper at Tab A is a first cut. I thought we would both save time if I could give you something to look at quickly. Some of the arguments -- and maybe even some of the issues -- could stand refinement, and I shall pursue that while awaiting your overall comment.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

P
ISRAEL

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | REMARKS |
|-----------------|---------------|--|----------|---------|
| 9 | telegram | Amemb Oslo to SecState | 12/27/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/1 2 pager Declassified | | |
| 11 | telegram | USDAO Paris to DIA | 12/29/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/2 2 pager Declassified E012958 per DIA letter 11-30-01 | | |
| 12 | telegram | USDAO Tel Aviv to DIA | 12/29/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/3 2 pager Declassified E012958 per DIA letter 11-30-01 | | |
| 26 | memo w/attach | HAK to the President 3 pager | 12/13/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/4 Exempted per MC 3.3(6)(i)(6) E012958 5-2-03 | | |
| 29 | memo w/attach | HAK to the President 1 p. submitted | 12/10/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02/02/5 SANITIZED per MC 3.3(6)(i)(6) 5-2-03 | | |
| 38 | Report | DIA Spot Report 1 page | 11/18/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02/02-6 Sanitized E012958 per MC 3.3(6)(i) DIA 11-30-01 | | |
| 59 | memo w/attach | HAK to the President 17 pages | 9/25/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/7 SANITIZED per MC 3.7(6)(i)(6) 5-2-03 | | |
| 42 | telegrams | DIRNSA to White House 21 pages | 11/9/69 | |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLNS 02-02/8 SANITIZED per MC 3.3(6)(i)(3) E012958 5/23/2008 | | |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Country Files - Israel [2 folders]

BOX NUMBER

605

FOLDER TITLE

① ISRAEL VOL III SEPT Oct '69 - 28 Feb '70 [Part 1]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SANITIZED

--Israel is in a worse position now than for the past twenty years: more isolated from the international community and the major powers; friends becoming increasingly disenchanted; suffering daily military losses with no letup in sight; economic situation worsening to the point of crisis; resistance growing in occupied territories and spreading to Israel proper.

--The one option open to Israel is another war but the results would not be as successful as in 1967 and would solve nothing.

--Israel's stance toward peace efforts is unrealistic. Israel trusts no one--UN, Arabs, great powers. The only assumption he could draw is that Israel intends to provide its own guarantees by staying where it is. This, he felt, would destroy the area, including Israel.

Comment: Mr. Helms' informant found some sympathy with these views among Israeli leaders. If there is a rationale for our present diplomatic exercise, it is to put before people on both sides a balanced alternative to the present course so the opponents of hard-line positions on both sides might have a serious alternative to argue for. At present, the stock Israeli reaction is: We have no choice.

SANITIZED

sees Israel's demise as only a matter of time. He apparently feels it is the Israelis, not the Arabs, who must fear time.

SANITIZED COPY

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

NLN 02-02/5 p. 3.3(b)(1)(6) 52-03

3 pages
letter

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1497

November 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WATTS

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *hhs*

SUBJECT: Israeli Desalting Plant (Log # 1497)

I have held your memo of August 29 for an inordinately long period of time because there was nothing we could say on this subject until the President had approved a policy toward the Israeli desalting plant. He has now done so, and I recommend that you respond to the Budget Bureau request for an NSC position on the AEC letter by sending the Budget Bureau a copy of NSDM 32.

This is the clearest statement of the Administration position that we have, and I see no reason to try to elaborate on it.

Fnette

*Plc. prepare memo for me,
forwarding NSDM 32*

*Nov 6 - BOB Hunter info y)
Clark y
jim*

11-12-69

*Dave Muckow, BOB, informed by
telephone of the above information. y
NSDM 32 sent to Mayo 11-6. il*

4424

DECLASSIFIED

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

November 12, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Theodore Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reply to Mrs. Meir's Message on
Vietnam Speech

The following response to Prime Minister Meir's message to the President on his Vietnam speech has been approved by Dr. Kissinger for transmission to Ambassador Barbour for delivery.

"The President is grateful for Prime Minister Meir's thoughtful message on the President's speech about Vietnam. He has been pleased by its positive reception in the United States and is especially gratified to know the leaders around the world like the Prime Minister have found hope in it."

Although the telegram transmitting Mrs. Meir's message said that she did not contemplate releasing it for publication, we understand through Mr. Garment that Mrs. Meir is now willing for us to use her message publicly here.


Jeanne W. Davis
Director
Secretariat

LHX d 11/12

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

Dispatched 11/12/69

4424

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

November 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Mrs. Meir's Message on Vietnam Speech--A Reply

Send to Walter-
ACTION
inform R...

Mrs. Meir asked Ambassador Barbour to pass the following message to you:

The Prime Minister wishes to congratulate the President on his meaningful speech and expresses her hope that he will speedily succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam.

NOV 11 1969

The President's speech contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over which, striving to maintain their independent existence, look to that great democracy, the United States of America.

I recommend that Wally Barbour be instructed to say in reply:

The President is grateful for Prime Minister Meir's thoughtful message on the President's speech about Vietnam. He has been pleased by its positive reception in the United States and is especially gratified to know that leaders around the world like the Prime Minister have found hope in it.

The message transmitting Mrs. Meir's message said specifically that she did not contemplate releasing it for publication. ~~Since it would be useful for Leonard Garment to be able to tell selected friends about this, I think he might check with his contact in the Israeli embassy to see whether that would cause any problems for the Prime Minister.~~

However, Mrs. Meir now reports via LEO Garment that she wants
RECOMMENDATION *us to use her message publicly here.*

That you approve the above reply.

Approve *HC*

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

11/10/69 - Note for file:
Pls. Mr. Meir's Remarks have
been placed in file & d.
- Mr. Meir - to Rabbi
Schulman Rubin at *

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

November 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Tony Lake

SUBJECT: Call from Rabbi Rubin

Rabbi Rubin called you to ask if he could mention to his press contacts the fact that the President said on Thursday, while meeting with the Douglass Committee, of which Rubin is a member, that Mrs. Meir strongly supports our position in Vietnam. Rubin thinks that this would have a very good effect in his area in cooling the Moratorium forces.

I mentioned to him Mrs. Meir's message on the President's speech (attached). He did not feel that he could use this in the same way that he could use the President's statement to the Douglas Committee, since the latter "falls within his special competence."

He is willing not to mention the President's statement if you think it would embarrass either the President or Mrs. Meir. I told him I would let him know.

Okay _____

He should only use her message _____ ✓

He should do nothing _____

He also said you had agreed Thursday to see him for a few minutes concerning his efforts on behalf of Jewish POW's. As you know, John Holdridge has been holding his hand on this. (I doubt very much that it is possible to limit a meeting with him to only a few minutes.)

Put on schedule _____

Continue to refer to Holdridge _____ ✓

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

* 902 L1 dy etc.

11/12/69 - Note for file:
Mrs. Meir's speech from
the plane page 2. d
mail. to Rabbi
Schacter Rubin at *
November 10, 1969

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

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Put on schedule _____

Continue to refer to Holdridge _____ ✓

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

* 902 L. only 1000

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Memorandum for Richard Moose

From: John Foster *JF*

(The primary purpose of Budget's memo is so that they can go back to AEC and say that AEC's letter is still under consideration. They don't really care whether they get an answer or not.

What AEC is trying to do is cut off the President's option for a non-nuclear desalting plant. The present thinking is in the direction of fossil fuel.

If you want to comment on this, it should probably be along the lines that we want a bill from Congress that leaves the greatest number of options open to the President and the NSC process.

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From: John Foster *John Foster*

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UNITED STATES

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JUL 31 1989

Honorable Robert P. Mayo
Director
Bureau of the Budget

Dear Mr. Mayo:

The Atomic Energy Commission wishes to furnish comments to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning H. R. 1003⁴, introduced April 14, 1969, a bill "[t]o authorize the Secretary of the Interior to participate in the development of a large prototype desalting plant in Israel, and for other purposes."

H.R. 1003⁴ is virtually identical to the draft bill proposed by the Department of the Interior on which we furnished comments to the Bureau earlier this year. As we stated at that time, the Atomic Energy Commission has worked closely with the Department of the Interior in studying the technical and economic aspects of dual-purpose desalting, including the feasibility of a large desalting project in Israel. We are convinced that the project in Israel is technically feasible and that it will produce important benefits to United States' objectives in the field of large-scale desalting technology. It follows, therefore, that we welcome and support the proposed legislation.

The benefits of the proposed project in Israel would be even greater than would otherwise be the case if the desalting plant makes use of a nuclear energy source, since only in this way will we take maximum advantage of the project in developing information on the coupling of nuclear reactors with large-scale desalting units. Numerous studies indicate that nuclear power will be the appropriate source of energy for the future large-scale desalting technology toward which the Israeli project will be an important step.

Particularly in view of the termination of the MWD project in California, we believe that technical and financial participation by the Commission, if the Israeli project is determined to be nuclear, would be justified. It is our understanding that the proposed legislation will not preclude the possibility of such participation by the Commission.

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Honorable Robert P. Mayo

- 2 -

We note that H. R. 10034 differs from the earlier draft bill with respect to the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with and enter into agreements with the Government of Israel and agencies thereof. To assure effective conduct of a project of this type, we believe it is important that the Department of the Interior participate actively along with the Department of State in the negotiation of the necessary international agreements, and we trust the language of H. R. 10034 would not be construed to interfere with this requirement.

We would appreciate your advice as to whether there is any objection to the submission of our proposed comments, a copy of which is enclosed.

Sincerely,


General Manager

Enclosures:

1. Ltr. dtd. 1/15/69, Bloch
to Frey, re Interior draft
bill.
2. Proposed comments on
H. R. 10034.

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1969

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Nuclear Program

As authorized by you, I called in Israeli Ambassador Rabin July 29 to carry out the first step in our scenario for discussions with the Israelis on their nuclear program. A full record of that meeting is enclosed.

To set the stage, I recalled that in Ambassador Rabin's talks with Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke last November there had been a discussion of what Israel means when it says it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In this connection I noted that there had been no meeting of the minds between us on the interpretation of "introduce". We would like Israel to accept our interpretation, which is that non-introduction means non-possession. Were Israel to possess nuclear weapons, we would see this as a direct threat to the national security of the United States since it would add a new dimension of danger to the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation.

I also made the point that there is some forward movement on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we feel it necessary to emphasize our concern over Israel's delay in signing. Noting that Prime Minister Eshkol had told us last December Israel was studying

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GROUP 1

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TOP SECRET/NODIS

2

the implications of NPT signature, I said Israel's failure to sign would be a setback to our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Finally, I noted our concern that Israel was acquiring strategic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, a development which the world would see as weakening Israel's assurances in the nuclear field.

I put to Ambassador Rabin our specific requests for (a) a report on the results of the Israeli government's study of the NPT question, (b) an assurance that when Israel said it would not introduce nuclear weapons it meant it would not possess such weapons, and (c) an assurance that Israel would not produce or deploy the Jericho strategic missile. In doing so, I carefully avoided making any explicit link between Israel's response and our supply of conventional weapons to Israel.

We had informed Ambassador Rabin in advance that I wanted to discuss the nuclear question with him but had not indicated the nature of what I would say. Predictably, the Ambassador was not prepared to go beyond earlier Israeli positions. On instructions from his Government, which he had apparently sought before our meeting, he stated that Israel's study of the NPT question was continuing and that he was not authorized to comment before that study was completed. With respect to nuclear weapons, he said he could only repeat that Israel would not be the first Middle Eastern state to introduce them. He did not comment on the missiles question. He undertook, however, to convey our approach on all points to his government.

If we have not had a reply to our approach in about one week's time, I believe we should underline the seriousness with which we view this matter by reminding the Ambassador that we are awaiting an early response.



Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

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NNNN
 POR 386
 CK 1945

09 Nov 69

WG
 CK 2000

AR 388
 CK 2015

NOR 389 EPH 702

2021 :URGENT***** MIDEAST--PLANES:

TEL AVIV, ISRAELI, NOV. 9 (SUNDAY) (REUTERS)--ISRAELI
 PLANES WENT INTO ACTION SATURDAY NIGHT AGAINST AN EGYPTIAN FLOTILLA
 WHICH SHELLED ISRAELI TARGETS SOME 12 MILES EAST OF THE SUEZ
 CANAL, AN ISRAELI MILITARY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED HERE.

HE SAID THERE WERE NEITHER CASUALTIES NOR DAMAGE IN THE
 EGYPTIAN NAVAL BARRAGE AND THAT ALL ISRAELI AIRCRAFT RETURNED
 SAFELY TO BASE.

THE ISRAELI SPOKESMAN SAID THE JETS THROWN INTO ACTION
 ATTACKED A FLOTILLA OF TWO DESTROYERS AND TWO OR THREE SMALLER
 ESCORT CRAFT.

THE EGYPTIAN GUNFIRE ON ISRAELI INSTALLATIONS SITUATED WEST
 OF THE EL-KANTARA-EL ARISH ROAD BEGAN AT ABOUT 10:30 P.M.
 AND LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES, THE SPOKESMAN ADDED.

REUTERS (A/V) LEN/CC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-02/8 per 3.3(b)(3) Ltr. 5/23/2008

By RS NARA, Date 8/27/2008

[p. 1 of 2]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
[FOR] This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and has been determined to be declassified.

~~SECRET~~

69 NOV 9 AM 1:41

NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON
11/09/69
ACTING SECRETARY:MR. SISCO

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV
IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE - PLEASE PASS SECRETARY ROGERS AT
LINDIS KEY BISCAVNE

REF: USDAO MESSAGE 2345 NOV 69

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN NAVAL ATTACK OFF SINAI

1. SISCO CALLED RABIN MIDNIGHT NOV 8 RE. REPORTS OF UAR NAVAL ATTACK ON ISRAELI POSITIONS AT ROMANI IN OCCUPIED SINAI AND ISRAELI REQUEST FOR INFO FROM USG ON LOCATION U.S. AND SOVIET SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN AREA. AFTER ASCERTAINING THAT INFO REQUESTED HAD ALREADY BEEN TRANSMITTED TO DATT TEL AVIV, SISCO MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. ISRAELI REPORTS INDICATED THAT UAR ATTACK HAD CAUSED NO DAMAGES OR CASUALTIES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, ATTACK HAD BEEN LAUNCHED FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PURPOSES TO HAVE UNIFYING IMPACT ON ARAB FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING CAIRO.

B. GOI WOULD BE WELL ADVISED NOT TO FALL INTO THIS TRAP BY LAUNCHING COUNTERATTACK AGAINST UAR NAVAL UNITS WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD WERE WITHDRAWING TOWARD PORT; WE URGE NO RETALIATORY ACTION BE TAKEN.

C. FOREGOING POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS REENFORCED BY DANGER INHERENT IN FACT THAT WHILE NO US SHIPS IN AREA THERE NUMBER OF SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS IN AREA.

2. RABIN SPECULATED THAT ATTACK DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR INTERNAL EGYPTIAN REASONS AS FOLLOW-ON TO NASSER NOV. 6 SPEECH. ISRAELI FAILURE LAUNCH EFFECTIVE COUNTERACTION WOULD ENABLE NASSER ACHIEVE HIS PURPOSE. HE COULD ASSURE US, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE CAREFUL SO FAR AS

~~SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Continuation Sheet

FORM DS 322A(CCR)

~~SECRET~~

2

SOVIETS CONCERNED; UAR WAS ANOTHER MATTER.

3. SISCO SAID HE WAS ASKING GOI TO HOLD OFF ON ANY COUNTERACTION IN PURSUIT OF UAR NAVAL UNITS.

4. RABIN SAID HE GOT THE MESSAGE AND WOULD PASS IT TO JERUSALEM.

5. AMBASSADOR SHOULD FOLLOW UP PROMPTLY. 4

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Confidential/Excluded

hto:
Q

TO: TONY LAKE

FROM: AL HAIG AND HAL SAUNDERS

1. This morning we pouched a suggested reply to Golda Meir's message to the President on Vietnam speech. Final paragraph of pouched memo said Prime Minister did not intend to release her message.
2. We want you be aware that word has just come from ~~xxx~~ Embassy Telx Aviv that Mrs. Meir has now authorized release. This apparently in response to request made to Israeli embassy here through other channels. Memo should be corrected to reflect this new word.

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1969 NOV 8 18 25

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE614

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04219 081818Z

45

ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01,550 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,/046 W

103748

O 081730Z NOV 69 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7517

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 4219

EXDIS

REF TEL AVIV 4203

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTS SPEECH ON VIETNAM.

BITAN HAS JUST CALLED TO ASK THAT I EXPLAIN, AS NO DOUBT ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS ALREADY DONE, THAT ANY APPARENT ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO AUTHORIZE RELEASE OF P.M. MEIR'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT REFTEL WAS SOLELY DUE TO HX# REQUEST FROM ISRAELI EMBASSY THEREFORE WAS MADE AT 0200 HOURS THIS MORNING AND HE DID NOT RPT NOT FEEL HE COULD AWAKEN P.M. AT THAT HOUR FOR HER ESSENTIAL APPROVAL. BITAN VERY MUCH REGRETS IF IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN THAT DELAY IN APPROVAL OF RELEASE OCCASIONED BY OTHER THAN ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAYS AUTHORIZATION GIVEN AS SOON AS HE COULD REACH MRS. MEIR AND ALSO NOTIFY EBAN.
BARBOUR

NOTE: SENTENCE AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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~~SECRET~~

24 September 1969

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST - SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

1. During the past 15 years, since President Nasser opened his country's gates to Soviet penetration, the Soviets have entered the region as a force active in all developments of the area.

2. Since the inception of this period we are witness to a situation in which the Israel-Arab conflict has become a central focal point, though not the only one, for the efforts of the Soviet Union to establish an identity of interest between itself and the Arab States. The Soviet Union, perforce, chose this method as the principal means to undermine Western influence, and particularly that of the United States, while establishing its own presence. The Soviet Union fostered and exploited the sense of Arab frustration towards Israel, and Egypt's ambition to establish its hegemony within the Arab world through the elimination of Israel, Israel serving as a geographical barrier between it and the major centers of the Arab world. The Soviet Union supplied Egypt and the other Arab countries the means with which to achieve their aims in relation to Israel, i. e. unlimited political support in the international community (for example: Moscow placed its right of veto at the disposal of the Arab nations, to be

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

exploited whenever it was deemed necessary to frustrate a resolution unacceptable to the Arabs). More important, the Soviet Union supplied the primary means necessary for the Arab States to achieve their final purpose - Israel's elimination - through a program of military aid. The Soviet Union dispatched a massive supply of the most sophisticated weapons to the Arab countries under the most favorable financial and political conditions. Economic aid was supplied only to the extent necessary to sustain the political support and military aid.

3. Thus, the Soviet Union set out to perpetuate a state of tension between Israel and the Arab States, while seeking to avoid all-out local war. This situation remains true so long as the Soviet Union believes that the Arab armies are incapable of defeating the Israel Defense Forces and subduing Israel.

4. On the eve of the Six Day War the Soviet Union, when it forwarded false information to Syria and Egypt on Israel's intention to launch an attack against Syria, did not have the intention to bring about war. The unstable nature and the easily sparked passions of the Arab peoples led to a speedy deterioration that was not foreseen by the Soviet Union during the first half of May 1967.

5. The central problem confronting the Middle East at the present time is the struggle over the end result of the Six Day War, the

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- 3 -

Israel-Arab conflict being intimately intertwined with the Soviet effort to break Israel's resistance, so that it might dictate the future developments of the region. At the same time, the Soviet Union continues to undermine the moderate Arab regimes so as to weaken Western influence over the area. Consequently, the present struggle over the results of the Six Day War is first and foremost an Egyptian-Russian struggle against Israel whose very existence and continued survival prevent the establishment of total Soviet domination over the region. The Soviet Union will persist in its quest to demonstrate to its Arab allies that it, and it alone, can bring about the restoration of their lost territories without their having to pay in return with the coinage of a genuine peace settlement, the kind of peace that will once and for all eradicate from the life of the Middle East the Israel-Arab conflict as a central issue. The achievement of such a situation is manifestly contrary to the needs of the Soviet Union since, once peace is established, the necessity for massive military assistance would be eliminated, as would the political support of the type given by the Soviet Union. A peace situation would bring about a weakening of Arab dependence upon the Soviet Union. More than that, with a peaceful settlement, the Arab States of the region would divert their major energies to their own economic and social development, whereupon the capacity of the Soviet

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-4-

Union to compete under such conditions with the United States will be small. A peace situation would not only prevent the undermining of U. S. positions in the region; it would go much further in generating an increasing American influence.

The Soviet Position on Solving the Situation Created Since the Six Day War

6. The following are the consistent elements of basic Soviet policy: (as expressed in the document presented to Secretary of State Rogers by Tcherniakov on June 17, 1969):

- a) Insistence on total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before June 5, 1967.
- b) Solution of the Arab refugee problem on the basis of the principle of personal free choice between repatriation and compensation.

In return for the achievement of these two aims, the Soviet Union is prepared (with Egypt's consent) to agree to peace, the meaning of which would be, by Soviet lights, nothing more than the cessation of the state of belligerency, and this without the need to recognize Israel, directly or indirectly. Hence the opposition to direct negotiation, the very

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-5-

undertaking of which would constitute recognition of Israel. The Soviet Union cannot acquiesce to a situation which could be interpreted as a state of "peace" that goes beyond the mere cessation of belligerency. It must, perforce, plant into the body of a political settlement the seed of continuing tension and even the seed of nullification, if and when the necessary circumstances might occur. The inclusion of the free-choice principle for the refugees creates the opportunity for a situation to emerge at some future time in which any number of refugees might demand repatriation to Israel; Israel would refuse to accept them, and by its refusal provide the pretext for the Arabs to nullify whatever obligations they might have undertaken. The situation of past belligerency would thus be restored with the Arab States already having received back all the territories they lost in the Six Day War.

7. In all its diplomatic contacts, public and private, the Soviet Union has not departed from these principles. There has been, moreover, no sign whatsoever, that the Soviet Union is prepared to alter its stand on these matters. Today, with the Arab armies having been so substantially rehabilitated, the Soviet Union prefers the present situation, on the assumption that contact with the United States prevents the renewal of war in the region. The prospect of a war between Israel and Egypt in

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PAGE 2

c. \$50 million in AID assistance. Israel last received an AID loan in FY 1966 and has since been off the AID rolls because of its high state of economic development (higher per capita GNP than Italy's).

3. Other military equipment. The Defense, State and Commerce Departments constantly have before them a range of Israeli requests for purchase of less dramatic equipment ranging from bombsights and sophisticated electronic gear to tanks and ordnance. These require export licenses.

4. Capital goods imports. Israel would like to reduce reliance on foreign arms suppliers by achieving a substantial degree of domestic self-sufficiency in arms production. The Office of Munitions Control in the State Department constantly has before it applications from American firms to export technology and production rights and licenses to manufacture a variety of military equipment in Israel. The U. S. at present has no detailed policy guidelines that govern what may be exported to Israel, and decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.

B. Broader requests for the five years, 1970-1974.

1. Financial assistance. The Israeli Embassy has presented a balance of payments projection table forecasting a foreign exchange deficit of \$1.2 billion, 1970-1974. In addition to the specific requests for aid in FY 1970, Israel has asked the U.S. to consider ways in which it could help close this gap. Israel recognizes that, as in its requests for FY 1970, the U.S. would have to meet this average deficit of \$240 million a year--if it chose to--by a variety of annual or longer term assistance programs ranging perhaps from military sales credit to debt roll-over. In this connection, the Government of Israel says it has requested West Germany to assign to it as a loan the \$250 million in bonds it holds here as part of the offset agreement. [The Israeli balance of payments projections indicate an uneven distribution of need: 1970 and 1971--\$200 million; 1972--\$225 million; 1973--\$300 million; 1974--\$275 million.]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

January 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Minister Argov, Israeli Embassy,
January 13, 1970

Argov began by asking what would be our next steps now that the Soviets had published their response to our proposals. I reminded him that I did not deal with the Middle East on the staff; my impression was that we had no plans to make further proposals at this time. I added that I had not myself made a detailed analysis of the Soviet statement and could not therefore give him a detailed judgment of it. Argov said this encouraged him because it meant that the Soviet position was not central to my concerns about the Soviet Union. I said he should draw no inferences one way or the other because, as I had told him, my responsibilities on this staff simply did not involve me in detail in the Middle East negotiations. Obviously, however, they were bound to figure in any judgment of Soviet policy generally.

Argov then asked whether the tough Soviet position on the Middle East was out of phase with other aspects of our relations with the USSR. I said this was difficult to judge. On Vietnam, the Soviets continued to support DRV stonewalling in Paris and there was thus nothing encouraging in our relations with Moscow on that subject. I added that the Soviets might or might not prefer a settlement in Vietnam -- people continued to argue about that; the fact was that even if this was their preference they were doing nothing to help bring it about. Argov asked why. I said this was open to speculation, as before; perhaps the Soviets felt they could not do anything, or they did not want to pay the political price of exerting influence on Hanoi, or their relations with China made them hesitant.

I continued that as regards Europe, there was of course the Soviet-sponsored proposal for a conference and there have been Soviet contacts with Germany and the Western powers have made an overture on Berlin. In my judgment, however, there has been no substantive Soviet advance on any of these matters so far.

In our direct dealings with the USSR there had been an encouraging beginning on SALT because of the absence of polemics and the generally substantive nature of the opening round of the talks. However, I felt it premature to say now whether this portends an eventual agreement.

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3. If the U.S. decides to support some Israeli military and economic strategy, what level of U.S. assistance is appropriate?

To carry out their military and economic strategies, the Israelis will request large amounts of military equipment, production rights, and \$1.2 billion in foreign exchange assistance over the next five years. The U.S. must decide how to respond to these requests. If the U.S. decides to support some Israeli strategy, we must also decide what level of U.S. assistance is required.

4. If the U.S. decides to provide some level of assistance to Israel during 1970-74, what is the appropriate mix of military and economic assistance programs?

In providing assistance to the Israelis, the U.S. has to choose among a wide variety of programs -- from military credit to debt rollover -- which would help to meet Israeli needs.

5. If the U.S. provides military assistance, should that assistance be provided mainly by selling end items or in some combination with licensing and production rights to support and expand Israel's armaments industry?

Israel wants not only to acquire major items of equipment but also, if possible, to achieve self-sufficiency in these by obtaining the licensing and production rights to make them in Israel (together with the economic support required to expand its industrial base). This could over time reduce Israel's need to import end items.

6. If the U.S. decides to permit a wide range of Israeli military procurement in the U.S., what policy guidelines and means for enforcing them are necessary?

Because of Israel's extensive requests for export licenses or production rights to a variety of U.S. equipment -- some of which relate to fairly sensitive equipment -- appropriate policy guidelines should be established to monitor these programs.

II. CURRENT MILITARY FORCES IN THE NEAR EAST

Force Comparisons. Israel's four principal Arab enemies (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq) ^{1/} are numerically superior to Israel in every category of military equipment. As shown on Page 3A, the Arabs outnumber Israel six to one in army personnel, three to one in jet fighter aircraft and artillery, and seven to one in anti-aircraft artillery. The current Arab/Israeli force ratios, however, are not appreciably different from those just prior to the June 1967 war.

^{1/} Throughout this paper Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq are referred to as the principal Arab nations. References to all Arab nations include these four plus Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Algeria.

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IV. ISRAELI ECONOMIC SITUATION

Previous U.S. Assistance to Israel

During 1948-1969, the U.S. provided \$1.5 billion in economic and military assistance to Israel. About 80% of the total aid was in the form of economic grants and loans. Enclosure VI shows U.S. economic and military assistance, by year, since 1965.

| | <u>\$ Millions</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
|----------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| Economic Aid | | |
| Grants | 278.0 | 18 |
| Loans | 235.2 | 16 |
| P.L. 480 | 426.8 | 28 |
| Eximbank Loans | 297.0 | 20 |
| Total Economic Aid | 1237.0 | 82 |
| Military Credit Assistance | 278.9 | 18 |
| Total Aid | 1515.9 | 100 |

Several important points emerge from a review of U.S. military and economic assistance to Israel.

-- U.S. economic assistance to Israel has increased since 1967, although credit terms have hardened. In the three years prior to the war, the U.S. supplied an average of \$44 million in economic assistance. Since 1967, U.S. economic assistance has averaged \$64 million per year with about half in agricultural commodity assistance (P.L. 480) and half in long-term loans from the Export-Import Bank.

-- U.S. military credit assistance has also increased since 1967. Since the June 1967 war, credit sales have averaged \$55 million annually.

Current Israeli Economic Requests

Israel has forecasted a foreign exchange shortfall of \$1.2 billion during 1970-74. The shortfall is projected to increase gradually from \$200 million in 1970 to \$300 million in 1973. The following is known about the Israeli requests.

-- Military Credit Assistance. Israel has requested \$149 million for military credit assistance in 1970 including \$30 million already agreed as credit on the sale of fifty F-4 aircraft plus the

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RR RUCKJCS
DE RUDKSO 4962 3631521
ZNY SSSSS ZLH
R 291510Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY USLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3073
INFO RUENCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 513
RUGMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 23
RUCKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCRJCS/DIA
BT

CALL 3337
FOR JEDC/MC
SERVICE

GUNBOATS

029-1677
333
RECEIVED

142809

~~SECRET~~ USLO 4962

SUBJECT: NORWAY DENIES OFFICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN GUNBOAT
CAPER, ATTEMPTS TO UNRAVEL PRIVATE INTERESTS

1. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINEDLY TRYING TO
STRAIGHTEN OUT THE QUESTION OF NORWEGIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE
AFFAIR OF THE 5 GUNBOATS WHICH NOW ARE PRESUMED TO BE HEADING
FOR HAIFA FROM GHERBOURG. THE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED
PRIMARILY THAT ANY NORWEGIAN INVOLVEMENT MAY HAVE AN EFFECT
ON NORWEGIAN INTERESTS (READ SHIPPING) IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
SECONDARILY, THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF AT LEAST ONE NORWEGIAN
MAY BLOW INTO FULL-SCALE LOCAL SCANDAL WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY
EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT.

2. THE GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF THE CASE, CONDUCTED BY COMMERCE
MINISTER KAARE WILLOCH, HAS CONFIRMED THAT NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES
WERE NOT INVOLVED, THAT THE SHIPS HAD NOT BEEN REGISTERED IN
NORWAY, AND THAT NO NORWEGIAN EXPORT LICENSE FOR THE SHIPS
HAD BEEN APPLIED FOR OR GRANTED. HOWEVER, LATE SUNDAY,
DECEMBER 28, A PROMINENT NORWEGIAN FINALLY ADMITTED THAT,
AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PANAMANIAN FIRM STARBOAT A/S,
HE HAD PROVIDED "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE" ON THE SALE OF THE
BOATS. MARTIN SIEM, A DIRECTOR OF AKERS GROUP, ONE OF
NORWAY'S LARGEST INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES (SHIPPING, FOR THE
MOST PART) FIRST ADMITTED HIS ROLE IN A CALL ON HIS BROTHER,
IN-LAW, FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE THORE BOYE.

3. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS INFORMED THE UAR IN CAIRO
THAT SIEM, WHO USED AN USLO POST BOX FOR HIS STARBOAT A/S
ACTIVITIES, WAS ACTING IN A PERSONAL AND PANAMANIAN CAPACITY
AND HAS REPEATED ITS OFFICIAL INNOCENCE. SO FAR, ACCORDING
TO OUR SOURCE, THE UAR DOES NOT SEEM CONVINCED THAT NORWAY
WAS NOT OFFICIALLY INVOLVED AND SIEM'S ROLE IS MAKING THE
TASK MORE DIFFICULT, SIEM'S FAILURE TO ELABORATE ON HIS

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN 02-02/1 Dec 30/2 DIA/101

By *AMG* NARA, Date 3-18-02

[2 pages]

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 J7-12 J5-2 NMCC-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-1

DIA/5 CSA-1 CNO-10 CSAF1 CMC-3 FILE-1 (67) ART/DT

1 OF 2

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STATEMENT THAT HE GAVE ONLY "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE" COINCIDES WITH PERSISTENT REPORTS THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AT LEAST WAS REPRESENTED AS THE PURCHASER. WILLOCH IS TO MAKE A PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON. IT IS EXPECTED THAT FAILING AN EXPLANATION BY SIEM, WILLOCH WILL RECOMMEND A FULL SCALE INVESTIGATION.

4. COMMENT: THE DEPARTMENT MAY NOT BE AWARE OF A MID-DECEMBER REPORT FROM THE USDAO PARIS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NORWEGIAN NAVY HAD PURCHASED THE GUNBOATS, ON THE BASIS OF THE PARIS REPORT THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE OSLO INQUIRED OF A HIGH RANKING NORWEGIAN NAVY OFFICE ABOUT A RUMORED NORWEGIAN PURCHASE OF THE VESSELS. THE RUMOR WAS DENIED AND THE DENIAL REPORTED THROUGH DIA CHANNELS. AS WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS PLANNING TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT AT NO TIME HAD NORWAY EVEN HEARD OF THE SALE OF THE VESSELS, THE EMBASSY, WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE CONCURRENCE, INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE SUBSTANCE, BUT NOT THE SOURCE, OF THE PARIS USDAO REPORT AND OF THE SUBSEQUENT INQUIRY TO THE NORWEGIAN NAVY. THE FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL TO WHOM WE PASSED THE INFORMATION EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION AND NOTED THAT A GREAT DEAL OF INVESTIGATING, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT SIEM'S ACTIVITIES AND REPRESENTATIONS, IS STILL TO BE DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT. GP-3

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VZCZCJCS847 Q571 4
PP RUCRJCS
DE RUFNCR 19318 31740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291112Z DEC 69
FM USDAO PARIS FRANCE
TO RUCRJCS/DIA WASHDC
INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR
RUDONBA/CINCSNAVEUR
RUTPSA/COMSIXTHFLT
RUQMVL/USDAO AMEMB TEL AVIV ISRAEL
BT

CAL 3337
FOR SEC/MC
VICE
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172
1429499

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ C-1000-AR DEC 69 USCINCEUR FOR #2,
(C) DEPARTURE OF ISRAELI VESSELS FROM CHERBOUR
MAJOR SENSATION IN FRENCH PRESS. GENERAL BELIEF IS
THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN COMPLICITY BY FRENCH
OFFICIALS AT MAY LEVELS. OPPOSITION PARIS DAILY
AURORE SAYS QUOTE EVERYBODY IN CHERBOURG KNEW THAT
THEY WERE GOING TO LEAVE UNQUOTE. FACT IS ISRAELI
CREWS WERE IN CHERBOURG AND WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY AND
FUEL VESSELS. CHERBOURG CUSTOMS RECEIVED AUTHORI-
ZATION FOR EXPORT (PRESUMABLY TO FICTITIOUS NORWEGIAN
FIRM AROUND 15 DECEMBER 1969). FOR DAYS TANK TRUCKS
HAD BEEN FUELING SHIPS. AT 2300 HRS ON CHRISTMAS
EVE (HEIGHT OF FRENCH FESTIVITIES AND LOW POINT OF
THEIR SURVEILLANCE) ISRAELI SAILORS WENT ABOARD. AT 0140
ISRAELIS PUT ASHORE TOOLS, GARBAGECANS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT
THAT DID NOT BELONG TO THEM. AT 0150 WITH RUNNING LIGHTS
OUT THEY SAILED OUT OF HARBOR THROUGH EASTERN PASS IN
BREADKWAIR, WHICH IS THE FURTHEST FROM THE HARBOR WATCH.
AS THESE VESSELS HAD BEEN OUT TO SEA FOR SHORT TESTS THIS
DID NOT SEEM TOO UNUSUAL. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THEY DID NOT
RETURN FROM THE TESTS AND THIS MORNING ARE REPORTED IN
TYRRHENIAN SEA. SEVERAL ISRAELI DEPENDENTS STILL IN CHER-
BOURG CLAIM TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT DEPARTURE.
THESE VESSELS WERE ORDERED BY ISRAEL AND SEVEN OF
THEM HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED. THE REMAINING FIVE WERE
TIED UP BY EMBARGO AFTER ISRAELI ATTACK IN BEYREUTH
AIRPORT. LAST 1 AT WAS INSISHED FIFTEEN DAYS AGO.
IN OCTOBER BOATS WERE SOLD OT STAR BOAT AND WEILL
SHIPPING COMPANY, PO BOX 25078 SOLLI, OSLO. ISRAEL AGREED
TO SALE PROVIDED IT WAS REIMBURSED TEN MILLION DOLLARS
ALREADY PAID TO BUILDER ON ACCOUNT.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
N4N 02-02/2 DIA Lett 11-30-01
By WLB
[2 pages] NARA, Date 5-14-03

ACT: DIA-20

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J5-1 NMCC-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 NSA-2 STATE-1
CIA-4 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1 (62) WJG/DT

1 OF 2

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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COMMENT: I DO NOT BELIEVE FRENCH J2 WAS ATTEMPTING
TO DECEIVE ME ON 9 DEC 69 (MY MSG C-975-AR DTD 9 DEC). HE
REALLY BELIEVED SALE TO NORWEGIAN COMPANY,
(1) FOR ISRAELIS, DOUBLE ADVANTAGE OF GETTING BOATS
AND EMBROILING FRENCH WITH ARABLS MUST HAVE SEEMED
ATTRACTIVE.
(2) CONCEIVABLY THIS COULD BE ELEMENT OF FRENCH
COMPENSATION TO ISRAELIS FOR REPORTED ARMS DEAL WITH
LIBYANS AND IRAQIS.
(3) COLLECTION CONTINUES, SIGNED WALTERS, GP-3.
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ADV CY TO DIA CJCS OSD

2 OF 2

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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ADVANCE
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GUNBOATS

VZCZCJCS768 QS#1788

PP RUCKJCS

DE RUQMVL 2636

631530

ZNY SSSSS

P 291500Z DEC 69

BM USDAO/TEL AVIV

TO RUCKJCS/DIA

INFO RUEBAPB/CUMNAVINTCOM

RUIPSPA/COMSIXTHFLT

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR

RUCJAAA/CINCSINKR

BT

SECRET NOFORN LIMDIS 2636 DEC 69.

SUBJECT: FRENCH SAAR BOATS FOR ISRAEL.

1. PERVERSIVE "MUMS THE WORD" MUTENESS PREVAILS IN IDF ON FRENCH SAAR BOAT MOVEMENT

R. DI COUSION ON SUBJECT IS, AT BEST, UNEASY

AND EVASIVE DUE TO POLITICAL FOCUS. OBVIOUS IMPRESSION GIVEN BY

KNOWLEDGEABLE IDF OFFICERS (DURING DINNER AT DATT'S RESIDENCE

28 DEC 69 WITH DAO ATTACHES ONLY) WAS, NEVERTHELESS, THAT BOATS

ARE DESTINED FOR ISRAEL. CAPT ASHKENAZI, IDF NAVY IN

ENLIGHTENED

CHIEF, CONFIDED THAT STORY WILL BE RELEASED IN APPROX SIX DAYS

WHICH WILL COVER ISRAEL FAVORABLY FOR ABOUT THREE MONTHS AT WHICH

TIME REAL FACTS WILL HAVE TO COME TO LIGHT.

2. ASHKENAZI FELT CLOSE SURVEILLANCE OF TRANSITING BOATS WOULD BE DIFFICULT EVEN FOR SIXTH FLEET. NO LESS SOVIETS AND ARABS WHO ARE MORE LIMITED. HE FELT THAT ALTHOUGH UNLIDTLY, POSSIBLY EXISTS THAT BOATS COULD BE STOPPED UNDER GUISE THAT THEY HAD BEEN STOLEN.

3. LOCAL PRESS HEADLINERS 28 AND 29 DEC DOMINATED BY SAAR BOAT MEDITERRANEAN TRANSIT SPECULATING THAT THIRTY KNOW SOA FROM GIBRALTAR TO HAIFA, CONTINGENT ON SEA AND WEATHER, COULD THEORETICALLY PUT ETA HAIFA PM, 30 DEC 69. AP ARTICLE SUBCAPTION CARRIED JERUSALEM POST STATES "SIXTH FLEET MUM: WITH SHORT TEXT "SIXTH FLEET AND NAIO SPOKESMAN IN NAPLES DECLINED TO GIVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE GUNBOATS. ONE JS NAVY COMMANDER SAID ANY STATEMENT HE MIGHT MAKE COULD EFFECT US RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL OR THE ARABS."

COMMENT: BOATS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED CAPABLE OF FORTHY KNOWS IN CALM SEAS. ETA HAIFA 30 DEC IS NOT UNREASONABLE ON POINT TO POINT BASIS. BUT DECEPTIVE DELAYING TACTICS WILL BE LIKELY EMPLOYED ALONG WAY, AND

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C
1153*

*RECEIVED
29 DEC 69
DISPATCH
5720*

| | |
|--------|---|
| DR | |
| DD | |
| AP | X |
| APD | |
| AP-Y | |
| AP-Z | X |
| AP-2DF | X |
| AP-2L | X |
| AP-2A | X |
| AP-2B | X |
| AP-2X | |
| AP-2A3 | |
| AP-3 | |
| AP-4 | |
| AP-5 | X |
| AP-6 | |
| S&T | |
| NMCC | X |
| CO | |
| CI | |
| STATE | |
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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NLN 02-02/3 DIA letter 11-30-01

By *xmb* NARA, Date *5-14-03*

[2 pages]

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U
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ADVANCE
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ON THIS END, CONSISTENT WITH EXTREME ISRAELI MEASURES, RECENT
PAINTING OUT OF HULL NUMBERS ON SAAR BOATS BASED IN HAIFA RELATES
TO DECEPTIVE MEASURES TAKEN ON DELIVERY END, LOCAL INTERNATIONAL
PRESS REPS BILLING AT THE BIT POSES ADDITIONAL PROBLEM FOR ISRAELIS TO
CONTEND WITH, AN IDF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TOLD ARMA ON 29 DEC THAT
SALE TO NORWEGIAN FIRM WAS MADE WITH KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF
FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHO WERE ALSO AWARE OF ULTIMATE DESTINATION; GP-4

BT
NNNN

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

7506

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Escalation in the Mid-East

This memorandum is not intended to be alarmist. However, one of my principal responsibilities is to identify impending shifts in the nature of dangerous situations before they become irreversible. On the basis of extensive intelligence analysis and contingency planning done since Kosygin's message to you, I believe that now is the time to raise such a question--not as a prediction but as a possible warning signal for discussion.

The Mid-East Conflict on the Verge of Escalation

The Israeli raids on the Nile Valley and the possible Soviet response increase the risk of a fundamental escalation in the nature of the Mid-East conflict.

Before Kosygin's message to you, the conflict was viewed as primarily an Arab-Israeli conflict, with the US and USSR having obvious interests on each side. Since Kosygin's message, attention has turned increasingly to the US-USSR contest for predominance in the Mid-East, with the Arab-Israeli conflict slipping toward a subordinate role of a tool in that larger contest.

To date, the US and USSR have been content to compete indirectly on the political level for political influence in this area. The Israeli raids and the resulting pressure on the Soviets to help Nasser better defend Egypt, however, have raised the possibility that the Soviets will feel compelled to assume responsibility for Egyptian air defenses. If they do, this will be a unique extension of Soviet protection to a non-Communist nation.

Such a Soviet move would pose a dilemma for the U.S. that would have implications beyond the Mid-East. If the U.S. did not respond, it could be judged a sign of superior Soviet power. If the US responded directly, that would confirm the elevation of the conflict to the US-Soviet level, increasing the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation there.

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- 2 -

Is the Issue Worth the Risk?

The issue is Israel's strategy of bombing in the populated Nile Valley-- beyond the zone where attacks might be called necessary to quiet Egyptian firing across the cease-fire line or to prevent Egyptian staging for an attack. The Israelis have said that this bombing has a political-psychological purpose--to bring Nasser to negotiations (or, some Israelis would say, to topple him).

Until Israel's raids started, the USSR seemed willing to do what it could to help Egyptians defend themselves. Now as a result of the raids, intelligence indicates that they may have decided to introduce an unspecified "system" into the UAR. Intelligence and military analysis also makes clear that, to be effective, any system would require large numbers (perhaps 12-17,000) of Soviets to install and operate it.

The question, therefore, is whether the U.S. has sufficient interest in Israel's deep penetration raids to warrant risking the deeper involvement of the USSR in Egypt with its potential for escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict into a US-USSR contest.

It seems clear that the US has no interest in deeper Soviet entrenchment in the UAR. This would be a step toward Soviet predominance in the area. It would lessen the control of the big powers over their involvement because at least one of the great powers would have become a combatant. It would increase the pressure for a US response and, therefore, the risk of an eventual US-USSR confrontation.

This risk could be considered justifiable if Israeli security or survival were at stake. They are not in the short term. When urged to call off their deep penetration raids and confine themselves to the area of military provocation along the Suez cease-fire line, the only Israeli answer was that stopping the raids would be seen as a sign of weakness unless Nasser agreed publicly to restore the cease-fire on his side. Yet the Soviets will surely know what U.S. intelligence reveals and Nasser has openly admitted--that Israel will maintain air superiority for the foreseeable future whether it demonstrates that superiority or not.

The Israeli raids, therefore, jeopardize two major US interests-- minimizing the risk of a US-USSR confrontation and preventing a step toward Soviet predominance in the area. Yet they are not essential to Israel's survival or military security.

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DRAFT MEMORANDUM

February 11, 1970

SUBJECT: Responses to Israel's Arms and Economic Assistance Requests

Summary

A special Review Group has studied extensive technical analyses of the military threat confronting Israel, and the military and economic assistance Israel has proposed to meet its problems. It has reviewed the broad range of possible U.S. responses along with the arguments for and against each. The members of the Group have reached certain general judgments based only on the technical analyses, and these are summarized below.

The purpose of this memorandum is to develop from these judgments (1) an overall strategy for responding to Israel's total requests and (2) a range of responses on a limited number of those requests which would be made immediately if there were a policy decision to go ahead. It also deals with the question of whether we should seek any quid pro quo from Israel.

1. The Backdrop

Israel's main source of major new military equipment since 1967 has been the United States. This will almost certainly remain the case for the foreseeable future, since past European sources (primarily the UK and France) are unlikely to risk

GROUP 1

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downgrading and declassification
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2. Some specific opportunity may arise in connection with our efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East. The opportunity has not arisen because the Soviets have been unwilling to agree to our two peace proposals; and Nasser has continued his policy of evading any response, which must be taken as a negative reply. If Moscow or Cairo were to accept our proposals as a basis for talks under Jarring's auspices, we could urge the Israelis to reconsider their ostensible rejection of the October 28 and December 18 peace settlement guidelines. If they refused in a circumstance where we had agreement from Moscow and Cairo, then would be the appropriate time to link the question of arms supply with the Israeli attitude on a peace settlement. Moreover, we do not exclude the possibility that a moratorium on new arms commitments to nations involved in the Middle East conflict could be implemented to good effect. The Soviets and French may find it more difficult to resist an open effort on our part to bring such limitations into effect.

3. Israel has not been generous in volunteering information, experience or equipment for our uses but the Israel Defense Force has been responsive to lower level horsetrading. This process is sufficiently advantageous to be continued.

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INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

February 12, 1970

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Ray S. Cline

Subject: Israel: Civilian Casualties Near Cairo Set Off Tremors in Israel

BEHR _____
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CHAPIN _____
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Israel has been concerned for some time about its credibility, its image in world opinion, and the direction of US policies in the Middle East. These concerns were reflected in the hasty official admission that there may have been a "mistake" in the bombing on February 12 of a factory near Cairo which killed 50 civilians and wounded 69.

A quick admission and a warning. Within two hours of Cairo Radio's announcement on February 12 of heavy civilian casualties, the Israeli Defense Forces spokesman announced on the radio that Israel's policy of attacking military targets had not changed, and that if the report of damage to a civilian target were true, "it can only be the result of a mistake." The Foreign Ministry telephoned the same message to Ambassador Barbour. Three hours later, the spokesman confirmed the "mistake," adding that the Defense Minister had asked the Red Cross representative and the chief UN observer to warn the Egyptians to defuse a 400 kilo delayed-action bomb dropped during the raid "before it is too late."

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Clearing the record. Sensitivity and concern about Israel's credibility and the nature of its military tactics against the UAR must be very high to warrant such a rapid response both in public and in private. Israel has long maintained that the best defense of its actions lay in its own humanitarian policies and in the credibility of its statements; both of these were called into serious question by Cairo Radio's report of civilian casualties.

An eye on Washington. American representations about Israeli air strikes in the UAR, moreover, have stressed the risks of bombing errors in populated areas. The "we told you so" will not be lost on Israeli officials, especially when reinforced by the Acting Secretary's statement of February 12. In addition, the US decision on arms supply is certainly very much in the minds of the Israelis responsible for foreign affairs and defense matters; they will take pains to smooth over anything which might jeopardize a decision in Israel's favor.

A sobering experience? The pilot responsible for the incident will no doubt be chastened by the experience, but the same dampening effect will probably not apply to Israeli military tactics as a whole. While there may be a respite of a few days before the next strike near the populated parts of Egypt, and extra target practice for the Israeli Air Force, Israel in all likelihood will hold to its strategy of pounding military targets within earshot of population centers in the hope of "teaching" Nasser that he cannot defeat Israel by military means. The subject of pilot error will be particularly sensitive for some time to come, however.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

63

January 12, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: A Framework for Desalting Cooperation
with Israel

In response to Mr. Watts' memorandum of December 11, 1969, I enclose a memorandum setting forth four alternative ways to proceed with desalting cooperation with Israel. The Department recommends the formation of an interagency working group (alternative 3) as an appropriate interim response, while we actively explore the viability of an agreement on general scientific and technological cooperation (alternative 4), which could include research in desalting. Either the reconstitution of the U.S.-Israel Joint Board (alternative 1) or the naming of a new Presidential coordinator (alternative 2) would imply too great a commitment to a construction project in Israel.

We would like to consult later with the White House staff on the circumstances and timing for informing the Israel Government of the position finally adopted. One factor to be considered will be our decision on Israel's arms and economic aid requests as a result of the current NSSM 81 and 82 studies.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum on Desalting Cooperation with Israel
2. Mr. Watts' Memorandum of December 11, 1969

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NO ACTION REQUIRED NOW,
SAUNDERS KEPT ORIGINAL FOR
FURTHER ACTION IN FUTURE.

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A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL
ON DESALTING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The President concluded (NSDM 32, November 6, 1969) that the Administration could not proceed now with plans to build a desalting plant in Israel. However, he also decided that the Administration would press ahead with research in desalting technology and would insure close cooperation with Israeli technicians in this area. The Israeli Government expressed great disappointment with this decision, but inquired what framework we envisaged for such cooperation. Otherwise, they said, cooperation had little meaning.

Four alternative frameworks are discussed below. They are all predicated on the assumption that the Administration will now move ahead with the construction and testing in this country of a test module incorporating a combination of the proven multistage flash (MSF) distillation process with the unproven but promising vertical tube evaporation (VTE) process. We have told Israel that this was a logical next step in developing desalting technology, because of its promise to reduce capital and unit water costs in desalting. If the decision is made not to go ahead with an MSF-VTE test module in the FY 1971 budget, it would be important to avoid an overly impressive coordinating mechanism, which would have little to coordinate.

Alternative One: The Joint Board

The U.S.-Israel Joint Board, which coordinated the several studies of a large desalting plant in Israel in 1965-68, could be reconstituted with a mandate to devise ways of formulating cooperative efforts with the Israelis. The Board has been moribund since early 1968. Its original membership should in that case be expanded to include a State Department representative, who would be the Chairman of the reconstituted Board. This would seem advisable in view of strong Congressional opposition to the Office of Saline Water's becoming involved in foreign entanglements. The Office of Saline Water (OSW) should, of course, continue to be represented, and possibly other bureaus within the Interior Department.

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Since the question of nuclear versus fossil fuel is not germane to the construction and testing of a MSF-VTE test module, an argument could be made for discontinuing the Atomic Energy Commission membership on the Board, although they would almost certainly wish to attend in an observer capacity, and might object to relinquishing full membership. The Agency for International Development might also wish to be present as an observer. If it was desired to emphasize the altered nature of our desalting relationship with Israel, the name of the body could be changed as well, perhaps to United States-Israel Joint Panel for Desalting Research.

Objections to this scenario would include, on the one hand, the argument that to reconstitute the original Joint Board, even under a new name, would imply a degree of continuity and financial commitment (at some later date) which does not, in fact, exist. It would keep alive Israeli hopes of United States financial support for a project in Israel. We may not be able, or may find it inexpedient, to gratify such expectations, and therefore we should not arouse them. For this reason the State Department does not favor reviving the Joint Board. Because of the implied continuation of a joint project, with hopes of future U.S. financing, Israel would favor this course.

Alternative Two: A Special Presidential Coordinator

A Presidential Coordinator, independent of inter-agency positions and responsive to the President's wishes, could formulate with his Israeli opposite number a program for cooperation and exchange of information on desalting research in general and on the design, development, and testing of the MSF-VTE test module in particular. He would have to be more of a water expert than either of his two predecessors. In the light of the more recent history of the way in which desalting contacts have been carried out, it might be more convenient to name a new Coordinator than to reconstitute some kind of Joint Board, since the Joint Board is identified in many people's minds with the discarded 100 MGD project. A new Coordinator could serve to highlight publicly the President's continued interest in desalting cooperation with Israel. He might be assisted by a United States Government Working Group drawn from the Departments of State and the Interior, and possibly the Atomic Energy Commission.

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WASHINGTON

INFORMATION/ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*
SUBJECT: Israeli Cabinet Statement

At the conclusion of today's special Israeli cabinet session a communique was issued (Tab A) strongly rejecting our latest proposals for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The communique cited the familiar Israeli objections to our approach and charged that our proposals could be interpreted by the Arabs as appeasement. It further stated that "Israel will not be the victim of big power or inter-power policy and will reject any attempt to impose a solution."

This is a predictably strong statement. The Israeli government is at least partly engaging in a war of nerves to back us off our more active policy.

The Israelis also, of course, have serious disagreements with us on the substance of a settlement. It is clear that Israel wants substantial changes in its borders and what it is partly reacting against is our public opposition to that position. Foreign Minister Eban made this quite clear to me.

But I would guess that the Israelis are also reacting as much -- maybe more -- to what they fear we may do in the future as to our actual position today.

Some in the State Department believe that we should communicate with Mrs. Meir before her statement to her parliament next Monday. The argument for doing this would be to try to take some of the sting out of the last few days' events.

The arguments against are:

-- If published, such a communication would make us appear two-faced. Now that we are on this course, we should stick to it.

-- It might be difficult to write gracefully without appearing to be succumbing to their counterattack.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we not so communicate with Mrs. Meir.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

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DEC 28 1969

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5912

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

December 26, 1969

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Condolence Letter for Ambassador Rabin

Brigadier General Carmon, Defense Attache of the Israeli Embassy, died at Walter Reed Hospital Tuesday.

Recommendation: It would be nice for you to give him the attached condolence note. Also, given current strains, any special attention on this human plane can be helpful.

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5912

December 26, 1969

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I want you to have this word of sympathy on the death of Brigadier General Carmon.

Our governments may from time to time disagree on some matters. But in revering the uniqueness of each human life--and in knowing the grief each loss brings--we are of one mind.

Personal regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel
2916 Chesapeake Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

HHSaunders:tmt 12/26/69

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YIGAL ALON INTERVIEW

JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 1810 GMT 22 DEC 69 M

(DAN HALPERIN INTERVIEW WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YIGAL ALON--RECORDED)

(EXCERPTS) QUESTION: ARE THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN MORE SERIOUS FOR ISRAEL THAN THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT?

ANSWER: REGARDLESS OF THE BORDERS THEY PROPOSED, THE FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO MAKE DETAILED PROPOSALS ON BORDERS, THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, AND WAYS TO SETTLE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS SERIOUS IN ITSELF. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR THAT WE WILL NOT FOREGO A PEACE TREATY ACCOMPANIED BY EFFECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A TREATY. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE OFTEN HAD DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITH THE AMERICANS--ALTHOUGH NOT VOICED IN PUBLIC, BUT NOW THEY ARE BEING VOICED IN PUBLIC--THEY TOLD US THEY WERE ONLY PREPARING THE GROUND FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THEY LEFT ALMOST NO POINTS FOR NEGOTIATION. BY PROPOSING AN EXACT MAP AND CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE 1949 ARMISTICE LINES, THE AMERICANS HAVE UNDERMINED THE PROSPECTS FOR TALKS WITH THE ARAB STATES. IF THERE WERE ANY PROSPECTS FOR TALKS WITH THE ARAB STATES, THEY HAVE BEEN PUT OFF.

QUESTION: DID THE GOVERNMENT VIEW WITH GRAVITY THE FACT THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS WERE CONVEYED TO ISRAEL AFTER AND NOT BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON?

ANSWER: I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE DOCUMENT WAS ALREADY IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S HANDS WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN MET WITH HIS U.S. COUNTERPART 30 HOURS BEFORE THE DOCUMENT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE OTHER THREE GREAT POWERS. I BELIEVE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL AND ELEMENTARY COURTESY DEMANDED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE DOCUMENT AHEAD OF TIME.

QUESTION: MR ALON, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT STATEMENT SAYS THE STATE OF ISRAEL STOOD ALONE IN THE 1967 WAR. DOES THIS MEAN THAT WE ARE AGAIN PREPARING FOR POLITICAL ISOLATION?

ANSWER: GOD FORBID. WE WERE ONLY REMINDING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND ALL THOSE INTERESTED IN ISRAEL'S CONDITION AND POSITION THAT IT WAS NOT WE WHO WANTED THIS WAR. IT WAS IMPOSED ON US. WE WERE ALONE IN THE BATTLEFIELD BUT PROBABLY NOT SO ISOLATED IN THE POLITICAL AND OTHER FIELDS.

QUESTION: WHAT WILL ISRAEL DO TO CHANGE THE U.S. STAND?

ANSWER: ISRAEL WILL EXPLOIT ALL THE RELATIONS IT HAS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THAT ITS PROPOSALS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED EVEN AS A BASIS FOR STUDY OR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THEY ARE COMPLETELY REJECTED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

QUESTION: THE U.S. PROPOSALS HAVE ACTUALLY CALLED FOR AN ALMOST COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE GOVERNMENT TODAY DECIDED TO ESTABLISH A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS. IS THIS THE REPLY TO THE U.S. PROPOSALS?

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ANSWER: THE FORMATION OF A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE HAS NEVER CONSTITUTED AN ANSWER TO POLITICAL PROBLEMS. ISRAEL IS OUTSTANDING FOR ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS. IT IS NECESSARY TO PLAN NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE AREAS AND IN EVERY APPROPRIATE PLACE.

QUESTION: IN THE LIGHT OF THE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD OUR POLITICAL SITUATION AROUSE FEAR?

ANSWER: THE RECENT U.S. PROPOSALS AROUSE CONCERN, NOT BECAUSE OF THEIR CONTENT BUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

23 DEC 1945Z WCW/TM

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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S/S 4282

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 19, 1970

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ISRAEL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Conversation with Congressman
Ogden Reid

Joe Sisco asked me to pass along the gist of a telephone call he received this morning from Congressman Ogden Reid which we find somewhat reassuring regarding the possible Israeli reaction to the announcement on Monday on arms. Reid spent the evening with Jacob Weizman, Minister of Transport, who made much of the point that he has been acting vigorously to cool off the Cabinet. He expressed great confidence in President Nixon and that he would do the right thing for Israel over the future. In this connection, Weizman referred to a luncheon which he had with the President some years ago at the United States Embassy with Ambassador Barbour. Congressman Reid interpreted these observations as essentially a recognition on the part of the Israelis to adjust to the upcoming decision while maintaining confidence that over the long haul the United States would not permit Israel's security to be materially weakened.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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MR NLN 02-39/14 p. 5-9 of 9 pp.

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It has been apparent for most of the past decade in which the Soviet position in the Middle East was expanding that Israel saw her future security depended on some kind of a balance of power between the revolutionary and the moderate Arabs.

SANITIZED [redacted] central to Israeli strategic thinking is her great dependence on Iran oil which reaches Israel through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. Although the June 1967 war and the continuing conflict since then has badly eroded

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the basis for the balance of power

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I believe that it still remains an important consideration in Israeli thinking -- particularly if Iran is added to the equation -- and a factor which may deserve more of our attention as we currently address ourselves to the question of the balance of power in the Middle East.

I thought you might find these ideas relevant to some of the issues that currently confront us in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Rich

Richard Helms
Director

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THE JOINT STAFF

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 July 1970
2000 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Israeli Aircraft Down Four Soviet-Piloted
MIG-21s

1. The US Defense Attache's Office (USDAO) reported by flash message at 301615 EDT that Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft shot down four Soviet-piloted MIG-21 aircraft approximately 10 nautical miles west of Ain Sukhna (see attachment) today.

2. At 300830 EDT, four IAF F-4 aircraft attacked a radar station at Ain Sukhna, and four IAF Mirage aircraft were conducting a photoreconnaissance mission along the coast from 27 nautical miles south of Suez City (see attachment) to Suez City.

a. Eight MIG-21s (four from the south and four from the north) closed on the Mirages, 5 nautical miles north of Ain Sukhna, as the F-4s completed their attack on the radar station. All sixteen aircraft joined in a dog fight that started over Ain Sukhna and lasted for 5 minutes, mainly in the area shown on the attachment, at altitudes of 25,000 feet to 3,500 feet and speeds of Mach 1 to 100 knots.

b. Two MIG-21s were downed by the F-4s with one AIM-9 missile and one AIM-7E missile, and two MIG-21s were downed by the Mirages with AIM-9 missiles at ranges of 1,500-2,000 yards.

c. Three Soviet pilots ejected, one at a speed over Mach 1 in what appeared to be a special seat for high-speed ejection. The fourth Soviet pilot apparently went down with his aircraft.

d. The Soviet pilots were reported to be aggressive and eager to fight but showed a lack of combat experience.

e. By the end of the aerial battle, a minimum of 20 MIG-21s had entered.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

By SP Date 25 MAY 07

5 Dec. 06

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
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3. No Israeli losses were reported. Further details will be forwarded by USDAO upon completion of pilot debriefing.

1 Attachment
a/s

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ANMCC (LDX)


JAMES W. NANCE
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

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Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

July 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Rabin

Ambassador Rabin made the following points in his telephone call this morning:

--Israel is taking a great military risk as well as serious political risks in subscribing to the cease-fire as articulated in the US proposal.

--Had it not been for the President's letter it would have been impossible to accept the US proposal. The letter helped a great deal but there remain serious problems.

--Israel still believes that it must have more complete assurances with respect to future arms shipments. Some of these assurances were provided during the two question and answer periods with Rabin.

--The Israeli Cabinet has still not taken an official position on the US proposal and Rabin wants it understood that ultimately Mrs. Meir anticipates some additional compensation and assurances on the military side as well as on the economic and credit side.


I told the Ambassador that you and the President certainly subscribe fully to the assurances provided in the first question and answer period, but that you had not had an opportunity to study yesterday's exchange and that it was difficult to go beyond what has been discussed thus far in the question and answer periods unless a specific issue is presented to us. I added that the best way for this to occur is through the normal discussions with the Department. However, I made it clear that I was not turning off Ambassador Rabin from coming to you should a snag develop in the established framework. I told Rabin that he should know that within the spirit of the President's broad assurances we should be able to solve problems as they arise. Rabin concluded by stating he hoped to see you on Tuesday to discuss some of the specific problems that remain.

(Attached is a cleaned-up version of the conversation from you to the President.)

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21036
ISRAELI
MEMORANDUM
I-35766/70
29 July 1970

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Discussion with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin,
Embassy of Israel, re Israeli Military and
Financial Requirements

Participants:

U. S. SIDE

The Secretary of Defense - Melvin R. Laird
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense - Robert J. Pranger
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense - Brigadier General
Robert E. Pursley
Chief, Special Negotiations, MA&S/ISA - Dr. Spiro C. Manolas
Country Director for Israel - Mr. Robert H. Kubal

ISRAELI SIDE

His Excellency Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Ambassador
to the United States
Major General Eliahu Zeira, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. S. Dror, Minister of Defense Mission, New York

Time: 1100 Hours - 21 July 1970

Place: Mr. Laird's Office, The Pentagon

1. Israel's Payment Problem

Following an exchange of pleasantries, Secretary Laird indicated he would like to talk about something which concerned him. He believed he was more budget-oriented than any Secretary of Defense for some time, as Defense has serious budget problems

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21036
ISRAELI
MEMORANDUM
I-35766/70
29 July 1970

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Embassy of Israel, re Israeli Military and
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Participants:

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Robert E. Pursley
Chief, Special Negotiations, MA&S/ISA - Dr. Spiro C. Manolas
Country Director for Israel - Mr. Robert H. Kubal

ISRAELI SIDE

His Excellency Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Ambassador
to the United States
Major General Eliahu Zeira, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. S. Dror, Minister of Defense Mission, New York

Time: 1100 Hours - 21 July 1970

Place: Mr. Laird's Office, The Pentagon

1. Israel's Payment Problem

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with many reductions being "forced on us." In working out his FY 72 allocations he started with strategy and asked what it would take to meet the objectives of our foreign policy. However, in the final analysis, decisions may have to be made on the basis of fiscal restraints; it probably shouldn't but it sometimes simply has to be that way. He said he was sure the Israelis had the same problem. He had looked over Israel's purchases and, as they were aware, there is as yet no FMS bill and accordingly it looked as though there might be a problem in financing these purchases. He noted that there may be serious problems here which have to be "faced up to", of concern to both us and the Israelis. Ambassador Rabin agreed this was a major concern. The Secretary then referred to a list of recent and proposed sales and Israeli repayment obligations, noting that large cash commitments were coming due very soon. The latter obligations were hopefully to be covered from the FMS bill.

The Secretary said he had briefed the House Armed Services Committee very recently on Israel's problems. He noted the total Israeli pricetag looked as though it would come to some \$600 million for this year, and saw no reason why this financial requirement should not come into public discussion. Ambassador Rabin agreed, but said that State guidance had been there was to be no publicity on US military sales to Israel. He said that this makes Israel's problem tougher on Capitol Hill, with the press, etc., since he was not allowed to discuss details. The Secretary said that he felt it would not be necessary to get into details. The Ambassador replied that it would be necessary to get into the total sums involved, which State guidance had excluded; otherwise, he would fail in the job of getting support. He saw two problems: first, to what extent was DoD willing to make allocations for Israel, and second, to what extent was the Secretary willing to give support with Congress and the public? In addition, there was the difficulty of coping with restrictive legislation such as the McGovern/Hatfield Amendment.

Secretary Laird said he would have to talk to Congress about this matter, and that he could not "hit them cold." It could be in executive session, and need not have to take place publicly. Ambassador Rabin asked whether the Israelis could talk to Congressional

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Committee Members. Mr. Pranger pointed out that a distinction must be made between DoD and the Israelis on this matter. The Secretary agreed that the Ambassador's problem was different. Thus, at the Armed Services Committee no one had been aware of the extent of the financing problem; Chairman Rivers had said that no one had ever told them about the money involved. The Secretary said that it was our responsibility to discuss this and to begin preparing Congress. Mr. Pranger noted that when the Presidential decision had been made it had not been costed in dollar terms for Congress or any one else, and there will now have to be a reckoning within the Executive Branch. The strictures on the GOI talking about it would still hold. Dr. Manolas pointed out that the sums being discussed were entirely for the present fiscal year. The Secretary said he realized that, and that the present bill only covered \$119 million for FY 70 and 71.

The Ambassador then referred to Section V of the Military Sales Act, noting that it gives an option to the Administration to request more money for friendly countries in the Middle East, including Israel. He is not certain just what else the bill meant. Secretary Laird said he didn't know for sure either but in any event it would not provide financing, only authorization. Ambassador Rabin said that no one in the Administration had requested money. Mr. Pranger replied that money was just as sensitive a matter as equipment, so the problem should be discussed in terms of Israel's total economic means and not just military needs. Secretary Laird asked whether US and Israeli planning figures on Israel's financial needs were in agreement. Dr. Manolas, Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Dror agreed that they were almost identical, but they only covered FY 71 requirements.

2. Israel's Requirements

Ambassador Rabin said he would like to present the requirements as his government sees them. He said Israel was facing a Soviet threat, and a new effort to get a solution on Soviet terms. He noted that in the one and a half years of US-Soviet discussions there has been no progress. Now, since the end of June, a combined offensive by the Soviets was pushing forward, stopping just short of the last step or two. It involved pushing SA-2s, modified SA-2s and SA-3s closer to the canal--now within 20 to 35 miles. He felt the Soviets had political as well as

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military motives, and that they were not taking the last military steps because they wanted to be able to claim they are seeking only negotiations, not military solutions. Israel, he said, reads the Soviet-UAR communique as a willingness to enter a political settlement but only on their terms. The military moves now taking place were to give this position credibility. He said that Israel had decided to cope with this threat. They would not challenge the Soviets by attacking the Russian positions in the UAR heartland; but Israel cannot permit the Soviets and Egyptians to gain air superiority over the canal. They would have to challenge moves in this direction with equipment from the US. Israel felt it could handle this problem if it only involved Egyptian and very limited numbers of Soviet personnel. He noted that the price was becoming relevantly high for Israel; that there are now between 20 - 60 sites to be attacked including mostly SA-2 backed up by 3 to 4 SA-3s, manned by the Russians. If Israel should attack the SA-3s he felt the Russians would not publish this fact, but in any event Israel was determined to attack effectively.

Ambassador Rabin then said that to make its attack effective Israel had three basic requirements: locate the active sites, get penetration help and obtain more effective armament from the US. The first problem, he said was to locate which of the many sites were active. This was no longer easy since equipment was moved from site to site. Only last Saturday, Israel had attacked six sites and two turned out to be dummies. Once the sites were located Israel then needed electronic equipment to penetrate without being hurt too badly by the salvos of missiles now being fired. He noted that US equipment now gave them the availability to cope with the SA-2, but it still would not meet the modified SA-2, and it would not touch the SA-3. Secretary Laird said he understood modifications necessary to deal with the modified SA-2 were coming along. Mr. Pranger noted that an Air Force technical team was on the way to Israel right now. The Secretary asked if these had been "sheep-dipped." Mr. Pranger replied that the profile would be kept as low as possible, and the Ambassador insisted that Israel would certainly keep the image low. Secretary Laird noted that he had been disturbed by headlines even outside of Washington on a USAF team visiting Israel. Mr. Pranger said that was a separate problem and concerned General Edmundson's visit. However, he said, this new team had been instructed in

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categorical terms and there should be no problem. Ambassador Rabin then turned to his third point and said Israel needs more effective armament than the conventional bombs it was now using. He then said with the Secretary's permission he would like to mention some specific needs.

3. RF-4Cs

The Ambassador said Israel very much wants two RF-4Cs, and while Israel preferred to get them in addition to the six aircraft, if this was politically impossible they would even substitute them for two of the six. He said the Mirage was simply not as well equipped as the RF-4s. Mr. Pranger pointed to the problem of exceeding 50 deliveries, and Secretary Laird said he understood this. Ambassador Rabin said he understood it as well. The Ambassador said that even one RF-4C would be appreciated. The Secretary said that Mr. Foster had talked to him yesterday on this subject and that DDR&E was now looking at the problem. Ambassador Rabin asked why was there a problem. Mr. Pranger noted that one problem was the use of the RFs against SA-3s. We felt there might be serious danger of losing the aircraft. Secretary Laird referred to a note which he said he had just received from Dr. Foster, indicating DDR&E was studying the SA-3 question and looking at what Israel needed and whether the RF could be equipped to go against the SA-3. He said we would have something in the way of an answer shortly. He added that the US was not trying to delay on this but was seriously pursuing the question.

4. Drones

Ambassador Rabin said that he had been told it would take the US at least 8 to 10 weeks to supply a drone capability. Mr. Laird asked whether Israel was looking at Canadian drones. The Ambassador said that Canada does not like to supply equipment to countries involved in hostilities and that Canada had been refusing Israeli requests. Secretary Laird pointed out that the Canadian system included ground launch gear and at present all the US has is an air launch system. Ambassador Rabin indicated willingness to accept air launch equipment, but Mr. Pranger and Mr. Kubal pointed out the serious problems which this would involve, including expense, the need to train C-130 pilots (Ambassador Rabin said Israel would hire commercial pilots), and the serious effects of taking one of only twelve available C-130s away from the USAF for this purpose.

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Secretary Laird said he hoped that there would be something that could be done without getting US personnel more involved. Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Dror agreed that no approach had been made to the Canadians but they did not feel such an approach would accomplish anything. Secretary Laird suggested to Mr. Pranger that while he understood this point, ISA might go ahead and talk to the Canadians, as the Joint Chiefs had said this would be the fastest way of getting drones.

5. DoD Moves to Improve Handling of Israeli Requests

Secretary Laird asked whether the Ambassador understood the new organization which had just been set up to handle Israeli requests. The Ambassador said he had been told about it. The Secretary said this was not designed to delay but to expedite, and that we are going ahead very rapidly with our studies. Mr. Dror referred again to the drones indicating that to get them in 8 to 10 weeks required that the USAF release them for modification. Mr. Pranger pointed out that other questions were involved here, including the question of ground launch equipment, and that we needed time to get our feet on the ground and complete our internal study. Mr. Kubal noted that the small US team now in Israel would be returning on 22 July and we wished to study their report before a decision was made.

6. Requirements Against SA-3

Ambassador Rabin said that Israel had now lost one F-4 shot down and one very badly damaged from SA-3s, and needed equipment to use against this missile. Mr. Pranger said we would be meeting with our returning team on this and other matters. He pointed out that there might be a problem of releasing advanced technical data and equipment. Ambassador Rabin suggested that the US could make use of the Middle East as a proving ground for its equipment by providing it for Israel to use.

7. New Armaments

Ambassador Rabin said Israel was mainly interested in two items: CBU's and the SHRIKE. He said Israel would provide a guarantee that it would not use CBUs against civilian targets; he indicated this had been Mr. Pranger's idea. Mr. Pranger said this

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had been one of his ideas; he added this was a serious matter that would have to have a much higher decision. Ambassador Rabin said this was for Israel also a serious matter and that the CBU would greatly ease its task; the sooner Israel could hit the missile sites the better. He noted the SHRIKE would be a great help in this respect as well. Secretary Laird replied that DoD was now organized to handle these requests rapidly. We had been able to provide a very quick response to Israel's request for dealing with the SA-2 because we had the equipment available. Now, however, more difficult problems were involved and we had organized a task group to handle them. He said that we have other problems in the area which are affected by our decisions which we must bear in mind. The Secretary considered that the people he dealt with in Congress must be prepared before we move too rapidly, and he added "that's not your responsibility, it's mine." He said he could not hit Congress "cold" but that he would take care of this matter.

8. A-4s

Ambassador Rabin said he would like to discuss the A-4 question. Mr. Laird asked if there were a problem with production. Mr. Pranger said that only the "M" was available from production, that even "M" production had not yet started, and it had not yet been accepted by the Marine Corps. He said we have A-4Es available from PAR (Progressive Air Rework) with the possibility of converting them into something like Hs. The Israeli representatives indicated that Israel prefers Ms, even if there is a several months delay. Ambassador Rabin said he thought all of the modifications to the Es would raise the price to almost as much as the M and he would rather have the newer plane which would be available for a much longer period than the older E. The Israelis said they understood that the Es, even with the newer Navy proposal, would have to go back to the manufacturer for some retrofitting, and would not be available at least until March. Mr. Kubal referred to a Navy position paper just received that morning which indicated that careful selection from available Navy A-4Es would greatly reduce the compatibility problem, and with 30 to 60 days notice, the Navy itself could complete both PAR and retrofitting which would make the Es fairly compatible with Israel's Hs. He also pointed out that since the H was no longer in production, Israel would have a compatibility problem with the M or with any other model.

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Secretary Laird said that we would check out this matter in detail, and added that he felt the Israelis must have had a good salesman working on them. Mr. Pranger commented that these problems were just an ordinary day in the life of ISA. Mr. Kubal pointed out that taking any of the Ms from new production would hurt the Marine Corps and asked whether Israel wanted Ms badly enough to wait for delivery from new production. Ambassador Rabin replied that Israel was willing to wait for some months but hoped Ms could be available by next April to July. He added that Israel wants more than the 16 discussed, but had been told to come back in November if nothing favorable happened. Secretary Laird said he hoped that something favorable would happen to end hostilities. Ambassador Rabin agreed but said Israel must be prepared for the worst. He added that Israel hoped to have an option of getting more A-4Ms and would even put up its own money so that McDonnell could be ready to deliver these in January 1972, and would take a chance on getting later approval. Mr. Pranger noted that this whole question of delivery involved critical questions of timing and we would check out the whole question of A-4Es and Ms. Secretary Laird added that we will look into the matter actively.*

9. Financial Question

The Ambassador then returned to financial matters and asked how we could help Israel to get out of its financial squeeze. Dr. Manolas pointed out that some very important questions were facing us, inasmuch as a number of bills will be coming due very quickly. Mr. Pranger said we will be discussing this with Under Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson and we planned to prepare a breakout showing, on a monthly basis, dollar payments coming due.** He noted that we had Israel's assurances that there would be no question of meeting immediate payments, but that Israel had a basic and very serious balance of payments problem. He said that following the discussions with State, Secretary Johnson would probably be calling Mr. Laird. Ambassador Rabin stressed the urgency of Israel's immediate financial problems and also the need to think of the long range problems. Secretary Laird said he understood this very well.

* Further information, confirming the Navy position paper, is being provided separately to Israel.

** Meeting with Secretary Johnson and ISA held on 22 July

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TELECON

Ambassador Rabin/Col Kennedy

3:00 p.m., July 4, 1970

R: Yesterday, I had a talk with Mr. Kissinger -- he phoned from the Western White House and said all the requirements for electronics gadgets were approved by the President. The instructions were supposed to be given to the Department of Defense. However, Mr. Pranger said nothing can be done before Monday. We just lose two days. Can you please check to see if something can be done? I know it is your national holiday, but within the armed forces, some people still must work.

K: I will look into it and call you back.

Col Kennedy/Ambassador Rabin

4:00 p.m., July 4, 1970

K: I have the impression things are going well. I am certain of the 30 items. They are well under way and we are hopeful they will be actually moving in a couple of days at the most -- by Monday. As to the others, they are preparing a whole package of lists of offer and want to consult with your people on Monday to wrap it up.

R: I hope the 30 pieces will go through quickly.

K: I am sure they are moving right now. I got this from both State and Defense. Is this satisfactory with you?

R: Yes; thank you very much.

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R: Yes; thank you very much.

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FM DICK KENNEDY
TO WINSTON LORD
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FOLLOWING MEMO FURNISHED INFORMALLY BY GEN. PURSLEY FOR
GEN. HAIG'S INFO. PURSLEY ASKED THAT IT BE FORWARDED TO
HAK OFFICE IN SC IMMEDIATELY. ATTACHMENT IS CABLE
ALREADY SENT TO YOU WH01038.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR ECM AGAINST SA-2 AND SA-3 MISSILES

ISRAEL HAS REPORTED INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE VITAL
CANAL AREA, POSSIBLY INCLUDING SA-3 MISSILES, INCREASED USE
OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND SOVIET PILOTS FLYING AIR COVER.
THE DANGERS OF THIS INVOLVEMENT, SHOULD THESE REPORTS PROVE
ACCURATE, AS WE EXPECT THEY WILL, ARE OBVIOUS (DIA IS CHECKING
NOW). THIS SOVIET ACTIVITY CARRIES WITH IT THE REQUIREMENT FOR
A US RESPONSE WHICH MUST INDICATE THAT THE US WILL NOT TAKE
THESE MOVES FOR GRANTED. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, US ACTIONS
SHOULD NOT BE HIGH PROFILE OR ESCALATORY IN NATURE, WHICH
COULD RISK TEMPTING THE SOVIETS TO STILL FURTHER INVOLVEMENT.

ISRAEL HAS REQUESTED A VARIETY OF US ECM EQUIPMENT. THIS
REQUEST, WHICH HAS COME TO US THROUGH THE ATTACHE HERE IN
WASHINGTON AND THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV, IS BEING REVIEWED
BY DDR&E AND JOINT STAFF EXPERTS UNDER GUIDANCE FROM ISA.
IT APPEARS TO INCLUDE A GOOD DEAL OF EQUIPMENT AIMED PRIMARILY
AT COUNTERING THE SA-3 AS WELL AS THE SA-2.
TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY WOULD, OF COURSE, GIVE THE ISRAELIS
THE ABILITY TO MOUNT DEEP RAIDS AGAINST SOVIET MANNED TARGETS
IN EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISRAELI ATTACHE HAS ASSURED US THAT
HIS COUNTRY WOULD GIVE US WRITTEN GUARANTEES TO THE EFFECT THAT
ISRAEL WOULD USE THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDED ONLY ALONG THE CANAL
(A GUARANTEE SUBJECT TO GOI FINAL APPROVAL).

AS A RELATED MATTER, DDR&E IS STUDYING, AT MR. PACKARD'S REQUEST,
US REQUIREMENTS FOR [REDACTED] ON THE SA-3. AND
WAYS IN WHICH ISRAELI COOPERATION COULD HELP US [REDACTED]

THE US AGREED, A YEAR AND A HALF AGO,
TO SELL ISRAEL 14 ALQ-71 JAMMERS AGAINST SA-2S BUT THE FINAL
COMPONENTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL THIS FALL HOWEVER

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Per Sec 1.4(e)(3) 43.3

SUBJECT: ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR ECM AGAINST SA-2 AND SA-3 MISSILES

ISRAEL HAS REPORTED INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE VITAL CANAL AREA, POSSIBLY INCLUDING SA-3 MISSILES, INCREASED USE OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND SOVIET PILOTS FLYING AIR COVER. THE DANGERS OF THIS INVOLVEMENT, SHOULD THESE REPORTS PROVE ACCURATE, AS WE EXPECT THEY WILL, ARE OBVIOUS (DIA IS CHECKING NOW). THIS SOVIET ACTIVITY CARRIES WITH IT THE REQUIREMENT FOR A US RESPONSE WHICH MUST INDICATE THAT THE US WILL NOT TAKE THESE MOVES FOR GRANTED. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, US ACTIONS SHOULD NOT BE HIGH PROFILE OR ESCALATORY IN NATURE, WHICH COULD RISK TEMPTING THE SOVIETS TO STILL FURTHER INVOLVEMENT.

ISRAEL HAS REQUESTED A VARIETY OF US ECM EQUIPMENT. THIS REQUEST, WHICH HAS COME TO US THROUGH THE ATTACHE HERE IN WASHINGTON AND THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV, IS BEING REVIEWED BY DDR&E AND JOINT STAFF EXPERTS UNDER GUIDANCE FROM ISA. IT APPEARS TO INCLUDE A GOOD DEAL OF EQUIPMENT AIMED PRIMARILY AT COUNTERING THE SA-3 AS WELL AS THE SA-2. TO PROVIDE THIS CAPABILITY WOULD, OF COURSE, GIVE THE ISRAELIS THE ABILITY TO MOUNT DEEP RAIDS AGAINST SOVIET MANNED TARGETS IN EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISRAELI ATTACHE HAS ASSURED US THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD GIVE US WRITTEN GUARANTEES TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL WOULD USE THE EQUIPMENT PROVIDED ONLY ALONG THE CANAL (A GUARANTEE SUBJECT TO GOI FINAL APPROVAL).

AS A RELATED MATTER, DDR&E IS STUDYING, AT MR. PACKARD'S REQUEST, US REQUIREMENTS FOR [REDACTED] ON THE SA-3. AND WAYS IN WHICH ISRAELI COOPERATION COULD HELP US [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE US AGREED, A YEAR AND A HALF AGO, TO SELL ISRAEL 14 ALQ-71 JAMMERS AGAINST SA-2S BUT THE FINAL COMPONENTS WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL THIS FALL. HOWEVER, THE AIR FORCE CAN MAKE 30 (VERY SIMILAR) ALQ-87 JAMMERS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY.

PLAN OF ACTION:

WE WILL INSURE THAT:

1. ISRAEL BE IMMEDIATELY PROVIDED WITH THE 30 ALQ-87 JAMMERS AVAILABLE FROM THE AIR FORCE. THESE WOULD BE SOLD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD BE USED ONLY IN CANAL AREA. WE WOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT WE EXPECT ISRAEL'S COOPERATION IN MEETING ANY US INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE SA-2S AND SA-3S. J-3 (GENERAL VOST), AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE (GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU), DIA (ADMIRAL SHOWER) AND DDR&E (MR. BENNINGTON) CONCUR;

END PAGE ONE

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-40/4: Per Sec 1.4(c)(1) + 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 5-19-2009

By P. H NARA, Date 10-14-09

[P. 1062]

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2. WE INDICATE TO ISRAEL THAT WE ARE STUDYING THEIR OTHER REQUESTS AND THAT WE PLAN TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE ATTACHE WHEN HE RETURNS FROM ISRAEL NEXT WEEK;

3. WE PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO PREPARE A LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE BUT WHICH WOULD STILL BE LOW PROFILE AND NON-ESCALATORY IN NATURE. WE CAN THEN TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT THIS GEAR COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE SHOULD A DECISION BE MADE TO DO SO;

4. WE CONSIDER SELLING ISRAEL [REDACTED] CONFIGURED SO AS TO ASSIST THE [REDACTED] BECAUSE THIS IS A RELATIVELY HIGH PROFILE ACTION, IT WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE STATUS OF PRESENT US INITIATIVES CAN BE BETTER DETERMINED.
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Per Sec 1.4(c)(3)

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4. WE CONSIDER SELLING ISRAEL [REDACTED] CONFIGURED SO AS TO ASSIST THE [REDACTED] BECAUSE THIS IS A RELATIVELY HIGH PROFILE ACTION, IT WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE STATUS OF PRESENT US INITIATIVES CAN BE BETTER DETERMINED.
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Persec 1.4.63 (JL)
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 July 70

Memo For Dave Richardson (Sit Room)

Ref our telephone conversation. The attached is for rettransmittal to BG Haig. Please advise Secretary Laird's office as to the time BG Haig receives the items.



Richard R. Heinzman
Captain, USAF

'70 JUL 3 PM 7:21

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

JLN 02-40/5 PER 3.3(b)(1); 14p. 5/19/09

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3 July 70

Memo For Brig. Gen. Haig

The attached is for your information per
our telephone conversation.

Brig. Gen. Pursley

70 JUL 3 PM 7:21

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1-35670/70

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Requests for ECM Against SA-2 and SA-3 Missiles

Israel has reported increased Soviet activity in the vital Canal area, possibly including SA-3 missiles, increased use of Soviet advisors, and Soviet pilots flying air cover. The dangers of this involvement, should these reports prove accurate, as we expect they will, are obvious (DIA is checking now). This Soviet activity carries with it the requirement for a US response which must indicate that the US will not take these moves for granted. At the same time, however, US actions should not be high profile or escalatory in nature, which could risk tempting the Soviets to still further involvement.

Israel has requested a variety of US ECM equipment. This request, which has come to us through the Attache here in Washington and through our Embassy in Tel Aviv, is being reviewed by DDR&E and Joint Staff experts under guidance from ISA. It appears to include a good deal of equipment aimed primarily at countering the SA-3 as well as the SA-2. To provide this capability would, of course, give the Israelis the ability to mount deep raids against Soviet manned targets in Egypt. At the same time, the Israeli Attache has assured us that his country would give us written guarantees to the effect that Israel would use the equipment provided only along the Canal (a guarantee subject to GOI final approval).

As a related matter, DDR&E is studying, at Mr. Packard's request, US requirements for [REDACTED] on the SA-3, and ways in which Israeli cooperation could help us [REDACTED]

The US agreed, a year and a half ago, to sell Israel 14 ALQ-71 Jammers against SA-2s but the final components will not be available until this Fall. However, the Air Force can make 30 (very similar) ALQ-87 Jammers available immediately.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 4282

March 19, 1970

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ISRAEL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Conversation with Congressman
Ogden Reid

Joe Sisco asked me to pass along the gist of a telephone call he received this morning from Congressman Ogden Reid which we find somewhat reassuring regarding the possible Israeli reaction to the announcement on Monday on arms. Reid spent the evening with Jacob Weizman, Minister of Transport, who made much of the point that he has been acting vigorously to cool off the Cabinet. He expressed great confidence in President Nixon and that he would do the right thing for Israel over the future. In this connection, Weizman referred to a luncheon which he had with the President some years ago at the United States Embassy with Ambassador Barbour. Congressman Reid interpreted these observations as essentially a recognition on the part of the Israelis to adjust to the

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PLAN OF ACTION:

We will insure that:

1. Israel be immediately provided with the 30 ALQ-87 Jammers available from the Air Force. These would be sold with the understanding that they would be used only in the Canal area. We would also indicate that we expect Israel's cooperation in meeting any US intelligence concerning the SA-2s and SA-3s. J-3 (General Vogt), Air Force Intelligence (General Triantafellu), DIA (Admiral Shower) and DDR&E (Mr. Bennington) concur;

2. We indicate to Israel that we are studying their other requests and that we plan to discuss them with the Attache when he returns from Israel next week;

3. We proceed immediately to prepare a list of equipment which would be as effective as possible but which would still be low profile and non-escalatory in nature. We can then take steps to insure that this gear could be made available on short notice should a decision be made to do so.

SANITIZED

4. We consider selling Israel [redacted] configured so as to assist the [redacted] Because this is a relatively high profile action, it will be held in abeyance until the status of present US initiatives can be better determined.

Concurrence:

J-3 - General Vogt
AFIntell - General Triantafellu
DIA - Admiral Shower
DDR&E - Mr. Bennington

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

MESSAGE CENTER

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ACTION

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INFO RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASH DC

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RUEFHQA/OSAF

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR EQUIPMENT

REF: A. DAO TEL AVIV 1290 021435Z UL 70

B. EMBASSY TEL AVIV 3442 020920Z JUL 70

1. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR USE IN RESPONDING TO ISRAELI REQUESTS (REFS A AND B):

A. BASED ON REF MSG AND CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN DASD PRANGER AND GENERAL ZEIRA, DOD IS STUDYING ON URGENT BASIS ISRAEL'S REQUESTS FOR ECM EQUIPMENT.

B. URGENCY OF REQUEST IS RECOGNIZED HERE, AND AS INTERIM MEASURE, DOD BELIEVES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE 30 REPEAT 30 ALQ-87 JAMMERS AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY. THESE MUST COME FROM USAF STOCKS, AND THUS REPRESENT INDICATION OF SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH US VIEWS SITUATION.

C. YOU SHOULD REMIND GOI THAT IN PROVIDING THIS EQUIPMENT, THE US CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE AREA OF CONFLICT NOT BE WIDENED.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL GOI THAT DOD WILL DISCUSS ISRAEL'S REQUESTS WITH GENERAL ZEIRA ON LATTER'S RETURN FROM CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL. GP1

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PAGE 1

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CY NR: CJCS(ADM MOORER)-1(1) J3(GEN VOGT)-1(2) SECDEF(MR LAIRD)-1(3)
ASD/ISA(MR NUTTER)-1(4) DDRE(DR FOSTER)-1(5)
DIA(GEN BENNETT)-1(6) FILE-1(7)

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IMMEDIATE

SECDEF

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV ISRAEL

INFO STATE

JOINT STAFF

DDR&E

SAF

DIA

~~SECRET~~ NO DIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

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999

COORDINATION:

NSC - MR. SAUNDERS

STATE - MR. DAVIES

DDP&E - MR. BENNINGTON (SUBSTANCE)

DIA - RADM SHOWERS (SUBSTANCE)

AF - M/G TRIANTAFELLU (SUBSTANCE)

JOINT STAFF - L/G VOGT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 JUL 3 PM 2:47

ROBERT J. PRANGER

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1970 JUN 23 14 44Z

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3.3(b)(1)(b)

10:30AM 6-23-70 JTJ

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 001

ATT.: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL (BY MESSENGER)

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)(b)

ON JUNE TWENTYTWO LAST, A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THAT AMOS EIRAN, ATTACHE (LABOR), EMBASSY OF ISRAEL, MENTIONED TO AN INDIVIDUAL BELIEVED TO BE RICHARD PERLE, WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE, THEIR CONVERSATION ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE TWENTYONE LAST. EIRAN TOLD PERLE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ANY ACTION BE DELAYED UNTIL THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT IS MADE, PROBABLY "ON WEDNESDAY" AND ALSO THAT IT BE TREATED CONFIDENTIALLY. PERLE SAID THAT HE, PERLE, HAD TOLD ONLY "THE SENATOR" AND THAT THE ONLY THING THEY WERE CONTEMPLATING WAS POSSIBLY PREPARING A

END PAGE ONE

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
ALN 02-40/90 SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(b) Hr. 29 Dec. 06
By SP Date 25 MAY 07

[p.1 of

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3.3(6)(1)(6)

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION [REDACTED]

STATEMENT AFTER THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT IS MADE.

ON THE SAME DATE, INFORMANT LEARNED THAT ONE DICK (POSSIBLY RICHARD VALERIANI, TELEVISION COMMENTATOR) INQUIRED OF SHAUL BEN-HAIM, COUNSELOR (PRESS AND INFORMATION), EMBASSY OF ISRAEL, AS TO WHEN HE, BEN-HAIM, FELT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE "FREE COMMENT", TO WHICH BEN-HAIM SAID, "WHEN THERE IS SOMETHING TO COMMENT ON". DICK THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ARRANGE FOR A TELEVISION INTERVIEW REPLY FROM ISRAELI AMBASSADOR YITZHAK RABIN AFTER SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS MAKES HIS STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST THIS WEEK AND BEN-HAIM SAID HE WOULD ENDEAVOR TO ARRANGE SUCH AN INTERVIEW.

THE CURRENT "DIPLOMATIC LIST," PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CONFIRMS THE POSITIONS HELD BY EIRAN, BEN-HAIM AND RABIN, AS SET FORTH ABOVE.

GP-1

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[p. 2 of 2]

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HC

May 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

Abba Eban, this past Thursday night, met with the President's Conference (leaders of major Jewish organizations) and explained to them in detail the true interdependence between the Middle East and Southeast Asia theaters. He stressed that the first priority is maintaining the credibility of U. S. foreign policy and to do so means making every effort to help shore up U. S. resolve. He made clear that he was not interfering but simply explaining. He stressed that there had been no dictation by U. S.; no bargain struck; no hidden conditions to his declaration.

Leonard Garment

cc: Henry Kissinger ✓

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- 2 -

Your Objective

The principal problem is how to reassure Israel sufficiently to keep it from acting precipitously without foreclosing our options in the weeks ahead while we sort out our own strategy on long-term military and economic support for Israel.

More concretely, the immediate question is whether to offer Israel secretly 6-8 more aircraft now to be added at the end of present deliveries this summer. This would be an interim assurance that we are not cutting off Israel's crucial source of supply, recognizing that we are not in a position just yet to take new diplomatic initiatives.

The broader question is what combination of diplomatic moves, if any, might make it possible to go on supporting Israel without serious further setback to the U.S. position in the Arab world. An open decision on aircraft now could foreclose the option of making new diplomatic initiatives.

The Special Review Group is developing alternative courses of action for you to look at in the NSC. It would be desirable to keep your choices open until you have had a chance to consider them.

My own feeling is that, while we do not want to go too far, we have to do something to keep Israel from acting out of desperation until we sort out our long-term strategy.

We are keeping open the pipeline on their requests for the ordnance necessary to sustain the attacks across the Canal, but our aircraft decision has special significance. Ideally, it would be preferable not to have to commit ourselves now. However, a promise now to add 6-8 Phantom aircraft and some Skyhawks to the present line of deliveries when they end this summer could be a token of your interest not to cut off their source of supply. If you did this, however, it would be desirable to ask them to keep it secret themselves, leaving us to handle any publicity so as to minimize Arab reaction.

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Talking Points

-- You recognize that recent Soviet moves represent departures from past Russian practices that have historic significance. Our public statements and private approaches to the Soviets have reflected this recognition.

-- You are keenly aware of how Israel must feel. Israel by itself could not meet the full military power of the USSR.

-- You have said before and reiterate that the U.S. has no intention of seeing Israel's existence jeopardized.

-- You have also said that you would not let the Arab-Israel military balance tip against Israel and you intend to keep that pledge. We are studying Israel's needs for replacement aircraft urgently and will have an answer for Israel shortly. Sisco and I agree that the following would be the appropriate language to use:

/ We understand Israel's anxiety and its need to be certain about future sources of aircraft and other military supply. We are continuing the pipeline of general logistical support. Once the NSC review is completed, we plan to focus with Israel on the question of additional or replacement aircraft to which Secretary Rogers referred in his March 23rd statement. Israel can be assured that its source of aircraft will not be cut off.

-- The alternative here would be to tell Eban in general terms that we will add a few planes to present deliveries but will have to give them specifics shortly.

-- Injection of Soviet forces raises issues that go beyond the purely Arab-Israel balance. There is no question that the overall political-military balance has shifted but it may be that supplying aircraft to Israel alone is no longer a complete answer to maintaining the balance. That is what Israel has asked us to examine, and it poses the gravest questions for us. You will reach decisions as quickly as possible.

-- Meanwhile, Israel will have steady access to the usual range of ordnance and other military supply items.

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- 4 -

-- The United States for its part, in addition to its commitment to Israel's survival, has a national responsibility to maintain a strong position in the Arab world. We see no way of reconciling these two aspects of U. S. interests other than through a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This may not prove possible. The challenge now facing us is how Israel and the U. S. can together work out a strategy which will reconcile our commitment to Israel's security with out need to avoid being progressively eliminated from the Arab world.

-- You are also aware of Israel's economic needs and will come to grips with them as soon as the immediate problem is worked out. [Following your March decision to provide \$190 million in financial assistance this year, a U. S. economic team went to Israel to gain fuller understanding of Israel's long-term financial needs. Their report is just in. Meanwhile, the PL 480 agreement has been signed, while the military credit is in suspense pending resolution of the Congressional debate holding up the Foreign Military Sales Act.]

Mrs. Meir's Message

You will recall Mrs. Meir's message of April 27 asking us to react sharply to the news that Soviet pilots are flying in the UAR (Tab A). Your response was the statement issued by Ron Ziegler. I suggest, however, that you specifically refer to it and ask the Foreign Minister to thank Mrs. Meir for it and to tell her, as you will have said, that you take it most seriously. (This would seem a safer way to acknowledge than a written note.)

Also attached (Tab B) is a fuller summary of Secretary Rogers' talk with Eban Wednesday afternoon. A memorandum from Secretary Rogers will be sent to you as soon as it arrives.



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- 4 -


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Department of State

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TELEGRAPH

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CONTROL: 5 0 5 3Q

RECD: JUL 21 535 PM '70

Z 212055Z JUL 70 ZFFG
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9094
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 3700
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 1024
BT
S E C R E T 3855

NODIS

1. IDF PILOT YITZHAK (JEFFREY) PEER (SHOT DOWN ON JUNE 30)
IS KNOWN TO HAVE COME TO ISRAEL FROM US AT AGE 16. HIS PARENTS
STILL REPORTEDLY LIVE IN NEW JERSEY. UNCLEAR WHETHER HE STILL
HOLDS US CITIZENSHIP; WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CHECK WHETHER
REGISTERED WITH EMBASSY, AND WILL ADVISE.

2. MENACHEM EINI RECEIVED PILOT TRAINING IN US BUT IS NOT
BELIEVED TO HAVE ANY US BACKGROUND. GP-3. BARBOUR
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PASSED TO AMMAN, CAIRO BY CG/T

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3702

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RECVD: 22 JUL 70

5:46AM

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REF: TEL AVIV 3856

WHILE STATEMENT REFTEL EMBASSY RECORDS SHOW PEER TO BE DUAL NATIONAL SEEMS LEGALLY CORRECT DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION INVITED DEPARTMENT ON SEPTEMBER 16, 1968, SUBJECT: CITIZENSHIP & PASSPORTS - PEER, JEFFERY H. REFERENCE: CLN JULY 15, 1968, WHICH INDICATES DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE IN OPINION CONSULAR OFFICER THAT MR. PEER HAD BECOME SUBJECT TO THE EXPATRIATION PROVISIONS OF 349(A)3 OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT BY ENTERING THE ISRAELI ARMY SEPTEMBER 1961. ACCORDING TO AFFIDAVIT ATTACHED TO CERTIFICATE OF LOSS OF NATIONALITY ALSO IN DEPARTMENT'S FILES PEER ACKNOWLEDGED HIS ENTRANCE INTO ISRAELI ARMY WAS FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACTION. IN ADDITION PEER OBTAINED VISA CATEGORY OFFICIAL A-2 NON-IMMIGRANT ONLY RIARY 9, 1969, TO PROCEED TO US ON OFFICIAL MISSION.

BARBOUR

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 3204

Control: 5637Q

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Recd: Jun 21 11 51 AM

MODIS

SUBJECT: MIDEAST INITIATIVE

1. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN ASKED AMBASSADOR TO MEET WITH HIM IN JERUSALEM EVENING JUNE 23. RAFAEL AND DCM ALSO PRESENT. MEETING WAS LARGELY REHASH OF ISRAELI IDEAS BROACHED 17 JUNE 19 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MRS. MEIR, BUT ATMOSPHERE LESS EMOTIONAL.

2. EBAN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER WANTED TO CORRECT FOR RECORD STATEMENT MADE IN US PRESENTATION ASCRIBING TO GOI IN 1967 VIEW THAT OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE WAS PEACE WITH- IN 1949-67 BORDERS. BOTH FROM RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS, THIS WAS NOT SO, AND HAD NEVER BEEN SAID. EBAN HAD MET WITH SECRETARY RUSK ON JUNE 22, 1967, AND HAD EXPRESSED GOI THINK- ING AT THAT TIME. GOI HAD REACHED NO CONCLUSION THEN ON JORDAN BOUNDARY AND HE HAD SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT WHICH BELIEVED WEST BANK SHOULD NOT GO BACK TO JORDAN. EVEN ON UAR, GOI POSITION THEN WAS THAT BORDER SHOULD BE BASED ON PALESTINE-EGYPT INTERNATIONAL BORDER, RATHER THAN ARMISTICE LINE, NOTING THAT FORMER PLACED GAZA WITHIN ISRAEL. FURTHER, IN 1968, EBAN HAD GIVEN US RESULTS OF NEW GOI THINKING, WHICH WOULD MAKE NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARN EL-SHEIKH.

3. AMBASSADOR REPLIED HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON EXACT ORIGIN OF US STATEMENT, BUT THOUGHT IT MIGHT ALSO REFER TO DECLARATION MADE BY ISRAEL ON OUTBREAK OF 1967 HOSTILITIES THAT GOI HAD NO DESIRE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION.

4. EBAN CONTINUED THAT "UNLESS" CLAUSE IN US PRESENTATION PLACING CONDITION ON DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL AFTER AUGUST WAS A TIME BOMB WHICH CREATED A CRITICAL SITUATION "2- THREE US WITH NO COMPENSATION". AMBASSADOR REPLIED THIS SENTENCE WAS STATEMENT OF OBVIOUS, RATHER THAN CONDITION. IT WAS STATING PERHAPS MOST OPTIMISTIC AND MODEST CONDITION, IF UNDER JORDAN ISRAEL AND EGYPT PROCEEDED TO 1967 WHERE THEY ARE GETTING CLOSER TO PEACE, AND IT "UNLESS" WOULD DELIVERY OF PLANES WOULD JEOPARDIZE THIS, GOI "2-3" WOULD THIS SENTENCE COME INTO

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-2- Tel Aviv 3204, Section 1 of 2, June 21, NODIS

EFFECT. MAJOR ISSUE WAS TO ACHIEVE PEACE. THIS SENTENCE WAS NOT AT ALL PROVOCATIVE, BUT SIMPLY STATEMENT OF OBVIOUS.

5. CABINET AND KNESSET HAD BEEN TOLD. EBAN SAID, THAT THERE WAS NO LINKAGE BETWEEN MAINTENANCE OF MILITARY BALANCE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS. NOW LINKAGE WAS THERE. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THIS WAS NOT LINKAGE, BUT STATEMENT OF EFFECT WHICH WAS TIED TO MATTER BY REALITIES OF SITUATION. ASSUMING THERE WAS NO WAR, ISRAEL WOULD NOT WANT TO BUY PLANES. SITUATION REQUIRES BOTH POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND MILITARY SECURITY.

6. RAFAEL INTERJECTED THAT US STATEMENT WOULD BE BETTER IF IT SAID PLANES WOULD BE DELIVERED UNLESS PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS. EBAN WENT ON THAT NEXT PROBLEM WAS CEASEFIRE. HE DID NOT KNOW IF US WAS TELLING NASSER THAT CEASEFIRE WAS NOT BREAKING POINT. MAYBE EXISTENCE OF CEASEFIRE WOULD BE BREAKING POINT AS FAR AS ISRAEL WAS CONCERNED. HE COULD NOT SEE HOW US COULD ASK FOR THREE MONTHS CEASEFIRE, WHEN UN RESOLUTION PUT NO LIMIT ON IT. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN UN CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS AND NOVEMBER 1967 RESOLUTION, WHICH EQUALLY BINDING. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THERE WAS NO CEASEFIRE BEING OBSERVED AS OF NOW AND WE WERE TRYING TO GET ONE REESTABLISHED.

7. EBAN CONTINUED HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW PRIME MINISTER COULD BE EXPECTED EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH US PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. WHEN HE AND PRESIDENT HAD DISCUSSED PUBLICITY, HE HAD SAID GOI WAS PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH PUBLIC RESTRAINT ON SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT, BUT THIS IS ASKING RESTRAINT ON NON-SUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT. NOT SO, AMBASSADOR REPLIED, WE HAVE AGREED TO 40 MORE PLANES, SIX DURING JULY AND AUGUST AND THE REST FROM SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, SUBJECT ONLY TO OFF CHANCE THAT LATTER DELIVERIES MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHERWISE PROMISING NEGOTIATIONS. EBAN SAID PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIS SOVIETS DO NOT SAY WHAT THEY DELIVER TO EGYPT, AND HE HAD ASSUMED US STATEMENT WOULD ALSO NOT BE SPECIFIC.

8. RAFAEL SAID US STATEMENT GIVES FOUR OR FIVE CONSIDERATIONS AND THEN SAYS AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL WILL BE LIMITED. WHY NOT SAY, AFTER LISTING THESE CONSIDERATIONS, THAT DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL BE GUIDED BY THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN LINE WITH SECRETARY ROGERS' STATEMENT OF MARCH 23. ISRAEL IS TO GO TO NEGOTIATING TABLE, RAFAEL CONTINUED, ON BASIS OF WORDING WHICH EMPHASIZES WITHDRAWAL AND UNDER A THREAT OF NO AIRCRAFT, EVEN IF NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE, EVEN WHILE CEASEFIRE NOT BEING OBSERVED, AND EVEN THOUGH NO RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS PURCHASES OR INSTALLATION OF ARMS BY SOVIETS. WHY GO ON IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES?

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-3- Tel Aviv 3204, Section 1 of 2, June 21, NODIS

9. DO YOU WANT NEGOTIATIONS, AMBASSADOR ASKED? OR DO YOU WANT A CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES? WE WANT NEGOTIATIONS, EBAN INSISTED, BUT THAT IS WHY WE REGRET ROADBLOCKS USG IS PUTTING IN WAY. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO MAKE DEMANDS ON ONE SIDE AND NOT ON OTHER. CEASEFIRE IS PART OF WHOLE SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. RAFAEL SAID ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED JARRING'S 1968 FORMULA, EVEN THOUGH IT NOT ENTIRELY IN ACCORD WITH ISRAELI IDEAS.

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10. U. S. Proposals

Mr. Pranger commented that the long range problem could be met with US peace proposals and we might manage at least a cease-fire. Ambassador Rabin said that a cease-fire would only help the Russians by giving them three months to build up their systems, and then enable them to open fire legitimately. Mr. Pranger noted that obviously, provisions would have to be made for policing the cease-fire. The Ambassador said the UN observers did no good at all but just sat there. Secretary Laird wondered whether there were not limits to how long the situation could go on the way it was going. He referred to a visit he made to Israel in 1953-54 at which time he had been briefed by the then Israeli Foreign Minister. He said that listening to the Ambassador today impressed on him how similar the problems today were to those presented to him 17 years ago. He said that things did not seem to have changed very much and we do not seem to have progressed. He felt things cannot keep going on this way for another 25 to 30 years or there would not be a future for anyone. The Ambassador agreed that things seemed not to have changed and said in a way they were worse because the Soviets had injected their own forces. However, if it is a choice between Israel's ceasing to exist and coping as best they can, then Israel preferred to cope. Secretary Laird asked how long can Israel do this; looking ahead at longer term problems. The Ambassador replied that they had done so since 1953 when the Secretary was first briefed, and they thought that in these 17 years Israel had achieved something. The meeting closed with an informal exchange of comments on the Secretary's recollections of his earlier visit to the Middle East.

Memorandum of Conversation
Prepared by:

Mr. Robert H. Kubal
OASD/ISA/NESA Region

Approved by: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA/
NESA

Robert J. Pranger

Date: 29 July 1970

Distribution:

(See Attached List)

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with
the Compliments of the
Embassy of Israel
at Washington

Shalom

*S. This is but
e of many. S.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1970

H. R. G.
FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: LEN GARMENT

You may have already seen this.

with
the Compliments of the
Embassy of Israel
at Washington

Shalom

P.S. This is but
one of many. S.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1970

HAIG
FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: LEN GARMENT

You may have already seen this.

HK

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1970

35

The Philadelphia
Inquirer

BACKGROUND AND OPINION

Time to Draw Line on Arab Terrorism against Israel, West

WASHINGTON.

How long—and how much—will it take for reasonable Americans to see that the so-called "Palestine guerrillas" are simply the Vietcong of the Middle East? The Soviet's proxy aggressors against Israel just as the Asian "liberation fronts" are Communism's proxy plants of South Vietnam?

How much international air piracy will be required, how much humiliation of sovereign governments by threats of the wholesale murder of innocent men and women unless Arab guerrillas held as criminals in the West are released, law or no law and justice or no justice?



WILLIAM S.
WHITE

When all this is typical of the sort of Arab "liberation movement" with which the Israelis are tortured year upon year, what fair man can complain that the Israelis have withdrawn from "peace talks" arranged with the best will in the world by the United States?

How much more evidence will be required of the repeatedly confirmed violations of the cease-fire by Soviet-backed Egypt, including the emplacement of missile sites which clearly menace the last lifeline of Israel, its air force?

THESE are questions which can no longer be evaded. They are put here with perhaps a frustrated insistence, for this columnist for seven years has been attempting with little success to point to two inescapable realities. One is that the Mediterranean has become the theater for a Soviet plan of expansion no less immense and in the end no less dangerous than the post-war Stalinist lunge that swallowed up Central Europe and would have swallowed up Greece and Turkey too but for the memorable intervention of President Harry Truman.

The second reality is that regardless of who was right or wrong in the ancient Arab-Jewish struggle it was at any rate the United States of America that set up Israel in the first place—and that state is now the only strong pro-Western position in all the Middle East. Let it fall we must not. And this is not because it is "Zionist"—its "Zionism" being the reason given by many for looking the other way.

It is because this thing at bottom is not too dissimilar to the Cuban missile crisis, if admittedly far less directly menacing to us here. And it must be met as such by the United States if we intend to remain a great power in this world. Moreover, if international gangsters can blackmail and demean the very body of Western justice, it is time to draw a line.

NOBODY wants war in the Middle East, and certainly not an American-Soviet confrontation. But all history suggests that the way to avert such a war is not to rely forever upon sweet reasonableness but rather to meet measured Communist thrust with measured American thrust. Mr. Truman did it in Greece and Turkey. Gen. Eisenhower did it in Lebanon. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and now Nixon did it in Southeast Asia.

True enough, the doves in the Senate have in years of endless clamor against the war in Vietnam conditioned a large number of Americans to believe that nothing is worth fighting for, or even taking the slightest risk for.

What powers abroad, apart from North Vietnam, may they have convinced that our national guts are gone? True enough, too, it is a bitter thing when Senators who have had only criticism for our side in Vietnam and little or none for the Communist side are now at the forefront of those "demanding" action in aid of Israel.

Still, this hypocrisy is part of the price of a free society. It does not alter the unalterable realities, galling though it is. Galling, too, it is that the honored name "commando" is now widely bestowed upon Communist thugs. An ugly travesty this is, at least to those of us who remember what the real commandos, mainly British, did in the darkest days of World War II to rescue victims of Nazi "liberation."

BACKGROUND AND OPINION

Time to Draw Line On Arab Terrorism Against Israel, West

WASHINGTON.

HOW long—and how much—will it take for reasonable Americans to see that the so-called "Palestine guerillas" are simply the Vietcong of the Middle East, the Soviet's proxy aggressors against Israel just as the Asian "liberation fronts" are Communism's proxy assailants of South Vietnam?

How much international air piracy will be required, how much humiliation of sovereign governments by threats of the wholesale murder of innocent men and women unless Arab guerillas held as criminals in the West are released, law or no law and justice or no justice?



**WILLIAM S.
WHITE**

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from "peace talks" arranged with the best will in the world by the United States?

How much more evidence will be required of the repeatedly confirmed violations of the cease-fire by Soviet-backed Egypt, including the emplacement of missile sites which clearly menace the last lifeline of Israel, her air force?

Manifestly afoot are two campaigns of Communist terrorism—the one quite familiar in the good old "liberation" device and the other quite new in that it is at will denying freedom of the very air to any and all of the Western world.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 21960

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Further Military Assistance for Israel

You have asked for a further military assistance package for Israel to offset continuing Egyptian/Soviet violations of the military standstill.

Mr. Packard has put together the most likely possibility, and the Special Review Group has agreed that it is appropriate. Before describing that package, I believe I should take a moment to outline where broader thinking on this subject stands. A Pentagon task force and the Special Review Group have been working together since early July on solutions to Israel's new military problem.

The Military Situation Israel Now Faces

The Soviet/Egyptian buildup has created a new situation for Israel which consists of these somewhat contradictory elements:

1. The defensive missile complex has made the cost of regular Israeli air attacks west of the Canal intolerably high. [It is more sophisticated and denser than the defenses in North Vietnam.] The Israelis, since summer 1969, have counted on these air attacks to suppress Egyptian artillery firing against the thin line of Israeli defensive positions on the east bank of the Canal.

2. This produces two results:

--Israel's capacity to strike at the base of Egyptian military strength has been limited. It is now more costly for Israel to defend against Egyptian air attack by striking Egyptian air bases. [This has become increasingly difficult since 1967 as the UAR has dispersed aircraft and hardened aircraft revetments.] It is now more costly to strike at Egyptian troop concentrations on the west bank. In short, Egypt is less vulnerable in the rear and therefore safer in pressing the war of attrition at the front.

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SECRET/NODIS

-2-

--Egypt's capacity to sustain an invasion across the Canal, however, has not yet been enhanced in a major way. The effectiveness of Israeli armor has not been diminished. Israeli air-to-air superiority over the Sinai is not affected, except by the fact that, unlike 1967, it will have to deal with more Egyptian planes in the air. Israel's own surface-to-air defenses are being improved with additional HAWK missiles. The Israeli Chief of Staff seems to share this assessment.

3. One way of summarizing might be: Israel's military task in defending the Suez cease-fire line has become more difficult. But Egypt's ability to take the Sinai back has not yet improved commensurately.

4. Israel is, therefore, faced with a choice between:

- trying to fly daily against Egyptian positions on the west bank of the Canal, attacking missile sites as necessary;
- trying to alter strategy to defend the Suez line in a different way.

The Two Possible Strategies

1. An anti-SAM strategy. The Israelis have in the past used their air force as artillery. While they could fly virtually without loss west of the Canal, it was an inexpensive and reasonably effective strategy to bomb the UAR artillery positions heavily. When the SAM's began to increase the cost of this strategy, Israel first turned its efforts to attacking the SAM sites themselves. U. S. military experts following USAF experience in North Vietnam believe this is not the most effective strategy (a) because missiles are quickly replaced and (b) because it makes more sense just to try to jam the missiles so other more important military targets -- in this case the artillery positions -- can be attacked.

We have, therefore, two schools of thought about what the next package for Israel should look like:

--The Israelis are still requesting items of equipment that would enable them to attack the missile sites themselves, along with the necessary jamming equipment to make them less dangerous to attack.

--U.S. military experts are thinking in terms of a package that

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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that when Sam Schulman presented you the bound volume of the Bantam book publication of your foreign policy message, you discussed his forthcoming trip to Israel with him.


Attached is the result of his conversation with Mrs. Meir.


Herb Klein

Attachment

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NATIONAL GENERAL CORPORATION

94 BNAI DAN

SHIKUN BAVLY

TEL-AVIV, ISRAEL

416-097

LOUIS LENART

August 21, 1970

Mr. Herb Klein
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Herb,

Since I will not be returning to the States for several weeks, I felt impelled to offer my profound thanks for your hospitality and valuable time last August 7th at the White House, before the Memory of our meeting becomes too stale.

As per his authority, I conveyed to Mrs. Meir and other leaders of the State of Israel, the President's warm words of assurance relative to his pledge to ^{keep} maintain the freedom of this courageous country. The Prime Minister replied by commenting that she has great trust in Mr. Nixon and advised me that she was totally relying on his letter and contents contained therein. She added that it was Mr. Nixon's letter that prompted her to influence her people to accept a "Cease-Fire".

Upon leaving her home, she requested that I notify the President, our "Big Boss", that she has placed all her faith in him. I too have tremendous faith and esteem for our President and do preciously hope that neither Mrs. Meir nor myself ever have any reasons to regret our historical, momentous and potentially daring approach; for if we are in error, the blood of a people will forever be on our heads and a great State may be destroyed. The future of the United States in the Middle East depends on the integrity, courage and ingenuity of our Administration. Failure would result in the monopoly by Russia of not only the Middle East, but Asia, ^{Caucasus} Turkey and Africa. I believe, as does the President, that the Middle East has at least as equal significance to the United States, if not greater, than the Asian Sphere.

Warmest personal regards,

Shikun Bavly

P.S. PLEASE EXCUSE TYPING.

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21466


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1970

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was gracious of you to transmit the volume from Prime Minister Meir entitled The Seventh Day which I have read with interest. Please convey my appreciation to the Prime Minister for her kindness in forwarding the book and for her very thoughtful regards.

Warm regards,


Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel

Ed

OUTSIDE SYSTEM

~~SAUNDERS/SMITH~~
SAUNDERS/SMITH

Dispatched via Stamping Desk 9/7/70.

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3.3 (b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

As you will recall, the MSSM-LO Committee charged me with informing you when first indications appeared of the introduction of new Soviet weapons to Egypt with particular reference to the [REDACTED]. This is the first such report.

Richard Helms
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

[REDACTED] Copy No. 1.

16 March 1970
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101
1 AUG 54

REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION 21466
August 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Book for You from Mrs. Meir

Ambassador Rabin, under cover of the note at Tab B, has transmitted to you a book entitled The Seventh Day -- Soldiers' Talk About the Six-Day War, at the request of Prime Minister Meir. Enclosed in the book is Mrs. Meir's calling card on which she has written "To Professor Henry A. Kissinger with very best regards." [Julie is now holding the book for you.]

The volume is exactly what it says it is -- soldiers' discussion of the June 1967 war. It was put together by a group of young kibbutzniks -- writers, editors, youth leaders, teachers -- who decided to record the reactions of their generation of "sabras" or native-born Israelis who had fought in the battle. They write in the opening pages: "We felt within ourselves the need to hear each other, to talk to each other, to open up a dialogue of heart and mind. We wanted to explain to ourselves and to our comrades what had happened to us in those six short days that lasted so long." All of the authors -- who call themselves the editorial board -- had participated in the war.

Their method was to traverse the country interviewing war veterans on the kibbutzim and record their comments. Each interview is the cause for a new chapter in the book. Other than division within that format, the book is pretty much a series of free discussions among the interviewers and the interviewed. From that point of view, it is fairly interesting in that it provides an opportunity for the reader to hear the Israelis themselves talking about the problem of Israel. There is no analyzing, no drawing of conclusions; there is only what the people have to say.

What Comes Through The book is a classic revelation of the Israeli personality -- it surfaces the constraints imposed upon a people who are driven by a sense of destiny to perform the toughest acts of self-defense and are at the same time possessed of melodramatic spirit. Reactions range from fierce determination never

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- 2 -

to yield what has been gained to unparalleled mental flagellation about what to do about achieving peace and becoming accepted. There is constant talk about the Jewish dream -- which in many cases is epitomized by Israeli possession of Jerusalem -- and the holocausts of the past which brought about so much persecution; there is an emphasis on the Jewish fate, the tragedy of a people bound for war in order to seek the peace, and the feeling that this may not be the end of the battle. Victors, yet with deep fears of being rejected once again, the Israelis who speak here represent both the strengths and the weaknesses ["the noose is getting tighter" as Eban puts it] of this unusual people. Several recurrent thoughts are worth noting:

--Many Israelis -- especially the young -- are concerned about becoming militarists. They are worried that they will not be able to reach the cultural and intellectual heights to which they aspire -- and which would benefit the area -- if they continue down the road towards becoming a garrison state.

--Most Israelis are not Arab-haters and are concerned that the Arabs do not appreciate this fact; they fear that they are unable to project what is important to them -- their Jewishness -- without having it read as imperialism. Those who are recorded here also see a role for the Palestinians, either in conjunction with the Israelis or in a separate state on the West bank.

--Most admit to the necessity for border changes for security -- rather than territorial -- reasons.

--Most are determined to keep Jerusalem in Israeli hands.

--All are tired of war and enjoy less the role of being a conquering power.

The real interest in this book lies in its projection of the Israelis' nervousness -- the phenomenon we are so familiar with in dealing with Israeli leadership.

Recommendation: That you sign the note at Tab A to Ambassador Rabin thanking him for transmitting the book.

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2000

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

12 August 1970

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Prime Minister Golda Meir has requested that I forward to you in her name the enclosed book entitled "The Seventh Day." I trust that you will find its contents of interest.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Y. Rabin

Y. Rabin, Lt. General (Res.)
Ambassador

The Honorable
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Executive Offices
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL OFFICE

NUMBER MO DA HR

21466 08 21 11

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: HPES ☒ FROM: ELIOT ☐ CLASSIF: U ☐ EXDIS
HAK ☒ ROGERS ☐ C ☐ NODIS
LAIRD ☐ LOU ☐ EYES ONLY
S ☐ RES DATA
TS ☐ CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN

DOC DATE: 8/12/70

RABIN, Y.

SUBJECT: Ltr forwarding her bk "The 7th Day"
(BK is available in HAK's office, per Julie)

ENCLOSURES: 1 () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Saunders

| | ACTION | INFO | RCD CY FOR: |
|-------------------------|--------|------|-------------|
| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG | | | |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | |
| DIR, SECRETARIAT | | | |
| SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | X | | |
| NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA | X | X | |
| EUROPE/CANADA | | | |
| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
| UNITED NATIONS | | | |
| ECONOMIC | | | |
| SCIENTIFIC | | | |
| PLANNING GROUP | | | |
| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | |
| FAR EAST | | | |

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
MEMO TO ()
RECOMMENDATIONS ()
JOINT MEMO ()
APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
ANY ACTION NECESSARY (X)
CONCURRENCE ()

DUE DATE:

28 Aug

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE 8/31 FROM Saunders TO HAK ACTION REQUIRED Sign letter to Rabin

MICROFILM DATA
DOV
INIT
DATE
ORIG: NSC
TO) PAF
WIC
SUBP

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/NOTE

NOTIFY:

COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC ☐ STAFF APPROVAL
PAF ☒ HAK APP'L
WIC ☐ HAK MARGINALIA
SUBP ☒ NSC FORM REQUIRED

Dispatched via Shipping Desk
Rabin 9/19/70

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21466

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1970

NOTE FOR MR. SAUNDERS

THROUGH: Jeanne Davis 

FROM: Julie Pineau

For staff action.

The book is available in Mr. Kissinger's office should you wish to see it. I prefer to keep it here in the event he asks for it.

Attachment

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8d18-

File your file
mldw

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 9, 1970

Henry:

I am concerned by your notes on second page of Saunders' memo. The package with which this memo deals is a contingency package including a rather large shipment of military materiel to Israel, which as I understand was designed to meet future contingencies for stepped-up Israeli military activity. It includes long-range artillery, HAWK batteries, tanks and other personnel carriers as well as considerable electronics and advance munitions. Saunders insists that it is really a contingency package which was not approved for actual delivery.

Al Haig

SECRET/SENSITIVE

AMH:wgh:8 Sep 70

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Hair to 2 2 Ziegler

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Hookers -

file

1. Continuing deliveries -

are they those promised
by LBT or this

Administration? When are
final deliveries of LBT planes
due to be completed?

2. Has military balance been
tipped - is this implied
by Laird remarks? u

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Yag to 2 2 Ziegler

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Hoskins -

File

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due to be completed?

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DEX TO SAN CLEMENTE

September 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON ZIEGLER
WINSTON LORD

FROM : Peter Rodman *PR*

SUBJECT: Morning Press Items

1. What is the President's view on the 14 Senators' proposal for a standstill ceasefire in Vietnam, now that he has had a chance to study it?

Guidance: We have read the letter. We find it a very constructive contribution. As I said yesterday, it is consistent with the President's approach to this question. We have proposed a ceasefire and are flexible on it.

FYI: Be appreciative, but don't endorse any details of it. End FYI.

When has the President ever formally proposed a comprehensive standstill ceasefire like this one, and what was the result?

Guidance: The President first proposed an internationally supervised ceasefire in his speech of May 14, 1969. It was put on the table at Paris immediately thereafter, and has been re-endorsed several times since then by the President and our Paris negotiators. Hanoi has refused to discuss it.

Isn't the Senators' proposal new because of the standstill and the political settlement aspects?

On
Guidance: ~~Our ceasefire proposal is flexible and comprehensive;~~ we've never ruled anything out. Our side has also offered a comprehensive proposal for political settlement, as I mentioned yesterday.

2. What about the reports that the U.S. now has hard evidence of Soviet and Egyptian violations of the Mideast standstill, and that General Dayan has persuaded the Israeli Cabinet to press for U.S. action? (L.A. Times, N.Y. Times, UPI-47-A)

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- 2 -

Israel

Guidance: I am sorry I am not going to get into that. We are in touch with all the parties. It would not be helpful to discuss this publicly at this time.

FYI: Try to hold this line. State plans to do so, but, if driven to wall, will "neither confirm nor deny" reports of our knowledge of violations. End FYI.

3. Secretary Laird told reporters this morning that U.S. aircraft deliveries to Israel were continuing. Is this new?

Guidance: I don't have a full text of Laird's remarks, but I understand that he was simply repeating the statements in his Monday letter to Stennis: "We are taking such steps as are necessary to assure that the arms balance does not tip against Israel."

FYI: Laird did suggest deliveries were continuing, in reference to aircraft that were promised but not delivered before the standstill went into effect; he did not cite types, quantities, or dates of deliveries. End FYI.

4. Have we given helicopters to Lon Nol?

Guidance: I have nothing to add to what I said yesterday.

Contingency Guidance: [For use only when fact of arrival of aircraft in Phnom Penh becomes known to press]: Comment should be confined to low-key confirmation that six U.S. UH-1 helicopters have been loaned to Cambodia for purposes of: (a) transport of Cambodian senior officials and leaders to countryside and provincial towns to maintain contact with the population, (b) evacuation of wounded, and (c) assistance in moving personnel and supplies.

FYI: Cambodia has some trained helicopter pilots, though they will need instruction (from the South Vietnamese) in flying this type. (They have flown French "Alouettes" previously.) End FYI.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 26, 1970

S/S 13078

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Soviet Jews Forwarded
by the Israeli Embassy

On September 2 Ambassador Rabin delivered a letter to Secretary Rogers attaching a letter addressed to President Nixon by 18 Jews resident in the Soviet Union (copies enclosed). The Ambassador requests that the communication be forwarded to the President for whatever action he may be able to take on their behalf.

The letter, signed by members of several families, describes their efforts to emigrate to Israel and charges that Soviet authorities are not only blocking in a variety of ways their efforts to emigrate but are also discriminating against Jews within the Soviet Union.

The Department has replied to Ambassador Rabin's letter with a letter from the Secretary (a copy of which is enclosed) confirming transmission of the incoming letter to the White House and restating as we did on the last occasion in April 1970 our position in support of freedom of movement for all persons. Since the Department's experience in the past has been that attempts by this Government to assist the efforts of persons in the Soviet Union to obtain permission to emigrate have been nonproductive and always contain the risk of doing more harm than good, no further specific action is planned.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated

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(38) 12093 S

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
ושיכונן

1970 SEP 3 AM 9 45

2 September 1970

ACTION
is assigned to

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

AO/164

NE

My dear Mr. Secretary:

RS/R

I have been instructed by my Government to forward the enclosed letter, with translation. It is signed by 18 Jewish heads of families, citizens of Georgia, USSR, and is addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel for transmittal to the President of the United States.

The letter constitutes an appeal for assistance to enable these families to unite with their relatives in Israel.

The authors of the attached letter make their appeal on manifestly humanitarian grounds, and it is in this spirit that I am forwarding their communication to the President for whatever action he is able to take on their behalf.

16650

Sincerely yours,

Y. Rabin

Y. Rabin, Lt. General (Res.)
Ambassador

①

Enc. ✓

9/13/70

The Honorable
William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

50C

12

USSR

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TRANSLATED FROM RUSSIAN

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
MR. RICHARD M. NIXON

Mr. President,

We, 18 religious Jewish families of Georgia, appeal to you with a request for help.

Each of us, after getting an invitation to emigrate to Israel from a relative there, obtained the necessary forms from the competent organs of the USSR as well as oral promises that there would be no impediment to his emigration. Each of us, expecting to emigrate any day, sold his property, including his house, and resigned from his job. We filled out the forms and remembered the promises. A year passed (for many - more than one) - and nothing happened.

We made dozens of applications to the Government of the USSR. This is the answer: in Tbilisi (Georgian SSR), in the section in charge of emigration, the visitors are now plainly warned before reception: "Don't come, if it's concerning emigration to Israel!"

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- 2 -

We appealed to the Commission for the Rights of Man and to the Secretary General of the UNO but it is evidently easier to adopt a resolution about the withdrawal of UN forces from cease-fire lines than to give even an answer to exhausted people ...

Meanwhile we are being assured that the Jews throughout the world do not represent a single nation because "they do not have a common economy, a common territory and culture, a common language and common customs." From this follows the conclusion that - if Jews are not a single nation there is no reason to want to go to Israel, and that whoever wants to go is an agent of international imperialism and Zionism. We hear and read such words quite frequently.

But common economy can exist only in a common territory: and there is one - in Israel. Therefore to say that Jews are not one nation is absurd; with equal success one can say that the Armenians, who are dispersed throughout the world and have a common territory only in the Armenian SSR, do not represent "one nation" either.

As for the rest, let us say that under the conditions existing in the USSR there is no place to learn the Jewish language; there is no single Jewish school in the country. Therefore it is not quite clear for whom the newspaper in Jewish is published. Under the conditions of an acute paper shortage this ought not be done; the few workers of the editorial office - evidently the basic readers of the papers - could inform one another of their compositions in some other way, without giving full-time work to the press.

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-4-

If the situation does not change, the Jewish nation will be obliterated within the boundaries of the USSR in the foreseeable future. The results of the population census of 1970 are supposed to be published soon, but one can foretell in advance that in comparison with the 1959 census (when there lived in the country 2,300,000 Jews) the number of Jews in the USSR has sharply decreased.

One can fail to notice tendencies and one can leave questions unanswered, but they do not cease existing because of it. In any case, when life poses questions it is impossible to keep silent, because there will unfailingly be an answer - but from others.

And then the answers might not be to the liking of all.

We therefore welcomed with joy the report of a press conference organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at which a statement of some Jews of the USSR was read out. We expected to hear about the revival of the culture of the Jewish people in the country, about the organization of Jewish theatres and schools, that our children would some day be able to speak the Jewish language - and about many other things that the Jewish people needs. Instead of this we heard the reminiscences of a Kolhoz chairman about dinners and feasts.

We expected that everything would be said by a Jew - Secretary of the CC of the CPSU or at least a Jew worker in the CC CPSU apparatus. . . However, as is known, there are no such persons.

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9465

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

From: Bill Timmons *BT*

Subject: Senator Pastore's inquiry about an export license application for Israel

1. This office has received a query for guidance on the basis of the following:

"Attached is a copy of a letter forwarded to me from Senator Pastore from the MB Electronics Division of Textron which has applied for a license to export vibration test equipment to Israel. This application is still pending before the operating committee. I am advised that DOD has submitted a negative response and State Department is "procrastinating" but probably leaning against approval. Apparently this equipment would have a possible application to the development of a nuclear weapon system. However, Israel already has similar equipment and three foreign countries make equipment of comparable quality and technology. I am concerned that a rejection or indefinite delay might have serious political repercussions in view of the phantom jet situation. The thrust of the Export Administration Act passed last year was toward liberalization and lessening of controls toward Eastern countries. It would be all the more so in the case of Israel from the standpoint of the Hill in my opinion.

"I call this to your attention because the present situation suggests to me that negative action will be taken assuming my reading of the State Department position is correct and I believe the White House needs to be aware of this in view of the political criticisms that might be made."

2. If appropriate, I would appreciate any advice or guidance that you would care to give.

3. This is simply forwarded as a matter pertaining to your areas of responsibility.

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E/EWT - Mr. Dozier

April 22, 1970

E/EWT - Seymour S. Goodman

Export of Vibration Testing Equipment to Israel

The following represents some of the background you requested on the application by MB Electronics, New Haven, Connecticut, to export a vibration testing system with a force rating of 15,000 lbs. thrust to the Israel Air Force.

1. Basically similar U.S. equipment, including two "exciters" with a force of 15,000 lbs. thrust, was sold in October 1967 to the Israeli Aircraft Industries. The earlier shipment did not have all of the data collection equipment being included in the current application. It should be noted that the Israeli Aircraft Industries, an Israeli manufacturing firm, does both civilian and military work.
2. The equipment in the current application is available from the U.K. and Japan. The foreign-made equipment reportedly performs the same function but is not quite as durable as the U.S. equipment.
3. We do not yet have a firm State position on this case. I understand NEA is leaning towards denial on foreign policy grounds. DOD has indicated it would recommend denial on grounds of nuclear non-proliferation.

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MEMORANDUM

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

April 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yitzak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
Shlomo Argov, Minister, Israeli Embassy
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

DATE and PLACE: Friday, April 24, 1970 at 6 p.m. in Dr. Kissinger's Office

Ambassador Rabin began by saying that, since April 18, there is a new phenomenon in the Middle East. Soviet pilots have taken an active role by participating in the air defense of Egypt.

In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, the Ambassador said that Israel estimates there are fifty Soviet pilots involved; Israel does not know how many aircraft are involved. They fly from three bases, two southwest of Cairo and one (Djankialis) near Alexandria. The last has been involved in only two incidents where planes were scrambled. Most of the activity has been from the two southern bases.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether Soviet pilots have engaged Israeli aircraft. The Ambassador replied, "Almost," on April 18 over the Nile. The Ambassador described the new pattern of Soviet activity as follows: Soviet-piloted aircraft operate south of an east-west line from Cairo to Suez. For the time being, they are not interfering with Israeli attacks in the Suez Canal Sector. Israel does not yet know whether they will expand their operations into that area.

Over the past week, the number of Soviet responses has grown rapidly. Whenever Israeli planes approach, Soviet planes are scrambled. As a normal thing, they have not tried to interfere directly with attacking Israeli planes, even in one instance when Israeli planes were attacking a target on the west shore of the Gulf of Suez south of the Cairo-Suez line.

The corollary to this move in Egyptian actions has been greater aggressiveness in Egyptian air attacks on Israeli positions in the Sinai. Since the Egyptians feel that their hinterland is defended by SA-3 missiles (there are now ten operational sites -- four around Alexandria, six around Cairo), they have mounted more sorties themselves.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION 9463

April 22, 1970

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Assistant Secretary Sisco's Talks in Israel

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As you know, Assistant Secretary Sisco has just completed a round of talks with the Israeli leaders. Among others, he met with Prime Minister Meir, Deputy Prime Minister Allon, Defense Minister Dayan and Foreign Minister Eban. These conversations did not turn up anything significantly new in terms of substance, but they do provide a good reflection of current Israeli views on several important matters.

Arms Decision. The Israelis are disappointed with our decision on their request for more aircraft. They have clearly, however, not lost faith in us and are probing the depth of our intentions. They now seem prepared to conduct future arms discussion quietly and discreetly.

Mrs. Meir reflected this disposition when she said she was hurt by the arms decision but that her confidence in you and the U.S. Government had not been shaken. What hurt the most she said was the growing doubt that Israel would not get more aircraft from the U.S. She said that we should give Israel the benefit of the doubt on its arms requests, since it is dealing with the question of its own existence and therefore should not be blamed for possibly exaggerating its needs. She was pleading for the right to be more careful and anxious about Israel's security than the U.S. might think necessary.

Defense Minister Dayan concentrated more on our future intentions than on the past. For instance, he specifically asked if it would be possible to continue receiving Phantoms and Skyhawks at the rate of four each per month through the end of the year (this would mean an additional 24 of each type of aircraft.)

Military Situation: The Israelis appeared preoccupied with and concerned over the increased Soviet military involvement in Egypt. They seem prepared, however, to react in a prudent and restrained manner that would neither escalate the conflict or jeopardize Israel's security.

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
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Enclosure 2

RECENT ISRAELI EMBASSY

"POLICY BACKGROUND" PAPERS

1. Four Power Talks - Obstacle to Peace; December 1, 1969
2. An Analysis of the U.S. Mideast Peace Plan;
December 24, 1969
3. Nasser's War of Attrition and the Soviet Dimension;
February 4, 1970
4. Atrocity in Zurich; February 22, 1970
5. The U.S. Response to Israel's Aircraft Needs -
An Assessment; March 26, 1970
6. The Soviet Union Assumes Combatant Role Against
Israel; April 29, 1970



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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 02-39/12 per ltr 15 Aug 2007

By CIM NARA, Date 9 Sept 2008

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S/S 6721

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

*Entered in HHS - HAK memo
(9834) of 5/1 HS*

May 7, 1970

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Israeli Embassy Circulates Comments
on Soviet Pilots in U.A.R.

The Israeli Embassy in Washington is circulating its sixth in a series of "policy background" papers issued over the past five months which have either criticized positions or actions of the United States, or have attacked the Soviet Union, or both. The latest paper is dated April 29, 1970 and entitled "The Soviet Union Assumes Combatant Role Against Israel" (copy enclosed). As in the case of the earlier papers, we assume that it is being circulated to members of Congress, the news media, and numerous private Americans and organizations. Since these papers in the past have caused an increase in the number of Congressional and public inquiries to the White House as well as the Department, the following background may be of assistance.

The document makes categorical charges against the U.S.S.R. Its thrust is that the Soviet Union, bent on aggrandizement, has systematically wrecked prospects for a relaxation of tensions in the Middle East. The document's opening sentence inaccurately describes the nature of Soviet pilot involvement in the U.A.R. as we understand it. It alleges that the Soviet pilots "have been carrying out combat missions against Israeli planes, with instructions to intercept and engage them in battle," when in fact Soviet aircraft have not engaged the Israelis in battle. Neither we nor, we believe, the Israelis know

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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RJ
MAY 18 1970

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POLICY BACKGROUND

-2-

April 29, 1970

3. The ruthlessness of Soviet policy unfolded in disastrous dimension in the Spring of 1967 when, by a series of calculated machinations, it created the conditions for the outbreak of war. Russia instigated its eruption by feeding Cairo with false intelligence reports, created the pretext for the Egyptian aggression, and provided the military tools that made it possible.

Phased Escalation

4. The war lost, Russia immediately set about recouping its losses. By shoring up Egypt's faltering aggressive posture through an unprecedented airlift of weapons and technicians, the Soviet Union snatched away the prospect of peace. It did all in its power, militarily and politically, to deflect the Israel-Arab conflict away from the peace table, back to the field of battle. The airlift was followed by a systematic and speedy rearming and retraining program of the Egyptian armed forces so that within 18 months they were already at a strength surpassing that of 1967. Each phase of military rehabilitation was accompanied by an escalating stage of military aggression until a point was reached, in the Spring of 1969, when Nasser was in a position to publicly abrogate the cease-fire and launch his war of attrition.

Soviets Held Key to Attrition Policy

5. The Soviet Union alone made this phase of the war possible by guaranteeing the resources for its conduct. It was entirely contingent on Soviet arsenals. The goal of attrition was in Nasser's words, "to exhaust and bleed Israel." He launched his strategy in the sure knowledge that Russia would supply him with

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RESEARCH STUDY

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

May 7, 1970

WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV: CLASHING INTERESTS AMIDST INTERDEPENDENCE

This paper is not a detailed history of events in the Middle East since the war of June 5-10, 1967 between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors. Rather it is a survey of the main trends that have developed between the main combatants, as well as of their interrelationships with the United States and Soviet Union, both of which are active in the area.

ABSTRACT

Since the June 1967 Six Day War, the Israeli Government has found the diplomatic and national security objectives which it has set for itself to be unattainable. Simultaneously, the range of options available to it for pursuing any policy has been progressively reduced. Whether any other policies would have brought about more favorable results must remain an undeterminable "historical if". However, it is now clear that the USSR and Egypt are set on a political and military course which each believes likely to pay major dividends vis-a-vis the positions of both the United States and Israel. In this situation, continued Israeli inflexibility in adhering to its present stands, along with its insistent and largely successful efforts to box the United States into the appearance and reality of total support

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Haig

April 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR BRYCE HARLOW

FROM: General Haig

SUBJECT: Briefing on Israeli Relationships for John R. Blandford,
Chief Counsel of the House Armed Services Committee

I am sorry it has taken so long to respond to your memorandum of March 30, 1970 concerning John R. Blandford's request for an in-depth briefing on our Israeli relationships. Hal Saunders of our staff has been designated by Henry to do this job if Mr. Blandford is still interested. Hal is probably the most qualified individual available and I am sure that Russ Blandford would find the time spent on the briefing of great value.

cc: H. Saunders

AMH:feg:4/9/70

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Views of Congressman Rivers'
Assistant, John Blandford,
re Our Policies Vis-a-Vis Israel

While I am not sure how Rivers' Assistant,
John Blandford, feels about the Arab-Israeli
conflict, I do know that Rivers has long been
an anti-Israeli bigot and therefore, suspect
that Blandford shares these views.

*with
this problem in mind
you do not want to
proceed? I believe
Saunders would more than
please him -
yes H*

Attachment

At dinner at his home the other evening, he expressed great concern over our policies vis-a-vis Israel.

I urge that an appropriate person be sent to give an in-depth briefing to Blandford on our Israeli relationships, especially including the jets issue. He can carry our word very powerfully with Chairman Rivers and the other members of the influential Committee.

HAK

this is tricky - How do
you wish to move?
@

Does to work

What may does to learn?
probably anti Israeli
Rivers is very @

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MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

26270

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

February 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Rusk-Eban Conversation -- June 22, 1967

Attached is the record of the Rusk-Eban and the Eban-Goldberg conversations of June 1967 to which Secretary Rogers referred at the NSC meeting yesterday morning. The first is the more important.

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Secretariat

I didn't get the attachment back - they
lx must have kept it upstairs - but let's
close the file out.

nancy 3/2 262570

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Memorandum to the Department of State To [Signature]

SECRET

ZNY USUN 77H-
R 2201Z JUN 67
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRRG
BT
SECRET USUN 5845

Control: 18210
June 22, 1967, 3:27 A.M.

SECTO 13

EXDIS

Elon-Russ - June 21, 1967

FOLLOWING UNCLEARED MEMCON FYI NOFORN AND SUBJECT TO REVISION.

SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG RECEIVED ISRAELI FOMIN EBAN ALG WITH RAFAEL AND HARMAN 7:15 P.M. JUNE 21. HOUR'S CONVERSATION REVOLVED AROUND TWO MAIN TOPICS: (A) SITUATION IN NEAR EAST AND ISRAELI VIEW RE SETTLEMENT AND (B) PRESENT PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION IN UNGA. THIS TELEGRAM COVERS TOPIC (A).

SECRETARY REFERRED TO SENTIMENT IN UNGA RE NEED FOR REAFFIRMATION PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL BEFORE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS ON BASIS F R SETTLEMENT COULD TAKE PLACE. HE BELIEVED THERE WERE TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS AS REGARDS FORM AND SUBSTANCE. IF WE COULD BE CLEAR ON SUBSTANCE WE COULD THEN BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON MODALITIES.

EBAN STATED ISRAELI INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE HAD COME TO SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY BUT NOT OTHERS.

PAGE 2 RUEHDT 5845 SECRET

EGYPT-ISRAEL. ISRAELIS WANTED PEACE TREATY ON BASIS PRESENT INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ISRAELI MARITIME PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS TIRAN AND SUEZ CANAL AND AIR PASSAGE OVER STRAITS. IN CONTEXT NON-BELLIGERENCY THIS WOULD MEAN ISRAEL WOULD BE TREATED LIKE EVERYONE ELSE. IN SAME CONTEXT ISRAELI ENVISAGED DEMILITARIZATION OF SINAI, WHICH WAS NATURAL BARRIER BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. FROM EGYPT, ISRAEL WANTED ONLY SECURITY. NO TERRITORY. ISRAELIS FELT EGYPT MIGHT BE ATTRACTED TO THIS CONCEPT.

IMPORTANT THING THAT THERE MUST BE TREATY WHICH COMMITTED EGYPTIANS. ISRAELI UNWILLING ACCEPT ANOTHER UNDERSTANDING ON BASIS OF ASSUMPTIONS. THIS HAD BEEN MAJOR FAULT OF 1957 ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD COMMITTED MUCH OF WORLD BUT NOT EGYPT.

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-2- USUN 5845, 220455Z JUNE 67

ISRAELI OFFICIALS WOULD LIKE TO REACH TREATY ON THE BASIS OF THIS
INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING THAT SYRIA KILLS
ISRAELI CIVILIANS AND SHOULD BE DEMILITARIZED. ISRAELI
WOULD LIKE TO AGREE THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT USE RETURNED
TERRITORY FOR PURPOSE OF DIVERSION OF JORDAN WATERS AWAY FROM
ISRAEL. EBAN NOTED THAT SYRIANS WOULD DIVERT THESE WATERS NOW
BECAUSE ISRAELI HOLD ESSENTIAL TERRITORY. EBAN CONCLUDED THAT
ISRAEL HAS OFFERED BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO
DETERMINE BOUNDARIES. THESE TERMS NOT UNGENEROUS.

PAGE 3 RUEHDT 5845 S E C R E T

GAZA. EBAN NOTED THAT EGYPT HAD NEVER CLAIMED GAZA, HAD NOT
ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPYING IT, OR FOR THE REFUGEES.
THE NATURAL THING WAS FOR GAZA TO BE IN ISRAEL. ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE
EVERY EFFORT ON BEHALF OF GAZA POPULATION WHICH TOTALLED OVER 350,000
PEOPLE. THIS PLUS ISRAEL'S PRESENT ARAB POPULATION WOULD BRING
TOTAL ARABS IN ISRAEL TO ABOUT 700,000. ISRAELIS WONDERED WHETHER
SOME COULD NOT BE SETTLED ELSEWHERE, E.G. NORTHERN PART OF SINAI,
"CENTRAL PALESTINE" OR WEST BANK OF JORDAN. ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE
TO MAINTAIN STATUS OF UNRWA AS SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE TO THESE
PEOPLE.

WEST BANK OF JORDAN. EBAN SAID ISRAELI THINKING "LESS CRYSTALIZED"
RE WEST BANK. THEY WERE STILL WORKING ON BASIS TWO TENDENCIES
TWO CONCEPTIONS IN GOI. ONE TENDENCY ASSUMED THAT THE PEOPLE
OF JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT AN AGREED SETTLEMENT ON
THE BASIS OF THE DEMARCATION LINE SHOULD BE WORKED OUT. ANOTHER
IDEA WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE
WEST BANK AND ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY AND ECONOMIC UNION.
THE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS LATTER APPROACH, SAID EBAN, WAS THAT IT
WOULD PUSH HUSSEIN BACK ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER. MOREOVER, THERE
WERE NO INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS FOR SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT.

THE SECRETARY INTERPOSED BY WONDERING WHETHER THERE WERE NOT
PRECEDENTS ON THE BASIS OF LETTING THE PEOPLE CONCERNED DECIDE.
EBAN REPLIED THAT GOI WAS TRYING TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON THE

PAGE 4 RUEHDT 5845 S E C R E T

INTELLIGENCE LEVEL. THERE WERE SOME "SERIOUS" ARAB LEADERS ON
WEST BANK WHO FELT THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH EAST JORDAN HAD

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-1- USNH 5845, 220455Z JUNE 67

BEEN ARTIFICIAL AND HAD PROVIDED THEM NO SECURITY. OTHERS HAD HASSLEFREE LOYALTIES.

SECRETARY INQUIRED IF THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT EGYPTIAN MILITARY PRESENCE AT SINAI WHAT WOULD BE SITUATION IN THE NEGEV? EBAN POINTED OUT THAT UNTIL REEF REMOVED THERE HAD BEEN THE SLENDEREST MILITARY PRESENCE POSSIBLE IN THE SOUTH OF ISRAEL.

SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS HELPFUL TO HAVE THESE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS. HE WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER DOCTRINE OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN ALSO APPLIED TO AIR PASSAGE. EBAN FELT THAT DOCTRINE WOULD APPLY, IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RE AIR TRANSIT, EXCEPT IN TIMES OF WAR. SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND WEST BANK MIGHT NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BRING TRANS-JORDAN INTO SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT. HE REALIZED ISRAELIS WERE ANGRY AT HUSSEIN BUT ADVISED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT SELL HIM SHORT. EBAN ADMITTED THAT ISRAELI'S FIRST REACTION HAD BEEN TO WRITE HUSSEIN OFF BUT THEY NOW HEARD THAT HUSSEIN WAS BEING PROPERLY CONTRITE.

SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE TWO POINTS:

1. REFUGEES. WE CONTINUED TO GET BAD INFORMATION ON THE REFUGEE

PAGE 5 RUENOT 5845 S E C R E T

SITUATION. APPARENTLY SEVERAL THOUSAND ARABS PER DAY CONTINUE TO LEAVE ISRAEL. IT WOULD BE A GREAT TRAGEDY IF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS RE-CREATED. OUR INFORMATION DOES NOT AGREE WITH ISRAELI'S STATEMENTS ON THIS MATTER. EBAN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM (WHO HAPPENED TO BE HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW) ON THIS POINT. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL BE LESS RIGOROUS IN ITS PROCESS OF SCREENING OF PEOPLE WHO LEFT THE WEST BANK DURING THE HOSTILITIES AND NOW WISH TO RETURN. HE FELT THAT ISRAEL COULD TAKE SOME GRANCES IN THIS RESPECT AND THAT WORLD OPINION WOULD PRESS ISRAEL VERY HARD ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION.

2. JERUSALEM. SECRETARY HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AS IT INVOLVED ACTUAL OR LATENT PASSIONS OF AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF PEOPLE. THE MATTER WAS VERY DELICATE AND COULD BE A SOURCE OF STRONG ANTI-ISRAEL FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES. EBAN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO PUT THE CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES UNDER CHRISTIAN CONTROL AND THE MOSLEM HOLY PLACES UNDER MOSLEM CONTROL. EBAN ADMITTED THAT ISRAEL HAD A JOB TO DO IN PROJECTING PUBLICLY ITS INTENTIONS REGARDING ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES.

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SECRET

-4- USUN 5845, 220455Z JUNE 67

LEAD REFERRED TO REQUEST OF SOVIET REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. HE AGREED THAT FULL REPLACEMENT MIGHT TAKE A YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL'S OWN AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES WERE LOW. ISRAEL HAD LOST 42 PLANES IN HOSTILITIES. THIS HAD LED TO GOV REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESENT CONTRACT TO SUPPLY SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIETS INTENDED TO REPLENISH FULLY ARAB INVENTORIES OR TO MAKE A MORE HONEST GESTURE. SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT FROM GROMYKO IF THERE WAS ANY SOVIET INTEREST IN SOME ARMS LIMITATION. SECRETARY NOTED THAT THIS WAS ISSUE AFFECTING WHOLE AREA AND THAT HE WERE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FOR ARMS FROM FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES.

RUSK
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:44 A.M., JUNE 22.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:44 A.M.

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-4- USUN 5845, 220455Z JUNE 67

EDAN RETURNED TO REPORTS OF SOVIET REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. HE AGREED THAT FULL REPLACEMENT MIGHT TAKE A YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL'S OWN AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES WERE LOW. ISRAEL HAD LOST 42 PLANES IN HOSTILITIES. THIS HAD LED TO GOI REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESENT CONTRACT TO SUPPLY SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIETS INTENDED TO REPLENISH FULLY ARAB INVENTORIES OR TO MAKE A MORE HONEST GESTURE. SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT FROM GROMYKO IF THERE WAS ANY SOVIET INTEREST IN SOME ARMS LIMITATION. SECRETARY NOTED THAT THIS WAS ISSUE AFFECTING WHOLE AREA AND THAT WE WERE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FOR ARMS FROM FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES.

RUSK
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NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:44 A.M., JUNE 22.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:44 A.M.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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TO: PRES ☒ FROM: ELIOT ☐ U ☐ LOG IN/OUT ONLY ☐

KISSINGER ☒ ROGERS, W ☐ LOU ☐ NO FORN ☐ NODIS ☒

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TS ☐ CODE WORD ☐ RES DATA ☐

SENSITIVE ☐

SUBJECT: *RUSK-EBAN Conversation -- June 22, 1967*

REFERENCE: S/S ☐ OTHER ☐ NOT XEROXED ☐

APPT'S: PRES ☐ HAK ☐ TALKER ☐ MEMCON ☐ DATE REQ. ☐

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION REQUIRED

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| ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | | |
| STAFF SECRETARY | | | |
| FAR EAST | | | |
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| LATIN AMERICA | | | |
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| LR PLANNING | | | |
| PROGRAM ANALYSIS | | | |
| NSC PLANNING | | | |
| CONGRESSIONAL | | | |

MEMO FOR HAK ☐

MEMO FOR PRES. ☐

REPLY FOR ☐ SIGNATURE ☐

FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ☐

MEMO ☐ TO ☐

RECOMMENDATIONS ☐

JOINT MEMO ☐

REFER TO STATE ☐

ANY ACTION NECESSARY ☐

CONCURRENCE ☐

DUE DATE: ☐

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23181

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRETOCT 29 1970
October 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: C. Fred Bergsten

SUBJECT: Follow Up With the Israelis on Our Aid Package for Them

After you informed Ambassador Rabin last week of the President's decision to seek \$500 million of aid for Israel under the Jackson Amendment, the Ambassador sent his Economic Minister to follow up with me on the details.

Attached is a complete memcon. The highlights were:

- I informed the Israelis of the terms under which we hoped to extend the \$500 million.
- We planned to seek the appropriation shortly after the Congress reconvened.
- We were not optimistic about springing the Foreign Military Sales Act from the deadlock caused by the Cooper-Church Amendment.
- We regarded this decision as meeting all of Israel's assistance needs for FY 1971, and were thus shelving their requests for additional assistance through other channels.
- This included a shelving of their proposal to transfer to Israel some of our German offset bonds; we would not rule out the eventuality for all time, but it raised major problems and was at the bottom of our list of possibilities, even for the future.
- We would reconsider a new issue which they raised: Israel's ineligibility to compete for aid procurement under our recent decision to untie aid lending for procurement in the lower income countries. (We classified Israel for this purpose as a developed country.)

The Israelis indicated a great interest in continuing to see me to discuss economic issues. Hal Saunders thinks it is a good idea, and I assume that it is consistent with your desires for our relations with Israel. I will therefore keep up the contacts, as they request them, unless you tell me

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22931

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

October 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: C. Fred Bergsten

SUBJECT: Israeli Proposal for Transfer to Israel of
German Offset Bonds

*My not state
- otherwise
Sunday*

OCT 20 1970 *AK*

At your request, I have investigated this issue -- which the Israelis had been raising for over a year -- in an effort to develop a definitive U.S. posture.

The Israelis want us to transfer to them the \$250 million loaned to us by the German Government under the 1969-71 offset agreement. The loan is for ten years at low rates of interest. The Israelis would use the money to purchase goods in the United States, and would probably repay the Germans directly. Such a deal would not require Congressional action, and this is obviously one of the major Israeli motives in pursuing it.

My "definitive" conclusion is that no definitive position need be taken at this time, pending Congressional action on the proposed request to Congress for an appropriation of \$500 million under the Jackson Amendment. If this appropriation is passed, all of their needs for additional external financing will admittedly be met for this year.

The only present contingencies under which I can envisage the need to seriously consider the offset option are if Congress refuses to appropriate the full amount requested, or if next year we felt constrained from making such a request by our own

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CONFIDENTIAL

budgetary limits and therefore wanted to help meet Israel's needs without affecting our budget.

Even if one of these contingencies were to develop, however, the offset transfer suggestion would still raise major problems:

-- The money belongs to Germany, and Germany would have to propose (or at least approve) the transfer. There is serious doubt about their willingness to do so, in view of their ongoing concern about potential additional Arab recognitions of the GDR. They would be particularly sensitive about an offset transfer at this time, in view of the clear link between additional aid to Israel and the Middle East hostilities.

-- The value which we place on offsets with Germany would be sharply undermined if we turned over \$250 million of the proceeds to another country, thus sharply increasing the difficulties of future offset negotiations with Germany.

-- Our offset agreements have always been under severe domestic criticism for being gimmicky and not really helpful to the U.S. balance of payments. The proposed transfer would justifiably add to this criticism, since the Israelis would use the proceeds to pay for items we would sell to them anyway. The transfer would thus simply represent export financing for goods that might otherwise have produced cash payments to the U.S., therefore hurting rather than helping our balance of payments in the short run.

There are answers to all of these points, though they are not very convincing and we might have to apply a fair amount of pressure to the Germans to get them to play. I would not rule out the idea completely, but I would place it near the bottom of our array of options for providing financing to Israel. (The Israelis,

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incidentally, have covered the waterfront: they have sought additional Export-Import Bank loans, additional PL-480, and supporting assistance from AID as well as the offset transfer and straightforward DOD sales and grants.)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

I therefore recommend the following position for at least the present, which I could convey informally to the agencies and the Israelis, if you approve. The Israelis are anxious for a reply, so I would appreciate your early approval or comments. The position is agreed by State, Treasury and Defense:

1. There is no need to consider the proposed offset transfer now, in view of the President's decision on overall U.S. assistance to Israel.

2. The proposal raises major problems and the U.S. is therefore dubious about it on its merits.

3. If we wished to provide assistance to Israel and were at some point in the future constrained either by our own budgetary problem or by Congressional difficulties, however, then we might consider the offset transfer possibility.

Approve HK

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: H. Saunders
H. Sonnenfeldt

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN



The Israeli Ambassador visited me with the head of El Al to plead for additional landing rights in the United States. The plea was persuasively put in terms of the overall needs of Israel.

After expressing highest regard for Israel and the concern for its economic need, I pointed out that both our international airlines are losing money. I pointed out also that on a strictly bilateral basis, Israel carries considerably more than its proportionate share of the traffic between the United States and Israel. I concluded by indicating that this disadvantage to our international airlines, the two major ones of which are in serious financial difficulty, would make consideration of the request most difficult.

I strongly urge that this request be denied, and that we continue to view air routes on an economic bilateral basis. Only in this way have we any hope of seeing TWA's international routes and Pan Am regain profitability.

cc: Fred Bergsten
Secor Browne

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

C
INFORMATION 24965
[Ref. 24868]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

January 20, 1971

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Munitions for Israel

You will recall my memo to you in San Clemente [Tab B] informing you that the Israelis had asked Defense for 5,000 cluster bomb units [CBUs] to permit them to undertake a new tactic to deal with Egyptian artillery along the Suez in the event of a breakdown in the cease-fire. I indicated that Mr. Packard would be writing to you about the sale. At that point in time, Defense had recommended to him that the weapons be provided.

At Tab A is the expected memorandum for you from Mr. Packard advising that Defense has reviewed and approved the sale of the 5,000 CBUs towards the implementation of the new Israeli tactic which Packard terms "less provocative" than others used by the Israelis. He notes that this package is subject to the same restrictions as placed on our earlier sales of these weapons [in August and November].

No action on your part is required.

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SECRET

24965



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

9 JAN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Providing Israel Additional CBU's

This is to advise you that we have reviewed and approved the sale of 5,000 Cluster Bomb Units (CBU's) to Israel. The Israelis requested these weapons because of their concern that harassment of military formations along the Suez Canal by Egyptian artillery would resume should the ceasefire break down. Israel also understands that the equipment in the recently approved anti-missile package can not provide a high confidence means of attriting surface to air missiles, (SAM's), particularly the more advanced models that have been introduced into the UAR. As you know, we have little hardware at the present which can effectively counter the advanced SAM's.

According to the Israelis, the CBU's would be employed either in a campaign of attrition or for a one time hit against the entire line of Egyptian artillery. They believe the severity of damage and the casualty rate would be so severe that Cairo would not continue the artillery bombardment. The use of the CBU's in this manner would provide a relatively effective counteraction against Egyptian artillery with a minimum of risk to Israel's aircraft.

The planned tactic is for the CBU's to be tossed into the Egyptian gun sites along the Canal with the Israeli aircraft having little or no exposure to the SAM's protecting the guns and avoiding actual penetration of UAR territory. This is a less provocative tactic than those previously followed by the Israelis.

The sale of the CBU's is subject to the same limitations on their use as were attached to our earlier sale of these weapons.

A handwritten signature, likely of David Packard, is located at the bottom right of the page. The signature is written in dark ink and is somewhat stylized.

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SECRET

January 12, 1971

MILITARY CREDIT FUNDING FOR ISRAEL
FY 1972

Section 501 (the Jackson Amendment) of the Defense Procurement Act provided authorization for the appropriation of funds for Israel in the aid supplemental for FY 1971. \$500 million was requested and appropriated. The Jackson Amendment, which does not define amounts, remains in effect until September 1972.

The issue now is whether:

1. to request funding for military credit for Israel in the FY 1972 request wholly under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) component of the new Security Assistance Program or

2. to request funding under both the FMS authority and the Jackson Amendment.

The arguments that have been made for initial funding exclusively under FMS are as follows:

1. The Jackson Amendment was an unusual funding device resorted to in a year when the Foreign Military Sales legislation was tied up in House-Senate Conference by the Cooper-Church impasse. Senator Jackson recognized this fact. Because of the impasse, the Senate Armed Services committee gave its approval to the Jackson Amendment, which was not proposed at the initiative of the Executive Branch. It was then endorsed by the full congress through the legislative process. However, there is at present no foreseeable need to fund the Israeli program in an abnormal manner this year. If the new FMS authorization gets tied up, the Jackson Amendment will still be available (until September 1972) as a fallback. No doors will be closed by going the FMS route.

2. The President has decided that in FY 1972 we will proceed on the basis of a new coordinated Security Assistance Program. Going the Jackson route for Israel would make its success more difficult.

--Pulling part of the Israeli program out of the new Security Assistance Program would deprive the new program of popular support, thereby jeopardizing funding for Cambodia and other key countries. The concept of linking requests was successful in the FY 1971 supplemental.

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs.
EO 12958 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

10 JUL 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

SANITIZED

These two documents provide an unusual insight to the motives and anxieties of Israel in the months leading to the present crisis; I am certain they remain central issues to Israel's current position.

During this period - 1966 and 1967 -- Israel's attention was focused on the implications of the imminent British withdrawal from Aden in early 1968.

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The British government had announced it was leaving Aden; the Egyptian army in the Yemen was positioned to seize Aden and threaten Saudi Arabia; the Soviet Union would follow the Egyptians into the Peninsula and the Gulf; the balance of power and stability in the region was threatened.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 62-40/3 123.3(6)(6) 6-19-07

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 9-7-07

15 pages

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